Center for a New American Security

Isn't it time to ask whether

Isn't it time to ask whether a counter-insurgency doctrine that DOES NOT enable us to achieve our political and strategic gains is a failure?

Largely everybody credits Gen. Petraeus and his skilfull application of his counter-insurgency doctrine for the security gains of the past two years. And don't get me wrong. I don't disagree. Yet, strategically, the situation is far from ideal from our point of view:
- Iraqi politicians have not made the compromises necessary for reconciliation.
- The Kirkuk football has been kicked off the field (but for how long).
- Iraqi reconstruction is sorely lagging behind.
- Iraqi Government's governance is far from stellar.
- In the end, the new Iraq will probably be closer to Iran than to us.
- Regionally, the Iraqi government remains shunned by most of its Sunni neighbors.
- Regionally, the Iraqi government cannot be counted on to assist the US on the Israelo-Palestinian conflict (remember that it was the only regional power NOT at Annapolis).
- Last but not least, the country is full of 'bad guys' who have spent the better of the past six years learning guerrilla/insurgency tactics. I can't help but think that some of them will fan out of Iraq and lend their hard-earned skills in other trouble spots around the globe.

Shouldn't this kind of outcome be taken into account in our counter-insurgency doctrine?

Pascale

@ gian p gentile: So you're

@ gian p gentile:
So you're pissed off not that he didn't mention the honorable and wise Mr. Bacevich, but that he didn't properly address him? The fuck, man?

I think one has to

I think one has to distinguish between military successes (statistics of security and retaking control of territory previously controlled by AQI) and political failures (the actual difficulties of national integration i.e. a true Nation Building in a fragmented society).
One of the reasons of this gap can be found in the underlying philosophy of contemporary COIN doctrine, which is very tied to the "guerre révolutionnaire" paradigm of the 1906s-1070s. Indeed, the very question is the analysis of the causes of violence in such a conflict. Acknowledging the necessity to counter subversive action is a good thing (and, on this particular matter, I think the US was pretty successful) but not sufficient. One has to take into account the predatory violence and the revendicative one as well in order to understand particular dynamics of these conflicts that are occurring in Iraq since 2003. In this regard, US campaign from 2007 onward was not successful enough to produce significant political results, except from the partial reintegration of the Sunnis in the political process (a great achievement to be sure, but dangerous because it reinforced the fragmentation of the political representation of the group and because it deepened the communal identity).
Best
Stéphane
PS: in order to understand all that stuff, I recommend you read one article by Stathis Kalyvas that was published in the Journal of Strategic Studies, issue 3, 2008.
PPS: of course, I can be completely wrong and my judgement surely is too harsh to worth to be taken into consideration... beside the fact I'm French.

Well, it seems as though

Well, it seems as though Bacevich is treated like an object; like he is the Coin Crowd's George Ball from the LBJ Administration. You remember, the contrarian, the guy who didn’t get things but they liked to have him around for the token alternative view. Sorry Brenden, but I sense a very subtle but still visible air of condescension toward him and his arguments, albeit paid with a sort of half baked respect. The "reliable exception?"--Like almost they want to say "there he goes again, the broken record."

"Isn't it time to ask

"Isn't it time to ask whether a counter-insurgency doctrine that DOES NOT enable us to achieve our political and strategic gains is a failure?"

Ummm, what would be your definition of sucess, then? That the Iraqis finally get out the rose-petals as you slowly leave? You seem to forget that the current COIN doctrine came about as a response to *failure*, not as a part of a Grand Design. If you invade a country and kill 100 000+ of the population, I think gratitude is a bit hard to expect, no? Also, again I am troubled by the lack of alternatives provided. How would you lot have played it differently, then? As Exum noted on the CNAS conference, what is/was the alternative? I can also come up with a whole lot of critiscism for the COIN doctrine, mostly that youre going about it in a half-hearted manner, but I fail to see what the alternative in practical terms is. Anyone point me to a blueprint for an alternative way of dealing with Af/Pak? Or what should have been done in Iraq?

Interesting, who do you

Interesting, who do you think accepts this consensus?

Here's how I wrote it up

Here's how I wrote it up this morning:

"Iraq is KIND OF for Iraqis - Technically US troops are OUT of Iraq's cities (On a more circumspect note, when searched, Google said "Did you mean to search for: US troops are OUT of Iran's cities") today, however US Troops WILL remain in and around the cities of Iraq on 'standby' until 'requested' by Iraqi commanders.

Expect those incidents to be un-reported to the US press, who will most likely NOT be present in any manner where they could physically observe US troop movements themselves, or for that matter be aware of ANY activity by the 132,000 'contractors' (cf. mercenaries) remaining in Iraq.

In Da' Buffalo's opinion, the dirtiest part of the Iraq war is just beginning... under the radar, and without press observation, even as the US appears to be withdrawing.

From Foreign Policy In Focus...

My report on this, and the now VIOLENT, diplomatically isolated, coup in Honduras

Populaton Centric Coin is

Populaton Centric Coin is Not a strategy. It is a grab bag of tactics, methods, rolled together into an operational method. But, sadly and wrongly, it has come to be seen as strategy. What we have now in Astan (and before in Iraq) is a strategy of tactics. I say ironic because Krepinevich's strategy of tactics argument about the American Army in Vietnam has been inverted. In Vietnam, so K's argument goes, the American Army was so consumed with fighting World War II all over again in the Central Highlands because of its conventional mindedness, it was unable to see a better way to fight the war using population centric coin. Now in Astan, tthe American Army and many other parts of the Defense Establishment can only see Coin tactics and methods; hence a Strategy of Coin tactics.

@ Gian Popcentric COIN is a

@ Gian

Popcentric COIN is a strategy. You just don't like it.

As far as Bacevich goes. He would get more respect if he didn't use so many logical fallacies to make his point.

My view: Mr. Bacevich's military service is worthy of respect. His scholarship is not, because he uses so many logical fallacies to make his point.

Pop-centric COIN is doctrine

Pop-centric COIN is doctrine that's currently driving strategy. Well, it's a proposed doctrine that actually isn't what we do all that much, but it reads well in FM 3-24 and it sells well with influential journalists.

I happen to like the doctrine, a sin Gian perhaps finds unpardonable, but only because it is more likely than not to work IN CONJUNCTION with more nefarious enemy-centric and terrain-centric aspects of warfare we don't discuss, lest it upset the dominant narrative.

What we really need to do is somehow arrange for Moqtada al-Sadr and his JAM to land in Afghanistan and begin their uniquely persuasive techniques of population-centric COIN to the Taliban's supporters on both sides of the border, much as the JAMmies managed to do in Baghdad and much of southern Iraq against the Sunni Arab militias after Samarrah.

As far as I have understood

As far as I have understood it, "Pop-centric COIN" (makes me think of the Bee Gees for some reason) is a formalization of on-the-ground improvisations made in the absence of previously established doctrine, no? So I think thats the angle you ought to come at it, its a improvised doctrine and so needs much streamlining. But in the absence of a functioning UN and US state department, its what you gotta learn.

Wayne Z: Examples on Bachevich logical fallacies??

What we really need to do is

What we really need to do is somehow arrange for Moqtada al-Sadr and his JAM to land in Afghanistan and begin their uniquely persuasive techniques of population-centric COIN to the Taliban's supporters on both sides of the border, much as the JAMmies managed to do in Baghdad and much of southern Iraq against the Sunni Arab militias after Samarrah.

What, you mean by providing clothing, milk, oil, rice, sugar, clothes, fuel for heating and cooking when supplies
are available, new homes, and stipends to displaced families or those who've lost breadwinners?

Source: http://refugeesinternational.org/sites/default/files/UprootedandUnstable...

Funny, I thought that's what we're trying to do...just extraordinarily poorly right now (with notable local exceptions).

Obviously that was

Obviously that was accompanied by some other 'persuasion,' but let's not pretend there were no pop-centric elements of some insurgent groups, either.

While people like Wayne Z.

While people like Wayne Z. keep jabbering about illogical fallacies but basically just engage in ad hominems, and others complain about alternatives or don’t understand that COIN is not a strategy, Bacevich actually analyzes our strategy, or whatever exists until one comes along.

The current American foreign policy tactics/strategy are simply unsustainable. The commitment for this open-ended war-on-terror extends out at least two decades. That means the all volunteer force with continue to really on National Guard and reserve troops. And anyone in the militaries ground units can expect to spend half of their lives in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Pakistan or wherever the “National Security State” (as Bacevich calls it) decides terrorists exist.

The current defense budget is $400-$600 Billion. At least 25% higher than during the Cold War. This to prevent the possibilty of a terrorist attack, when at least 50,000 Americans are killed every year in car accidents or murdered by their fellow citizens.

This means the burden unfairly falls on less than 1% of the population. To change that would require a draft that would in turn raise the numbers in the military to the point where our defense budget would be $3 Trillion. We can’t afford that.

We are expanding our role in Afghanistan just as our allies are tiring and drawing down their forces. There is nothing from history, in our numbers or tactics, the political situation, or in the terrain or population dispersal in Afghanistan that suggests a force of 60,000 troops can achieve our goals there.

Not a single conflict or country we are currently engaged in is considered what was termed an MRC(Major Regional Conflict) in the 90s. The US Military is tasked with being able to fight two of these simultaneously. Now how did you think that was going to happen?

The current deployments do nothing to prevent terrorists from striking the US. 9/11 was launched from Boston by people who had been living in Florida and trained at American flight schools.

This COIN philosophy that is pumped by Exum,CNAS, and Tom Ricks is not currently being employed in Iraq (at least not since yesterday) and the troops don’t exist in Afghanistan at the levels necessitated by COIN doctrine so we don’t even need to discuss whether it is being employed or is effective.

COIN is basically a clever way for neo-liberals to show they are tough on security issues while simultaneously creating a break from neo-conservative ideology. It another sense it is a marketing strategy to sell never-ending war while we wait for the next big conflict with China or whoever.

Because what is best in life is, as Conan says, “To crush your enemies, to see them driven before you, and to hear the lamentations of their women."

I'm going to ignore the

I'm going to ignore the swathes of incoherence in your post, Johnny, and ask one simple question.

The report I linked to (by a humanitarian organization, no less) describes how Shia and Sunni militias in Iraq used a mixture of security provision, social services, and coercion to gain support among Iraqis.

Although we haven't and won't be indulging in that brand of coercion, there's a core social scientific logic behind that strategy that's the same as pop-centric COIN.

If it's all BS, then how do you explain why the militias used it, and why it worked?

"Yes, the National Guard and

"Yes, the National Guard and Reserves will be called upon extensively. And they should be - that's why they exist according to national policy."

That's incorrect. They exist to round out dedicated combat units in times of national emergencies and for defense of the nation. Not to spend multiple tours and half their lives in two countries half the way around the globe. One where the goal was to make sure there were no weapons of mass destruction and remove Saddam Hussein. The other where the goal was to kill or capture Bin Laden.

You use the term troll. Wow, you really have this internetz blogging stuff down, don't you, Darling? We really should believe you know what the fuck you are talking about.

The man makes a point!

The man makes a point! Wey!

J. Rico, what you are saying is something I actually (partly) agree with. If the US army becomes the new UN security forces, then the US army is screwed. Also agreed that if this kind of pattern repeats itself in Somalia/Bolivia/Sudan/Texas, then we are talking on serious dose of imperial over-reach. Wich is why Kilcullen and others (including moi, not that anyone cares) scream Never again as often as they/we can. That doesnt change the fact that we as an alliance are committed in Af/Pak for at least 10 years. Trapped by the godamn stupidity of Rumsfeld, who smashed every window of opportunity in Afghansitan with his Iraqi hammer and by refusing to do even a minimum of "nationbuilding" the first 4-5 years. Iraq was and is one of the worst ideas in modern history, and was a total screwup geo-strategically. Now we *have* to do Af/Pak, with (as you note) way to few troops on the ground, and a UN thats been gutted these last 8 years. But it *has* to be done, as much for the sake of Pakistan as for the sake of Afghanistan.

My solution? Double the effort in Afghanistan for the next 5 years. Not just troops, but money and aid. (Wich seems to tally closely w the admins plans.) Make some areas in the countryside function, secure hold and build. Define wich enemy is wich, and fight those that deserve it (Git out of Korengal, par example. Get the PRTs to work. And as always, my ultimate advice wich noone listens to: Get the chinese in.

And Jason Fritz, beware of calling folks idiots when you state shit like "Yes, the National Guard and Reserves will be called upon extensively. And they should be - that's why they exist according to national policy." If that isnt exactly a example of a Starship Troopers view of the armed forces, I dont know. "Of course we are at war! Thats why we have an army!". Being in posession of a chainsaw doesnt mean you are obliged to cut down every tree in sight.

P.S. Bacevich's use of the

P.S. Bacevich's use of the imagery of Gulliver being tied down by the Lilliputians is widely recognizable, but perhaps not the most relevant satire from the Travels.

In the Travels, Gulliver volunteers his service on behalf of the war plans of the Emperor of Lilliput, a committed Little-endian, against his Big-endian rival the empire of Blefuscu. In case the analogy in the satire is not immediately obvious to the reader, and perhaps to deflect just a little attention from European religious wars, Swift even invokes the Qu'ran in this dispute:

"These civil commotions were constantly fomented by the monarchs of Blefuscu; and when they were quelled, the exiles always fled for refuge to that empire. It is computed that eleven thousand persons have at several times suffered death, rather than submit to break their eggs at the smaller end. Many hundred large volumes have been published upon this controversy: but the books of the Big-endians have been long forbidden, and the whole party rendered incapable by law of holding employments. During the course of these troubles, the emperors of Blefusca did frequently expostulate by their ambassadors, accusing us of making a schism in religion, by offending against a fundamental doctrine of our great prophet Lustrog, in the fifty-fourth chapter of the Blundecral (which is their Alcoran). … a bloody war has been carried on between the two empires for six-and-thirty moons, with various success; during which time we have lost forty capital ships, and a much a greater number of smaller vessels, together with thirty thousand of our best seamen and soldiers; and the damage received by the enemy is reckoned to be somewhat greater than ours. However, they have now equipped a numerous fleet, and are just preparing to make a descent upon us; and his imperial majesty, placing great confidence in your valour and strength, has commanded me to lay this account of his affairs before you."

Everything is in Gulliver.

Gulliver on COIN, both pop- and enemy-centric; the flying sky-island Laputa's King's method of suppressing
insurrections:

"If any town should engage in rebellion or mutiny, fall into violent factions, or refuse to pay the usual tribute, the king has two methods of reducing them to obedience. The first and the mildest course is, by keeping the island hovering over such a town, and the lands about it, whereby he can deprive them of the benefit of the sun and the rain, and consequently afflict the inhabitants with dearth and diseases: and if the crime deserve it, they are at the same time pelted from above with great stones, against which they have no defence but by creeping into cellars or caves, while the roofs of their houses are beaten to pieces. But if they still continue obstinate, or offer to raise insurrections, he proceeds to the last remedy, by letting the island drop directly upon their heads, which makes a universal destruction both of houses and men. However, this is an extremity to which the prince is seldom driven, neither indeed is he willing to put it in execution; nor dare his ministers advise him to an action, which, as it would render them odious to the people, so it would be a great damage to their own estates, which all lie below[.]"

Gulliver on Shock and Awe, to the king of the giant Brobdingnagians:

"In hopes to ingratiate myself further into his majesty's favour, I told him of "an invention, discovered between three and four hundred years ago, to make a certain powder, into a heap of which, the smallest spark of fire falling, would kindle the whole in a moment, although it were as big as a mountain, and make it all fly up in the air together, with a noise and agitation greater than thunder. That a proper quantity of this powder rammed into a hollow tube of brass or iron, according to its bigness, would drive a ball of iron or lead, with such violence and speed, as nothing was able to sustain its force. That the largest balls thus discharged, would not only destroy whole ranks of an army at once, but batter the strongest walls to the ground, sink down ships, with a thousand men in each, to the bottom of the sea, and when linked together by a chain, would cut through masts and rigging, divide hundreds of bodies in the middle, and lay all waste before them. That we often put this powder into large hollow balls of iron, and discharged them by an engine into some city we were besieging, which would rip up the pavements, tear the houses to pieces, burst and throw splinters on every side, dashing out the brains of all who came near. That I knew the ingredients very well, which were cheap and common; I understood the manner of compounding them, and could direct his workmen how to make those tubes, of a size proportionable to all other things in his majesty's kingdom, and the largest need not be above a hundred feet long; twenty or thirty of which tubes, charged with the proper quantity of powder and balls, would batter down the walls of the strongest town in his dominions in a few hours, or destroy the whole metropolis, if ever it should pretend to dispute his absolute commands." This I humbly offered to his majesty, as a small tribute of acknowledgment, in turn for so many marks that I had received, of his royal favour and protection.

"The king was struck with horror at the description I had given of those terrible engines, and the proposal I had made. "He was amazed, how so impotent and grovelling an insect as I" (these were his expressions) "could entertain such inhuman ideas, and in so familiar a manner, as to appear wholly unmoved at all the scenes of blood and desolation which I had painted as the common effects of those destructive machines; whereof," he said, "some evil genius, enemy to mankind, must have been the first contriver. As for himself, he protested, that although few things delighted him so much as new discoveries in art or in nature, yet he would rather lose half his kingdom, than be privy to such a secret; which he commanded me, as I valued any life, never to mention any more."

I'm with Johnny. While he

I'm with Johnny. While he makes a circuitous argument, the point is that you can't expect the DOD to execute a strategy for the Middle East that is separated from the strategic realities of the rest of US policy and world events. And that's what Bacevich is pointing out, that at best, Obama's getting us out of Iraq, which was a stupid war to begin with, and the worst part is that Obama hasn't figured out that the current strategy in Afghanistan isn't working because he isn't learning from Iraq. Gian is right also, that Bacevich was used by CNAS to show how "open" they are to other arguments. Hell with them.

Ibn's view of "strategic and moral obligation to continue to play a constructive role in promoting peace and reconciliation in Iraq" just amounts to empty words. We broke the Pottery Barn items, so now we're obligated to not just replace the items but to rebuild the store and guard it against not just future vandals but its store employees? No. Enough rhetorical speeches about "obligations" and "promoting peace." Time to let Iraq deal with its own domestic challenges and time for us to get back to addressing future threats.

"Obama hasn't figured out

"Obama hasn't figured out that the current strategy in Afghanistan isn't working because he isn't learning from Iraq. "

Excuse me, but how long has McChrystal had command? And youre dooming it already? I think there will be much more decisive action from muslims under B. Obama, with the spectre of Bush gone the moderates have much more space. Wich is why the Iran response was correct as well. In a two year perspective, Im optimistic. And that is rare.

Jason Fritz: "At the risk of

Jason Fritz: "At the risk of engaging in what is essentially a troll (albeit not an anonitroll), Johnny, you a are a flaming idiot. For those that know me (and there are quite a few on this blog who do)..."

Just because you are known to other posters in no way indicates you are not a troll, troll.

Calling someone a 'flaming idiot' is trolling... troll.

@ Jonny Rico An example of

@ Jonny Rico

An example of one of Bacevich's logical fallacies can be found in his most recent WaPo article. He says that the surge was a complete and utter failure because we didn't find WMDs or a link between Sadaam and 9/11. That is a 'non sequitor' fallacy because the purpose of the surge was to reduce violence not justify the original invasion.

I have read probably everything that Bacevich has written and in every single article he writes he uses logical fallacies to prove his point.

Btw Starship Troopers was an awesome movie.

Re: Jason Fritz's post at

Re: Jason Fritz's post at 10:30 PM. Johnny Rico, I have a telegram for you, the contents include: http://blog.mrhacks.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/oh-snap-chart.jpg

Btw, since you have been making quite a name for yourself, care to explain your service to the nation? Or are you just a very conservative civilian?

I wrote a quite long comment

I wrote a quite long comment that seems not to have been posted...... fantastic.