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On Technology and Revolution (updated)
Today's Washington Post had a really interesting op-ed by two U.S. pollsters:
Many experts are claiming that the margin of victory of incumbent President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was the result of fraud or manipulation, but our nationwide public opinion survey of Iranians three weeks before the vote showed Ahmadinejad leading by a more than 2 to 1 margin -- greater than his actual apparent margin of victory in Friday's election.
While Western news reports from Tehran in the days leading up to the voting portrayed an Iranian public enthusiastic about Ahmadinejad's principal opponent, Mir Hossein Mousavi, our scientific sampling from across all 30 of Iran's provinces showed Ahmadinejad well ahead.
Now that bit about Ahmadinejad was interesting enough, but here's what really caught my eye:
Much commentary has portrayed Iranian youth and the Internet as harbingers of change in this election. But our poll found that only a third of Iranians even have access to the Internet, while 18-to-24-year-olds comprised the strongest voting bloc for Ahmadinejad of all age groups.
Why do I find this to be interesting? Two reasons. The first has to do with the way in which we Westerners might confuse the protests of the young, urban, and technologically savvy to be somehow representative of the population at large. The urbane urban classes of the Earth see themselves in each other. Persons living in New York and London might have more in common with one another than they would with persons from Sale Creek, Tennessee and Glencoe, Scotland, respectively. And those same urban classes might identify with those Western-clothed, rioting youths protesting in Farsi and English on the streets of Tehran. But are their protests representative of Iranian people overall?* Are we simply finding common cause with a technologically-assisted minority and confusing it for a popular movement? One observer of the Moldova protests noticed the way in which we Westerners get fascinated by "Twitter revolutions" because, hey! We use Twitter too! Elsewhere, sceptics wonder how much effect these technologies really have.
Second, another observation that came out of the Moldova protests was this maxim: Live by Twitter, Die by Twitter. Social networking technology like Twitter, Facebook and cellular phones allows all kinds of new capabilities -- such as the ability to call for a flash mob outside parliament on 30 minutes notice, far too quick for the authorities to respond. But what happens when the state simply shuts down all wireless networks? Or bans Facebook? Now what are you going to do? If you grow too dependent on social media the state can shut down, you've got a pretty big weakness. The counter-revolutionary forces, of course, have all kinds of secondary communications equipment they can use. The revolutionary forces might not.
*I should note here that the sample of the survey cited seemed small. But it's the best hard data I have seen. If anyone can offer other data, leave links in the comments section.
UPDATE: To go along with my own asterisk, ABC's director of polling has some harsh things to say. And in the comments section, there are helpful links to analysis by Juan Cole on the rural/urban divide and other good comments. My favorite, though, is this helpful tip for any Iranian readers, from everyone's favorite Norwegian anarchist:
[S]omeone should make a how-to book on rioting in farsi. You dont throw rocks 60 meters away, dammit, and one garbagebin does not a barricade make.
Sound advice.
AM, I agree, very
AM,
I agree, very interesting, but the polling was conducted from May11-20. This, of course, leaves open the possibility of a sizable shift in the last two-three weeks before the election.
I don't think anyone doubts that Western media outlets have clouded judgment, particularly when one recognizes how often CNN turns to twitter messages as if it is some credible source. That said, there's clearly a reason why Iranian presidents have yet to lose a reelection campaign. And, I don't think that reason is democratic one.
Fair points. But I think the
Fair points. But I think the difference - and who knows, I am not a pollster and won't pretend to be - is in the population density and the ability to mobilize voters in Iran: http://www.realclearworld.com/blog/2009/06/the_khatami_factor.html.
Best,
Kevin
Very good points, but the
Very good points, but the fascination may also be that Westerners, or better yet, OUTSIDERS, think they are getting 'unfiltered', raw data that may be more accurate. You nicely point out the dangers of this thinking above.
However.
These tools didn't exist just a short time ago, so, how much data do we have about what internetage-y stuff actually represents? I dunno.
I think a lot of the
I think a lot of the blindness comes from western journos dealing mainly with folks in Tehran who speak english. Ahmadinejad is basically a far-right nationalist a la Le Pen, and his standing among the religious and rural youth is not to be underestimated. Nor is the point that at rural voting-places many may not feel it safe to vote for change, of course.
As a sidenote, someone should make a how-to book on rioting in farsi. You dont throw rocks 60 meters away, dammit, and one garbagebin does not a barricade make.
PS: Agreed on the
PS: Agreed on the twitter/cellphone lack of utility. In a police-state, there is also the added danger of traceback and punishment. The old school ways are often most effective. I wonder how hard they will crack down on this.
"As a sidenote, someone
"As a sidenote, someone should make a how-to book on rioting in farsi. You dont throw rocks 60 meters away, dammit, and one garbagebin does not a barricade make."
fnord, are you a youth counselor or something? Please say no.
I was at this event where
I was at this event where Ballen released the data which is referred to the AM's post above. I've got two posts on it for those interested. One is a round up of what Ballen offered, as well as Flynt Everett and others at the event, and the other is a live report via Twitter as it happened:
http://www.taylormarsh.com/2009/06/11/on-the-eve-of-the-iranian-elections/
http://www.taylormarsh.com/2009/06/08/liveblogging-iran-pre-election-pub...
Flynt Everett said in an interview to Spiegel that he wasn't surprised by Ahmadinejad's win. Ben Smith has that one:
http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/0609/Or_he_won.html
fivethirtyeight.com has some
fivethirtyeight.com has some really interesting breakdowns of the numbers and the discussion of what seems fishy. If nothing else it would seem that results being posted 2-3 hours after polls closed when counting is done by hand with paper ballots seems questionable. I also saw a report that the official numbers had Ahmadinejad getting 70% of the vote in Mousavi's home town, which would seem to push believability.
What an outtstanding post.
What an outtstanding post. I couldn't agree more.
Fnord,
"I think a lot of the blindness comes from western journos dealing mainly with folks in Tehran who speak english. Ahmadinejad is basically a far-right nationalist a la Le Pen, and his standing among the religious and rural youth is not to be underestimated. Nor is the point that at rural voting-places many may not feel it safe to vote for change, of course."
Excellent point. I can't help but notice how just about every Iranian interviewed by the US media about the elections speaks fluent English. In the greater context of Iranian society, these people are a very very small elite, a totally unrepresenative sample, yet reporters don't seem to get this.....
I wrote this in another
I wrote this in another thread, but I've seen a report from a UK-based Iran expert that returns are showing 82% of absentee voters in the UK chose Ahmadinejad.
While Ex makes a fair point (that I think needs making) about selection bias, this number, for me, seems unlikely.
Another noteworthy figure is
Another noteworthy figure is that Karroubi got nearly 60% of the vote in Lorestan in 2005, with Ahmadinejad at less than 10%.
This time around, Ahmadinejad got around 70% in Lorestan, with Karroubi at about 6%.
Weird.
The counter-revolutionary
The counter-revolutionary forces, of course, have all kinds of secondary communications equipment they can use. The revolutionary forces might not.
AM, this seems like a good post to give you some f/b on the technology used by your new server. I have found that whenever I post a comment with more than a couple of links, the IP from which I posted from becomes forever blocked from previewing or posting a comment ever again.* This has happened with both a fairly large institutional IP address and a residential network—I'm guessing that it has something to do with your adblock software.
No matter, I just tunnel through using the TOR anonymity network, and post a comment, as I'm doing right now. The whole thing is anonymous, though not encrypted, end-to-end, and you can encrypt the url and use other security features, which don't concern me, because I'm just trying to get around what I believe to be your adblock-ware, but the point stands. A sophisticated user concerned about their personal or group safety could use readily available tools like anonymous strongly encrypted remailers or steganography. Take away the wireless network? There's the lower bandwidth phone network, which is widely available outside North Korea.
I would argue (agreeing with half your point) that the driver for samizdat is not the specific technologies used for transmission, but the underlying political forces. If government forces are pitted against urban techno hipsters blowing off some steam on twitter 140 characters at a time, then not taking the twitter safety valve away may be the wisest course. Taking the technology away will just drive committed opponents to much harder to control technologies and limit government credibility/ability to undermine information from revolutionaries.
What I'm really saying is: would you please ask your tech folks to stop blocking my two main IP addresses so I don't have to wait the three extra seconds for TOR's rerouting?
*I get the "Saving…" with the spinning pizza, followed by the yellow highlighted text "Not saving? Wait a few seconds, reload this page, then try again. Every now and then the internet hiccups too :-)". Reloading and trying again never works because I'm guessing that my unshielded IP address is prevented from posting due to some adblock-ware.
The disparity in numbers is
The disparity in numbers is fascinating, and truly evidence we are likely to never know whether Ahmadinejad received 45% or 70% of the vote (especially when you consider who "owns" the ballot boxes and their counting makes it all nearly moot anyway). Regardless, it's not really relevant at this point, the situation has already moved past arguing over numbers.
There are clearly a critical mass of people who have the perception that the results were intentionally manipulated. At this point it matters little whether the results were correct or not, it's the perception that matters, and that this perception is shared by a large amount of Iranians who feel either empowered enough, or motivated enough (or both) to hazard themselves at some risk. The curious thing will be whether these protests continue for some time in the streets or move to other venues. And if they do, will this simmering discontentment actually make it more difficult for the West to bring a harder line on Iran since to some change may appear to be just over the horizon? And can we figure out what is really going on despite our western cultural biases? I don't think just the neo-cons have the market cornered on finding the "right" facts to fit the events of our world.
Juan Cole has alos seen the
Juan Cole has alos seen the WaPo article, and he is not impressed:
http://www.juancole.com/2009/06/terror-free-tomorro-poll-did-not.html
Among other items, I quote:
"Ballen noted in May, "The current mood indicates that none of the candidates will likely pass the 50 percent threshold needed to automatically win; meaning that a second round runoff between the two highest finishers, as things stand, Mr. Ahmadinejad and Mr. Moussavi, is likely."
That is, based on his polling, Ballen did not expect Ahmadinejad to get to 51%."
And Mahmoud got 64% on Friday?...
Polling in authoritarian
Polling in authoritarian states is always affected by the pollee's concern that the pollster is a member of the state security apparatus.
I will tell you one thing - efforts by Western jackasses to label this the "Green Revolution in Iran" after the rest of it are mind-bogglingly stupid. This is a historical deal - recall the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, the Rose Revolution in Georgia - what other ones am I missing here? It's almost Soviet-style revolutionary ideology, isn't it?
Here is how the conservative ideologues in Iran will play it:
"I haven't been posting anything about Iran, but it's really beginning to resemble two other disputed elections: the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine and and the Rose Revolution in Georgia. Both saw massive citizen protests (associated with a color) and serious accusations of election theft and fraud. Incidentally, the protests were organized by a democracy-building coalition of western forces."
The Iranian leadership would like nothing more than to portray the opposition as a coalition of Israeli and U.S. interests working to undermine and weaken the Iranian state. If change does come to that country, it will have to come from the inside, and there is some evidence of splits within the real ruling system, the clerical religious leadership. Idiots who attempt to influence this are shooting themselves in the foot.
I do often wonder if certain regional interests would not prefer the Iranian boogeyman to the Iranian democracy, however - for example, how many right-wing Israeli pols rely on "evil Iran" in order to get elected? Also, ever notice how democracy has a way of spreading? Where is the next "democratic revolution" going to be, do you think? Saudi Arabia? They could do with a ceremonial monarchy and a powerful democratically elected parliament, if anyone could - isn't that what "the plan to bring democracy to the Middle East" is all about?
The main factor to convince
The main factor to convince me that the elections were cooked is the procceeding after the elections:
Usually, after elections, there is a provisional result and a few weeks later a final result.
Even in Iran, a 2 day period between the two results applies. Still, the provisional result was declared definitive almost immediately. That's highly damning by itself, nevermind all the other factors casting doubt on specific results ....
As other commenters have
As other commenters have pointed out, the poll was conducted from May 11-20, so it doesn't measure voters who were swayed by the debates and the massive street campaigning (both of which seemed to help Mousavi).
And if you look at the details, it had a 27 percent undecided rate, which also casts some doubt on the findings.
http://www.themajlis.org/2009/06/15/about-that-wapo-op-ed
A major major major point is
A major major major point is that Mousavi was allowed to make a speech to the crowd today, and Khatami has said that a investigation will come within 10 days. As I write this, the first reports of Ahmadinejads goons shooting people is trickling in, it may be that the heavyhandedness of the regime will backfire. How is Al Jazeera calling it?
Comment by Midnight Rambler
Comment by Midnight Rambler on June 15, 2009 - 11:47am
Yeah, I'm not convinced either. Cole, as usual makes a good case. Another point of interest is what's going on underneath. Decent discussion here:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/31370576#31370837
The urban/rural class
The urban/rural class argument is a pretty common frame for people when thinking about Iranian elections in general. Juan Cole had a nice piece on it in relation to this election: http://www.juancole.com/2009/06/class-v-culture-wars-in-iranian.html
The urban/rural thing would make sense, except that Ahmadinejad won all these ethnic minority regions he got trounced in in the last election, won every home town of the opposition candidates, etc., etc.
And here is his commentary on the WaPo op-ed: http://www.juancole.com/2009/06/terror-free-tomorro-poll-did-not.html
I am no hack for Juan Cole, but his analysis here seems pretty persuasive. Regardless, the urban/rural thing, in this case, seems like a trope given the ethnic vote disparities, home town vote disparities, etc.
Additionally, as other
Additionally, as other commentators have noticed, the timing of the announcements of the results and the way the results were announced does not seem too credible because they deviated from the way they had reported every previous election. . .
An alternative explanation
An alternative explanation (pure speculation): Ahmadinejad tried to pull one over on Khatami and the high mullahs, using his control of the state (as opposed to the clergy) to fix numbers. The mullahs who may not necessarily think Ahamad. is such a great person, were backed into a corner. Mousavi was given the nod from above to protest (notice the other two candidates backing) and so allowed the mullahs the opportunity for a countercoup through clerical investigations.
Damn, there is a good board-game a la JUNTA hidden in this.
So Fnord, who volunteers to
So Fnord, who volunteers to pass out the gringo money? Or in this version, is it euros?
US 0, Italia 0, but Clark
US 0, Italia 0, but Clark with a red card.
USA (playing one down) 1,
USA (playing one down) 1, Italia 0
End of first half.
How about that?
If it hasn't already been
If it hasn't already been posted...Great photos out of Iran
http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2009/06/irans_disputed_election.html
What are Juan Cole's
What are Juan Cole's credentials on Iran?
O/T, but good news for you
O/T, but good news for you "rule of law" types...your poor misunderstood victims are kickin it in the Carribean...
Po wittle Taliboos
I don't recall anyone sending me to the Carribean....
As far as who wins - the
As far as who wins - the guys with the guns.
I'm sticking my nose in
I'm sticking my nose in stuff I don't know much about (limited pretty much to what I read here), but Democracy Arsenal has in interesting post on Lebanon and how it might relate to Iran. Or that it might not.
http://www.democracyarsenal.org/
Thanks to all the Michael Cohen nonsense, I've been reading it almost every day now. So thanks for that.
Looking at #iranelecton on
Looking at #iranelecton on Twitter, they're getting extremely upset that Twitter will be briefly down for maintenance tonight in the States.
So not only are they depending on social media alone, they're depending on only one channel. That's sad that there are other ways of instant communication (such as IRC) that is lost on this crowd.
This article has a ton of
This article has a ton of specific details I have not seen elsewhere. Can anyone more knowledgeable about Iran issues speak to it. . .
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/KF16Ak02.html
Turns out the Ballen op-ed
Turns out the Ballen op-ed was a bunch of crap that the WaPo let print anyway.
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/behind-the-numbers/2009/06/about_those_...
"Damn, there is a good
"Damn, there is a good board-game a la JUNTA hidden in this."
Umm, Fnord, how the hell could you play JUNTA??? The Anarchists only come in play during the coup phases
- no money for them to be distributed by El Presidente ...
(I haven't played for ages, though, so my memory might be a bit foggy ...)
Nate Silver at 358 dealt
Nate Silver at 358 dealt with this pretty comprehensively too. I mean, AN was supposed to have won in Tehran, so saying Iran is not Tehran doesn't make sense: Iran and Tehran allegedly had the same results.
Positroll: Lol. You could
Positroll: Lol. You could build a allegiance of disgruntled workers, criminals, peasants and anarchists and get 2 extra assassinationslots, if I remember right. Hey, watch the career of Daniel Ortega and youll see what I mean, no?
On a serious note, the MSM failed big in not covering any of the other Iranian towns that had riots as well. Several of the deaths happened outside Tehran. Witch is interesting, because it speaks of a new disgruntled netwerked society. I would love to know the average age and background of the Basij.
The iran poll article in the
The iran poll article in the Washington Post missed the main finding: 52% refused to say whom they supported, As a pollster I have worked in over 30 countries, including many environments where there is a lot of fear - and it is usually the antigovernment people who are afraid. When only around 30% say they support the government, that is the number that counts. Mos of the don't knows are anti-government. This is underlined by the poll's finding that three-quarters of the respondents were critical of the policies of the Iranian government and its hostility to the West. Those sure don't sound like Ahmedinejad voters to me. The authors of the article were not professional pollsters-- and it showed. If a grad student in my research methods class had handed in an analysis like the one the Post published, they'd have gotten a D (if I was marking leniently).
Michael Rubin is certainly
Michael Rubin is certainly right that technology can give an edge, either to the defenders of the status quo, or to the challengers. In some cases, it can be decisive. But, as I am sure Rubin understands, it is one factor of several major ones.
Technology is after all a means that can be applied to an end. But for the means to be applied at all, there must be a motive website hosting. Or, as Nietzsche said, there must be the will. The elections in Iran provided an opportunity for disgruntled youth to support a candidate—”moderate” and “reformer” only in terms of the established extremism of the Islamic Republic’s government—who might put a kinder and gentler face on the rigid theocracy, and might give them a bit more breathing room. Their campaigning expressed this desire, motive, will.
But the “Supreme Leader,” not satisfied with his few hand-picked candidates, and with the absolute power to veto policy or legislation he did not like, decided to fix the election in favor of the most extreme candidate, Ahmadinejad. Those opposed to Ahmadinejad were stunned that their votes were nullified and replaced with nonsensical vote counts. The challenging of the governors of the Islamic Republic began with voters’ rejection of the fixed election. There was now a double motive, a strengthened will.
The Supreme Leader, not satisfied with having spoiled his legitimate monopoly by fixing the vote and betraying Iranian voters, decided to respond to the demonstrators with the batons and guns of the police and militia, beating and killing ordinary citizens more or less at random. The Supreme Leader, after all, represents God and the Islamic Revolution. Except he no longer does. The brutality of the regime has provided a triple motive, an even more strengthened will to the opposition. The Supreme Leader and his acolytes have lost legitimacy, as has this form of rule. So the opposition yells from the rooftop, “Death to the dictator” and “God is great,” invoking the oppositional slogans of the Islamic Revolution.
It is true, as Rubin says, that the opposition have used technology—Twitter, the internet, cellphone cameras—to mobilize and to send abroad their message and images. This is important. But we must remember that martyrs have become legends and spurs for opposition for millennia, long before modern means of communication. And that primitive forms of communication, such as opposition samizdat, have trumped modern communications technology in the hands of the state. So, yes, advanced technology can help, but it is advantageous, not necessary.
If we recall Ibn Khaldun, we will be reminded that, in addition to motive and will, organization and solidarity are factors that can be decisive in regime change. It is the superiority in these elements that Ibn Khaldun credits with the ability of peripheral tribes to conquer states, as so often has been the case in the Middle East and North Africa. And here I would recommend caution in prophesizing the rapid fall of Islamic Republic. The Revolutionary Guard, the militia, and the army are highly organized; the opposition, no matter how strongly motivated, is not. The best hope for change is that a major part of the military, also disillusioned with the loss of legitimacy of the government, will go over to the opposition. If this does not happen, it may take the opposition years to organize sufficiently to challenge effectively the government.
The curious thing will be
The curious thing will be whether these protests continue for some time in the streets or move to other venues. And if they do, will this simmering discontentment actually make it more difficult for the West to bring a harder line on Iran since to some change may appear to be just over the horizon? And ClubPenguinCheats can we figure out what is really going on despite our western cultural biases? I don't think just the neo-cons have the market cornered on finding the "right" facts to fit the events of our world.
I had 642-145 and was enough
I had 642-145 and was enough for the moment. Yet with the revolution of the modern day technologies in addition to the increased competition led me to join 642-971 as well as 312-49 classes to make the mark. Computer industry is reshaping day by day BH0-006 and we have to simply to go with it. What so ever learning is a fun and I am enjoying it.
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