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We are Not Winning in Afghanistan...And Times is Running Out
September 11, 2008 | Posted by Kip - 8:25am | 7 Comments
These were the words yesterday of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen.
He also said that while victory is becoming more elusive, we still can win.
At the same time, the President and Chiefs announced that 4500 additional troops will be sent this winter. Kip, however, doesn't quite understand the math as the 24 Marine Expeditionary Unit is being withdrawn and replaced with a single battalion of Marines and an Army brigade (whether the Brigade will serve in Farah and Helmand or elsewhere, Kip isn't sure). This seems like an actual addition of just over 2000 troops rather than 4500 from current force levels (if someone reads it differently, feel free to correct in the comments, and I'll update).
This would leave a shortage of more than 5000 troops over what is currently being requested in Afghanistan by the senior leadership. Those requests don't take into account the decision--not yet funded--to increase the Afghan National Army from 80,000 to 120,000. The current acknowledged advisor shortage in Afghanistan--based on too small teams--is acknowledged as 2500. The addition of 40,000 Afghan Army troops should add a requirement for at least 1000 advisors. Our overall troop shortage is then closer to 11,000, and this increase will still leave us short close to 9,000 troops. Meanwhile, Kip thinks that the actual (as opposed to requested) troop need is two-to-three times larger.
Increasingly it has become clear that the amount of risk we take in Iraq and the amount of risk we take in Afghanistan are linked. For those interested, NPR ran an article this past July that explains the math behind strategic calculations of how many troops we can add to Afghanistan. Bottom Line: the Army and Marines are tapped out. Only with reductions in Iraq, can we succeed in Afghanistan.
With time running out, the question becomes, how much are we willing to run out the clock in Afghanistan in order to maintain less strategic uncertainty in Iraq?
He also said that while victory is becoming more elusive, we still can win.
At the same time, the President and Chiefs announced that 4500 additional troops will be sent this winter. Kip, however, doesn't quite understand the math as the 24 Marine Expeditionary Unit is being withdrawn and replaced with a single battalion of Marines and an Army brigade (whether the Brigade will serve in Farah and Helmand or elsewhere, Kip isn't sure). This seems like an actual addition of just over 2000 troops rather than 4500 from current force levels (if someone reads it differently, feel free to correct in the comments, and I'll update).
This would leave a shortage of more than 5000 troops over what is currently being requested in Afghanistan by the senior leadership. Those requests don't take into account the decision--not yet funded--to increase the Afghan National Army from 80,000 to 120,000. The current acknowledged advisor shortage in Afghanistan--based on too small teams--is acknowledged as 2500. The addition of 40,000 Afghan Army troops should add a requirement for at least 1000 advisors. Our overall troop shortage is then closer to 11,000, and this increase will still leave us short close to 9,000 troops. Meanwhile, Kip thinks that the actual (as opposed to requested) troop need is two-to-three times larger.
Increasingly it has become clear that the amount of risk we take in Iraq and the amount of risk we take in Afghanistan are linked. For those interested, NPR ran an article this past July that explains the math behind strategic calculations of how many troops we can add to Afghanistan. Bottom Line: the Army and Marines are tapped out. Only with reductions in Iraq, can we succeed in Afghanistan.
With time running out, the question becomes, how much are we willing to run out the clock in Afghanistan in order to maintain less strategic uncertainty in Iraq?
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