Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS.
One of our regular blog readers requested some discussion of the recent spate of bombings in Iraq and the implications for the U.S. pullout from Iraqi cities set for June 30 (this Tuesday--mark it on your calendar). This wave of attacks has prompted a good amount of hand-wringing about the coming “unraveling” of the country. Here’s my two-cent analysis.
Obviously we don't want to underestimate how dangerous and violent Iraq is. Even with the dramatic improvements in security over the past two years, it's not exactly a choice vacation destination and probably won't be for the foreseeable future. From the remnants of AQI to the underground members of the JAM and “special groups,” there’s no shortage of bad guys out there who would like to undermine the Iraqi government. With U.S. forces pulling back, they have some opportunity to reemerge, probe the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces, and spark a new round of communal strife.
So it’s not like the current series of bombings is unexpected. Certainly it’s not a good thing, but it’s also important not to overreact:
Despite all these bombings, we have yet to see signs that the death spiral of sectarian retaliation has returned or is about to return. This is a point that General Odierno has made with some regularity. The attacks in and of themselves are terrible, but not necessarily strategically significant unless they trigger waves of reprisals that Iraqi forces cannot control. If there are signs of this occurring, it doesn’t seem like they’re being noticed. Instead we get statements from al-Sadr after the recent attacks calling for restraint. Obviously we can’t take that restraint for granted, but that still seems qualitatively better than the days of 2006.
In any case, even if we’re concerned about some degradation of security, what are we supposed to do? A number of folks, including Stephen Biddle, have counseled slowing the pace of withdrawal, but to exactly what end? Iraq’s forces may not be the best in the world and Maliki may be overconfident, but it seems to me that what the Iraqis need is more assistance in resolving some underlying conflicts that can drive violence (Sunni integration into government, Kurdish territorial and oil disputes) and developing the governmental and economic institutions necessary to sustain the state. It’s not clear to me that continuing our troop presence in Iraq at its current level and disposition is still required to advance those goals.
Of course, I could be completely wrong. But if Iraq is about to go off the rails, I will predict that it will not be because of the Sunni-Shi’ite divide that still gets a lot of the U.S. media focus. It will either be a flaring-up of the simmering Kurdish-Arab conflict, or something else we haven’t thought of yet.
Can anyone suggest some good Iran blogs to follow in English, from the resistance (dare I profane) standpoint?
". . . it seems to me that what the Iraqis need is more assistance in resolving some underlying conflicts that can drive violence (Sunni integration into government, Kurdish territorial and oil disputes) and developing the governmental and economic institutions necessary to sustain the state."
Pretty tall order!
Fascinating stuff.
I wonder what is Iran's next move now that the United States is drawing down its presence. It struck me that Iran really pushed to have the SOFA written the way it is with the United States decreasing its presence over two years.
With the problems that are leftover like Arab-Kurd territorial tensions and a hydrocarbon law. I wonder if the Surge failed in terms of its political objectives?
Wasn't the political goal of the Surge to give breathing room to Iraqi politicians and figure some of these issues? I guess in the short term you could say that the Surge was a tactical success but a political failure. But from what I understand from Iraqi politics, Arabs define time differently than we do in the west. Maybe a political success is more a long to longer term concept.
I think the greatest failure of the Surge maybe even the military's COIN doctrine is that the focus is too much on the legitimacy and processes of the central government as opposed to the other political processes at the region and town level. It strikes me that power in Iraq comes from the tribes, religious leaders on the Shia side, and for a lack of a better phrase some gangster shit of the Sheiks. A combination of all three perhaps. The local processes were used to produce short term physical oriented stability as opposed to creating a longer term political solution on the local and regional level.
Then again there is something to be said about a centralized democratic government that has constituencies cutting across every region. But does representation translate into success as defined as a stable and productive Iraq?
@Ibn Muqwama
This is interesting. I think Iran's position is that they didn't want a SOFA so the US would be Iraq for a long time. On the other hand Iran exerts enough influence with the major political parties of Iraq (Shia of all brands and Kurds) that the political end product, the SOFA, was shaped in a way that favored Iran. That is keep the Americans tied down and providing physical security at the operational and tactical level and beating the US at the political level.
And bribery doesnt create peace.What happens when we stop paying them to not kill each other.
Ibn, Abu, Bin, Bint, whatever....
Haha—everyone is making this mistake.
Ibn muqawama is gonna get backhanded for confusing so many people. Here's a behind-the-scenes video showing what it's like to work as a co-blogger with Ex (El):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SfSy7vj47vU
For a truly depressing sumup on Iraq, check out this: http://www.takimag.com/blogs/article/the_surge_is_it_soup_yet/
Maybe the next serious battle will be between the Turkmen and the Kurds in Northern Iraq, that'll put the States in an interesting position.
The Return of the Strategy of Zarqawi?
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