Center for a New American Security

Talks over the SOFA, and the strategic framework agreement (SFA) that will be bundled along with it, remain contentious. Lets be clear on one thing: the current Iraqi leadership wants some kind of long-term partnership with the United States, including assurances that we will protect them against foreign invasion, continue to conduct counterterrorism operations, continue to train and support the ISF, continue to help them re-negotiate their debt obligations, etc. All of this is in the November 2007 "Declaration of Principles," signed by Bush and Maliki, which the SFA is meant to codify. What they bristle at--or at least see as a "marketing problem" with the Iraqi people--are the various immunities in the SOFA (for our troops and contractors--the latter of which has apparently been addressed) and prerogatives in the SOFA (such as control of Iraqi airspace, the right for U.S. troops to detain Iraqis, the right to conduct independent U.S. operations, basing rights, etc.). So think of this as a "sovereignty game." The Maliki government wants us to continue to help them with residual support--on their terms.

In this light, there have been some interesting recent developments:

• Iraqi foreign minister Zebari suggested that a long-term security deal may not be possible this year and American officials have suggested the same thing (Dr. iRack is hearing this from his sources too). But instead of re-upping the UNSCR, the Iraqi and U.S. governments may sign an "interim" bilateral pact that will expire after a year or two. Good idea. This would allow the next administration to (re)negotiatiate the agreement(s) instead of having a lame duck administration lock us into commitments:

• Maliki now suggests that the security deal(s) may include a timetable for U.S. withdrawal, either in the pact or as a separate memorandum of understanding. This reflects Maliki's newfound (over)confidence in the ISF as well as the growing Iraqi public sentiment against a long-term U.S.-Iraqi pact occurring outside the context of a time horizon for withdrawal.

So the Bush administration has an opportunity. They can put a time horizon into the pact and condition the residual support the Iraqi government dearly wants on continued political progress to lock-in recent security gains. Sounds like a viable "exit strategy" and a pathway to a reasonable, realistic definition of success. Doesn't mean the administration will seize this opportunity, of course.