Center for a New American Security

A minor kerfuffle of sorts occurred earlier this week when the Financial Times reported that the Karzai government was engaged in Saudi-brokered peace negotiations with representatives of the Taliban (ed: Which Taliban? More on that later). CNN took the story one further by alleging that “Taliban leaders are holding Saudi-brokered talks with the Afghan government to end the country’s bloody conflict — and are severing their ties with al Qaeda.”

The Afghan government has denied that such negotiations have taken place, but expressed hope for peace talks with the insurgents. Contradicting suggestions made earlier in the year that the Taliban could co-operate with the Afghan government, spokesman Mullah Brother vehemently rejected the idea of negotiations with Kabul and there is no supporting evidence that Mullah Omar has broken with Al-Qaeda. (Given that Saudi money and madrasahs were a major source of the early Talib, their position as an honest broker leaves much to be desired.)

Interestingly, these stories emerged around the same time that the Senior British commander in Afghanistan, UN envoy Kai Eide and the U.S. Secretary of Defense have been arguing that the only resolution in Afghanistan will come with a settlement that includes the Taliban.

Troy assumes that the Afghan government has some form of on-going negotiations with various insurgent groups. Insurgencies are hardly monolithic, both among the support base and active guerrillas, one can typically find a variety of motivating issues and relative levels of commitment. Moreover, like any organization, insurgent movements can be rife with internal tensions and competing sources of power. The historical record suggests that through accommodation, many insurgents can be politically swayed or economically induced to rally to the government’s side. Although the goals of insurgent leaders cannot always be accommodated, the concrete grievances that motivate both the rank-and-file insurgents and their supporters frequently can be met.

Although subsequent reporting by the BBC suggests there may be less to the negotiation story that first reported, the event does raise some questions:

Who among the insurgents can be negotiated with? Haqqani? The Quetta Shura? Militants like Hekmatyar? Is it reasonable to think that any of them could be co-opted by/brought into the Afghan government?

If such an agreement could be reached, who would guarantee it? Troy seriously doubts that the Saudis would be in a position to oversee the Afghan government and prevent Taliban “backsliding”

How secure are the Afghan Taliban at present? An unnamed senior diplomat in Kabul told the Financial Times that the Taliban “are desperate to [negotiate]…they have had seven years of suffering severe losses on the battlefield and they know that it is not sustainable.” Yet, Carlton-Smith warns ““We’re not going to win this war. It’s about reducing it to a manageable level of insurgency that’s not a strategic threat…” The Taliban have been losing some of their leaders to American military action, but at the same time, Karzi’s position is not appreciably better than it was in 2002. Which side would be negotiating from the position of strength?

Secretary Gates’ comments aside, most stories reporting this news emphasize that the U.S. opposes negotiations. What SHOULD the American position on negotiation with the Taliban be? Should they offer the Talibs the same deal they did pre-OEF? (i.e. handover UBL and the senior AQ leaders and we’ll talk) As Troy recalls, Afghanistan was about eliminating ungoverned space/terrorist sanctuary. I will defer to AM on the finer points of this, but the U.S. and Europe has found a way to live with groups like Hamas and Hezbollah in control of quasi-states. Hardly a desirable outcome in Afghanistan, but how does it compare to the British Ambassador’s suggestion that the best possible outcome is to install an “acceptable dictator in Kabul”?

Discuss...