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Abu Muqawama: June 2009

Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS. Abu Muqawama retains the right to delete comments that include words that incite violence; are predatory, hateful, or intended to intimidate or harass; or degrade people on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. In summary, don't be a jerk.

  • Here's Bob Woodward recounting NSA James Jones' visit to Afghanistan:

    "National Security Adviser James L. Jones told U.S. military commanders here last week that the Obama administration wants to hold troop levels here flat for now, and focus instead on carrying out the previously approved strategy of increased economic development, improved governance and participation by the Afghan military and civilians in the conflict.

    "The message seems designed to cap expectations that more troops might be coming, though the administration has not ruled out additional deployments in the future...Jones made it clear in his visit to Afghanistan that it is a new era and that Obama will not automatically give the military commanders whatever force levels they request -- the frequent practice of President George W. Bush in the Iraq war."

    Umm...maybe I was watching the wrong war, but it seemed like there was a period between, say, 2003 and 2006 when insufficient troop levels (and the Bush administration's unwillingness to raise them) were regularly cited as a major factor in the ongoing failure to stabilize Iraq.

    Snark aside, one of the lessons from Iraq has to be that the basic services, governance, and economic development lines of operation, which many U.S. commanders knew pretty well before FM 3-24 and the "Surge," weren't very sustainable until a modicum of security was established.  So if we are committed to our current strategy in Afghanistan, it seems pretty darn important that we're confident we have the force levels necessary to establish that minimum level of security.  Otherwise our "civilian surge" and reconstruction initiatives seem likely to be DOA.  That's not a call for the administration to reflexively throw in more troops without a rigorous analysis of strategic costs and benefits, but it does suggest that it needs to double-check to ensure that its ends, ways, and means in Afghanistan are are all aligned.

     

  • Lots of stuff on the U.S. pullout from Iraqi cities today.  The reactions of Iraqis serve as a sobering reminder to us Americans that Iraqis see things quite a bit differently than we have.

    Nevertheless,  the New York Times, Jawad al-Bolani, and others (Prof. Bacevich being the reliable exception) agree that there is a lot of work left to do, and that most of it will have to be done by Iraqis with a little help from us when necessary.

    UPDATE: For those who haven't seen it already, here's General Odierno's letter to the troops explaining the transition that occurred today.

  • As I sort through my pile of vacation emails, I found this op-ed that my colleague MZ passed along last week.  I don't know much about Sri Lanka, but I remember some of our readers clamoring for more coverage of the end of the long-running war between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tigers and its lessons for counterinsurgency.

    A couple things strike me about this piece, though:

    --Its key point, "Perhaps the most important lesson is the debunking of the widely held belief that terrorism cannot be quelled militarily...All too often, the greatest obstacle to military success is the starry-eyed interference by third parties insisting that only diplomacy and negotiation can bring a true end to terror-based conflicts," puts this piece squarely in the Edward Luttwak school of thought.  Luttwak also derides the brand of population-centric counterinsurgency found in FM 3-24 as essentially too wimpy for the task at hand and prescribes the use of force without much regard for collateral damage as the only real way to victory.  That's all well and good, but I don't think that this "Real Men Do Civilian Casualties" line offers (or should offer) a compelling lesson for Western strategists dealing with insurgencies today and in the future.  I don't think emulating the approach of Romans, Germans, or Sri Lankans is really an option that is open to us.

    --The LTTE seems to have been centrally directed by its leader Velupillai Prabhakaran in a way that the insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan are not.  The Iraqi and Afghan insurgences appear to be more cellular in structure and not impacted very much by the killing of individual leaders (though maybe we just haven't gotten the guys high enough on the food chain yet).  Perhaps one explanation for why the Sri Lankan approach worked was because they had one obvious head of the snake to cut off, while the different enemy factions in Iraq and Afghanistan are a bit more amorphous.

    --The authors caveat themselves at the end after starting their column by lauding the sweeping Sri Lankan victory.  They warn that the LTTE's overseas supporters may well resort to terrorism to carry on the Tigers' torch.  So maybe this military triumph hasn't solved everything after all.

  • One of our regular blog readers requested some discussion of the recent spate of bombings in Iraq and the implications for the U.S. pullout from Iraqi cities set for June 30 (this Tuesday--mark it on your calendar).  This wave of attacks has prompted a good amount of hand-wringing about the coming “unraveling” of the country.  Here’s my two-cent analysis.

    Obviously we don't want to underestimate how dangerous and violent Iraq is.  Even with the dramatic improvements in security over the past two years, it's not exactly a choice vacation destination and probably won't be for the foreseeable future.  From the remnants of AQI to the underground members of the JAM and “special groups,” there’s no shortage of bad guys out there who would like to undermine the Iraqi government.  With U.S. forces pulling back, they have some opportunity to reemerge, probe the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, and spark a new round of communal strife.

    So it’s not like the current series of bombings is unexpected.  Certainly it’s not a good thing, but it’s also important not to overreact:

    Despite all these bombings, we have yet to see signs that the death spiral of sectarian retaliation has returned or is about to return.  This is a point that General Odierno has made with some regularity.  The attacks in and of themselves are terrible, but not necessarily strategically significant unless they trigger waves of reprisals that Iraqi forces cannot control.  If there are signs of this occurring, it doesn’t seem like they’re being noticed.  Instead we get statements from al-Sadr after the recent attacks calling for restraint.  Obviously we can’t take that restraint for granted, but that still seems qualitatively better than the days of 2006.

    In any case, even if we’re concerned about some degradation of security, what are we supposed to do?  A number of folks, including Stephen Biddle, have counseled slowing the pace of withdrawal, but to exactly what end?  Iraq’s forces may not be the best in the world and Maliki may be overconfident, but it seems to me that what the Iraqis need is more assistance in resolving some underlying conflicts that can drive violence (Sunni integration into government, Kurdish territorial and oil disputes) and developing the governmental and economic institutions necessary to sustain the state.  It’s not clear to me that continuing our troop presence in Iraq at its current level and disposition is still required to advance those goals.

    Of course, I could be completely wrong.  But if Iraq is about to go off the rails, I will predict that it will not be because of the Sunni-Shi’ite divide that still gets a lot of the U.S. media focus.  It will either be a flaring-up of the simmering Kurdish-Arab conflict, or something else we haven’t thought of yet.

     

  • Apologies for the delay in posting new stuff, but I'm currently on vacation at my beloved childhood home in America's Finest City.  The gorgeous weather, fantastic surfing, and incomparable fish tacos make it hard to concentrate on blogging, counterinsurgency, defense policy, or any of the other things that normally preoccupy me in DC.

    I'll be one of the guest bloggers (along with Denominator, who you've already met, and a couple of others) while Abu Muqawama is away.  I am going by Ibn Muqawama, but I am not related to the legendary AM, nor can I claim to be anywhere as great and accomplished.  I can only hope to try to help keep the blog afloat until the Boss Man returns.  We'll cover a lot of the same areas as usual; this blog is, after all, "the go-to for the COIN set" (thanks, Ms. Vlahos!) and I, for one, would hate to disappoint its many fans by changing things up too much.

    But if you think all we're worried about are sneaky Taliban insurgents, think again!  You may be aware that there's been some hubbub of late sparked by a certain hermit kingdom in Northeast Asia led by some guy with a fetish for WMD.  And the United States and international community have had a devil of a time figuring out what to do about it.  But according to this unintentionally hilarious paragraph in an otherwise interesting Foreign Policy column, we've been worrying too much about the DPRK's nukes and not enough about its secret ninja army:

    "As for North Korea's Special Operations Forces (SOFs), South Korean estimates now place their numbers at as many as 180,000 men. North Korean SOFs are probably among the best- trained, best fed, and most motivated of all the forces in their military. They routinely undergo intense training that includes carrying 50 pounds of sand for 10 km in one hour, hiking in extreme cold weather, martial arts methodologies that include fighting with three to 15 opponents, and even using spoons and forks as weapons. Troops also engage in intense marksmanship training and even daily knife-throwing training. They can attack quickly, reaching key nodes in South Korea by aircraft, through tunnels in the DMZ, or even by maritime vessel."

    God help us all.  And watch your silverware.

     

  • Coming at the issue of journalism, propaganda, and war/insurgencies from a slightly different angle, this clip from the archives of ABC News is currently being passed around among the Vietnam veterans community.

    It is the ABC evening news, hosted at that time by Howard K. Smith (who first came to fame for reporting on WWII with Edward R. Murrow, and whose son fought at LZ Albany  in November ‘65) and Harry Reasoner. The date is 28 April 1972. To put that in perspective, this is after the U.S. pulled out ground troops from the Republic of Vietnam. The North Vietnamese had just started what is now called (in the US anyway) the “Easter Offensive,” an almost completely conventional cross-border assault. The U.S. is responding solely, if overwhelmingly, with airpower. The South Vietnamese are doing the fighting on the ground. A little more than two weeks after this report John Paul Vann will take over de facto control from Vietnamese LTG Dzu and personally orchestrate American airpower in the defense of Kontum, effectively crushing the NVA attack and saving the RVN. Forty-one days later he himself will be killed in a helicopter crash. The offensive was defeated.

    The issue for consideration is the fact that this link/clip is being passed around by U.S. Vietnam veterans as an example of American anti-military media bias during the war. In other words, traitorous propaganda on behalf of the North Vietnamese enemy. Take a look, see if you see the same thing.    

     

  • There is something disturbingly reassuring in watching real honest-to-goodness traditional propaganda. It gives you a false sense of superiority, in a sort of twisted way, to chuckle at some of the better examples of ham-fisted story twisting, either of the deliberate or the accidental sort.

     

    The past masters of this, of course, were the Soviets. And for sheer amusement value almost nothing could surpass the antics of Baghdad Bob . So admittedly, in comparison to these masters, the efforts of the Ministry of Defense of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka are somewhat thin gruel.  Still, it can be worth a chuckle to follow the twists and turns that propaganda may take.

     

    Most recently the Washington Times, one of the most conservative papers in the US, has the curious distinction of publishing an op-ed in favor of a Socialist government which just won the conventional phase of a civil war with the heavy backing from Communist China (which came about after the US cut off military aid and advice back in 2007). That Monday Op-Ed is now highlighted, in turn, by the Socialist government, albeit with some confusion about the difference between the Washington Times and the Washington Post.

     

    Here’s the front page of the Sri Lankan MoD.

     

    Here is the MoD’s extracted synopsis of how the “Washington Post” (apparently some confusion there with the Times) supports the Sri Lankan way of war.

     

    And here is the Washington Times original.

     

    Strange bedfellows indeed.

    On a more directly topical note, how many think that what was happening in Sri Lanka these past four years (out of more than 20 years of conflict) was an insurgency? How many understand it to have become a traditional conventional Civil War with some terrorism thrown in? And what is or should be the role of propaganda for either side? In the US we have laws about propaganda, mostly as a backlash to the First World War. But is there a legitimate role? When does "information" cross the line into "propaganda"?   

  • Hello all. The landlord asked me to enter real subtle-like. So I am doing my best to comply. Bear with my reticence. ~ Denominator

    Now look, I’ve served in the 1st Cav. I’ve even served in the 3rd Brigade (highlighted in this story). I wear my Stetson at the least provocation, and defy anyone who contends that the huge frackin’ patch doesn’t matter. That being said, I must cede that my old Division does have the ability to produce moronic decisions upon occasion. In this case, they are going all Old School on the media. But it’s not like that darned liberal-dolschtoss-out-to-getcha media. No, in this case the 1st Cav has taken the all-American decision to ban a reporter from the flippin’ STARS AND STRIPES.

    You go there boys. Point that M-249 straight at your leather personnel carriers and pop off a full box?

    Let me check something here…You do know that the Stars and Stripes is, according to the Department of Defense is, well, I’ll let them point it out: “Stars and Stripes is a daily newspaper published for the U.S. military, DoD civilians, contractors, and their families." But perhaps you missed that next line that Congress authorized. You remember Congress, right?  "Unique among the many military publications, Stars and Stripes operates as a First Amendment newspaper, free of control and censorship. We have published continuously in Europe since 1942, and since 1945 in the Pacific. Today, our readers number well over 350,000.” In other words, still theirs, look at it this way, “Stars and Stripes is a Department of Defense-authorized daily newspaper distributed overseas for the U.S. military community.” What part of that did you not understandimipate?

    You banned a reporter from the Stars and Stripes for Anti-American reporting? Seriously? Whiskey Tango Foxtrot? Clue for you: You, the officers who did this, just are not that important. As both Bill Cosby and my own old man told me, upon misbehavior, “I brought you into this world, I’ll take you right back out. Doesn’t matter to me. I’ll make a ‘nuther one jest like ya.” The Army is like that. What were you thinking? You just set yourselves up for the biggest kneecapping since the Sopranos went off the air.

    What really blows my mind is that I know for a fact that Major General Dan Bolger knows better than this. I’ve read his writing for 15 years, and watched the man go out on patrols, as a G.O. mind you. He understands. (See update: 3rd Bde/1CD is under 25ID) He understands that:  A. The Press is not the enemy. B. You cannot control the press. C. Trying to control the press only results in bad press, which damages the war effort. D.  Giving the press access always results in better stories. So right now you who made this decision are betting on one thing: That Bolger will automatically support you, despite the fact that you just made one of the most egregiously misguided “decisions” in the whole eight years of this war. Nice one. Buy yourselves a round at the O-Club when you get back to Hood.

    Personally, I’m thinking, you Battalion and Brigade Public Affairs officers responsible for this are using some of the prohibited local products in your decision making on this count, and you’ve been supported by the probable fact that the Division PAO did not fully inform the Division Commander of the lowdown. Now that it’s out there in the open, I fully expect that Bolger will quietly, in his subtle way, come to you and casually explain things. Cause, like, he’s a real subtle guy. (Mooted by update)

    And I model for Men’s Health.

    UPDATE: An alert reader who saw this before suggested, and I checked, and the fact is that once again the 3rd Brigade, 1st CAV is under the control of 25 ID/MND-N. That takes Bolger out of the equation. 25 ID is commanded by MG Robert L. Caslen.

     

     

  • I will be out of the country and unable to blog for the next month. Expect guest bloggers -- hand-selected for their skills in sarcasm (and nunchuks, naturally) -- presently.

  • Many thanks to the reader who saw this YouTube clip of David Kilcullen speaking to the nerds at Google. I always learn something when I listen to or speak with Dave -- even when conversation drifts to Scotch or Jermyn Street shirtmakers.

  • Steve Biddle, in typically intelligent analysis, considers a "double transformation":

    Ironically, the traditionalists are right about tomorrow, but the young Turks are right about today.

  • My colleague Kristin Lord has been asking around, trying to find out who is in charge of our communications efforts in Afghanistan. The answer, apparently, is you. Abu Muqawama readers are hereby invited to participate in the "Why Afghanistan Matters" video contest. The snarkiest entries will be posted here.

    IO
  • From the Daily Telegraph, excerpting a paper published in the British Army Review:

    Writing in the British Army Review, an official MoD publication, Major SN Miller, stated: "Lets not kid ourselves. To date Operation Herrick [the British codename for the War in Afghanistan] has been a failure".

     

    He claimed that hundreds of millions of pounds of taxpayers money had been wasted on a war which had failed to deliver any real reconstruction, governance or security.

     

    Rather than "winning hearts and minds", Major Miller, who serves in the Defence Intelligence Staff serving Intelligence Corps, said the British presence had had the opposite effect.

     

    But his most blistering attack was on the UK's counter-narcotics policy, where the illicit sale of drugs has been successfully used by the Taliban to fund the insurgency and kill British troops.

     

    He wrote: "British policy towards the poppy crop has been an unmitigated disaster. The chief "effect" of the British presence in Helmand has been to transform Helmand into the opium centre of the world.

     

    "This remarkable milestone was achieved just two years into the British intervention."

    I recently read a much more sympathetic portrayal of the British efforts in the south that was co-written by Theo Farrell (who has a lot more love for the British Army than you would expect from an Irishman married to a Frenchwoman). And in conversations with U.S. officers in Afghanistan, it appears as if there is good understanding that the conflict in RC-South is much different from -- and in some ways more difficult than -- the fight in RC-East. Still, blunt talk from a British officer should not be ignored. And the British national security establishments have, if possible, emerged from Afghanistan with even more egg on their faces than their American counterparts. A U.S. Marine Corps officer I know who recently trained with the British reported they were all reading FM 3-24, largely because their own military has failed time and time again since 2005 to write a new COIN manual of their own.

    Maj Miller claimed that the British government "sleepwalked" into Helmand in 2006 "without any meaningful reconstruction plan, without the resources to undertake-nation building tasks, and, critically, without any desire to fight a major insurgency".

     

    He added: "It was thanks to the tenacity of the common soldier and the paratrooper that British embarrassment was saved."

  • We last saw the BBC's John Sweeney when he was baiting Scientologists in California, but Londonstani went through hazardous environment training with him a year or so back, and sure enough, here he is reporting (well) from the Swat Valley. And here he is talking about reporting from such an environment.

  • I spoke with Greg Jaffe last week, and though he had just returned from Afghanistan a few hours earlier, he couldn't wait to tell me about this young shalwar qameez-wearing company commander who had really impressed him in Konar Province. Captain Harrison's story is in today's Washington Post.

  • Hookers 5-0 Egypt:

    JOHANNESBURG — In news that, if true, will bring relief to World Cup organizers and embarrassment to the Egyptian soccer team, three South African newspapers reported Sunday that Egypt’s players apparently did not lose their money to robbers but to prostitutes after an historic 1-0 victory over Italy at the Confederations Cup. The accusations were quickly denied by the head of the Egyptian soccer federation. “I think that they said that to divert attention from the main issue, which is security, by creating a scandal for the Egyptian team,” Samir Zahir, the chairman of the Egyptian federation, told The Sunday Independent newspaper. Security has been the hot-button top in the run-up to the 2010 World Cup. The South African police said Friday that Egypt had reported that five team members had their wallets lifted. The amount reportedly was $2,400. The burglary was said to have been discovered after the Egyptian players returned to their hotel rooms following Thursday’s victory over Italy.
  • Watch this woman in a chador take a break from listening to Bikini Kill on her iPod long enough to wheel this dumpster into a barracade at :47 of this video. Just awesome, these Iranians.

  • First off, let me praise those bloggers -- Andrew Sullivan, Nico Pitney, Robert Mackey -- who have used Twitter feeds from Iran to tirelessly live-blog the uprising in Tehran. But all the same, I am happy that articles and analysis are now popping up that question the actual usefulness of Twitter as a tool of the revolution. Because it seems apparent that while Twitter has been useful in getting news out of Iran, it has been the more old-school techniques -- like, you know, word of mouth -- that have really been the driving forces behind organizing the protests that have shaken the mullahs.

    The New York Times puts things in perspective in today's paper:

    Skeptics note that only a small number of people used Twitter to organize protests in Iran and that other means — individual text messaging, old-fashioned word of mouth and Farsi-language Web sites — were more influential. But Twitter did prove to be a crucial tool in the cat-and-mouse game between the opposition and the government over enlisting world opinion.

    More nuance arrives in today's Washington Post:

    First, Twitter's own internal architecture puts limits on political activism. There are so many messages streaming through at any moment that any single entry is unlikely to break through the din, and the limit of 140 characters -- part of the service's charm and the secret of its success -- militates against sustained argument and nuance. (Yes, "Give me liberty or give me death" totals just 32 characters, but Patrick Henry's full speech exceeded 1,200 words.) What's most exciting is the aggregate effect of all this speech and what it reveals about the zeitgeist of the moment, but it still reflects a worldwide user population that skews wealthy, English-speaking and well-educated. The same is true of the blogosphere and social networks such as Facebook.
    Second, governments that are jealous of their power can push back on cyberspace when they feel threatened. The Iranian state runs one of the world's most formidable online censorship regimes. In the past week alone, officials have blocked access to YouTube, Facebook and the majority of Web sites most often cited by reformist segments of the Persian blogosphere. They supplement this censorship with surveillance and the threat of imprisonment for those who speak out. Even if they fail to block political speech or organizing activities, the possibility of future retaliation can chill the most devoted activists and critics.
    Paradoxically, the "freedom to scream" online may actually assist authoritarian regimes by serving as a political release valve of sorts. If dissent is channeled into cyberspace, it can keep protesters off the streets and help state security forces track political activism and new online voices. As Egyptian democracy activist Saad Ibrahim said last week during a discussion at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, this appears to be part of a long tradition for governments in the Middle East, especially in Egypt, where dissent is channeled into universities and allowed to thrive there, as long as it does not escape the university walls.
    Third, the blogosphere is not limited to young, liberal, anti-regime activists; state sympathizers are increasingly active in the battle for online supremacy. Our research into the Iranian blogosphere shows that political and religious conservatives are no less prominent than regime critics. While the Iranian blogosphere is indeed a place where women speak out for their rights, young people criticize the morality police, journalists fight censorship, reformists press for change, and dissidents call for revolution, it is also a place where the supreme leader is praised, the Holocaust denied, the Islamic Revolution defended and Hezbollah celebrated. It is also a place where Islamist student groups mobilize and pro-establishment leaders, including President Ahmadinejad, reach out to their constituents within the Iranian public. Our most recent research suggests that the number and popularity of politically conservative and Islamic bloggers has grown over the past year, relative to the number of secular reformists, possibly due to the events leading up to the presidential election.

    So let's not go all Twitter crazy just yet. Oh, and Evgeny Morozov went off on Foreign Policy's net.effect blog. Worth reading.

  • Yesterday's New York Times carried a needed editorial on spending more tax dollars to support the F-22, an aircraft whose production run has been capped at 187 by the Department of Defense but extended by the Congress. Today's Washington Post helps us understand why, with this story on the way in which small towns rise and fall with weapons programs. It's hard not to pity the people of Owego, but this is the kind of stuff that happens when weapons programs double in cost.

    It's also hard not to feel annoyance with allegedly conservative congressmen who praise the free markets -- and accuse the president of "socialism" -- yet continually vote to fund what have become massive federal jobs programs. And at some point, elected leaders have to look the people of Owego in the eyes and break the news that large projects to build weapons systems are to strengthen the nation's defense -- and not to revive industrial centers or provide jobs. It's awfully tough to break the news to the people featured in this article, but necessary all the same.

    Sorry, Owego.

  • And huge kudos to all the media -- mainstream and new -- who have kept their mouths shut about this for the past several months.

    David Rohde, a New York Times reporter who was kidnapped by the Taliban, escaped Friday night and made his way to freedom after more than seven months of captivity in the mountains of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
    Mr. Rohde, along with a local reporter, Tahir Ludin, and their driver, Asadullah Mangal, was abducted outside Kabul, Afghanistan, on Nov. 10 while he was researching a book.
    Mr. Rohde was part of The Times’s reporting team that won a Pulitzer Prize this spring for coverage of Afghanistan and Pakistan last year. Mr. Rohde told his wife, Kristen Mulvihill, that Mr. Ludin joined him in climbing over the wall of a compound where they were being held in the North Waziristan region of Pakistan. They made their way to a nearby Pakistani Frontier Corps base and on Saturday they were flown to the American military base in Bagram, Afghanistan.
    “They just walked over the wall of the compound,” Ms. Mulvihill said. The driver, Mr. Mangal, did not escape with the other two men.
    The initial report was that Mr. Rohde was in good health, while Mr. Ludin injured his foot in the escape.
    Until now, the kidnapping has been kept quiet by The Times and other media organizations out of concern for the men’s safety.

    We join the Times and others in wishing David a hearty welcome home. It's going to be quite the book.

  • Hey, kids, go visit our new Natural Security Blog, which is to Abu Muqawama what Grape Juice is to Grape Drink. Contributors to the blog include Christine, Sharon, and Seth Andre 3000.

  • I am not a big fan of politically-motivated translation services, but this MEMRI clip of Ahmadinejad getting grilled by Max Rodenbeck (The Economist) and a visibly sober Robert Fisk (The Independent) is well worth watching. Rodenbeck, in particular, lets Ahmadinejad have it. And Ahmadinejad, playing his part, is reliably creepy.

    [h/t The Arabist]

  • Rajiv Chandrasekaran has a long profile of our failed development efforts in Afghanistan in today's Washington Post. Worth your time. At some point -- and that point should have already arrived several years ago, honestly -- non-kinetic lines of operation will be the main effort in Afghanistan and combat operations will take a back seat in our efforts. The U.S. government, though, has really struggled to figure out what we should be doing in Afghanistan with respect to agricultural programs and other development projects.

    I'll say this, though: it's all well and good for Richard Holbrooke to tell Rajiv Chandrasekaran that we're not going to conduct counter-poppy operations. But the last time I checked, Holbrooke has command of exactly zero battalions on the ground. And I am not sure we're all on the same page here with respect to what our priorities should be. So he better synch this with ISAF commanders first, because I am hearing different things from different people at the moment.

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