Center for a New American Security

And now for a CNAS New Boy...

Fred Kaplan's piece in Slate got me thinking. In this op-ed (.pdf), published by the grown-ups at Small Wars Journal, I write on the differences -- and similarities -- between COIN and CT:

My experience in Iraq, though, had led me to the false conclusion that CT perhaps had no role in population-centric COIN. In London last year, I had dinner with a former and widely respect allied commander in Afghanistan and asked him whether or not direct action special operations forces – or “SOF”, the kind of forces best suited for CT missions – had a place in COIN.

The retired U.S. general looked at me quizzically and replied that of course they did. “SOF is how you play offense in COIN. It’s how you keep the enemy off balance.”

CT tactics and operations, then, are part of many effective COIN campaigns. Such operations, though, must be tied into the greater strategy. One thing the U.S. military did very poorly in the early years of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was to coordinate operations between the “general purpose” units and “vanilla” special operations forces on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan and the secretive counter-terror task force that was also active in both countries. By some accounts, only the close personal relationship between Generals Stanley McChrystal and David Petraeus led to greater cooperation between the Joint Special Operations Command and the theater commander in Iraq in 2007.

One thing most policy-makers seem to understand, though, is that a population-centric COIN campaign in Afghanistan would be long, messy, and expensive. Our NATO allies would no doubt tire of the inevitable rise in casualties before we do, and with the global economy in dire straits, it is worth noting that – largely due to issues of re-supply – an infantry brigade costs twice as much to operate in Afghanistan as it does to operate in Iraq. For this and many other reasons, there exists far less enthusiasm in the community of COIN theorists and practitioners about a possible COIN campaign in Afghanistan than there was for a COIN campaign in Iraq.

At the same, time, though, an orthodox CT campaign is almost certainly destined to fail spectacularly in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Kinetic raids – whether by special operators or rocket-carrying drones – are universally unpopular in Pakistan and further alienate the very people in whose hands Afghanistan’s fate lies. What Pakistan needs to become an effective partner in the struggle against violent extremists is the subject of much debate. What is certain, though, is that Predator strikes – even when they kill militants – make the Pakistanis less likely to accept U.S. and allied support or advice.

Success, then, means getting past the COIN versus CT paradigm and thinking about which best practices can be imported from each discipline – and how the two mentalities can be fused with the realities on the ground in Afghanistan to offer policy-makers solutions beyond the usual models.

I didn't really take exception with anything Fred wrote but at the same time have offered him space to respond...

Update:

Thanks to Andrew for his excellent commentary, but I should note that my column did make this point about the CT vs COIN clash: "Obviously," I wrote, "any plan will wind up doing at least a bit of both; the debate is over priorities and emphasis." -- Fred Kaplan