Center for a New American Security

In a recent LAT op-ed, Max Boot attempts to diagnose some of the reasons the SOFA talks aren't going so well, and then he concludes with:

[I]n order to reach an accord, the U.S. will need to do a better job of diplomacy -- never a strong suit of this administration. The Iraqis, for their part, will have to overcome the intoxication produced by recent victories and come to a realistic appraisal that they will need substantial American support for years to come. [Hat tip to American Footprints for tagging this op-ed, and giving Dr. iRack a shout-out.]

That's it. Just "better" diplomacy. To be fair, Boot argues that U.S. negotiators should offer a few small face-saving concessions at the tactical level (e.g., joint procedures for processing detainees), but he offers no strategy that would improve the prospects of a bilateral deal that would benefit both countries.

Why not? It's not because Boot isn't smart enough--it is the ideological position he subscribes to, and the associated analytical blinders this position creates. Boot is basically perplexed: "[W]hy are Iraqi leaders trying to hinder the very military operations that have been making their country safer and thus strengthening their own authority?" Those silly Iraqis, they're trying to grab defeat from the jaws of victory by forcing us to leave!

This sentiment tracks with an emerging narrative among Boot's buddies, like the Kagans and Charles Krauthammer, who now claim that we're so close to "winning" that and the only way we can lose is if we start to withdraw. Consider this from the WSJ editorial page:

[A] permanent U.S. military presence – albeit one reduced over time – would give Iraqis the confidence to continue their political maturation. Another Iraq national election is scheduled for next year, and it is an opportunity for democracy to put down even deeper roots. It's crucial for Americans to understand that, apart from the Sadrists, all factions of Iraqi politics now support some kind of U.S.-Iraq status of forces agreement to succeed the U.N. mandate that expires later this year.

We are winning in Iraq. Indeed, we can now say with certainty that we will win, as long as we don't repeat our earlier mistakes and seek to draw down too soon [emphasis added].

So, in the context of near-victory, this crowd simply can't fathom why the Iraqis would try to screw things up by thwarting a SOFA that is required to authorize the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq in 2009 and beyond.

But the truth of the matter is that it is difficult to see a way forward in current negotiations if one starts from the premise that the entire goal of the talks is to allow the United States the maximum amount of "freedom of action" in Iraq and the largest possible troop presence for as long as we want.

As Dr. iRack wrote yesterday, even the Maliki government--which probably, deep down, wants a long-term bilateral security relationship--is uncomfortable with this position, because it is a blow to Iraqi sovereignty--creating, at the very least, a political "marketing" problem in the face of rising national sentiment and impending provincial elections. According to the WaPo:

The Bush administration's Iraq policy suffered two major setbacks Friday when Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki publicly rejected key U.S. terms for an ongoing military presence and anti-American Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr called for a new militia offensive against U.S. forces. . . .

The moves by two of Iraq's most powerful Shiite leaders underscore how the presence of U.S. troops has become a central issue for Iraqi politicians as they position themselves for provincial elections later this year. Iraqis across the political spectrum have grown intolerant of the U.S. presence, but the dominant Shiite parties -- including Maliki's Dawa party -- are especially fearful of an electoral challenge from new, grass-roots groups.

"All the politicians are trying to prove that they care more about Iraqis than they do about Americans -- otherwise they know the people and the voters will not support them," said Ala Maaki, a senior lawmaker with Iraqi's largest Sunni political party. "I think we could see al-Maliki and Moqtada Sadr trying to one-up the other today and see who can take the strongest stand against the Americans."

Moreover, because Maliki et al. are increasingly overconfident that they can police Iraq all by themselves, and the Bush administration has done a great job of convincing the Iraqi government that we need them more than they need us (because our support to Maliki, at the strategic level, is effectively unconditional), the current Iraqi ruling coalition believes they have all the leverage. This shouldn't be the case. After all, Boot is right when he corrects the false impression that the ISF is ready to go it alone:

In reality, while Iraqi troops are becoming much more capable, they still rely on U.S. assistance for key "enablers" such as logistics, surveillance, communications and air support. Without that help, which is coordinated by U.S. advisors embedded with Iraqi units, Iraqi security forces -- no matter how brave and dedicated -- would be hard put to operate successfully against such hardened terrorists as Al Qaeda and the extremist Shiite factions known as "special groups." American troops also serve a vital function as a buffer between sectarian groups still suspicious of one another.

It's true that fewer American combat troops are needed. . . . But the contributions of U.S. logistics people, advisors, air crews, intelligence collectors and other specialists continue to be as important as ever. It will be years before the Iraqis are able to take over some of these functions.

So, how can we make diplomacy more effective?

1. Address the nationalist backlash. The negotiation of a new bilateral U.S.-Iraq security framework should be occurring within the context of negotiating a time horizon for the departure of U.S. forces from Iraq. Not immediately; not irresponsibly. But a clear signal that the trajectory is set for the U.S. leaving (combined with a firm commitment to not to have "permanent" or otherwise "enduring" bases in Iraq) would help alleviate some anxieties among the Iraqi public and lawmakers, and give the Iraqi leadership a stronger hand in deflecting criticism from the Sadrists and Iran. This is something Boot and his clan doesn't get (or aren't willing to admit). At the same time . . .

2. Convince the Iraqi government that they are not yet ready, militarily, to go it alone. This can be done by showing them (repeatedly) the facts regarding operations in Basra, Sadr City, and Mosul--that is, evidence that without U.S.-provided critical enablers, these operations would have failed. It could also be done at the tactical level by withholding or slow-rolling some U.S. support here or there and, if the ISF falls flat, using that as evidence to strengthen the argument. These steps will increase U.S. leverage in bargaining for some type of agreement by helping convince the Iraqi leadership that they still need us, but it will only work if we . . .

3. Make U.S. commitments to continue supporting the Iraqi government conditional. Promises of residual support to the Iraqi government--including leaving a robust residual U.S. presence, for a while, to deter external aggression, continue to target terrorists, and prevent a coup; training, advising, equipping, logistical, air, intelligence, and other forms of support to the ISF; continued support in building the governance capacity of Iraqi ministries; continued support in renegotiating external debt obligations and encouraging foreign investment; and continued efforts to gain more support from Iraq's neighbors--should be made conditional on the Iraqi government continuing to move toward political accommodation and improved governance. Deep down, these are all things the Iraqi government wants (if you don't believe Dr. iRack, look at the November 2007 "Declaration of Principles for a Long-term Relationship of Cooperation and Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America."), so we should be using them for leverage.

Look, Dr. iRack knows that these recommendations are not foolproof. Maliki's government could call our bluff and cave into the delusion that they don't need us. If so, it's not clear why we should be supporting the government anyway. They don't need us? Fine. They want us to leave? Fine, we'll leave. But Dr. iRack doubts it will go down like this. More likely, negotiations that included a timeline for a U.S. draw down would give the Iraqi government more than enough "face saving" material to ward off the nationalists, while giving them a path to secure a bilateral agreement with the United States that protects the long-term interests of the Iraqi state. They would still have to give us something (continued progress toward political accommodation), but if they won't do that, we shouldn't be supporting them anyway.

All this said, Dr. iRack doesn't think there's any prospect the Bush administration will wake up and follow his advice. They share all the ideological blinders that Boot, the Kagans, Krauthammer, and the WSJ exemplify. So, the best outcome would be stalled SOFA/SFA talks that lead to a reluctant renewal of the UNSCR. This would pass the negotiations along to the next administration so they could actually deploy a diplomatic approach that might work.