Center for a New American Security

About a year ago, I sent my buddy John a copy of The Street Without Joy. John was in the 173rd Airborne in eastern Afghanistan at the time, and reading this article in the New York Times Magazine had reminded me of the fighting in Indochina as described by Bernard Fall 50 years earlier.

This report by Tom Ricks, though, suggests the U.S. Army's officer corps is not being terribly honest with itself regarding the difficulties in Afghanistan. A few of you sent this report on the Battle of Wanat to me, and I am especially interested in hearing what the readership has to say.

When most of the fighting was over, about an hour later, nine American soldiers were dead and another 27 were wounded. Between 21 and 52 of the attackers were killed. The Americans held the outpost, which is impressive, considering their 75 percent casualty rate. ...

It is an interesting case to study especially because of the discrepancy between what is known about the incident and what has been learned from it. In other words, the facts gathered by Col. Mark Johnstone in the Army investigation are compelling, but the conclusions drawn from those facts are not. Rather, the Army appears determined to shy away from the lessons indicated by those facts. Here is what the Army concluded -- basically that we did OK, we should have had a Predator overhead, and that we shouldn't have trusted those lousy Afghans. And then let's talk about how brave our soldiers were. ...

The soldiers did fight valiantly at Wanat. I am in awe of them. As one reported to the Army investigator, "I continued to lay suppressive fire with the 240 [machine gun] but it was difficult because I was unable to stand due to wounds in both legs and my left arm." When this soldier ran out of ammunition he realized that he was the only one left alive in his corner of the outpost, with the enemy so close he could hear them talking.

It takes nothing away from the soldiers to say that there are other lessons to be learned here. "You go through the 15-6 and your heart sinks, as you see all this," said one person who has reviewed most of the data gathered on the battle.

Indeed, one way to honor them would be to look at what might have been done better to help them. But the Army seems positively determined not to study the Wanat incident.