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Repeating Mistakes?
Here's Bob Woodward recounting NSA James Jones' visit to Afghanistan:
"National Security Adviser James L. Jones told U.S. military commanders here last week that the Obama administration wants to hold troop levels here flat for now, and focus instead on carrying out the previously approved strategy of increased economic development, improved governance and participation by the Afghan military and civilians in the conflict.
"The message seems designed to cap expectations that more troops might be coming, though the administration has not ruled out additional deployments in the future...Jones made it clear in his visit to Afghanistan that it is a new era and that Obama will not automatically give the military commanders whatever force levels they request -- the frequent practice of President George W. Bush in the Iraq war."
Umm...maybe I was watching the wrong war, but it seemed like there was a period between, say, 2003 and 2006 when insufficient troop levels (and the Bush administration's unwillingness to raise them) were regularly cited as a major factor in the ongoing failure to stabilize Iraq.
Snark aside, one of the lessons from Iraq has to be that the basic services, governance, and economic development lines of operation, which many U.S. commanders knew pretty well before FM 3-24 and the "Surge," weren't very sustainable until a modicum of security was established. So if we are committed to our current strategy in Afghanistan, it seems pretty darn important that we're confident we have the force levels necessary to establish that minimum level of security. Otherwise our "civilian surge" and reconstruction initiatives seem likely to be DOA. That's not a call for the administration to reflexively throw in more troops without a rigorous analysis of strategic costs and benefits, but it does suggest that it needs to double-check to ensure that its ends, ways, and means in Afghanistan are are all aligned.
which many U.S. commanders
which many U.S. commanders knew pretty well before FM 3-24 and the "Surge," weren't very sustainable until a modicum of security was established. So if we are committed to our current strategy in Afghanistan, it seems pretty darn important that we're confident we have the force levels necessary to establish that minimum level of security.
And what would those force levels be? Well according to Stephen Biddle and actual COIN doctrine in his latest article in :
The Cost: What will it cost to defeat the Taliban? No one really knows. War is an uncertain business. But it is very hard to succeed at counterinsurgency (COIN) on the cheap. Current U.S. Army doctrine is clear on this point:
[M]aintaining security in an unstable environment requires vast resources, whether host nation, U.S., or multinational. In contrast, a small number of highly motivated insurgents with simple weapons, good operations security, and even limited mobility can undermine security over a large area. Thus, successful COIN operations often require a high ratio of security forces to the protected population. For that reason, protracted COIN operations are hard to sustain. The effort requires a firm political will and substantial patience by the government, its people, and the countries providing support.
In fact, the doctrinal norm for troop requirements in COIN is around one security provider per fifty civilians. Applied to the population of Afghanistan, this would mean about 650,000 trained soldiers and police. If one assumes that only half the country requires active counterinsurgency operations (the south and east at the present time), this still implies a need for about 300,000 counterinsurgents.
Well, forget about 300,000 American troops, so I guess that means training 300,000 Afghans up to American counterinsurgent standards (and equipping them). Good luck with that.
Of course, even if we achieve those levels, we all know what will happen to the Afghan army when we leave. The same thing that happened to the Afghan army when the Soviets left in 1988. They magically disappeared.
The first thing that comes
The first thing that comes to mind is that while there is such a thing as having too few soldiers in an insurgency, increasing the numbers does not greatly increase the odds of victory. In all honesty I personally credit the former insurgents with being far more responsible for our recent success in Iraq than I do the 'surge'. It may have been deemed essential to send more soldiers, but there is a good chance that it is politically impossible to go beyond a certain number of reinforcements.
It might amount to them
It might amount to them simply putting a "smiley" face on a situation they can't avoid. Perhaps the logistics for significantly increasing the amount of troops aren't working out?
I like the way this Ibn
I like the way this Ibn Muqawama chap thinks.
While it sure would be nice
While it sure would be nice to have a strategic reserve, I think Johnny Rico is focusing on a wrong metric, that of "victory".. We are not going to "defeat" the Taleban anymore, see? We are going to marginalize them as the crazy fucks they are. Why do they hate islam? Why do they hate swimmingpools? It seems its finally goodbye to the warrior metrics and back to soldiers again.
Wich leads me to good news from Pakistan: Jamaat-e-Ahle-Sunnah has gone out and condemned Taleban as enemies of Sharia, and the Deobandis and Tablighi Jamaat have joined. It may be that the killing of Naeemi was the straw that broke the camels back. In short, there is a big movement starting branding Taleban un-islamic, as erhabis. Now there is an info-opportunity for ya, get them sermons distributed along with the video of the wipping of a 17 year old girl.
P.S: : Another fine moment
P.S: : Another fine moment in british military history: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/30/kabul-opium-haul-british-mil...
Sigh.
Whisky Tango Foxtrot? No
Whisky Tango Foxtrot? No Kidding!
Jones says there's a new guy in town who won't automatically "GIVE" U.S. military commanders commanders "whatever" they request? Did POTUS not appoint his generals? And for what purpose? How on earth would he inform himself as to the reality on the ground if not by LISTENING to the boots he put there? Pie in the sky economic development, improved governance and participation by the Afghan military and civilians in the conflict ain't gonna happen without credible commitment to protection and training. This arrogant posturing deriding "the frequent practice of President George W. Bush in the Iraq war" is maddening. If Obama's generals assert that we haven't enough troops to hold taleban from destroying the pie in the sky then skip the lofty dreams and don't hang our precious treasure out to dry. Ridiculous. Obscene.
Johnny Rico, the Afghan Army
Johnny Rico, the Afghan Army did not magically disappear after the Soviet Union left. The last Soviet troop crossed the Friendship Bridge on 2/15/89, but there hadn't been an offensive operation by them for a long while at that point (I think it was Operation Magistral, but there might have been another one or two). Najibullah's army held on to the major towns for years after that, even when the Soviet Union collapsed and stopped aiding his regime.
The Mujahideen didn't take over Kabul until 1992. Two crucial events triggered the Najibullah government's collapse: the effective post-Soviet Russian embargo on the country, and the defection of Abdulrashid Dostum to the mujahideen.
Saying the Afghan Army vanished after the Soviets left is just not true. The Afghan Army actually performed better once the Soviets left than when they were still there. And even today, the best ANA officers out there were officers in the DRA Army. We shouldn't underestimate Afghans' resilience or autonomy.
That being said, Ibn makes a good point: development without security is kind of pointless. However, I'd balance that with the understanding that so far development as a percentage of war budget has lagged far behind Iraq, which was already more developed than Afghanistan. The country has been starved of funds, and Bush's 2002 talk of a New Marshall Plan didn't help manage expectations. But it's worth keeping in mind, when we parse the words surrounding the Afghan economic stimulus package (or whatever), that the first six years of Afghanistan cost the same as 2006 in Iraq. So we're dealing with a fundamentally different scale of operations and history.
He was great in Star Wars.
He was great in Star Wars.
Development without security
Development without security = we build this bridge up every day, every night they blow it up. How can they be making this mistake again? I'll bear witness to seeing this movie, and it was very, very sad to watch.
@Fnord,
"We are not going to "defeat" the Taleban anymore, see? We are going to marginalize them as the crazy fucks they are. Why do they hate islam? Why do they hate swimmingpools? It seems its finally goodbye to the warrior metrics and back to soldiers again."
I like the way you put that, really. They ARE crazy fucks, it's just too many people (muslim people sadly) need to see it to believe. I am getting a feeling, instinct (as opposed to hard data) that the pyschological tide turned against them in Afghanistan and possibly Pakistan.
That's the Takfiri narrative, IMHO.
Oh, and I loved the SL links ...but really...get off the Brits out thing, huh? They are out, and the world was kinda better when they were IN, says one grandson O' Feinan...WTF, you want the Norsemen and their descendents (Eire) running the f*cking world?
;-)
Elf: Actually, they are
Elf: Actually, they are getting more marginalized in Pakistan at the moment, because they over-reached in the Swat. Think paralels to AQI getting hammered after showing their true faces in the Caliphate attempt. From what my local pakistani conservative commenter, Mohammad Usman Rana, tells me in my daily paper, there is a concerted move by the main religious bodies in Pakistan decrying that their attacks on other muslims show their true colours. (The bad part of that is of course that their only way of regaining legitimacy is to do something spectacular against the occupiers.) Pakistans answer to Pat Robertson, Muneeb-ur-Rehman (http://hquk.wordpress.com/2006/07/19/biography-of-mufti-muneeb-ur-rehman/) has come out against that wipping-video with all guns blazing it seems. (Note: I rely on our Pakistani news-commenters on this). So thats good news.
While I dont want to come across all starryeyed, i think Obamas Cairo-speech and his "apology-round" opened a window of opportunity in the muslim world for the moderates to strike back. Lets just hope he doesnt cave in on the Israeli question, because a lot will be read into that issue on a symbolic scale. Those outposts have taken on a huge symbolic value.
This is not a shock at all.
This is not a shock at all. Weeks ago, Gates, Patraeus etc... were on the record that we had somewhere between 12-18 months to "turn things around". While for domestic political reasons they will probably have until winter 2011, its clear they are going into this next period with the troops they already have in line. Absent some exigent circumstance, they're not going to ramp things up signficantly. Couple this with the continuing drone strikes in Pakistan (AM's favorite pinata) and its clear the admin is setting themselves up politically to declare victory on their terms in 2 years. They'll let events dictate the terms as they get closer to their end date.
As to what will determine "victory/success" everything is pointing to the direction that they will hail the elections, coupled with the al-qaeda/taliban body count of proof positive of "sucess" and begin moving us out prior to the '12 election. This morning Zbigniew Brzezinski calibrated it in terms of economic progress that the admin will tout as proof of sucess. Regardless the metrics used; economics, body counts, what AM and Fick proposed in Triage or whatever the heck AM comes up with after his current 3 hour tour, its clear this rodeo is reaching the main event soon, and the credits will be rolling in a couple years. Hopefully some sustainable progress will be acheived before then.
We might measure sustained progress on the ground proposed by the metrics of Triage, but if you want to know how long the US sustained effort will continue, that is going to be measured by a different set of circumstances. Afghanistan/Pakistan isn't occuring in a vacuum, and regardless of best intentions, the "two clocks" that General Patraeus spoke of in terms of Iraq applies just as well here. Simply put, the metrics of Triage might measure sustained sucess in Afghanistan and put more time on its "clock", but its a different set of facts over here that will determine when the clock hits midnight and cinderella takes her carriage home from this war.
A giant element of this
A giant element of this article that hasn't been noticed:
"Jones and the British voiced their distress at the possibility that Mangal [Gov of Helmand Province] would be ousted, and Jones promised to intervene personally with Karzai."
Intervening in domestic political affairs will not go down well ahead of the 20 Aug elections.
This is
This is disconcerting....
"The pulses also fooled Colonel General Khodaidad, Afghanistan's minister of counter-narcotics, even though the spherical black beans, about the size of small ball bearings, looked nothing like poppy seeds. When shown the mung beans by the Guardian, he said they were a strain of "super poppy".
I for one am very proud of
I for one am very proud of Johnny Rico for leaving an intelligent, non-inflammatory comment.
New Major AQC Video focuses
New Major AQC Video focuses on "AFPAK"
http://www.washingtonpost.com
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/01/AR200907...
Once Marine units arrive in their designated towns and villages, they have been instructed to build and live in small outposts among the local population. The brigade's commander, Brig. Gen. Lawrence D. Nicholson, said his Marines will focus their efforts on protecting civilians from the Taliban, and on restoring Afghan government services, instead of a series of hunt-and-kill missions against the insurgents.
"We're doing this very differently," Nicholson said to his senior officers a few hours before the mission began. "We're going to be with the people. We're not going to drive to work. We're going to walk to work."
Only 500 Afghan soldiers along for the trip (so far). The COIN crowd will be happy with the quotes. Taking in mind the brouhaha with Stars and Stripes lately with the USA, wonder how close the media will get to see this play out over the next months?
"Saying the Afghan Army
"Saying the Afghan Army vanished after the Soviets left is just not true."
You certainly have an interesting concept of true. In your first two paragraphs you outlined how the Afghan army disintegrated. You provided dates showing this happened after the Soviets withdrew. Maybe should should go back and read the history... or better yet, just read what you wrote.
Or maybe it's just me. Maybe It has something to do with the definition of "Afghan" or "Soviets" or "is."
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