Center for a New American Security

Shinseki, as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, supported the war plan. The head of U.S. Central Command, Gen. Tommy Franks, and his planning staff presented their approach to the Joint Chiefs and their staffs during the development of the plan. There was ample opportunity for the chiefs to express concerns and propose alternatives. There is no record of Shinseki having objected.

Shinseki also met with the commander in chief himself to discuss the plan. On at least one occasion at the White House, President Bush asked each member of the Joint Chiefs, including Shinseki, whether he believed the Iraq war plan was adequate to the objectives. Each said it was.

On the one hand, there is a lot of truth in this op-ed. I am sure Gen. Shinseki would agree that he did not protest the Iraq War plans as vigorously as his admirers on the Left imagine him to have protested. On the other hand, the author of this op-ed -- the loyal mouthpiece for a man most can agree was a horrible failure as Secretary of Defense (the second time around, it should be noted) -- cannot be trusted to provide a reliable narrative of Gen. Shinseki's retirement (announced early by Sec. Rumsfeld, which effectively made Shinseki a lame duck). He is also not likely to endorse the idea that Sec. Rumsfeld's Pentagon was a working environment in which all protests from the uniformed officer corps were squashed and within which dissent was not tolerated.

I might bite my tongue if the author of this op-ed was currently working in a PRT in Afghanistan and not in a cushy job at Bank of America. And, I'll admit, that's probably unfair of me.