Center for a New American Security

As regular readers know, I have used this blog to think about deterrence and coercion in southern Lebanon over the past few months. This weekend, I have the weekly "The Big Idea" column in The National.

... the harshest blow to Israel was the widespread perception that Hizbollah had fought the mighty IDF to a standstill: as the late Ha’aretz defence correspondent Ze’ev Schiff lamented to me a few months after the war, “We have lost our deterrence capability.”

But this may have been one of many false assumptions about the results of 2006. It was said, for example, that the fighting would set Lebanon back a decade. But this summer’s tourist season was the best in memory, and despite the global economic crisis, the banking sector remains strong. As I have travelled around both southern Lebanon and the Dahiyeh in the past few months, I have been struck by the speed and skill with which Hizbollah and external donors – not just Iran but also the countries of the Gulf and the West – have rebuilt areas that appeared devastated beyond repair. Lebanon – and Hizbollah’s constituents – now have as much to lose in 2008 as they did in 2006.

In this light – and reflecting upon the belligerent words coming from Tel Aviv – Schiff may have been mistaken. Some of my Lebanese friends have dismissed the words of Eisenkot as “dangerous” and “stupid”. But I am not sure they are either.

In 2006 Israel brought a horrific amount of air and artillery power to bear on Lebanon, and few north of the Blue Line believe they would hesitate to do so again. Hizbollah’s July 2006 cross-border kidnapping raid was a serious mistake that had devastating consequences for the people of Lebanon. If the words of Eisenkot have effectively communicated that another such provocation will bring even harsher retribution, then Israel’s deterrent capability remains intact – so long as it doesn’t have to be put to use.

Deterrence, as the legendary American defence analyst John Collins reminds us, is a strategy for peace – not for war. The principles of deterrence are different from those of war. Whereas surprise and security are paramount in war, deterrence often hinges on publicising one’s capabilities and leading the enemy to believe you’re crazy enough to use them to the full effect.

[Read it all here.] [Also, Nir has a piece on PMCs in the same issue.]