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Abu Muqawama on Vacation
July 28, 2009 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 8:58am | 18 Comments
A month in Afghanistan was not enough of a break from the sweatshop Nate and John are running (just three blocks away from the White House!), so I am off for a week's vacation, traveling back across the Atlantic to one of those Arabic-speaking countries I tend to favor. I'll try to link occasionally while gone.
Great, you go on vacation
Great, you go on vacation and I am stuck with that Wu Tang Clan song in my head.
So when do you want to meet
So when do you want to meet for a beer at the Duke of Wellington?
I would like to use this
I would like to use this opportunity, if I may, to return to the question of interest groups and the processes of governing during an occupation. I am only a layman in these matters, so please bear with me.
Herein, there would appear to be four primary interest groups.
a. The most important interest group: That of the great power who has determined that it will "transform" this nation to better meet the great power's needs, and which wishes to manage this tranformational process primarily through the offices of the "its" host government, military and police.
b. Then there is the host government itself, which is tasked by the great power to perform the transformational process that this great power requires.
c. Next, there is the insurgency, which seeks to rid the country of both the great power and its ambitions.
d. Lastly, there are the common people, who will be forced to endure this battle of whether there will or will not be a transformation as required by the great power.
The point I am trying to make here is that the will and interest of the people would not seem to be the driving or determining factor in these battles. In this regard, the people appear more as sheep.
Does history not indicate that such battles are often won, primarily through the capabilities and commitment of the great power, who (1) works with minority groups and (2) uses its (the great power's) capabilities as "force multipliers" for this minority group and, thus, (3) keeps "the people" (the majority) at bay?
Indeed. From AM's July 24th
Indeed.
From AM's July 24th post, The Limits of Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan:
"We, as Americans, typically wage counter-insurgency campaigns as third parties -- that is, we fight on behalf of another government."
May I be so bold as to say that this may not be a correct way of understanding how these things actually work?
Whether accomplished by Americans, or by others, counter-insurgency campaigns most often find a host government who is (1) signficantly assisted, managed and controlled by a great power and (2) is organized by the great power to fight and govern on its (the great power's) behalf and in its interest. (Should the host government find itself in disfavor with the great power, it may find itself, somehow, overthrown and replaced.)
Thus, while the great power may, indeed, do some or much of the fighting (which it hopes to push off on the host government as soon as possible), it typically does not do so as a "third party." Accordingly, it may be more correct to say -- and to understand -- that the host government is more often the subordinate and so-call "third party" in these affairs and is acting, as such, on behalf of the great power.
With this distinctly different understanding of how counter-insurgencies actually work, should we reconsider the questions posed by the very important "Limits of Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan" post?
Bit of a subject change, but
Bit of a subject change, but is this the Taliban's FM 3-24?-
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/07/20097278348124813.html
""Does history not indicate
""Does history not indicate that such battles are often won, primarily through the capabilities and commitment of the great power, who (1) works with minority groups and (2) uses its (the great power's) capabilities as "force multipliers" for this minority group and, thus, (3) keeps "the people" (the majority) at bay?""
Not really. Although you haven't defined who "minority groups" are, so it's a little hard to analyse what you have written.
The counterinsurgency battle is between the insurgents and the government of the host nation. The majority of the people generally decides which party is which. However the GP is by definition assisting the government.
Other para-military groups engaged/supported/enabled in this COIN campaign are generally useful/necessary, however they are far more so when representative of the interests of the population. They are also not strictly required.
If your meaning is that the COIN campaign engages armed elements (minority) as opposed to unarmed elements of society (majority), then that's dictated by the security situation and the needs of the citizenry. You could make the same observation that your own government is more interested in police than it's citizens because they're the ones they pay and give guns too.
""Whether accomplished by
""Whether accomplished by Americans, or by others, counter-insurgency campaigns most often find a host government who is (1) signficantly assisted, managed and controlled by a great power""
Not really. Take Sri Lanka, Spain, China, UK, etc. While it may theoretically be more likely, due to perceived illegitimacy of the host govt, when they are a state proxy/surrogate/dependent of a colonial power, it certainly isn't a central or defining element.
""and (2) is organized by the great power to fight and govern on its (the great power's) behalf and in its interest. (Should the host government find itself in disfavor with the great power, it may find itself, somehow, overthrown and replaced.)'''
Again, not really. Your thinking may be clouded by US interested conflicts or those of similar powers due to their literary/news popularity. This is primarily an observation about the prevalence of colonialism. Also the nature of weak vs powerful states. An insurgency in a weak state is obviously less likely to be immediately crushed and will therefor become a problem/threat which draws in assistance from stronger states as it grows/persists.
""Thus, while the great power may, indeed, do some or much of the fighting (which it hopes to push off on the host government as soon as possible), it typically does not do so as a "third party."
Yes, it does. It's either the government or it's not. If it's not, then it's a 3rd party. If the argument is they are there to fight for their own interests, then that's really no observation at all. If it weren't then they wouldn't be there.
"" Accordingly, it may be more correct to say -- and to understand -- that the host government is more often the subordinate and so-call "third party" in these affairs and is acting, as such, on behalf of the great power.""
Only in so much as the host govt couldn't do this on it's own, therefor requiring external assistance from interested parties who will do so to further their own interests. This however is like politics 101. Think about how it relates to the Dutch in Afghanistan, the Chinese entering into Sri-Lanka only recently, Southern Thailand and the nobody assisting the Karen in Burma.
There are plenty of insurgencies/COIN campaigns that don't fit the mould you describe, it's just that they're not in the interests of the nations that run the news coverage. The success/failure of those isn't any less relevant because a superpower, the attention of it's population and it's media wasn't involved.
Does this mean the blog is
Does this mean the blog is over until you get back?
Kilo: I agree that I have
Kilo:
I agree that I have been too general in my discussion and that I should have limited my ideas to cases wherein a great power is the prime mover in the affairs of and conflict in another state.
But I would disagree with the concept that, in such relevant cases, "the battle is between the insurgents and the government of the host nation." This would not seem to be how the battles are actually perceived -- within the country concerned -- and generally throughout the world.
For example: The North Vietnamese and Viet Cong then, and the Vietnamese generally today, do not seem to call their war -- shaped substantially by Americans -- as "The Vietnamese Civil War." Instead, they call it "The American War." The war that occured in Vietnam before this, involving the French, they call "The French War" or "The Anti-French Resistance War." The war involving the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, likewise, is not know as "The Afghan Civil War." Universally (except possibly in Russia today), this conflict is known as the "The Soviet-Afghan War." (The United States certainly does not call this conflict "The Afghan Civil War.")
Considering this, and in the context of my limiting concession above, could the rest of my discussion be considered accurate and relevant?
In wars such as those listed above, and many of those which are occuring today, is it still correct to perceive and reasonable to portray these conflicts as "battles between the insurgents and the host government of the nation concerned" (civil wars); wherein, the great powers (including the United States) are simply acting as "assisting" third parties?"
""In wars such as those
""In wars such as those listed above, and many of those which are occuring today, is it still correct to perceive and reasonable to portray these conflicts as "battles between the insurgents and the host government of the nation concerned" (civil wars); wherein, the great powers (including the United States) are simply acting as "assisting" third parties?" ""
Well yeah, because that's what's going on. Take a look at any of your examples, or fresh in everyone's mind, Iraq. The defeat of the insurgency there didn't make it the 52nd US state just like the Nth Vietnamese didn't win control of Sth Dakota when they won in Vietnam. If the outcome is always who controls the state and that's not the superpower, how are they anything other than a 3rd party ?
I didn't say battles, I said battle. The fight is between the insurgents and the government for the state. Whoever does the fighting doesn't change that. If badgers could take care of your insurgency problem then release a bunch of badgers. What doesn't change is that the involvement of the 3rd party/badger is only necessary if the host government couldn't do this itself. If it could you wouldn't have an insurgency, you'd have that nuisance that happened a long time ago that we can't remember now because something as notable as a war wasn't necessary.
When you write this.....
""Accordingly, it may be more correct to say -- and to understand -- that the host government is more often the subordinate and so-call "third party" in these affairs and is acting, as such, on behalf of the great power.""
.....it may or may not be correct in many examples through simple realpolitik. However it never has and never will be the case that a government under siege by an insurgency does any such thing other than to keep control of the state or fight in anyone's interests other than their own. What the whole fight is for.
So no, it's not more correct to say that on the topic of counterinsurgency campaigns.
Sri-Lanka didn't put down its insurgents until a superpower got involved. There wasn't a point at which they were offloading the munitions onto docks that the SL govt stopped fighting for themselves and started fighting for the Chinese. The battle always was between the insurgents and the government for control of the state (or a little bit of it). Likewise, whether this superpower involvement escalates to providing training or direct military involvement, this only relates to the superpower's commitment to the outcome, it doesn't redefine who the battle is between or the objective of the host nation participants.
Of course if you have 3 rifles and an angry scottish terrier and the US helps you defeat a Russian armed insurgency, you gonna be in all kinds of political debt until your grandkids are old. But only because you're the government who those debts fall on.
Kilo: Why then are such
Kilo:
Why then are such conflicts known, especially by the peoples of the countries in which these conflicts occur, as:
a. The "French War," instead of as the "Vietnamese Civil War Part I,"
b. The "American War," instead of as the "Vietnamese Civil War Part II,"
c. The "Soviet War" or the "Soviet-Afghan War," instead of as the "Afghan Civil War Part I."
Should the United States not prevail (note I did not say should the host government not prevail) in the current conflict, do we not expect that this conflict will be known as the "American War" (by the Afghans) and as the "American-Afghan War" (elsewhere in the world), instead of as the "Afghan Civil War Part II?"
All of the portrayals above (The French War, The American War, The Soviet-Afghan War and the American-Afghan War) emphasize the international character of these conflicts and the fact that the battle is primarily against the great power and only incidently against its subordinate third party proxy host government.
Yes?
"Why then are such conflicts
"Why then are such conflicts known, especially by the peoples of the countries in which these conflicts occur, as:"
You already answered this yourself in a prior post.
""do we not expect that this conflict will be known as the "American War" ""
Let's say we do. This either changes what I told you is unchangeable or it doesn't. It doesn't.
""All of the ... above ... emphasize the international character of these conflicts and the fact that the battle is primarily against the great power and only incidently against its subordinate third party proxy host government."
Nope. They emphasise this because that was the most notable characteristic of it.
This however is a pointless distinction. Either the Vietnamese insurgency which started before and ended after US involvement was primarily concerned with the US or it wasn't. It wasn't. Either the Sth Vietnamese govt was a proxy of the US prior to the US deciding to get involved or it wasn't. It wasn't. Your reasoning for stating that any insurgency is concerned with overpowering the host government only as an incidental concern isn't based on anything.
Most US-supported COIN campaigns have been limited to supplying the host govt with training and weapons. No US military deployments. The exact same way that the US began it's engagement in Vietnam and could have chosen to limit it to as well. What's that do to your logic ? I also already mentioned China in Sri Lanka. Either address these in what you are writing or we've already put this notion to bed. Personally, I don't particularly care whether any of those are referred to as "The American War", because it doesn't really mean anything, let alone redefine the nature of an insurgency.
Kilo: Thank you for helping
Kilo:
Thank you for helping me work through this.
But your recent comment seems to forget the concession I made earlier, which limits my ideas "to cases wherein a great power is the prime mover in the affairs of and conflict in another state."
This criteria would exclude such things as insurgent-host government conflicts which start and/or end with only limited great power involvement (your Vietnam prior to/after great power take over and your Sri Lanka-China examples). In such conflicts, indeed, the host government may be considered the principal and the great power may be known as the assisting third party.
However, in cases wherein (using your comment above) "the most notable characteristic" of the conflict is great power involvement, direction and control, then I say that this is, quite obviously and on its very face, an international affair. In such cases, when the great power has clearly taken charge, then the host government has become the third party -- assisting the great power in achieving its (the great power's) designs for the country/region.
How else might we determine whether a conflict is an international or civil affair? Let us look at the insurgent's strategy, tactics and methods: Are these primarily directed at and designed to defeat the great power and cause him to withdraw? If so, then we have, even in the eyes of the insurgents, an international -- not host government -- focus.
Kilo: Do we think that something like Para I-6, FM 3-24, for example, might be addressing the distinction that I am trying to make?
"However, in cases wherein
"However, in cases wherein (using your comment above) "the most notable characteristic" of the conflict is great power involvement, direction and control, then I say that this is, quite obviously and on its very face, an international affair. In such cases, when the great power has clearly taken charge, then the host government has become the third party -- assisting the great power in achieving its (the great power's) designs for the country/region."
I don't really understand the point of this distinction though.
Once a superpower becomes involved, the fact that they are the most dominant force opposed to the insurgents is a given. This however doesn't change the battle they are in, what both sides are trying to achieve and the outcomes for victory for each side. If what you have to do to take over the state is march on the capital then you do that. If what you have to do is defeat the govt police/military then you do that. If what you have to do is defeat the superpower's military, then do the first 2 things, then that's what you need to do. You're still only doing this in order to march on the capital though.
If you understand this, don't, disagree with it or don't, is so far yet to be determined*. You've not even acknowledged this has been written so far*. However what is completely clear is that there is no point explaining it again if you have no interest in the answer.*
Nothing changes in this objective whether there's govt soldier in your way, or a soldier in a US-supplied tank, or a US-supplied tank with a US-supplied US soldier in it. The control of the state/etc is still the objective for the insurgent and the defeat of the insurgency is still the objective for state and any superpower supporting it. Hence, whether the guy in the tank is a local or a US solidier, the same objectives of counterinsurgency apply.
Whether insurgents are primarily concerned with attacking police stations, superpower forces or marketplaces doesn't change the nature of the conflict they are in unless they've given up the goals of the insurgency. At which point the argument is irrelevant. If there is no insurgency whose objective is to destabilise/replace the government then counter-insurgency isn't relevant.
I can't see any point in discussing this further on the basis that you believe official COIN doctrine doesn't adequately address a scenario, when you've not once mentioned either how it does, how that is lacking, nor have any interest in acknowledging any response you're provided*. If you've already convinced yourself and this state of mind is immune to or uninterested in addressing any alternate reasoning that you are provided, then you've already achieved success with the only audience you are interested in. There really isn't any way to advance that discussion.
*Yeah, more than a little deja vu.
Perhaps AM is attending a
Perhaps AM is attending a Taliban BEER FEST in the style of Obama, the racist perfesser, and the cop?
Maybe Exum and Mullah Omar can drink their favorite label of goat's milk and trade manuals. Omar would see that COIN is obviously the best strategy in the world (as it works SO WELL every time it is tried), disband the Taliban and turn them into a 24-hour tech support branch for AT&T.
Kilo: Thanks again. You
Kilo:
Thanks again. You have been very helpful.
Let me just close by returning to AM's July 24th post, "The Limits of Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan" and his statement that:
"We, as Americans, typically wage counter-insurgency campaigns as third-parties -- that is, we fight on behalf of another government. "
AM seems to be saying that (1) Americans do not always fight in counter-insurgency campaigns as a third party and that (2) other nations (more often than Americans) do not fight as third parties in counter-insurgency campaigns.
In such circumstances, when we/they are not fighting as a third party, how then do we/they fight? I think as the principal. Who then gets the third party role? I think it is the host government that assumes this role.
Best, Bill.
Recent United States study
Recent United States study and discussion regarding insurgency / counter-insurgency does seem to have been undertaken without adequately regard to or address of the specific context within which many / most such conflicts involving Americans occur.
The dominant feature of these conflicts would seem to be United States (great power) direct and indirect involvement in the affairs of lesser nations. Yet this subject is avoided or is rarely or inadequately addressed.
The new US Army and Marine Counter-Insurgency Field Manual, for example, spends virtually all its time on the generic aspects of insurgencies / counterinsurgencies and avoids a detailed discussion how great power / lesser nation dynamics can cause these conflicts generally and how the United States / lesser nation dynamics can cause them specifically. Yet this is the context within which American soldiers must learn to fight.
One would think that for Americans and American soldiers to "know their enemy," they must know and understand how great power and United States involvement in the affairs of lesser nations can and do work to make these conflicts more likely.
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