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Clowns to the left of me / jokers to the right
June 22, 2009 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 3:02pm | 58 Comments
Wait, the crusading, hawkish
Wait, the crusading, hawkish right plus the paleo-isolationist right constitutes "all sides"? Maybe Vlahos was right about you dirty, scheming leftists!
While I think Gentile is a
While I think Gentile is a clumsy writer, and he often puts arguments together poorly, I think one point where he criticizes Nagl is good:
Nagl says, "“The soldiers who will win these wars require an ability not just to dominate land operations, but to change entire societies."
Yikes. Really? Change socieites? In many cases I think the limits of third-party COIN are so that attempts to "change socieites" (to a point where the third-party is happy with the end-state) are fiscally irresponsible and potentially destabilizing. There is some arrogance that "changing societies" is even possible. Have we really "changed" Iraq? Or have we just altered the domestic makeup of the regime, and worked to strengthen an elected central government (nevermind the lack of institutions within Iraq which put limits on the power of the executive, and help foster the civic society necessary to maintain a democracy).
AQ wants to bleed us dry. Why let them (though AF-Pak is not entirely/mostly an AQ problem)? If the people who understand COIN never want to do it, then the COIN crowd needs to understand its own limits. While Gentile trys to push this narrative, he is hurt by the fact that he isn't the best writer/debater.
While I think Gentile is a
While I think Gentile is a clumsy writer, and he often puts arguments together poorly, I think one point where he criticizes Nagl is good:
Nagl says, "“The soldiers who will win these wars require an ability not just to dominate land operations, but to change entire societies."
Yikes. Really? Change socieites? In many cases I think the limits of third-party COIN are so that attempts to "change socieites" (to a point where the third-party is happy with the end-state) are fiscally irresponsible and potentially destabilizing. There is some arrogance that "changing societies" is even possible. Have we really "changed" Iraq? Or have we just altered the domestic makeup of the regime, and worked to strengthen an elected central government (nevermind the lack of institutions within Iraq which put limits on the power of the executive, and help foster the civic society necessary to maintain a democracy).
AQ wants to bleed us dry. Why let them (though AF-Pak is not entirely/mostly an AQ problem)? If the people who understand COIN never want to do it, then the COIN crowd needs to understand its own limits. While Gentile trys to push this narrative, he is hurt by the fact that he isn't the best writer/debater.
With regards to Bacevich's
With regards to Bacevich's comments, I'd like to know the context of finding this "alternative". If it is regarding Iraq and AF-Pak, no other alternatives really exist because of gross mistakes made at the outset of each conflict. If, however, the context was a future problem in another country then other alternatives do exist. Specifically, Kilcullen argues the necessity to get out of the business of invading countries with terrorists in his book The Accidental Guerilla and in a talk he gave at Google. I am sure that Kilcullen is not alone at CNAS.
At least its from a real
At least its from a real publication this time, instead of just 'some guy' who doesn't like you.
Yes, Isolationist republicans are still out there, polishing their America First pins and shocking listeners with tales of carnage in the trenches of the Great War. Never Again!
That said, I think the article is right when it talks about how politically astute your crew has been, AM. Whether you guys have established an "unquestioned orthodoxy" or not is highly debatable, but CNAS has definitely ridden the Obama train. Not that that's somehow intrinsically wrong.
Please don't cut my ear off!
I can't really believe you
I can't really believe you just threw out OMC. That's pretty bold.
Andrew, Don't sweat it
Andrew,
Don't sweat it brother. I don't know what they used to say in Tennessee, but growing up in Arkansas we had a saying...
"If you weren't getting any criticism, then you wouldn't be saying anything important, and nobody would care."
I have nothing but envy for your situation.
I would read Bacevich's
I would read Bacevich's 'Limits of Power' and the collective works of antiwar.com to understand this position.
As the casualties mount in Afghanistan, CNAS will be the new neocons who "manipulated us into this debacle." There just isn't any way to get around that. Exum appearing on Rachel Maddow periodically will only go so far.
It didn't help that a month or so ago Tom Ricks threw a hissy fit and called Kelley Vlahos and antiwar.com stupid because whe dared disagree with him. he obviously had never read anything on the site and thought it was some random blog.
Vlahos, Raimondo, and the rest of the crew at antiwar and TAC know what they are talking about and should not be taken lightly.
AM really got airborne after
AM really got airborne after Obama was elected.
One may guess that he will stall with a republican as next president.
Dhimmitude will not last long as a global strategy.
Johnny, Just because someone
Johnny,
Just because someone knows quite a bit about something, doesn't make them right.
This article underlines to me the nature of partisan politics. With a few name and date changes, this article could have been slamming proponents of the Iraq surge, but since there's a Democrat in the White House, it's acceptable to use the same rhetoric?
While Bacevich is a serious
While Bacevich is a serious scholar. Anti-war.com is a joke...
Maybe this is one thing Ricks got right! (/kidding) (/maybe)
I'm sorry, but where is the
I'm sorry, but where is the unfair criticism in this article?
It looks like a basic point/counterpoint piece on CNAS people and policies.
There is no unfair
There is no unfair criticism. CNAS and its groupies get all bent out of shape because while they are a wonderful marketing force for the National Security State, they can never seem to make coherent counter-arguments to the points made by the likes of Bacevich.
If you are looking for a
If you are looking for a good piece on the social/political theory that informs pop-centric COIN theory, then one needs to look at Kalyvas' critique of FM 3-24 here:
http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/POPJune08CounterInsurgency2.pdf
His piece and Ollivant's are both very good.
I'm sorry, but where is the
I'm sorry, but where is the unfair criticism in this article?
Here's a start: For every soul in the room who truly believes this is the “pragmatic and principled approach,” there was surely another for whom the Long War means guaranteed employment, flush contracts, justified research, more trips to Capitol Hill. A reason for being.
Of course, this follows the Bacevich template: cast aspersions about the intellectual integrity of your interlocutors, suggesting that they support certain policy positions because it will result in employment or other benefit. That's how Kilcullen was criticized in Bacevich's National Interest review -- and with remarkably little outrage or even comment -- so why not apply such base motivations to the entire crowd?
CNAS and its groupies get all bent out of shape because while they are a wonderful marketing force for the National Security State, they can never seem to make coherent counter-arguments to the points made by the likes of Bacevich.
Sure, dude. No "coherent counter-arguments" at all; it's a wonder so many people -- in the business of national security and otherwise -- find them compelling.
"But that was all so 2007,
"But that was all so 2007, before it was accepted by these Clintonian Democrats and the Washington foreign-policy establishment writ large that the surge strategy promoted by the neoconservatives was a success."
Yeah, sure, after the neocons effed up everything else they possibly could. Promoted by the neocons as a last ditch, but formulated by our very own (and one of Australia's) military humanities geeks. At least they got one thing right. Kilcullen is "ubiquitous".
"COIN today is the realm of CNAS, as if Frederick Kagan and AEI had never existed."
We can dream...
This is absurd. The neocon dream was spreading democracy with a transformed slimmed down military knocking regimes over and being welcomed as liberators. The COINdinista position (if such a thing even exists) does not seek out these wars, does not seek to spread democracy any further than it is necessary to stabilize societies by clearing, holding, building, and helping to legitimize the governments that the neocons clumsily propped up. One is a naive Fukuyama-on-steroids utopian vision divorced from practical considerations and the other is a substantive strategy for winning wars, not choosing them. Am I wrong here?
"...there are just a handful of experts who dare to confront the CNAS crowd regularly....But CNAS clearly has the rest spooked. Several interviewees for this story asked that their names be left out..."
Obviously this is due to the CNAS hit squad that Fick and Ex run. Knocking down doors and busting caps in the beltway and out. Its why I moved abroad. I made fun of Ex's beard.
Vlahos piece is people being
Vlahos piece is people being haters. At least it mentioned the blog by name. The last paragraph really tells the tale, because for the point to make sense you have to accept that things in Afghan having been going well up until now and the last eight years haven't been a series of experiments.
What topics are Washington
What topics are Washington think tanks forbidden to discuss?
U.S. foreign policy, fossil fuels, and the ever-increasing scale of American energy imports.
Ask the commanders about this interview with Charlie Rose, June 2007:
Charlie Rose: What is he [Maliki] and his government not doing that you want to see them do, and do soon? Because you are talking about four months before an assessment that may be a determination that this new strategy is not working.
General David Petraeus: Well, it's, again, the entire government, not just in a sense his office, or the Prime Minister. The entire government does need to come to grips with some of this very tough legislation. I think the dog closest to the sled is the hydrocarbon law, as it's called. It really has to do with the distribution of the oil revenues. Iraq is generating enormous oil wealth on a daily basis, a yearly basis, and it needs to distribute those -- it has committed in the law that was approved by the Council of Ministers that those revenues would be distributed equitably to all Iraqis. That's a very, very important agreement, by the way -- hugely important...
Yes, hugely important - and also the main driver of the Iraqi insurgency, the #1 recruiting theme - no, it's not Al Qaeda and the restoration of the 10th century Islamic caliphate, it's theft of Iraqi oil by international oil corporations and their host governments.
If you don't take that into account in your COIN strategy, you're just pissing propaganda. However, if the central goal of your organization is to promote the theme of "America the good, America the just", then the last thing you want to talk about is U.S. foreign oil policies. On the other hand, if you actually wanted to promote peaceful resolution of the Iraqi situation, then honest resolution of the oil issue is required (meaning no production service agreements and booked reserves for Exxon, Shell, BP, Chevron, Conoco, etc., but rather the standard Middle East national oil company scenario - and both the U.S. and the puppet oil minister are promoting the former, not the latter).
Notice that while the U.S. troops are scheduled to pull out of Iraqi cities, they will not be standing down the Oil Protection Force, will they? How obvious is it that the real agenda is still the same as it was in 2002:
West Sees Glittering Prizes Ahead in Giant Oilfields
by Michael Theodoulou in Nicosia and Roland Watson
Published on Thursday, July 11, 2002 in the Times of London
"The removal of President Saddam Hussein would open Iraq's rich new oilfields to Western bidders and bring the prospect of lessening dependence on Saudi oil. No other country offers such untapped oilfields whose exploitation could lessen tensions over the Western presence in Saudi Arabia."
In Iraq, COIN has been used primarily to protect international oil company interests, which is after all the main strategic thrust of the entire debacle - just look at Dick Cheney's energy task force maps, Feb 2001 - Iraqi oil fields and a list of suitors (from which American and British interests were noticeably absent).
This myopic policy has resulted in the needless deaths of hundreds of U.S. soldiers and thousands of Iraqi civilians, and the focus on Iraq created a debacle in Afghanistan - really, Iraq has been one of the most idiotic and shameful episodes in recent U.S. history. Of course Washington think tanks don't want to talk about it - there's really nothing good to say.
Chris makes some great
Chris makes some great points, but the COIN crowd needs to examine its limits. What can a third-party do? Can we really mold/shape identities? This is a very constructivist reading of world politics/social theory.
Is it possible that some identities can not be molded, and as Kilcullen points out, instituions that are not organic (or imposed institutions) will likely be seen as illegitimate, and have a high probability of failing.
Having a modest outlook of what a third-party can really accomplish is missing from the public debate. However, I can see flashes of this outlook in all the COIN writers/strategists. I think the COIN crowd has some of the greatest minds in strategy today, but I also see it being taken to an extreme, where one loses their sense of what is realistically possible.
However, I would have argued this before the Surge and been proven wrong. Our limits all depend on circumstances and local realities. The surge did not succeed militarily and fail politically. It allowed for enough "breathing room" for the Iraqi government to "get the job done." However, if we look at the government that is in place, and the limits of our ability to build a coherent functioning government, maybe the Surge is just a time-buyer until Maliki becomes a strongman. Maybe not.
I know I criticized Gentile for being a bad writer and then I rambled like that... Oops.
CNAS is the liberal version
CNAS is the liberal version of AEI. They have basically the same foreign policy. They both want to bring democracy to the mid-east. Preferably without violence, but will use violence if necessary.
I think that it is funny that Andrew Exum hates neocons while at the same time advances their agenda.
Of course, this follows the
Of course, this follows the Bacevich template: cast aspersions about the intellectual integrity of your interlocutors, suggesting that they support certain policy positions because it will result in employment or other benefit. That's how Kilcullen was criticized in Bacevich's National Interest review -- and with remarkably little outrage or even comment -- so why not apply such base motivations to the entire crowd?
Oh, you mean like the following:
But for now, I suspect that one of the reasons Krauthammer, Kagan & Co. are criticizing Obama's tactics vis a vis Iran is because the majority of Americans would find their strategic goals they hint at but never reveal to be bat-guano crazy.
http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/06/arguing-iran.html
At least the AmCon article ascribes reasonable, if not admirable, motivations to the CNAS crowd-- Andrew isn't even charitable enough to consider NeoCons! sane. Or are you one of those people who find it acceptable to dish it out to NeoCons! but certainly can't take the fire when it's incoming?
What's wrong with being
What's wrong with being Hillary Clinton's "national security team in waiting?" Shouldn't you be proud of that? Stand up for what you believe in, Exum! Apparently, CNAS and this blog can't stand any form of criticism, no different than any liberal. Just be patient AM. when the Muslim Brotherhood run the country, your group will be sitting pretty.
But who can top the previous comment, that dhimmitude won't last long as a global strategy. Cheers, mate!
RA: You make some good
RA:
You make some good points, and are correct to point out the constructivist position inherent in COIN. And yes, constructivism can give rise to hubris, but assuming that identities and opinion are fixed is simply ignores history, including recent history.
It's clearly easier to cause societies to fracture along ethnic, sectarian, or class lines (depending on where and when we're talking about) than to (re)construct more inclusive ones, but that doesn't mean it's impossible. There's a pretty good body of evidence - Kalyvas included - that people follow a sort of bounded rationality in throwing their loyalty behind a particular socio-political order (and the forces backing it).
The challenge is combining the real benefits (e.g. security, economic opportunity, etc.) with an info op using the right symbolic logic so that people can defect to your preferred identity construct without too much cognitive dissonance. In other words, an Eshaqzai tribesman in Kandahar needs to a) derive real benefits from loyalty to the Afghan gov't, b) believe he will derive those benefits, and c) be able to pledge that allegiance without having it clash fundamentally with the rest of his sense of identity.
I give up... what does this
I give up... what does this even mean?
"COIN has yet to be fully tested or even legitimated by any success outside of the surge narrative...
One more point, RA: Having a
One more point, RA:
Having a modest outlook of what a third-party can really accomplish is missing from the public debate.
While that formulation is appealing, it runs into some problems of evidence and expectations. I don't think we have a firm grasp of what is and isn't possible for a third-party in a civil war, and more to the point how that varies according to context, and around which critical factors.
Secondly, the people whose loyalty we're trying to attract don't want modest results: they want major ones. In part because of the risk involved in placing a bet on us, and in part because they are at least minimally aware of the discrepancy in resources and wealth between their situation and ours. If we don't generate major change, it looks like we're not actually in it to win, in which case why bet on us in the first place?
Why Dr XM, my dearest online
Why Dr XM, my dearest online friend, if may call you that...you didn't mention you can get people jobs ...that puts things in an entirely new light....
I kid, I kid.
"Every problem has a military solution. Every problem is a nail because we have a hammer. " said the Anon think tanker.... umm...didn't Bacevich say that in "The New American Militarism"?
CNAS has it's own hit squad? Cool. Did you enable the LEGO's with nano-bot technology?
Semi-Serious. Congrats. Yourrrrr IT .
MK, Great stuff. Thanks. I
MK,
Great stuff. Thanks. I will need to think on this.
As you rightly point out, and something I completely agree with, cultures/peoples change. This is not to me the problem. And maybe you are right, it isn't "impossible" for us to construct more inclusive, participatory socieities. But this just doesn't come out of nowhere. You can't just say: here, have a civil society! There you go.
There can be construction, but it has to be slow, gradual, and with the proper prerequisites. This is why I think when Kilcullen and others say 10-15 years for Afghanistan, I tend to think more like 30-50. This is not politically viable, nor financially. So where do we draw the line. While it may be "possible" maybe it isn't "worth it".
Also, your last points on what we don't know, and the expectations of our counterparts are examples of why COIN is questioned by people like Gentile. We don't know how much we can affect a local/small war, because each culture/peoples will react differently to our presence. Also, the fact that more is expected out of us than we can actually provide/accomplish begs the question, why put yourself in such a situation? As James C. Scott points out in Seeing Like a State (Ex, this should be on the reading list) attempts to improve the human condition by outside forces tend to fail, miserably. Maybe this means we need to look again at what the goals of COIN are, maybe they need to be more modest. But then, maybe COIN loses its utility all together.
However, you make some great points, and like I said, I need to think more on this.
"Every problem is a nail
"Every problem is a nail because we have a hammer."
While I am sure Bacevich would be flattered, it was Mark Twain who said this.
These clowns would help if
These clowns would help if they had any sort of realistic alternative. Bacevich/Vlahos & Co say that these wars are expensive, that the military is controlling all sorts of foreign policy apparati (sp?) and the like.
Ok, great. I agree. As Kilcullen says, let's not invade another sovereign country with 150,000 troops and spend trillions on it. Where's the beef? Let's get State beefed up and work on bringing the military back from the fore-front of American foreign policy. I'm all about it.
But when it comes to "what do we do about a a massive vacuum in the hotbed of transnational takfiri ideology - central Asia (not the Arab world )-" there's just silence. Or that idiot Cohen's "get bin Laden and get out."
The COIN "movement" is about winning the wars we're in and being able to do it if called upon. If they're interested in pushing "no more interventions" take it up with the idiots who started these wars. Otherwise, come up with a viable alternative and I'm all ears.
For now, COIN seems to be it.
Matt
Although I am pretty sure
Although I am pretty sure Bacevich does say it in New American Militarism...books at home, I will have to check.
Or r u saying that Mark Twain is now a Think Tanker, and an Anon one at that? How far the Republic has fallen...
I think that it is funny
I think that it is funny that Andrew Exum hates neocons while at the same time advances their agenda.
I would submit, Wayne, that you don't actually know much about the neocons, then.
RA - again, good points.
RA - again, good points.
But this just doesn't come out of nowhere. You can't just say: here, have a civil society! There you go.There can be construction, but it has to be slow, gradual, and with the proper prerequisites. This is why I think when Kilcullen and others say 10-15 years for Afghanistan, I tend to think more like 30-50. This is not politically viable, nor financially. So where do we draw the line. While it may be "possible" maybe it isn't "worth it".
I agree with both of you ; )
By which I mean that relatively high levels of engagement will be required consistently for 5-10 more years, followed by intermittent periods of intensive engagement in the subsequent 20-30 years. I don't think we're talking large troop presence engaged in combat ops for more a few more years, if we're successful. And if we're not, we also won't be talking about a large troop presence...
There's no question Afghanistan is a hard case - in fact, one of the hardest - but that's why our enemies adapted to make use of it, as they are in Yemen and Somalia. Whenever possible they'll choose the terrain that favours them most. Sucks that they won't agree to meet us next Thursday at the Fulda Gap, but that's why they the enemy and not the the OPFOR in an exercise.
We don't know how much we can affect a local/small war, because each culture/peoples will react differently to our presence.
I don't completely agree with this. While we'll never have perfect knowledge, careful and deep analysis of a specific conflict at a specific time can provide a reasonable guide for engagement. If that weren't true, then that lack of certainty should constrain our application of conventional military means as much as COIN.*
Problem is that the analysis inside governments and international organizations often isn't great, and we haven't yet pinned down generalizable principles well enough to keep people from producing dreck.
Also, the fact that more is expected out of us than we can actually provide/accomplish begs the question, why put yourself in such a situation?
Because the alternative sucks more. That's a glib answer, but it basically boils down to that, IMO. Looking back over both recent and distant history, we've tried the 'just stay out of it' approach with poor results - hell, we tried it in Afghanistan during the '90s. While that's an extreme example, in a globalized age in which individuals and non-state groups are empowered through a combination of technology dissemination, ease of travel, and media (all of which we also rely on for our prosperity), I don't think we can afford to assume the disorder at the margins of the global order won't reach us. That DOES NOT mean going heavy into every situation of state instability, but it does mean engaging carefully and intelligently and leveraging our resources through local and global allies to mitigate and hopefully resolve that instability.
Ryan, "Yeah, sure, after the
Ryan,
"Yeah, sure, after the neocons effed up everything else they possibly could. Promoted by the neocons as a last ditch, but formulated by our very own (and one of Australia's) military humanities geeks. At least they got one thing right. Kilcullen is "ubiquitous".
"COIN today is the realm of CNAS, as if Frederick Kagan and AEI had never existed."
We can dream...
This is absurd. The neocon dream was spreading democracy with a transformed slimmed down military knocking regimes over and being welcomed as liberators. "
Can you actually define what Neo-cons are? It's really simply to use this as a slur, and very convenient too, because it makes it seem as if the the problem was just Bush and Co -- get rid of them and everything is better. The fact is, George Bush's foreign policy wasn't especially "neo-con" because that term is useless. is Ken Pollacj a neo-con? Thomas Friedman? Every single major Democratic Senator at the time who voted for the war in the Senate? There was nothing in W.s foreign policy that was out of character with American history of liberal interventionism. The only difference is that he was willing to intervene in Iraq, whereas Clinton was not.
Looks like just another ad
Looks like just another ad hominem attack by the NeoConArtists. Dont give a hoot about the merits of another's argument. Just call names. Well, that worked well for Bush League America. Now did it not? Old school military minds married to old school politicians attempting to force and bully their way back to supremacy. Brute force American power has not worked since WWII, but that never stopped the madness of the military complex. I am all gunho to be armed to the neck and willing to strike fatal blows in self defense, but at the end of the day, you have to work and play with others. Maybe we should start with fair and free trade practices without the corporate rigging and theft of other nations' wealth and the subsequent death of lower and middle class Americans defending the "shareholders" or executives' wealth. Have the "jokers" go suck their toes. I am not accepting nor tolerating their ultra-right wing attacks and propaganda. The election was won by the Nerds as Hodgeman explained eloquently last week at the correspondents dinner http://tpmtv.talkingpointsmemo.com/?id=2784320 . The Jocks are just silly junior high children at this point threatening all the other children.
I dont know how willing you are to accept the extremely poor performance of our military force in Iraq and Afghanistan other the last seven years. SEVEN years going on eight. A massive cost to taxpayers. A divisive result on our nation. Thousands of dead. Where are the results? Check the price of oil. Check the global threat level. Looks like to me, the neocons need to remember their capitalist creed of: The best predictor of future performance is past performance. And for all the super Patriots take your empty rhetoric to the funerals of all the children killed and injured last month by your improperly deployed B1 bomber. After seven years you cannot construct, guide or follow a simple process still. Hold your heads in shame.
Thank god we have other think tanks to replace the old school deadenders from AEI and others! At least that is my humble opinion from out here on the climate changed prairies of America. Please forgive me Supreme Leaders of the Republican Guard for I have sinned. Yeah, right. Catch you at the next election polling place. I will be the liberal wise guy eating granola and grinning wide and large while listening to Green Day on my iPhone.
@ Erik Vanderhoff ''I
@ Erik Vanderhoff
''I would submit, Wayne, that you don't actually know much about the neocons, then.''
I know much about neocons.
"Clowns to the left of me /
"Clowns to the left of me / jokers to the right "
Well, at least you admit the Left are Clowns, and the Right has a sense of humor ;-)
"COIN seems to be it" Or at
"COIN seems to be it"
Or at least you bought it. Tell me Matt, how many decades, billions of dollars, and National Guard troops spending half their lives away from home before you re-evaluate whether it is "it."
Alternative? How about not escalating with more troops and not expanding into Afghanistan for starters.
Basically when you say you aren't hearing any alternatives, what you are saying is you are not hearing any that meet your lofty ideals.
Statistically, only one in four counterinsurgencies is successful. What makes you think yours will be the one. Kind of like 100% of couples thinking their marriage won't be one of the 60% that end in divorce. Or the 90% of drivers that think they are above average.
Have you even looked at the casualty figures in Afghanistan through the first 22 days of June versus those in Iraq. Did you read anything about the car bombs the last two days in Iraq? COIN is working alright. At least those who disagree with you are just clowns and not terrorist sympathizers.
It is only a matter of time
It is only a matter of time before an org chart pops up online connecting CNAS to the Fed, the Trilateral Commission, the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, the Free Masons and the Pope. You guys don't have Geronimo's skull as an ashtray do you? CNAS is probably you guys sitting around a sweat lodge naked discussing clear, build and hold.
"sitting around a sweat
"sitting around a sweat lodge naked discussing clear, build and hold"
Seeing as the McChrystal can't clear and hold anything within rocket range of Bagram, CNAS with probably be history within a year or two.
Afghanistan will be the end of the Obama presidency. Nagl and Kilcullen will be revered like Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld. Ricks like Judith Miller. Exum will get a sweet deal at Huffington Post (or be special Military analyst on Rachel Maddow for the next war) and MattC86 will have to go back to writing "First Bitches!" on Perez Hilton.
"Just because someone knows
"Just because someone knows quite a bit about something, doesn't make them right."
That's correct. But I didn't say otherwise. In fact, I said neither thing, nor did I make any correlation or causation between the two things I didn't say.
Please don't put words in my mouth.
I said they knew what they were talking about. I never said Exum didn't.
The insinuation here and elsewhere (mainly Ricks) is that Vlahos is crazy or stupid.
I personally am quite up to date on the argument and judging it from as an objective standpoint as I can muster my personal feeling is that antiwar.com/Vlahos/Raimondo/Bacevich are beating the tar out of Exum/Nagl/CNAS/McChrystal/Obama/Ricks.
People talk about an alternative, but the reality is that COIN really doesn't take into account the big picture or grand strategy - Bacevich does. But you would actually need to read one of his books to understand that. Reading sound-bites from speeches is not really doing your homework.
People talk about an
People talk about an alternative, but the reality is that COIN really doesn't take into account the big picture or grand strategy - Bacevich does.
Could you explain what you mean, because I see it exactly the opposite?
COIN is a plan B for
COIN is a plan B for conflicts that have not been going well for over 6 years (some would say "wars" we are losing). Nothing more.
In other words, COIN is a way to continue these wars. Not to end them.
These assholes here talk about "alternatives." Pull the troops out, you dumb fucks. Like we did in Vietnam 70-72.
All of Bacevich's writing and his philosophy is about how we as a nation have turned Wilsonian ideals into a God-given mandate to spread "freedom" across the globe. And how "liberty" is our code word for waging never-ending war.
Bacevich has been writing about this long before anyone knew who Exum or Obama were. COIN/CNAS and how antiwar.com and Gentile are painting them fit perfectly into Bacevich's narrative. Bacevich knows it. And CNAS knows it. That's why they want so badly for him to like them.
There was a reason he was allowed to be the lone "dissident."
@Chris Mewett No "coherent
@Chris Mewett
No "coherent counter-arguments" at all; it's a wonder so many people -- in the business of national security and otherwise -- find them compelling.
Find what compelling? The counter-arguments I say don't exist?
Well? I'm waiting. Feel free to post links to any you can find. And please make sure to reference the initial argument of Bacevich's that you were referring to.
...Oh. and when you said the business of otherwise... were you referring to crack-smoking? I'm not sure. You're so vague.
@MK: I think Bachevich's
@MK:
I think Bachevich's point is that, in terms of the big picture, we are seeing many military elites (former and active) having a disproportional amount of influence on policy and national security ideas, which obviously tends to lead towards military solutions. Likewise, while many derided the Bush Administration for his dependence on neocons (rightfully so), we could be seeing Obama including COINdinistas into the debate at an unhealthy rate. The point is you still have too many like-minded individuals (many of whom get really pissy when critiqued, as witnessed on this blog, much like neocons a few years ago), emanating from the military, pushing military-centric solutions to foreign policy. That may seem normal to some, but that is most certainly not the way good governance is designed in an ideal world.
Its a disturbing pattern from my point, so I'm glad Bacevich points this out. Democrats (I'm one of them) are in many ways gravitating towards ideology the way the Bush administration did; too point this out will only help the discourse.
Johnny RIco: As far as I can
Johnny RIco: As far as I can see, your argument boils down to this: "Pull the troops out, you dumb fucks. Like we did in Vietnam 70-72". To wich my comment is: And what do you think will happen then to all the folks who have believed the US promises of a better tomorrow?
"And what do you think will
"And what do you think will happen then to all the folks who have believed the US promises of a better tomorrow?"
The same thing that happened to the South Vietnamese?
What the hell do you care? It certainly won't be any worse than what is happening to the Sudanese....Oh, wait, I'm sorry. Can you find Sudan on a map, Fnord? Or does your mental GPS/Google Earth system only run where America intervenes for "freedom."
Sorry, you're wrong. I follow Bacevich. My argument is his. The "pull out the troops" comment was not how my argument "boiled down." It was how your brain chose to distort it. Read the thread again, or have one of your children explain it to you.
Red - thanks for the
Red - thanks for the response.
...pushing military-centric solutions to foreign policy. That may seem normal to some, but that is most certainly not the way good governance is designed in an ideal world.
Here I disagree with both the characterization of COIN, and the description of where the problem lies. COIN is supposed to include a major non-military lines of operation. That too much of that effort is currently carried out by military personnel is a symptom of institutional and structural problems at DOS and USAID. As a colleague of mine is fond of pointing out there are 2-3 million people serving in the US military versus 6,700 DoS Foreign Service Officers, and even fewer USAID FSOs. And it's not just a matter of funding - too many (though certainly not all) State Dept officials aren't willing to deploy somewhere dangerous and uncomfortable. The over-militarization of current COIN is a symptom of many institutional problems, but also a widespread unwillingness of civilians to step up.
But that aside, having studied peace and stability ops pretty closely, I've yet to find an example where security and governance could be fostered without a force strong enough to deal with spoilers. In fact, if you study UN peace ops, you'll find the opposite problem to that which concerns you - not enough force, leading to endless conflict with huge tolls on civilians.
Johnny RIco - Well, I've spent quite a bit of time in Central and East Africa, including Sudan, and I think you're full of it too. If you can't see the fundamental differences between Vietnam and Afghanistan, you don't know your history. Go read about Hazarajat in the mid-90s and then tell us about how the threat of a bloodbath is inflated.
Bacevich lays way too many
Bacevich lays way too many faults at the military's door. We have done as we are asked. Further, he seems to see a world without enemies, a history that doesn't seem to include the Fascists or the Communists and the 100 million plus they killed and in which we the USA are the prime aggressor. He really needs to get over Vietnam and the guilt trip. And he does need to answer the question "what alternative"? I've read two of his books and I think a fair sample of his essays. When he even presents an alternative it seems to be along the lines of change the world so there's some kind of mutually agreed on international order and a UN that works. I do believe his central thesis is that America is trying to change the world into being a community of liberal democracies at bayonet point so.....
"I follow Bacevich" - where? He doesn't want to lead, except perhaps in the classroom. He is worth reading as a note of caution for America and it's military. Dr Bacevich's diagnosis of our ills is worth consideration. Dr. Bacevich has no realistic prescriptions. Dr Exum and Dr Fick, et al do.
That last one hurt BTW
That last one hurt BTW (prescription...)
I wonder if Bacevich wants the argument to be about him. I kind of doubt it. Once again, what are your alternatives? "Pull out the troops" "Don't invade" etc...Can you guys get some new material? Please? It's like watching network news.
And what is your alternative? Bend over while savages conduct marauding tribal raids with airline tickets and train/bus tokens instead of horses, because that's what they do? We didn't start the war in AsbuffooPakeestan. They did, the Russians invaded, and they've been playing the passive aggressive victim game since. We made one mistake, and that was not leaving them to Boris, who uhh ...heh heh...doesn't quite frame his internal debates the way we do.
"What the hell do you care?
"What the hell do you care? It certainly won't be any worse than what is happening to the Sudanese...."
Last time I checked, NATO was not an ally of Sudan, nor had we promised them our cooperation in a fight. II realize you have no conception of honour and would willingly sacrifice babies for your own comfort, but the argument is just plain immoral nevertheless.
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