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Given the successes enjoyed by the United States military in implementing its new counter-insurgency doctrine in Iraq in 2007, one would expect proponents of the doctrine to be eager to attempt a similar effort in Afghanistan. But that’s not the case. Indeed, many of the military officers and theorists who championed this doctrine are divided over whether or not a similar approach would work in Afghanistan. For them, Afghanistan presents an especially difficult case study.
[An] improving security situation and an increasingly capable Iraqi government now allow the United States to shift the balance of effort east, to America’s forgotten war. This shift comes in the nick of time.
Even if an additional 30,000 American and NATO troops were deployed in southern and eastern Afghanistan, the Taliban problem would not be reduced. It would merely be pushed back over the Pakistan border, destabilizing Pakistan’s already volatile North-West Frontier Province, which itself is more populous than Iraq. This amounts to squeezing a balloon on one end to inflate it on the other.
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