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Funding U.S. Counterinsurgency Wars
June 22, 2009 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 4:05pm | 18 Comments
Steve Biddle, in typically intelligent analysis, considers a "double transformation":
Ironically, the traditionalists are right about tomorrow, but the young Turks are right about today.
I am actually banging my
I am actually banging my head against the wall while I read this. Has Biddle actually ever heard the term Hybrid Warfare? Does he honestly believe Iraq and Afghanistan is low-intensity warfare?
Andrew, you have often said that Lebanon in 2006 is the metric through which you gauge where someone is in the strategic atmosphere. For Biddle, it seems he has ignored the fact that Israel had trained to police the Palestinians, and fight a massed Blitzkreig-style war. They were not engaged in COIN warfare. Lebanon is, like Hybrid Warfare itself, in the middle. It is that idea the US has been training for and fighting since 2006. It is the idea that Petreaus and Gates have been trying to imbue in the political leaders. Lebanon shows what the US (and the West in general) must train to fight because it allows every strategy to be used to fight and counter what is being thrown at you.
I am sick to death of the the dichotomised thinking that pervades the US strategic culture.
During the Cold War, the
During the Cold War, the United States did not focus -- militarily -- on "winning the wars of today;" which, at that time, were almost proxy hybrid/irregular wars and campaigns -- and the most prolific and extensive such challenge that the United States has ever faced.
Instead, the United States focused on winning the convention war that never came.
By this strategy and budgeting decision (not focused on "winning the wars of today"), the United States achieved a great success.
Is there a lesson here for today?
Correction to my first
Correction to my first paragraph above:
During the Cold War, the United States did not focus -- militarily -- on "winning the wars of today;" which, at that time, were almost ALL proxy hybrid/irregular wars and campaigns -- and the most prolific and extensive such challenge that the United States has ever faced.
Sorry.
"Does he honestly believe
"Does he honestly believe Iraq and Afghanistan is low-intensity warfare?"
Why shouldn't he. It is extremely low intensity warfare. The highest sustained casualty rate (deaths) the US experienced in Iraq was about 4 per day. It is now less than 1.
Now do those numbers for Vietnam, Korea, WWII, WWI, Civil War.
Do it for the Somme, The Battle of the Bulge, Antietam, Tarawa.
Try this. Calculate how many Russians and Germans died per day driving from Stalingrad to Berlin.
Iraq and Afghanistan are so low intensity, there has been confusion over whether or not to call them wars.
Bill, Yes, the US focused on
Bill,
Yes, the US focused on winning ‘wars’ around the globe during the Cold War by utilising military power and it did not work! The US did not win the Cold War in the sense of overcoming your opponent. The Soviet Union collapsed because of its own internal economic and political contradictions and inefficiencies. The SU opted out of the security dilemma. That is a win by default, not a victory in the traditional sense.
Also, do you not believe that if the US had actually succeeded in its overseas wars that collapse might have come sooner? What if Vietnam had been won through the proper use of power right from the beginning? Would that not have cemented US power even more so? Would Latin America be so hostile to the US if it did not support genocidal dictators over less brutal leftists and just let countries decide their own fate? I am sorry to rage again against the dichotomised thought process in US strategic policy, but it fails every test. Good vs. Evil; Us vs. Them does not work! And this is what you are suggesting. The US did not succeed in any overseas campaign because it never acknowledged the idea people might be fighting for reasons other than the Communist global conspiracy. (Accidental Guerrilla anyone?)
And finally, you are forgetting one major point: the enemy gets a vote. Who is actually going to challenge the US in a conventional land battle? So why should conventional be the absolute focus of military power? If you end up fighting in a Hybrid warfare environment all the time where massed armoured assaults are irrelevant, why bother having them at such excessively high levels?
Visitor,
And how long did those battles last for? A few days, a week, a month or so? Insurgency wars last for years, and soldiers generally spend more days in actual combat than they would in a conventional battle. Does that not conform to the basic definition of high-intensity conflict? Just because fewer die does not mean it is less intensive.
Also, the hybrid warfare model acknowledges the use of high-intensity conventional warfare techniques by non-conventional forces. So how does this not make it high-intensity?
sorry, I was 'Visitor'
sorry, I was 'Visitor' before, still getting used to the system. But I like it, not having to post an email addy.
The British lost 60,000 casualties and 20,000 dead on the first day of the Somme. Maybe you wouldn't call that "high" intensity warfare, but "ultra" high or "mega" high.
Let's just repeat that. 1 day. 20,000. 5 times the entire US death toll in 5 years.
Now lets divide 4000 by 5 by 365 days = 2.2 per day for Iraq on a long-term sustained basis. We can do WWI whenever you like. (I'm waiting)
Okay, so 20,000 over 2.2 = The first day of the Somme was over 9000 times as intense as your average day in Iraq.
So even if we say the Somme was ultra-mega-super-intense. Iraq is stil lame-lame-lame-low-dull-intensity by comparison.
Try again.
Hint: Use actual numbers and facts instead of relying on your opponent.
And no, getting smacked by an IED is no more or less intense then getting hit by a WWI arty round. With or without body armor or an iphone or heli medevac.
"Hybrid-warfare" ? Please.
"Hybrid-warfare" ?
Please. Don't insult my intelligence. I've never heard this term before I came to this website. You can't be fucking serious. This is the type of shit star-trek nerds and people that play fantasy baseball discuss. Hybrid-warfare.
Like one minute you are all T34 versus Panther with MG42s and Kyatushas blazing. Mines and bunkers, Stukas , Messershmitts, Stormoviks. Craziness and Death.
And then with a shhh and a whirr, we are chilling, smoking a cigar with Ho Chi Minh, and trying to grab some information about a young Che Guevarra. Then riding into the Kazakhi sunset on a unicorn with a headwrap and my CIA badge safely hidden.
... yeah. You and MattC86 will have to tell me that story some other time.
When is the halftime? Does the Blitzkrieg or the Operation Phoenix come first?
Johnny, You really must
Johnny,
You really must have devoured that art of arguing by Dave Barry Andrew posted a week or so ago. The only thing you missed was the inappropriate Nazi reference.
“Hint: Use actual numbers and facts instead of relying on your opponent.” – Last I checked, that was the major metric used in Vietnam and it was a major reason for the strategic failure. What is the point of counting bodies if your actions merely create more enemies?
What exactly is wrong with the term Hybrid Warfare? I also did not hear it before becoming aware of the GWOT COIN dissenters (now named COINdistas) and so far it has encompassed the problems encountered in past few years quite well. Furthermore, when you go back and reread the history of much of modern non-state-to-state-based warfare with the understanding of what Hybrid Warfare is, the reasons for abject failure are far more obvious than they could be with any other intellectual concept.
“When is the halftime? Does the Blitzkrieg or the Operation Phoenix come first?” – and you wonder why I protest the use of dichotomised thought processes! The point of Hybrid Warfare is that they both can be used at once - by you and your opponent - and unless you have the tools available to fight both, as well as gain the support of the at-risk population, you lose.
What is the point of posting all that vitriol?
Look Davies, I'm still new
Look Davies,
I'm still new here myself. I'm just tryin to smoke out the Abu Mook himself. Looks like he's kindof shy.
I wouldn't worry about me. I'm American, I love my Mother and I'll scrap with you any time over any issue.
But I wouldn't do that. Because I'll fucking kill you. Read some books and cook me pancakes and sausage and we'll get along a whole lot better. Now fuck off.
Sorry. I didn't mean to get off to a bad start. let me make it up to you. Analyze why the Israelis decimated both the Egyptians and the Syrians in October 1973.
Write me up 500 words and if I like it, I'll tell Petreaus you're not retarded.
Ah, the all-american male
Ah, the all-american male pruning his feathers in blessed anonymity. Got to love them keyboard warriors.
Now what was your actual point behind the bluster, Rico? That Iraq was low to no intensity? Tell that to the Iraqis.
From the link"
From the link" "...Krauthammer has shown quite a bit more intellectual..."
I stopped reading right there. Anyone who REALLY believes he is any more 'intellectual' than a chimpanzee just could not be worth reading
(...and my apologies to global chimp society for that comparison, along with the GW Bush comparisons I've used over the years)
Me Bad... Wrong thread.
Me Bad... Wrong thread.
You look, Juan my boy, In
You look, Juan my boy,
In most Western Cultures it's considered impolite and off-putting to drop your trousers and defecate on the doormat immediately after entering someone's house. Likewise, introducing yourself on a blog by announcing that you will "fucking kill" (I have yet to see or hear of that actually being done...would be pretty grisly) someone unless they cook you sausage and pancakes and then compose a short essay for you is typically frowned upon. I highly doubt that you'll get any reaction out of AM himself, as you failed to get a reaction from Ricks when you were trolling his blog. Announcing that you're here to "smoke him out" doesn't improve your chances either. Try insulting SNLII instead.
You really outdid yourself there with comparing the casualty numbers from the first day of the Somme with Iraq; I once proved that Detroit didn't have a crime problem by pointing out the major discrepancy between the number of Michigan Soldiers killed at Cold Harbor and the number of police killed in the line of duty over an average year. However, I wasn't able to explain why the Civil war was immediately followed by a lengthy and torturous process of reconstruction; I mean, we had a war right? When was halftime?
At the risk of falling to your level, I suggest that you take your sausage, pancakes and essay and scurry back to the Rodger Young. I think I hear you mother calling.
hot off the presses: "Iraqi
hot off the presses:
"Iraqi Oil Minister Hussain al-Shahristani answered questions from members of Parliament who are concerned pending auctions are not structured with Iraq's best interests in mind, The Times of London reports.
"The oil minister must convince us why the government should have spent $8 billion to develop oil fields, but then offers them to foreign firms like pieces of cake," said Jabir Khalifa Jabir, secretary of the Oil and Gas Committee in the Iraqi Parliament.
Shahristani announces the winners of the auction next week in a bidding round that includes 32 foreign oil companies, including supermajors BP and Royal Dutch Shell."
How does COIN and "hybrid warfare" fit into that scenario? Oh I got it -
1) Observe that uppity dictators in the Middle East are threatening your security by dropping British-American oil firms in favor of those from Russia, China, France, etc. Recognize that you can't bomb the country once the Russians and Chinese set up shop there. Invent multiple dishonest reasons for invading the country, and enlist your domestic media links (Judith Miller) in an effort to sell it to the public. Who was the man of the hour? John Rendon? - and oh yes - make sure you've got lots of flags on hand. There are two PR lines to push:
1a) Biological and nuclear and chemical and ballistic missile programs - all non-existent, but with an intelligence agent like Chalabi & the INC running the program (curveball, etc.), who cares? Just get Micahel O'Hanlon and Ken Pollack to write books and articles based on Chalabi's lies, then organize conferences based on those writings - same old bullshit.
1b) Links between Saddam and Al Qaeda. This is where things get interesting, as apparently Rumdolt and Dickhead and their shady group of psychopathic Edward Teller-inspired nutcases first introduced torture in an effort to elicit confessions from Al Qaeda detainees of links to Saddam - so if you were wondering what the real reason was that the CIA destroyed all those interrogation tapes, that's probably it.
2) Bomb the living shit out of the target in a massive 'shock and awe' campaign involving lots of ultra-high power ordinance, then charge in with multiple armored columns and secure the country, which has no military strength to speak of after a decade of sanctions and UN inspections. Cakewalk - declare Mission Accomplished, sign some oil contracts, pat your new puppet on the head and fly back home for the victory party! (minus the troops you left to guard the oil installations)
Which such a brilliant plan in place, how could it have gone so wrong?
Let's ask the British... and the Germans... and the French.... and the Soviets...
"To perceive victory when it is known to all is not really skillful. Everyone calls victory in battle good, but it is not really good. - Sun Tzu"
Victorious in battle but defeated during the occupation. What now? Oh, I know - COIN.
let's play acronyms, aka, maximum snarkiness. Is it:
Covert Operations Inspired by Nazis?
(no)
Completely Obvious INdiscretions?
(not really)
Clear! Oops! I... No!
(yes)
Public grilling for Gordon
Public grilling for Gordon Brown and Tony Blair in Iraq inquiry
* Nicholas Watt, chief political correspondent
* guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 23 June 2009 21.13 BST
"Gordon Brown and Tony Blair face being questioned in public over their roles in the run-up to the Iraq war after the chairman of the independent inquiry indicated that he is to summon the prime minister and his predecessor to give evidence."
When do we get to ask those questions of the U.S. leadership?
Today's wars seem very much
Today's wars seem very much like yesterday's wars, to wit: Wars of national liberation:
-- Conflicts fought by indiginous people -- against imperial powers or their local surrogates
-- in the name of self-determination -- thus attempting to remove an imperial power's influence
-- often founded in guerrilla or asymettric warfare -- sometimes with the assistance/intervention of other states.
Yesterday, different groups of indiginous people used the banner of communism and the support of the Soviet Union and China to try to rid themselves f the West.
Today, certain indiginous people fight against the West under the banner of Islam and with the support of various Islamic countries and factions.
During the Cold War, the United States determined that it would be counterproductive and strategically irrational to go chasing -- militarily --after these various wars of national liberation; as this seemed to play into the enemy's(ies') hand. Instead, other methods and tactics were used to good effect.
Today, in stark contrast, the US has determined that military intervention and "societal transformation" are the way to go in today's wars of national liberation.
But will military intervention and societal transformation techniques -- brought forward by the very people (the West) that they wish to get rid of -- be sufficent to have the indiginous people forego their wish to be liberated? Or is this wishful or irrational thinking?
A final question: Is the Islamic world the last great civilization not to have achieved true independence from the West?
Johnny, Nice sledging! Did
Johnny,
Nice sledging! Did you sleep better after threatening me? Also, threatening someone is not the same as high level intellectual debate. You would understand this if you passed High School.
Thanks to the other guys for the back up.
I also threw up a little at this line - "...Krauthammer has shown quite a bit more intellectual..."
I'll write 1000 words on what happened in '73 if you write 1000 words on why similar techniques failed in Lebanon '06
g.d.,
One of the major problems with the Hybrid Warfare model is that it lacks a grand strategy. I personally am eagerly awaiting something from the COINdistas on that level.
The very idea of Hybrid Warfare arose out of the failures of Iraq and the GWOT on all levels. However, that is not to suggest that there will be a political decision in the future to invade another country in a similar duplicitious way but still have the military run a Hybrid Warfare based approach.
Where on earth does Biddle
Where on earth does Biddle get the idea that the IDF is COIN-centric? The fact is that the IDF has been preparing for the same wars it has fought during its existence. Certainly IDF units have been tasked with patrolling occupied Palestinian territory, but they do so from the protection and comfort of Merkava tanks and massive armored personal carriers. In fact, rather than policing the Occupied Territories, the IDF is more a of giant team called out to perform punitive expeditions against the PA and Hamas. Does Biddle really thing that the IDF is interested in winning over the local Palestinian population?
The problems with the IDF in Lebanon was a heavy, mechanized force being canalized into small valleys with villages and natural terrain interrupting any ability for it to truly operate the way it was trained to take on an invader surging through the Golan heights. In fact, the head of the IDF during the 2006 was Halutz, an air officer who was far more enamored of the US's netcentric "Shock and Awe" model than he should have been, As a result, the IDF fought clumsily as they tried to engage Hezbollah as if it were a conventional force with far too much emphasis placed upon force protection and staying buttoned up in their armor. The result was that the IDF suffered similiarly as did the Soviets did in 1939-40 in Finland with Israeli armor being attacked as mottis by Hezbollah Panzerjaeger teams with ATGM and RPGs.
With a casualty-adverse IDF, manned by too many inexperienced reservists atop Merkavas and APCs, the largely light infantry of the Hezbollah could come out of their bunkers and hideouts and harass the IDF almost at will. If anything, perhaps more of a WWI Stormtrooper inspired and trained IDF force, heavy with combat engineers and infantry deployed on foot, guided by a militarily-sound mission, could have had more success during the 2006 Lebanon war. IDF COIN orientation my foot.
To refute the effectiveness of COIN by pointing to the failure of the IDF in 2006 invites comparisons that Hezbollah fights similarly to the Taliban. Hezbollah is far better trained, equipped and tech-savvy than the Taliban. Hezbollah also has only one war and one opponent for which they have trained for the past 25 years. Their strategy and even their tactics, to make expeditions by the IDF too costly and painful, are wholly different from that of the Taliban.
As for whether or not the Trads or the COINs should have their say, perhaps we should be asking whether our nation or those of the West will make the mistake of invading countries where COIN and Nation-building is even required. Should we focused on training the bulk of our forces to engage in conflicts that are drawn-out, expensive and very challenging (politically, militarily, etc.) to say the least or should we be building up smaller forces that have a lower profile and a smaller footprint? What if we were to raised Twenty light infantry battalions within the Special Operations Command, trained in COIN and nation-building, rather than converting the entire conventional force to do so. Perhaps a Special Operations Command with it's own light infantry battalions with its own COIN capable air and naval forces would be better suited to these missions.
If a conflict required anything larger than what a beefed-up Special Operations Command could handle, perhaps we should be asking the question of whether that conflict serves the strategic interests of the US.
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