Center for a New American Security

As I’m sure most readers noticed, President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki agreed to include a “time horizon” for withdrawing U.S. troops from Iraq as part of the bilateral strategic framework currently under negotiation. . . or did they?

This is what the written statement from Bush's Press Secretary said:

In the context of these improving political, economic, and security conditions, the President and the Prime Minister discussed the ongoing negotiations to establish a normalized bilateral relationship between Iraq and the United States. The leaders agreed on a common way forward to conclude these negotiations as soon as possible, and noted in particular the progress made toward completing a broad strategic framework agreement that will build on the Declaration of Principles signed last November, and include areas of cooperation across many fields, including economics, diplomacy, health, culture, education, and security.

In the area of security cooperation, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that improving conditions should allow for the agreements now under negotiation to include a general time horizon for meeting aspirational goals -- such as the resumption of Iraqi security control in their cities and provinces and the further reduction of U.S. combat forces from Iraq. The President and Prime Minister agreed that the goals would be based on continued improving conditions on the ground and not an arbitrary date for withdrawal. The two leaders welcomed in this regard the return of the final surge brigade to the United States this month, and the ongoing transition from a primary combat role for U.S. forces to an overwatch role, which focuses on training and advising Iraqi forces, and conducting counter-terror operations in support of those forces.

This transition and the subsequent reduction in U.S. forces from Iraq is a testament to the improving capacity of Iraq's Security Forces and the success of joint operations that were initiated under the new strategy put in place by the President and the Prime Minister in January 2007.

“A general time horizon for meeting aspirational goals." Seriously? That’s the best they could do. That phraseology ranks right up there with "WMD-related program activities."

No, seriously, what does the time horizon actually mean? The administration is adamant that it does not imply a fixed timetable . . . or even necessarily a withdrawal. According the NYT:

The White House offered no specifics about how far off any “time horizon” would be, with officials saying details remained to be negotiated. Any dates cited in an agreement would be cast as goals for handing responsibility to Iraqis, and not specifically for reducing American troops, said a White House spokesman, Gordon D. Johndroe. . . .

On the prospect of dates for American withdrawals, Mr. Johndroe, the White House spokesman, said that the agreement would not prescribe American troop levels over time, but rather reflect a transition to Iraqi command. “The agreement will look at goal dates for transition of responsibilities and missions,” Mr. Johndroe said in an e-mail message. “The focus is on the Iraqi assumption of missions, not on what troop levels will be.”

The Iraqi government, however, described the agreement in somewhat different terms. The NYT continues:

Under pressure from political parties wanting a diminishing American role, Mr. Maliki began demanding something in the agreement that would make it clear that American troops were on the way out. Iraq’s statement on Friday, reflecting those internal sensitivities, referred more specifically than the American version to “a time frame for the complete transfer of the security responsibilities to the hands of the Iraqi security as preface to decrease the number of the American forces and withdraw them later from Iraq.”

In Baghdad, a member of Mr. Maliki’s Dawa Party, Ali al-Adeeb, said the withdrawal of American and other foreign forces was fundamental to an accord. “The Iraqi government considers the determination of a specific date for the withdrawal of foreign forces an important issue to deal with,” he said. “I don’t know what the American side thinks, but we consider it the core of the subject.”

Similarly, the Washington Post reported:

Iraqi government spokesman Ali Dabbagh confirmed in a statement that Iraq and the United States had agreed "to specify a time horizon to achieve a full handover of security responsibility to the Iraqi forces in order to decrease American forces and allow for its withdrawal from Iraq."

But Sadiq Rikabi, a senior political adviser to Maliki, said in an interview that negotiators were still hashing out the details of troop cuts. The Iraqi government, he said, wants specific timelines governing different stages of what will eventually become a full U.S. withdrawal of combat forces.

"There are two principles that determine the military relationship: no permanent bases and no permanent existence," Rikabi said. "In such a way, there should be a timetable for withdrawal."

So what explains the different interpretations? And if the Maliki government appears set on establishing some timetable, why did they sign on to a more ambiguous time horizon? Two possibilities suggest themselves:

1. The Iraqi leadership deep down wants a fixed timetable for a complete withdrawal, despite contradictory statements suggesting otherwise, but they were forced to agree to more ambiguous language by the Bush administration.

2. The Iraqi leadership actually wants the U.S. to transition to a support role and reduce its military footprint sooner rather than later, but it is not in favor of a fixed timetable or a complete withdrawal in the near to intermediate term. Nevertheless, to appease rising nationalist sentiment and sovereignty concerns in an Iraqi election year, the Maliki government wants to appear to be demanding some kind of schedule for U.S. withdrawal.

Explanation #2 seems much more likely given the recognition among many in Maliki’s coalition that they will require some residual military presence and support from the United States for several years to come.

If it is true, however, that the Iraqi leadership wants this kind of residual support, and this accounts for the nature of the agreement, Dr. iRack wants to know what the Bush administration demanded from Maliki in exchange for this commitment? Apparently zip, nada, nothing, zilch. So, yet again, the administration failed to exploit our rapidly diminishing leverage to extract concessions from the Maliki government on the political front that might actually help produce lasting stability in Iraq.

Why would the Bush administration pass up this opportunity? Because, to play this game right, the administration would have to be willing to pull U.S. support from the Iraqi government and leave if Iraqi leaders didn’t meet our conditions—something Bush has never been willing to do. Even worse, because the Bush administration is ideologically inclined to desire a long-term military presence (albeit at reduced levels) in Iraq, this sets up a negotiating situation in which the administration is basically begging the Iraqis to let us stay instead of trying to get them to convince us we shouldn’t leave. In short, the Bush administration’s entire approach appears tailor made to not only piss away our leverage, but to make sure that the Iraqis have leverage over us!

Update: Reuters reports that Maliki told a German magazine that he backs a 16-month timetable: "U.S. presidential candidate Barack Obama talks about 16 months. That, we think, would be the right timeframe for a withdrawal, with the possibility of slight changes." When asked if this meant he was siding with Obama over McCain, Maliki said it was not his place to tell people who to vote for, but "Whoever is thinking about the shorter term is closer to reality. Artificially extending the stay of U.S. troops would cause problems." Again, the key to interpreting comments like this is: what does the American presence, in Maliki's view, look like at the "end" of the 16 months? Is it zero? Maybe, but Dr. iRack doesn't think so. Regardless, Maliki is at the very least signaling that he would like to see most troops out in 2010, and the time horizon may be closer than we think. So, how will the next president, Obama or McCain, manage our inevitable draw down to get the most out of the Iraqis on the way out?

Update II: Based on a recent trip to Iraq, a new piece by Kim Kagan in the Weekly Standard concludes with this:

But even the most extreme of these hubristic Shia advisers [to Maliki] strongly favor a partnership with the United States. "Iraq is flying west," one of them told me over a dinner of rice, kabobs, and masghouf (a fish dish). The debate over the details of the military arrangements for 2009 has overshadowed a much more important point, he said, echoing the comments of the young people at the party headquarters we visited: Iraq wants American help of every kind. The security arrangements must be seen within the context of this larger partnership, he added. Like American politicians, of course, he and the rest of Iraq's leaders have to figure out how to sell any specific agreement to the parliament--and to the voters. That makes negotiations difficult, but it is also the strongest possible sign of hope in Iraq.

The whole purpose of the surge was to transform the conflict over power in Iraq from a military to a political struggle. We and the Iraqis have accomplished that goal--for now. But the most critical period in the birth of a new Iraq lies ahead. America can stand beside this fractious and sometimes violent young state whose people are now passionate about democracy. Or we can abandon them to their enemies, to their own fears and insecurities, and to the fragility of their months-old efforts at real reconciliation. It is a weighty choice, but not a hard one for anyone who has seen the vision of a possible future Iraq.

Yet by simplistically framing the issue as a choice between unconditional partnership and total abandonment, Kagan never asks herself: "OK, the Iraqis want us, they need us, so what should we get from them in return for this support?" That is the key political question for the next administration . . . and it is vital if the United States is to push Maliki et al. to make the difficult compromises necessary to lock-in the gains from the surge. The Kagans of the world don't (ever) see that. Instead, they simply use everything and its opposite to make the case that we should stay, forever, no strings attached.