Abu Muqawama: Post
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Back from Afghanistan
Greetings, readers. I apologize for being out of the loop for these past four weeks. About five weeks ago, I was asked by General McChrystal to be part of a small team of scholars and practitioners helping to conduct his 60-day review of strategy and operations in Afghanistan. So I have spent the past month traveling around Afghanistan conducting interviews and trying to evaluate ISAF's operations.
Obviously enough, much of what we observed and concluding during my time in Afghanistan will remain confidential. But I filled two notebooks with over 160 pages of hand-written notes, and I suspect that much of what I saw and observed will leak out onto this blog over the next few months.
In this first post back, though, allow me to just make a few observations:
1. Winning in Afghanistan will be really, really difficult. I was and am still haunted by one of the last paragraphs in David B. Edwards' majesterial Heroes of the Age:
Afghanistan's central problem [is] Afghanistan itself, specifically certain profound moral contradictions that have inhibited this country from forging a coherent civil society. These contradictions are deeply rooted in Afghan culture, but they have come to the fore in the last one hundred years, since the advent of the nation-state, the laying down of permanent borders, and the attempt to establish an extensive state bureaucracy and to invest that bureaucracy with novel forms of authority and control.
Ooph. With that paragraph in mind I set about examining ISAF operations and strategy, which will largely succeed or fail based on the degree to which the institutions of the Afghan state are capable of defeating this insurgency. To say we are facing an uphill struggle in Afghanistan is an understatement. But as a famous commander once said, hard is not hopeless.
2. I was tremendously impressed by the quality of the men and women working for General McChrystal at ISAF. There is a joke going around that when Petraeus took charge in Iraq, he gathered the smartest people he could find to help him win. When McChrystal took charge in Afghanistan, meanwhile, he gathered ... well, a bunch of guys from the 75th Ranger Regiment. The truth is, General McChrystal has assembled a team of smart officers and advisers who understand the challenges of Afghanistan and are willing to speak unpleasant truths. Many of these officers are indeed men who served with McChrystal in either the Ranger Regiment or the Joint Special Operations Command. Others are men and women hired sight unseen but with reputations for exceptional intelligence or hard-won experience in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. Col. Chris Kolenda, for example, an armor officer who successfully commanded a battalion in northeastern Afghanistan, led our team. Sarah Chayes, meanwhile, was retained from General McKiernan's staff. There are other examples -- many, in fact -- and they all speak to a commander who has cast a very wide net in search of talent to help win in Afghanistan.
3. General McChrystal understands population-centric COIN. Forget all that nonsense about a guy with decades of direct-action special operations experience not being mentally limber enough to adapt to protecting the population. About five minutes into a discussion of civilian casualties in my first week in Kabul, I watched McChrystal stand up and spell out for his staff in explicit terms exactly why killing civilians makes one operationally ineffective in an environment like Afghanistan. McChrystal is not inclined to draw attention to his storied history as a special operator. But when he tells you that it's impossible to kill your way out of this war, you believe him -- because Lord knows, he's tried.
4. My experience in Afghanistan was made great by the incredible team with whom I worked and all of those outside ISAF who invited me into their homes or over for dinner and coffee to talk about the situation in Afghanistan. As someone who is trained in the languages, history and politics of another region of the globe, I am always eager to hear from those with knowledge of Afghanistan and its peoples more nuanced and complete than my own.
Consider this, then, the first of many posts I'll be writing on the war in Afghanistan in the coming weeks. For now, though, I am jet-lagged, in dire need of another cup of coffee, and behind on many emails. Thanks to the readership for putting up with my absence, and thanks to Ibn Muqawama for keeping this blog going while I was away.
Welcome back! Looking
Welcome back! Looking forward to your perspectives. To the extent it is not classified and doesn't get you into trouble, please share your perceptions of the commanding generals of the ANA. {General Staff officers, the 5 Corps commanding generals, Kabul's 111st Division commanding general.} Did you get much face time with Defense Minister, General Abdurrahim Wardak and Chief of the General Staff, General Bismillah Mohammadi Khan? What are their impressions of General McChrystal and his strategy?
I would also be interested in your impressions of the Ministry of Interior.
I suspect you focused more on short term tourniquet operations rather than medium term Afghan capacity building. This said, could you also write a few articles about CSTC-A's perceptions and plans going forward?
In my view, one high ROI investment would be to bribe--OOOPS I meant retire--some older ANA officers and replace them with younger officers. Has funding this idea been discussed at ISAF?
Soldier no longer in Iraq,
Soldier no longer in Iraq, are you there? Would love to touch base offline.
Glad to have you back.
Glad to have you back. Let's get the ball rolling again, please. You can look forward to some fierce criticisms of COIN. I eagerly await such discussions, as well as the upcoming results from the Afghan Surge. Exciting times we live in. Btw, WaPo also has a pretty good article on the F-22 being effectively halted (for now).
Why is it that Afghanistan
Why is it that Afghanistan is susceptible to harboring terrorist groups, but back-country villages of hillbillies in Kentucky are not? The hillbillies would not tolerate it. They would fight back, call the police, and organize themselves into vigilante groups. The Afghan people find ways to compromise with the ruffians. Figure out why the two groups behave differently and that will probably go a long way toward figuring out the way ahead. The most important difference seems to be that one group would not likely be able to reconcile any common ground for compromise, whereas the Afghanis can and do.
If Afghanis refuse to co-exist with the Taliban, then the Taliban will have no refuge among the Afghanis, whether functioning institutions of the state are present or not.
"Schmedlap" I don't agree
"Schmedlap" I don't agree with you. Keep in mind that Afghanistan has a very low per capita income. Afghan villages, tribes, or districts that oppose the Taliban are likely to be wiped out without substantial external assistance. Afghans remember that the Taliban and their allies have perhaps two hundred thousand fighters in Pakistan. They can always cross the border and wreck havoc when they are least expected. There are many paths through the huge mountains (which are part of the great Himalayan mountain ranges.) They cannot be all shut off. This is why the best you can hope for from many villages close to the Pakistan border is that they call the ANSF or ISAF on a cell phone to report Taliban (and similar group) activity. For these villages to do more is suicide.
Your point has more merit for parts of Helmand and Kandahar far from the Pakistani border. But keep in mind . . . how are the tribes suppose to afford guns and ammunition? Afghanistan is far poorer than you realize.
Schmedlap, you might want to read some Afghan polls. 91% oppose the Taliban nationwide. However, in the South, support for the Taliban is much higher. Support for the ANA nationwide is 87%.
@ Schmediap Those
@ Schmediap
Those hillbillies didn't seem to mind hanging out with ruffians when they were called moonshiners. Even today their is a pretty serious problem with moonshining in that part of the country. The biggest part of the problem is that the local population tends to side with their kin instead of the police.
@Anand Who does these polls
@Anand
Who does these polls that say support for the ANA is 87% and opposition to the Taliban is 91%? If those numbers were that high we wouldn't be having any problems.
I'm seriously curious about these polls because it seems like when we enter a town the whole township disappears. If this is the case, how do we ever muster enough respondents to make a poll accurate?
Welcome back..lookin fwd to
Welcome back..lookin fwd to reading about the trip
"About five weeks ago, I was
"About five weeks ago, I was asked by General McChrystal to be part of a small team of scholars and practitioners helping to conduct his 60-day review of strategy and operations in Afghanistan"
Welcome back. I look forward to whatever you can say about 'strategy and operations' - I have been whining at Ink Spots, and elsewhere, about the strategy part......
http://tachesdhuile.blogspot.com/2009/07/reports-pakistan-still-pakistan...
"I watched McChrystal stand
"I watched McChrystal stand up and spell out for his staff in explicit terms exactly why killing civilians makes one operationally ineffective in an environment like Afghanistan."
Did it really take us eight years to get here?
It's nice to see it's
It's nice to see it's dawning that Afghanistan will be very difficult ( I happen to think the project is doomed) because of the nature of Afghan society, the nature of western armies and the realities of western society, but it's sad that yet another assessment is thought to be needed to see the obvious.
@Anand, You say that you
@Anand,
You say that you disagree with me, but I see a whole lot in your post that we agree on. For the sake of argument, let's assert that I agree with every word that you wrote. Given that assertion, are functioning institutions of the Afghan state necessary to secure the population? I say no. That is not to say that they can't help, but I wonder if we have gotten so obsessed with 3-24 dogma that everything is now viewed not as a flavor of conflict, but as a flavor of COIN.
That was what stuck out at me in the blog entry. The author wrote: "ISAF operations and strategy... will largely succeed or fail based on the degree to which the institutions of the Afghan state are capable of defeating this insurgency."
Have we chosen that strategy because we think it is the only way or because we think it is the preferred way? I hope the latter.
gringo lost, would you like
gringo lost, would you like me to post links to opinion polls?
I would note that the South is far more supportive of the Taliban than anywhere else in Afghanistan, including among Pasthuns from East Afghanistan. This is why the South is such a challenge. Specifically, the main problems in the South are Helmand and Kandahar. The Taliban has considerable popular support in both.
Many of these polls have detailed methodologies to explain how they select what villages and towns to poll.
Here are two recent polls:
http://www.iri.org/newsreleases/pdfs/2009%20June%2016%20Survey%20of%20Af...
http://www.cmi.no/pdf/?file=/afghanistan/doc/1083a1Afghanistan2009.pdf
Analyze them yourself.
M Shannon, why do you think Afghanistan is "doomed"? If the international community gives Afghanistan $200 billion in grants over 20 years, I think Afghan per capita GDP can exceed the current level in Andra Pradesh India (the province whose capital is Hyderabad . . . a major high tech center in South India with 7 million people.) I would note that Hyderabad has a large concentration of muslims, and was the place where the last remnant of the Moghul Empire (the Nizam . . . whose legal language was Farsi) dissolved in 1948. The Mongol Moghul empire ruled most of Afghanistan, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan for about two centuries until the early 18th century.
How do you measure success. One set of metrics would be:
1) Real per capita GDP
2) Real tax revenue for the Afghan Government = Real GDP * (% of GDP collected in tax revenue)
3) ANA and ANP capable of managing internal security inside Afghanistan, albeit with substantial long term foreign funding
4) A functioning democracy comparable to the worst functioning large province in India
If these are the relevant metrics of success, I am pretty confident that success can be achieved. Remember that the Afghans want to succeed.
Welcome back! Your standing
Welcome back!
Your standing invite back to the big Z is always valid.
Cheers!
Friedman's op-ed is worth
Friedman's op-ed is worth reading. It's on the early bird, if you have access.
"I’ve long argued that there should be a test for any officer who wants to serve in Iraq or Afghanistan — just one question: “Do you think the shortest distance between two points is a straight line?” If you answer “yes,” you can go to Germany, South Korea or Japan, but not to Iraq or Afghanistan. Well, this war has produced a class of officers who are very out-of-the-box thinkers. They learned everything the hard way — not in classes at Annapolis or West Point, but on the streets of Fallujah and Kandahar.
I call them: “The Class Too Dumb to Quit.” I say that with affection and respect. When all seemed lost in Iraq, they were just too stubborn to quit and figured out a new anti-insurgency strategy. It has not produced irreversible success yet — and may never. But it has kept the hope of a decent outcome alive. The same people are now trying to do the same thing in Afghanistan. Their biggest strategic insight? “We don’t count enemy killed in action anymore,” one of their officers told me."
Anand: I think it's doomed
Anand: I think it's doomed (not in order of priority) because:
* Most of the money allotted here won't be spent here. What is spent here is often wasted.
* Raising GNP won't lead to reduced numbers of rebels. Iraq had/ has a much higher GNP than Afghanistan and the number of hostiles is/was probably greater,
* If the current recession or slow down continues the money will dry up,
* I expect Karzai to win the election, for the current corrupt government to continue and for the Taliban to use his win as proof of the corruption of the government. Many westerners will doubt a regime with Fahim as a vice-president is worthy of support and they will be correct,
* Most sensible Afghans are appalled at the notion of their son joining the ANA or ANP. That means the corruption in the police will continue or get worse as it expands by taking in the dregs. The inability of the ANA to operate on it's own after seven years points to severe (and perhaps unrepairable) problems in it's staffing, motivation and training.
* Almost every sensible Afghan wants to move out of here. Most are more disgusted with the government than afraid of the Taliban,
* Support for the war is decreasing in the main contributing NATO countries. Canada, Holland and the Aussies are already signalling they want out,
* The history of western COIN campaigns post WW 2 gives no reason to believe a successful outcome is likely.
All of the primary factors leading to successful insurgencies (bordering safe haven, rough terrain, foreign forces leading, corrupt government) are at play.
* An improvement in IEDs could easily lead to a trebling of NATO casualties with a matching reduction in public support. From the Iraq experience a US fatal casualty rate of 2-3 per day would seriously erode support. Rates that would demoralize NATO allies are of course much lower.
* The nature of the current short service "middle class" professional military isn't suited for long term policing in a foreign country.
That said, do I think that Mullah Omar will be the head of state of Afghanistan and welcome back his AQ friends. No.
Just as in Iraq the original bad guys will be gone and will be replaced by a different gang of thugs who will eventually become troublesome. In the meantime the west will pour cash in and try out the latest COIN theories until it gets diverted by something else and wanders off to leave the Afghans to sort themselves out. Yes, we did this in the past and paid for it, but I see no evidence that the US government is capable of learning from it's mistakes.
"I watched McChrystal stand
"I watched McChrystal stand up and spell out for his staff in explicit terms exactly why killing civilians makes one operationally ineffective in an environment like Afghanistan."
Did it really take us eight years to get here?
50 years? 100 years? 230 years?
are we there yet?
Welcome back! Would love to
Welcome back!
Would love to hear some on how your work-dynamic has been.
News: German Armed Forces
News:
German Armed Forces Intensify Fighting Against Taliban
Germany is undergoing its biggest operation yet in Afghanistan. Backed by 300 German soldiers, 1,200 Afghan army troops are mounting an offensive against the Taliban insurgency. The deployment of heavy weapons underscores how serious fighting has become in northern Afghanistan. ...
For the first time, Marder infantry fighting vehicles -- which have heavy firepower and were only recently relocated from Mazar-e-Sharif to Kunduz -- have been deployed. On Sunday, one of these vehicles fired at an insurgent position. And the Germans fired three mortar rounds on areas the Taliban had retreated to. ...
According to SPIEGEL ONLINE sources, missiles are also being fired by German fighter jets in northern Afghanistan for the first time. Following a first deployment of fighter jets on June 15 in northern Afghanistan by the ISAF international security force, most supplied by the United States, Afghan forces requested so-called "air support" for a second time on Sunday. ...
Sources told SPIEGEL ONLINE that five Taliban were killed and two seriously injured after ISAF fighter jets fired missiles and aircraft cannons. The Bundeswehr claims that no collateral damage important enough to be mentioned had occurred in the operation.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,637646,00.html
I was pretty sure this kind of change would (only) come after the September elections in Germany. Now it seems like the German government considered Afghanistan to be more important than a few percentage points in September. I'll give them credit for that.
>>> Who does these polls
>>> Who does these polls that say support for the ANA is 87% and opposition to the
>>> Taliban is 91%? If those numbers were that high we wouldn't be having any problems.
>> Here are two recent polls: Analyze them yourself.
The Taliban figure is almost exact. Nearest for the ANA is positive/neg ratings of performance -- first is at 57/34, second is 65 pos.
Welcome back! One thing I
Welcome back!
One thing I was struck by both in yesterdays post and in 'Triage" is that you are very explicitly talking about reforming a broad range of "institutions" to do COIN rather than training individual leader in the army. While people have been making this type of argument in the past implicitly, I think that using the specific language of institutionalism is a new and potentially very useful step for COIN practitioners and policy makers.
The last few years have seen some movement in studying meso-level phenomenon, whether by looking at the large tribal groups as the functional unit of analysis as Prof. Christa does (traces of the technique are here http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65151/fotini-christia-and-michael..., more so in her academical work) or looking to Social Network theory (as David Betz pointed out here http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009/06/08/100-years-of-coin-what-new-ha...).
Abu M: I'm curious if the use of the term on your part is reflecting a actually refinement in how you are thinking about what the appropriate "level of analysis" for COIN is or if I'm over reading this in a desperate attempt to make academia relevant (and snlii will smack me down in 5-4-3...)
Glad you are back. This
Glad you are back. This blog honestly collapsed a bit while you were gone.
"Afghanistan's central
"Afghanistan's central problem [is] Afghanistan itself, specifically certain profound moral contradictions that have inhibited this country from forging a coherent civil society. These contradictions are deeply rooted in Afghan culture."
Which means we have to copy the approach of the Taliban: Get the kids while they are still young. I.E. make it possible for them to go to school, and give them reading materials that show that the old ways of tribal strife lead to povety and death. Show them what a modern muslim nation can look like (Turkey etc). Introduce them to the ideas of democracy, rule of law and the scientific method. ...
"About five minutes into a discussion of civilian casualties in my first week in Kabul, I watched McChrystal stand up and spell out for his staff in explicit terms exactly why killing civilians makes one operationally ineffective in an environment like Afghanistan."
1. Good with respect to Gen McChrystal.
2. Not sure about the time line, but why does he still have to explain that to his hand-picked staff ??
Where there newbies present? Was he just pointing out some details or discussing problems of practical application of the principle?
Ooops. Forgot to mention: Good U R back in one piece ... (jet lag not withstanding)
"are you there? Would love
"are you there? Would love to touch base offline."
Anand, since this press-release-disguised-as-a-blog jumped the shark, a number of us bolted to http://tachesdhuile.blogspot.com/
You get all the Kool-Ade drinking over there, too, but at least they offer limericks and haikus, including one about Exum that's somewhat funny.
Since I'm also being sent to OEF for a long, strategic review NOT intended for "Stan the Man," I'll probably share some thoughts over there that are slightly different from those one might find here.
" McChrystal is not inclined to draw attention to his storied history as a special operator. "
Show me the CIB compiled during this "storied history" as a "special operator."
There once was a man from
There once was a man from CNAS.
Who got stuck up an Afghan's ass.
A COINdinista 'til the end,
He thought we could win,
But instead flunked strategy class.
Andrew, You say "winning" in
Andrew,
You say "winning" in Afghanistan will be really, really hard. Please define "winning."
SNLII,
You have a great mind and wit and you provide a lot of sound analysis - it's too bad you too often waste your talents on unnecessary insults - insults that reflect more on your character and your arguments than Andrew's.
The limerick was written as
The limerick was written as a joke. It's conveyed in the language of the frontline trooper.
In no way was I personally dissing Exum, and the mock indignation that functioned as much is even funnier than the limerick, itself.
As Exum knows, I have nothing but the highest respect for him, and championed him as a thinker long before he arrived at CNAS. Indeed, I told them they should hire him before he went there.
I also never outed him when he hid behind his mask as "Abu Muqawama," a pretty much open secret.
So spare me the bombast about my "character" or how I so often "insult" him. Most people would love to be so insulted.
@Anand Thanks for the links.
@Anand
Thanks for the links. I'm not going to pretend to be a statistician or anything like that. But here are a few things that stuck out to me:
You said: "91% opposition to the Taliban"
The News Poll said: "9% strong local support for the Taliban"
>> It's a jump to say 91% opposition, you should of just said what the report said instead of trying a little trickery of your own.
You said: "81% support the ANA"
The International Republican Institute stated Afghans gave the ANA a rating of 3.24 out of 5; that compared to 2.49 for ISAF
Wait, wait... Those reports you cite aren't done yet..
You said: "81% support the ANA"
The News Poll said: "In another measure, 57 percent of Afghans rate the performance of the police positively, and ditto for the Afghan Army – not overwhelmingly positive measures, but the best out there. (Again as noted, just 32 rate the performance of the United States positively; 33 percent, NATO/ISAF forces.) Given Afghan institutions’ support, it could prove more popular to put their imprint – rather than a Western face – on anti-insurgent efforts."
Thanks. Are there any other polls that you would want me to analyze?
@ Andy I'm sure SNLII
@ Andy
I'm sure SNLII doesn't need anyone to stick up for him, but I believe that the haiku he posted was not his, but just one from a comments section on an Ink Blots post:
http://tachesdhuile.blogspot.com/2009/07/unleash-your-inner-galula.html#...
Scratch what I said, Andy.
Scratch what I said, Andy. SNLII did say that. It would help next time to scroll all the way down on the comment.
Gringo lost: I think that
Gringo lost:
I think that the limerick WAS posted first on tachesdhuile - boy, you think they could come up with a more intuitive blog name, one that's a bit easier to remember - but it was posted by none other than SNLII himself.
ADTS
Good grief. I was written
Good grief. I was written as a joke by an avatar.
Everyone who knows me know that I'm no enemy of Exum's. Get over your mock indignation, people.
"tachesdhuile" -- sound it out in French and it's "oil slicks." You know, from COIN.
Hey, insults in limerick
Hey, insults in limerick form. Yay! Let me try, too:
There once was a soldier in Iraq.
Who ate on his own a whole pie stack
It blew up his belly
Transformed him to jelly
Now he is no longer in Iraq.
Now if I only knew any of these guys in person it would be way funnier ...
On the other hand, I can stay kinda anonymous this way.
Joys of the internet age ...
---
Andy: +1
Ok, after I read SNLII's new
Ok, after I read SNLII's new comment, I retract my "+1" with a"sorry" attached.
On the other hand, I still like my limerick ... ;-)
" tachesdhuile - boy, you
" tachesdhuile - boy, you think they could come up with a more intuitive blog name"
Well, if you set a bootmark, it will autotranslate into Ink Spots.
For the froghaters' benefit, I presume ...
Well, if you set a bootmark,
Well, if you set a bootmark, it will autotranslate into Ink Spots.
For the froghaters' benefit, I presume ...
In fact, it's just for blogspot's benefit; "inkspots" as a url was already taken.
Eh, whatever SNLII. The
Eh, whatever SNLII. The internets aren't exactly the best tool for subtle communication.
SNII, sorry for going off
SNII, sorry for going off topic. Looking for a good primer on Israeli confiscation of Palestinian private property 1948 to the present paying below market rates or no price at all using eminent domain type laws.
The best primer I have found so far was written by you:
http://abumuqawama.blogspot.com/2008/12/kill-your-tv.html
""Custodian of Absentee Property Law." Since 1961, a formal institution, the Israel Land Administration (or, "ILA") has existed to administer many of these "absentee" properties. In 1967, the "Eretz Israel" statutes pushed the policies into the annexed East Jeruslaem sections."
Looking for more similar information.
________________________________________
Winning in Afghanistan in my mind amounts to:
1) finding a way for the Afghan government to generate some real tax revenue (or else the government will not be real; but will be accused of being a proxy for foreign powers that fund it) This will probably take two decades to achieve.
2) increased per capita real income (Again we are looking at a two decade time line.) For a couple reasons:
2a) increased per capita real income increases the taxing capacity of the state
2b) increased per capita real income increases the strength of civil society to resist the Taliban (and its allies), and organized crime (including the opium lords)
2c) increased per capital real income is strongly correlated (some would say caused by) much higher education levels that have many noneconomic salutary effects
3) Increased capacity and performance of the ANA and ANP (I am assuming that they will need $130 billion in foreign funding over the next 20 years.)
4) An elected government which functions comparable to the worst functioning former Moghul province in India
To M Shannon's points:
"* Most of the money allotted here won't be spent here. What is spent here is often wasted." Money has to be spent more efficiently. Would you argue that the CSTC-A isn't spending money on the ANSF efficiently?
"* Raising GNP won't lead to reduced numbers of rebels. Iraq had/ has a much higher GNP than Afghanistan and the number of hostiles is/was probably greater," Violence in Iraq had a high negative correlation with economic growth. Some (such as myself) however would argue that the drop in violence caused the economic growth rather than the other way around.
"* If the current recession or slow down continues the money will dry up," Afghanistan probably needs $250 billion over 20 years in grants. About $100 billion can come from other countries. $150 billion is approximately 0.03% of probable US GDP of $450 trillion over the next 20 years. It is far cheaper than maintaining a large ISAF presence in Afghanistan.
"* I expect Karzai to win the election, for the current corrupt government to continue and for the Taliban to use his win as proof of the corruption of the government. Many westerners will doubt a regime with Fahim as a vice-president is worthy of support and they will be correct," Hey I like Fahim :-) No fair. Fahim was Massoud's right hand man in liberating Afghanistan from the Taliban. Just keep him away from the MoI or MoD ministries!!! ;-) All kidding aside, what is wrong with a Karzai/Fahim government?
"* Most sensible Afghans are appalled at the notion of their son joining the ANA or ANP. That means the corruption in the police will continue or get worse as it expands by taking in the dregs. The inability of the ANA to operate on it's own after seven years points to severe (and perhaps unrepairable) problems in it's staffing, motivation and training." Wow! The ANA only accepts a small fraction of highly motivated applicants. The 203rd ANA Corps can operate independently. I also challenge you to prove that the ANA has motivation problems. Staffing . . . yes that is a problem. Many of the older officers need to be retired off. There are many post 2001 NCOs and officers in the ANA who would do a far better job. The ANA and ANP need far more money to teach their soldiers and officers how to read and right. They also need far more foreign trainers and advisers. What are your perceptions of the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP.) They seem to be a bright spot in the MoI.
"* Almost every sensible Afghan wants to move out of here. Most are more disgusted with the government than afraid of the Taliban," Ahum. Many Indians (who remember where ruled by the same Moghul empire as most of Afghanistan was until the early 1700s) would have told you the same thing in the 1980s. But the economic reforms of 1991 gradually changed all that. Similarly, attitudes in Afghanistan will change as per capita real GDP rises.
"* Support for the war is decreasing in the main contributing NATO countries. Canada, Holland and the Aussies are already signalling they want out," Advisers, trainers, civilian governance experts and foreign aid are more useful than combat troops. There is more support for these services than you imply. Just to give you one example, there have been no protests in India against India giving the Afghans $2.1 billion in grants. This means that India could easily give much more money to Afghanistan. Public opinion in China, Japan, South Korea, and other countries is also conducive to much more foreign aid for Afghanistan.
"* The history of western COIN campaigns post WW 2 gives no reason to believe a successful outcome is likely.
All of the primary factors leading to successful insurgencies (bordering safe haven, rough terrain, foreign forces leading, corrupt government) are at play." I wouldn't agree. You are forgetting that most Afghans see the Taliban as an unpopular proxy for foreign powers. Most governments around the world are very corrupt. The ANA and ANCOP can lead. They need more funding, training and equipping.
"* An improvement in IEDs could easily lead to a trebling of NATO casualties with a matching reduction in public support. From the Iraq experience a US fatal casualty rate of 2-3 per day would seriously erode support. Rates that would demoralize NATO allies are of course much lower." Where will they get these IEDs? Remember that their popularity in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia has taken a tumble. These use to be large supporters of the Taliban and their allies.
"* The nature of the current short service "middle class" professional military isn't suited for long term policing in a foreign country." This is why the ANSF will need $130 billion in foreign funding over the next 20 years.
حمدا لله على
حمدا لله على السلام
I'm an American dammit! How
I'm an American dammit! How can you expect me to know the French for oil spots? I got two choices in junior high - Spanish or French - and I took Spanish because I heard it was easier. Not that I'd be able to find oil spots in Spanish, either, but that's beside the point. How dare they start a blog that requires erudition for its name to be intuitive!
ADTS
I'm with Andy - I too would
I'm with Andy - I too would like to know how we will define win. I said as much at my place, too.
http://onparkstreet.wordpress.com/2009/07/21/you-are-not-alone-in-being-...
I was not so questioning during the run up to the Iraq War, so I am going to be more questioning now! Of course, I am now drinking deeply of the libertarian Kool-aid and pretty much don't trust anyone on anything. I might have gone too far in the opposite direction......
(I thought SNLII was just goofing around, but, as I said on another thread around here, I love the messy free speech nuttiness of the internets, and I thought the blog was okay during Abu M's absence. Ibn Muqawama did fine. I just get freaked out by the main CNAS page. It feels like big brother is looking out at me.)
"How dare they start a blog
"How dare they start a blog that requires erudition for its name to be intuitive!"
You mean as in the case of a blog named Abu Muqawama ??? ;-)
@Anand You talk like money
@Anand
You talk like money grows on poppy plants or something.
Afghanistan probably needs $250 billion over 20 years in grants... $150 billion from the US
Are you aware that in 2008 we only gave $26 billion in foreign aid... worldwide? This number was way up from the $10 billion we gave in 2000?
Are you also aware that we just hit the $1 trillion dollar mark for our annual budget deficit?
So, where is all this money going to come from? We sure as hell don't have it.
"Not that I'd be able to
"Not that I'd be able to find oil spots in Spanish, either"
According to my dictionary, ink spots = manchas de tinta.
Any native speakers around?
@ Positroll: "How dare they
@ Positroll:
"How dare they start a blog that requires erudition for its name to be intuitive!"
You mean as in the case of a blog named Abu Muqawama ??? ;-)
###
Somehow, with respect to the Ink Spot blog, I think it has to do with the syllables (seriously). Abu - not hard to remember. Muqawama - kind of rolls off the tongue (at least if you're not pronouncing correctly). As for its meaning, fair enough...
ADTS
Depending on your accent,
Depending on your accent, "taches d'huile" is only 2 syllables (unless you pronounce the last "e")
and it rolls of the tongue well, too. Try "tush dooi" .... ("i" pounounced as in "give")
That's "i" pronounced as in
That's "i" pronounced as in "give" ...
Who else thinks Anand has a
Who else thinks Anand has a secret shrine to Ex in his closet ( press clippings , photos etc) - Mancrush or Stalker ? Careful Ex !
Gringo, 9/11 alone cost the
Gringo, 9/11 alone cost the global economy over $250 billion in losses. The annual pentagon budget is over $500 billion a year. $250 billion over 20 years is $12.5 billion a year of which I think $7.5 billion will need to be provided by the US. Ending aid to Israel will provide $3 billion of the $7.5 billion. $4.5 billion a year for 20 years is a lot of money. It is about how much money spent over 20 years. For comparison, ISOF spends $90 billion a year in Afghanistan.
The objective would be to achieve the following targets in 20 years:
- $1500 per capita real income in 2009 dollars (or an annual per capita real growth rate of about 5% per year in the interim)
-$250 per capita tax revenue in 2009 dollars (17% taxes as a percentage of GDP; lower than Hong Kong!)
-About $14 billion a year in annual tax revenue measured in 2009 dollars ($250*56 million people) {Assuming 3% annual population growth rate}
For comparison, China has achieved far higher growth rates than the above. India's annual per capita growth rate is 6% (although it has averaged 7% since the early 2000s.) Afghanistan will be significantly helped by the low base effect. Afghanistan only had 1,000 or so freshman in college in 2001, compared to about 45,000 this year. Growth in Afghanistan could easily be much higher than the above if the international community pays more for Afghanistan's education system.
Where the money will come from? Technological innovation or what statisticians call total or multi factor productivity:
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/prod3.t03.htm
We need to facilitate greater technological innovation. As Deng said: "to get rich is glorious." If the US averages growth rates of 1% a year (as currently expected), then the deficit is out of control. If we average 2% per year, then we will have a huge exploding surplus within 20 years. Power of compound interest.
On Afghan public opinion, from http://www.cmi.no/pdf/?file=/afghanistan/doc/1083a1Afghanistan2009.pdf
See question 18 (90% oppose, 8% support Taliban fighters, 86% oppose, 11% support foreign Jihadi fighters)
In prior polls, 5% supported Taliban fighters compared with 94% who opposed them. This represents a surge in Taliban support in the South.
See question 38: (percentage that have a favorable or unfavorable view towards)
1/12/09 – Summary table
----- Favorable ----- ---- Unfavorable ---- No
NET|Very|Somewhat|NET|Somewhat|Very|No opinion
a. The Taliban 7 3 4 91 12 79 2
b. Osama Bin Laden 6 2 4 92 10 82 3
c. The United States 47 7 40 52 25 27 1
d. Pakistan 8 1 7 91 26 65 1
e. Great Britain 39 6 32 54 26 28 7
f. Iran 57 19 38 40 22 19 3
g. Germany 61 17 43 31 17 14 8
h. India 74 27 47 21 13 8 5
(tried to improve the formating of the above but failed. 91% unfavorable view of the Taliban comes from the above. Negative for OBL is 92%. Negative for Pakistan is 91% (although 26 percentage points of that comes from "somewhat unfavorable," so the intensity of dislike is much lower than the intensity of dislike for the Taliban and OBL.) The most popular country was India (probably because India is perceived as anti Pakistan.)
The 87% favorable view of the ANA comes from the other poll. The other poll breaks down a subcategory called (Pashtu who identify themselves as Pashtu first, Afghan second.) About 10% of Afghans fall in this category. The opinions for this subgroup is very different from the opinions of other Pashtu or other Afghans.
@ Positroll on hating frogs
@ Positroll on hating frogs and pronunciation...unless I'm having an identity crisis, I don't hate my own French half.
As Gulliver said, the URL was taken. He has also explained pronunciation thus: tash [rhyme with "bash"] d'wheel and even as a former French pronunciation teacher, I find it easy and accurate.
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