Center for a New American Security

With things improving in Basra, the debate has resumed about British vs. U.S. COIN tactics in Iraq. For a long time, the Brits claimed they were operating in a very different environment down south from the Yanks in the central and northern parts of the country. But with the Basra offensive, the American and British models seemed to be tested in the same laboratory. The early post-mortem is shaping up something like this: the Brits were too soft and accommodating, which led to the take-over of Basra by criminal gangs and Iranian-backed militias, while the Iraqi Army (with critical U.S. support) went in hard and the gangs ran away. Poof, presto, things got better . . . and it's all because the Coalition moved away from the British model. True? The Brits don't think so. They argue that, regardless of the merits of their earlier approach, what facilitated the recent success was the British decision to pull out of the center of Basra, pushing the Iraqi Army into the lead. So it is the Iraqi face on the operations, not the doctrine.

Who is right? Dr. iRack thinks its too soon to tell. But as readers ponder the question, check out this good piece in today's NYT.