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The British Military and Counterinsurgency
August 11, 2008 | Posted by Troy - 9:48am | 93 Comments
Picking up on Dr. iRack’s post below on the impact of British policy on the security situation in Basra, Britain’s much discussed competence in counterinsurgency has come under serious criticism recently. Speaking at an event last month, David Kilcullen knocked the early (2003-2004) British approach in Basra: “look at us we’re out on the street, [in] soft caps, and everyone loves us.” By 2006, in Kilcullen’s estimation, “the British army was defeated in the field in southern Iraq.” British operations in Afghanistan similarly failed to live up to the hype.
Daniel Marston, a former counterinsurgency instructor at Sandhurst argues that the British were not actually very well prepared for counterinsurgency operations as the outset. Instead of having deep institutional memory and competence for conducting small wars, there were “major problems with their pre-deployment training. There were a lot of problems with their education….the staff college had one day for counterinsurgency for majors. The RMA Sandhurst lieutenant’s course was a bit of a joke, bit of a video here and there.”
In fairness, there were a number of senior British officers, most notably General John Kisley who questioned whether or not the British Army really excelled at COIN to the degree they thought they did. Moreover, since suffering setbacks in both theaters, the British have undertaken a concerted bottom-up effort to re-learn counterinsurgency for the contemporary operating environment.
While Americans who are still sulky over the Aylwin-Foster critique would undoubtedly like to rub the Brits nose in it, it is worth taking a look at the impact operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have had on the British military. Keep in mind that, in terms of manpower and equipment, the British Army and RAF together are basically the size of the U.S. Marine Corps. Maintaining operations in both theaters has put a serious strain on the military. With only 50,000 deployable soldiers, present deployment cycles are estimated to lead to a crisis within 12-18 months. In an attempot to backstop the Army, the Royal Navy is planning its largest deployment on land in 50 years, sending 1,000 sailors to Helmand province in the fall to provide radio operators, drivers and medics.
Morale in the British armed forces is reported to be quite low and internal MoD surveys indicate that nearly half of all officers and men in the Army are considering resigning. This is compounded by a failure to meet recruiting targets. In addition to the operational tempo, resources for equipment and training are extremely scarce. Troy’s interlocutors have told him that, with the exception of funds for domestic counter-terrorism, the MoD is broke. (Though somehow that doesn’t prevent the Royal Navy from signing up to buy two aircraft carriers.) In one telling example, the military is so hard up for operational helicopters that they are considering renting them from third countries or perhaps Blackwater. Troy is not sure whether this should make you laugh or cry. Probably both…
Given the circumstances it is probably worth cutting the Brits a bit of slack…
Daniel Marston, a former counterinsurgency instructor at Sandhurst argues that the British were not actually very well prepared for counterinsurgency operations as the outset. Instead of having deep institutional memory and competence for conducting small wars, there were “major problems with their pre-deployment training. There were a lot of problems with their education….the staff college had one day for counterinsurgency for majors. The RMA Sandhurst lieutenant’s course was a bit of a joke, bit of a video here and there.”
In fairness, there were a number of senior British officers, most notably General John Kisley who questioned whether or not the British Army really excelled at COIN to the degree they thought they did. Moreover, since suffering setbacks in both theaters, the British have undertaken a concerted bottom-up effort to re-learn counterinsurgency for the contemporary operating environment.
While Americans who are still sulky over the Aylwin-Foster critique would undoubtedly like to rub the Brits nose in it, it is worth taking a look at the impact operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have had on the British military. Keep in mind that, in terms of manpower and equipment, the British Army and RAF together are basically the size of the U.S. Marine Corps. Maintaining operations in both theaters has put a serious strain on the military. With only 50,000 deployable soldiers, present deployment cycles are estimated to lead to a crisis within 12-18 months. In an attempot to backstop the Army, the Royal Navy is planning its largest deployment on land in 50 years, sending 1,000 sailors to Helmand province in the fall to provide radio operators, drivers and medics.
Morale in the British armed forces is reported to be quite low and internal MoD surveys indicate that nearly half of all officers and men in the Army are considering resigning. This is compounded by a failure to meet recruiting targets. In addition to the operational tempo, resources for equipment and training are extremely scarce. Troy’s interlocutors have told him that, with the exception of funds for domestic counter-terrorism, the MoD is broke. (Though somehow that doesn’t prevent the Royal Navy from signing up to buy two aircraft carriers.) In one telling example, the military is so hard up for operational helicopters that they are considering renting them from third countries or perhaps Blackwater. Troy is not sure whether this should make you laugh or cry. Probably both…
Given the circumstances it is probably worth cutting the Brits a bit of slack…
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