Center for a New American Security

The Khanaqin issue Iraqologist referred to in his AM guest post has escalated. Khanaqin is a majority-Kurdish district in northern Diyala occupied by peshmerga in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, and is consequently one of the “disputed” territories whose status is to be resolved along with Kirkuk’s according to Article 140. In the course of the recent military offensive in Diyala, the Iraqi Army tried to order the peshmerga to withdraw from Khanaqin and, at least according to Azzaman, vacate government buildings. The current situation appears to be a standoff, with the IA outside the city and the peshmerga refusing to withdraw.

Barzani’s office issued a statement saying it’s odd, since Khanaqin is a pretty safe place, that the IA would enter ostensibly to combat terrorism. Another prominent Kurdish official went on to claim that the “government mobilization” on Khanaqin was intended to preempt its resolution by 140. Then Maliki said that it was the “right of the army to enter any province or region in Iraq without exception” [emphasis added to highlight inflammatoriness]. Barzani responded by saying that the KRG was ready to “play cards it has never played before,” including withdrawing support from Maliki’s government.

From a constitutional standpoint (PDF here), Maliki unquestionably has the better argument. Article 110.2 is explicit in granting the central government the power to “formulate and execute national security policy,” while the best the Kurds have is Article 121.5, which grants regions only the right to the “establishment and organization of internal security forces.” There may be some legislation or CPA order to the contrary, but my reading of the legal situation is that the IA can surely enter Diyala at will and probably the KRG as well. This has just never been tested before, to my knowledge, since the Kurds have been a strong participant in every post-2003 central government. Keep in mind too that Kirkuk is in an almost identical situation: it’s not part of the KRG, but peshmerga (mostly PUK) keep the “peace” there. The only difference between Kirkuk and the other disputed territories is that annexing Kirkuk, via 140 or other means, would not require redrawing provincial boundaries.

The back story here is well-known. The Kurdish parties have been, from the beginning of the war, the most organized and strongest of all the Iraqi factions, most of the rest of the which were weak and divided. They’ve leveraged their relative strength to secure their long-term future vis a vis the rest of Iraq. In a highly non-inclusive process, they won a constitution that is extraordinarily decentralized by any standard and guarantees them de facto autonomy. The insertion of 140 itself would never have happened had the drafting process been at all representative of the rest of Iraq. In his memoir, Paul Bremer uses Barzani’s threat of secession to justify the dissolution of the Iraqi army. (Iraqologist doesn’t have the book on hand to check this reference, but hey, this is blogging!) While this disastrous decision is hardly solely Bremer or the Kurds’ fault, his account is indicative of the Kurds general MO the past five years.

While Kurdish separatism is currently having a disastrous effect on Iraqi stability, their motivations are understandable: they were in open conflict with and faced oppression from Baghdad for two decades preceding the invasion (and on and off before that). Looked at in the context of Iraqi history, they’re getting what they can, while they can. Their dominance in the current central government (at the moment threatening to come unglued) and their legal autonomy are a major victory for them, and totally without precedent in the history of Iraq. Getting hold of Kirkuk, Sinjar, Khanaqin, etc. is the next step in this broader effort. The difference now is that the Arabs are starting to get their act together.

The PUK/KDP had as a tactical ally in this effort ISCI, with whom their relationship goes back to at least 1992, not borne out of the exigencies of post-2003 politics as many assume. ISCI was a full partner in the drafting of the constitution, even though its own region-formation ambitions appear to have faded for now (pace Visser, and I’ll have another post on that soon). ISCI has supported Kurdish claims on Kirkuk, but since they no longer appear much interested in creating a balanced, symmetrical federalist system in Iraq, it has less strategic interest in taking this position. In other words, since ISCI appears committed to dominating Iraq from Baghdad, it’s not in their interest to be effectively ceding territory. They certainly don’t seem to be standing in the way of Maliki/IA’s recent agitation against the Kurds.

Perhaps more importantly, though Maliki has glommed himself onto ISCI in most respects, he is still his own man and does come from a much different ideological background. Iraqologist tends to explain current Iraqi politics in terms of money and power rather than ideology, but it may be worth pointing out here that Maliki has never been much of a fan of federalism (cf Visser). Even if that’s not convincing, his current much-discussed overconfidence and strongman ambitions should be enough evidence that he’s not about to give in to the Kurds, despite their being a pillar of his government. Arab Iraqis are getting pretty fed up with PUK/KDP territorial ambitions—especially after their obstructionism on the PEL—and he can get a lot of mileage out of this.

Anyway, the big point here is that the main ISCI/Kurd/Maliki bedrock alliance of the past two years is showing some strain. Iraqologist could go on and on speculating about the implications of this, how much is the result of chance (and the recent Maliki psychodrama) vs. how much it’s a consequence of the “center” emerging in Baghdad and how that affects calculations on all sides. He’ll save that for later posts—his inaugural post has become a marathon and does not bear the jaunty, refreshing blogging style to which he aspires. Better to leave these thoughts half-formed and get busy enjoying his holiday weekend.

All right, bring on the “Green Zone American” attacks!