Center for a New American Security

The BBC had an interesting story a few days ago about what Maliki "really" said regarding the need to set a timetables for withdrawal within the context of ongoing SOFA/SFA talks:

In an audio recording of his remarks, heard by the BBC, the prime minister did not use the word "withdrawal".

What he actually said was: "The direction is towards either a memorandum of understanding on their evacuation, or a memorandum of understanding on programming their presence."

Mr Maliki's own office had inserted the word "withdrawal" in the written version, replacing the word "presence".

Contacted by the BBC, the prime minister's office had no explanation for the apparent contradiction. An official suggested the written version remained the authoritative one, although it is not what Mr Maliki said.

The impression of a hardening Iraqi government line was reinforced the following day by comments from the National Security Adviser, Muwaffaq al-Rubaie.

He was quoted as saying that Iraq would not accept any agreement which did not specify a deadline for a full withdrawal of US troops.

Significantly, Mr Rubaie was speaking immediately after a meeting with the senior Shiite clerical eminence, Ayatollah Ali Sistani.

But in subsequent remarks, Mr Rubaie rode back from a straightforward demand for a withdrawal deadline.

He said the talks were focused on agreeing on "timeline horizons, not specific dates", and said that withdrawal timings would depend on the readiness of the Iraqi security forces.

Militant elements

The confusion reflects the dilemma facing Iraqi government leaders.

On the one hand, many of them - particularly among the Shia factions - face a public which regards the US presence as a problem rather than a solution.

With provincial elections coming up soon, they could be outflanked by more militant elements such as the supporters of cleric Moqtada Sadr, who wants American forces out now and opposes negotiations that would cover their continued presence.

Yet the government knows that its own forces are not yet in a position to stand on their own against the two major challenges they face - the Sunni radicals of al-Qaeda and related groups, and the militant Shia militias which were partly suppressed in fierce battles this spring in Basra and Baghdad.

Both groups could simply bide their time awaiting the American withdrawal before making a comeback drive.

Violence has fallen off considerably from the horrendous levels of 2006 and the first half of 2007, but hundreds of people are still dying violent deaths every month.

Hence the ambiguity in statements by Iraqi leaders, who know that their own survival depends on US support continuing until Iraqi forces are genuinely able to stand alone.

All of this seems to validate a number of points Dr. iRack has been making for some time now:

1. The Iraqi leadership knows that the Iraqi public continues to dislike the U.S. presence, and in an election year those concerns have to be accounted for.

2. The Iraqi leadership--Maliki in particular--is much more confident in the capabilities of the ISF, making them willing to bargain harder during negotiations.

3. Whether or not they want a timetable for withdrawal, they want a "time horizon" that establishes some parameters for the draw down of U.S. forces and the transition from a lead-U.S. role to a U.S. support role.

But . . .

4. Most Iraqi leaders recognize, deep down, that they will still need the U.S. to provide support and critical enablers to the ISF for a while to come even as the U.S. moves out of the lead in combat operations.

So, to repeat something Dr. iRack has long argued, we should be negotiating a security framework within the context of setting a time horizon for our draw down and transition to a support role while also conditioning residual support (including, critically, support to the ISF) on political accommodation. The administration may or may not be doing the former, but they are most definitely not doing the latter. They don't believe in strategic conditionality. And, as a consequence, we are giving up what little leverage we have left to push the Iraqis toward the kind of political compromises--on SoI integration, fair elections to co-opt moderate Sadrists and avoid alienating Sunni tribes, etc.--that are necessary to lock-in security gains from the surge.