Center for a New American Security

On Wednesday of last week, Prime Minister Maliki met with a group of satellite TV executives, gave 8 minutes of prepared remarks, and then took questions on a range of subjects for over an hour (PMO transcript here). It was all quite illuminating, particularly in regard to Maliki's strongly nationalist stance on the SOFA negotiations, federalism, and the Kurdish issue. There has been some English coverage of this event: readers should check out Reidar Visser's take on the federalist issue, plus the blog coverage about Maliki's offhand remark that US domestic politics played a role in setting the withdrawal timetable.

Maliki's prepared opening remarks are tough-sounding, nationalist, and very anti-federalist. His main point is that a strong central government is essential to protecting the country "both in terms of security as well as politically" and that excessive federalism works contrary to that goal. The "political" aspect is likely a reference to the political leverage the US and the Iraq's neighbors are able to exert thanks to Iraq's weakness and political division. He qualifies this stance on federalism (sort of) but takes a clear shot at those (like the Kurds and ISCI, without mentioning them by name) who have called for a broad devolution of power from the center:

"This does not mean a renunciation of federalism. Yes, we will establish federalism. However, we must say that the central government is stronger than the federal entities and that the federal entities are not stronger than the central government, as some think, with the central government only collecting and generating revenue and distributing it. This is how some see the central government, that it should be at this level of weakness. This contradicts the basic goal of building a strong state capable of defending itself."

In addition to the anti-federalism theme, he strikes the populist, veiled anti-US (or at least anti-foreign) chord throughout, particularly in his line referring to Iraq as "a targeted country in a targeted region."

Overall, the opening remarks are a proud defense of the assertion of central government power in warding off internal division and protecting Iraq from foreign interference. What's particularly interesting is Maliki's explanation of why he chose this theme for his opening remarks: "The subjects that could be raised in this meeting are many, but I think this speech, expressed to this extent, is the key to the other subjects crossing the minds of journalists, the satellite channels and reporters, and the public also wants to be aware of it." In other words, Maliki sees the state's being strong, undivided, and able to protect itself as the key to everything the journalists will likely ask him about: the SOFA negotiations, his actions against the Kurds, his stance toward the Awakenings, and so forth, i.e. everything people keep citing as evidence for his "strongman" ambitions. This is Maliki the nationalist in full flower.

The brunt of the Q&A that follows is about the SOFA negotiations. Maliki goes to great lengths to deflect criticism of his office's over-involvement in the process and his sidelining of the former team, which had a number of high-ranking Kurdish officials. He stresses that the Iraqi COR will get final say on the matter and nothing will happen secretly, so he's not monopolizing the process. As a particular dig at the Kurds, and speaking the language of disgruntled Iraqi nationalists, he says that the members of the team were chosen "on the basis of professionalism, not on a quota basis." The word quota (muhasasa) is always used by Iraqis when decrying the post-2003 system of government in Iraq in which, at least so far, high-level leadership positions have been allocated according to sect and ethnicity. In other words, he's saying, "We are one Iraq, and the Kurds don't get to be part of the negotiating team just by virtue of their being Kurds. There is no special dispensation for their views on these issues." This is a big deal.

As for the substance of the agreement, he gives the withdrawal dates that have been widely reported: June 2009 out of the cities, all forces out by the end of 2011, although he leaves a little wiggle room for training and air support, to be determined at the end of 2011, should the Iraqi government decide they are needed. (Yes, Maliki appears to be dictating terms to the US.) Maliki adds an interesting tidbit--currently all the rage in the blogosphere--claiming that the original date was the end of 2010, but that the Americans negotiated an additional year because of domestic political reasons.* Maliki depicts the primary remaining sticking point as the immunity for forces issue, with both the Iraqi and American sides refusing to budge. He himself does explicitly say that anywhere else in the world that the US has forces, they do not fall under host-country jurisdiction, thus highlighting the toughness of the Iraqi stance and simultaneously leaving the door open to back away from this demand later.

According to Maliki, as it stands now, the Iraqis have given their demands to the Americans, gave them two weeks to respond which have now passed, and they're still waiting to hear back. If the agreement doesn't get signed in time, Maliki says, the Iraqis will go back to the UN to get them to extend Chapter 7. However, he speculates that, because of the Georgia dispute with the Americans, the Russians won't vote to extend it, and in any event, the Iraqis are going to present their same conditions to the UN, in which case the Americans will use their veto. In this case, the year will come to an end and "the American forces will be without legal cover and will have no other choice but to withdraw immediately or stay and be in violation of international law. This is not possible and would be an embarrassment to both sides."

Overall, it looks to Iraqologist like Maliki may be trying to shape public opinion toward acceptance of the agreement. First off, Maliki's account of the SOFA negotiations is basically that the US has caved on every single demand, and the only remaining sticking point--immunity of forces--is something everyone knows the US will never give. (Even to be in the position to be demanding it is a sign of success!) Who could reject such a heroically won, Iraq-favorable agreement? It's like he's trying to out-nationalist the nationalists in the COR and in the public. Maliki also talks up the consequences of not getting an agreement signed. His account may be a lot of stagecraft and PR, which the US--who really wants to get this thing signed as well--may not object to.

Regardless, getting this agreement through the COR is going to be tough. The issue is not so much the withdrawal timetables themselves (June 2009 and December 2011), which are pretty short. Most Iraqis want the US out, but don't want an abrupt withdrawal that could destabilize Iraq. What most Iraqis really don't want is anything that smacks of a long-term US military presence in the country. Thus, in the COR debate, much will depend on how the post-2011 US support presence is described in the agreement. This debate is also going to be complicated by the fairly strict time limit imposed on it by the expiration of Chapter 7 on 12/31/08. Considering how fraught with peril the approach of getting COR approval is, Iraqologist wonders how sincere Maliki is in his stated intention to follow through with it.

In any event, Iraqologist has gone on too long (again). Interested readers should check out the rest of the Q&A, where Maliki gets into a range of political subjects, including the SoIs and the Kurdish issue (although he doesn't say anything too surprising on these matters.) In conclusion, suffice it to say, if you want a good example of what Maliki's famous nationalism and confidence look like, this press conference is it.

*Readers of Arabic will note that the OSC translation that the bloggers are using is not quite faithful to the Arabic transcript issued by the Prime Minister's Office. The Arabic says that the Americans requested a change "due to political circumstances" full stop, not "due to political circumstances related to the domestic situation." However, taken in context, there's really no other possible interpretation than that Maliki is referring to US political circumstances. This is either a case of the OSC translator extrapolating (to which Iraqologist, with his own liberal translations, is quite sympathetic!) or the PMO altering the transcript slightly after the event. But again, the fact that Maliki is talking about US politics is clear.