Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS.
Greetings, readers. I apologize for being out of the loop for these past four weeks. About five weeks ago, I was asked by General McChrystal to be part of a small team of scholars and practitioners helping to conduct his 60-day review of strategy and operations in Afghanistan. So I have spent the past month traveling around Afghanistan conducting interviews and trying to evaluate ISAF's operations.
Obviously enough, much of what we observed and concluding during my time in Afghanistan will remain confidential. But I filled two notebooks with over 160 pages of hand-written notes, and I suspect that much of what I saw and observed will leak out onto this blog over the next few months.
In this first post back, though, allow me to just make a few observations:
1. Winning in Afghanistan will be really, really difficult. I was and am still haunted by one of the last paragraphs in David B. Edwards' majesterial Heroes of the Age:
Afghanistan's central problem [is] Afghanistan itself, specifically certain profound moral contradictions that have inhibited this country from forging a coherent civil society. These contradictions are deeply rooted in Afghan culture, but they have come to the fore in the last one hundred years, since the advent of the nation-state, the laying down of permanent borders, and the attempt to establish an extensive state bureaucracy and to invest that bureaucracy with novel forms of authority and control.
Ooph. With that paragraph in mind I set about examining ISAF operations and strategy, which will largely succeed or fail based on the degree to which the institutions of the Afghan state are capable of defeating this insurgency. To say we are facing an uphill struggle in Afghanistan is an understatement. But as a famous commander once said, hard is not hopeless.
2. I was tremendously impressed by the quality of the men and women working for General McChrystal at ISAF. There is a joke going around that when Petraeus took charge in Iraq, he gathered the smartest people he could find to help him win. When McChrystal took charge in Afghanistan, meanwhile, he gathered ... well, a bunch of guys from the 75th Ranger Regiment. The truth is, General McChrystal has assembled a team of smart officers and advisers who understand the challenges of Afghanistan and are willing to speak unpleasant truths. Many of these officers are indeed men who served with McChrystal in either the Ranger Regiment or the Joint Special Operations Command. Others are men and women hired sight unseen but with reputations for exceptional intelligence or hard-won experience in counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. Col. Chris Kolenda, for example, an armor officer who successfully commanded a battalion in northeastern Afghanistan, led our team. Sarah Chayes, meanwhile, was retained from General McKiernan's staff. There are other examples -- many, in fact -- and they all speak to a commander who has cast a very wide net in search of talent to help win in Afghanistan.
3. General McChrystal understands population-centric COIN. Forget all that nonsense about a guy with decades of direct-action special operations experience not being mentally limber enough to adapt to protecting the population. About five minutes into a discussion of civilian casualties in my first week in Kabul, I watched McChrystal stand up and spell out for his staff in explicit terms exactly why killing civilians makes one operationally ineffective in an environment like Afghanistan. McChrystal is not inclined to draw attention to his storied history as a special operator. But when he tells you that it's impossible to kill your way out of this war, you believe him -- because Lord knows, he's tried.
4. My experience in Afghanistan was made great by the incredible team with whom I worked and all of those outside ISAF who invited me into their homes or over for dinner and coffee to talk about the situation in Afghanistan. As someone who is trained in the languages, history and politics of another region of the globe, I am always eager to hear from those with knowledge of Afghanistan and its peoples more nuanced and complete than my own.
Consider this, then, the first of many posts I'll be writing on the war in Afghanistan in the coming weeks. For now, though, I am jet-lagged, in dire need of another cup of coffee, and behind on many emails. Thanks to the readership for putting up with my absence, and thanks to Ibn Muqawama for keeping this blog going while I was away.
@ Positroll on hating frogs and pronunciation...unless I'm having an identity crisis, I don't hate my own French half.
As Gulliver said, the URL was taken. He has also explained pronunciation thus: tash [rhyme with "bash"] d'wheel and even as a former French pronunciation teacher, I find it easy and accurate.
Damned sorry I missed catching you in Kabul, AM. I'll look forward to reading your impressions as I gather my own.
Afghanistan is very much an Asian hillbilly country... but don't confuse hillbilly with stupid. These people are not invincible, but they are consummate survivors (read fence-sitters.) The toughest nut to crack will be corruption. Coping mechanisms developed to ensure self-interested survival and gain in 30+ years of wartorn chaos don't die easily, nor do the bonds of those who profit from their positions and networks.
The civilian capacity-building "surge" will tell the tale more that anything else. Security is mui important, but without developing effective, transparent, and accountable civil mechanisms all will be for naught. Courts are a huge key... or formalizing the link between local/provincial government (read ANP) and traditional actors... shuras... that can bring some sort of access to justice. It's not enough not to kill civilians. They must know that their neighbor can't buy his way out of trouble, or that being poor doesn't mean being cursed to being taken advantage of without recourse.
We live in interesting times. Tough but not impossible.
We'll see how it goes. I'm going to do my part, and I'll look forward to reading yours.
Oh... one other thing... I am particularly proud of being linked to on your page. Taking your lead, I have moved to http://afghanquest.com to comemorate the new tour in Afghanistan. Hopefully you will continue to link to me in your blogroll.
Cheers,
Blue
@Anand
The title of that poll you cite says these exact words as an intro:
"Support for U.S. Efforts Plummets Amid Afghanistan’s Ongoing Strife. "The United States, its NATO allies and the government of Hamid Karzai are losing not just ground in Afghanistan – but also the hearts and minds of the Afghan people."
But to get to your numbers...
a) I think $250 billion over the next 20 years is pretty optimistic. For next year alone the defense allocation to Afghanistan is going to top $60 billion. That means in 4 years we will already be spending about what you think the costs will be in 20.
Now...
b) If we want Afghanistan to succeed by raising its GDP to $1500 per capita, then it'll be a success just like Chad, Cambodia, Benin, Sudan, Zambia.... Oh wait, those countries have GDPs of more than $1500. Do you get my point here?
I think you're trying to paint to nice a coat on things... Let's be serious about the challenges and our capabilities to meet those challenges.
Other than that, I agree with you that we should help Afghanistan with its development and security needs. But at a price that is much more affordable to us.
gringo lost, look at the granular data by question. It is much more useful than looking at someone else's summary. President Karzai is pretty popular if you look at the most recent public opinion poll, although his popularity has fallen in the west.
$250 billion = grants to Afghanistan over 20 years from the global community. Of which I think America should foot 60%. Breakdown:
-$25 billion = ANP (assuming steady state of 125,000 ANP; this would be $10,000 per ANP per year.)
-$50 billion = ANAAC (250 steady state aircraft at $10 million per aircraft per year)
-$55 billion = ANA - ANAAC (assuming steady state of 175,000 ANA and $20,000 per year per ANA soldier)
-$75 billion = Ministry of Education budget + international university scholarships
-$45 billion = infrastructure capital spend
-$50 billion in loans for infrastructure and other long term economic development to be repaid with Afghan tax revenue.
-balance of courts, civil servants payroll, health care and social spending paid for with Afghan tax revenue (including natural gas pipeline transit fees, Aynak copper mine, other natural resources royalties, corporate and individual taxes.)
-
I think it will take this much money. Where would you cut back? Educating a young population of 31 million people from scratch is very expensive.
"Chad, Cambodia, Benin, Sudan, Zambia.... Oh wait, those countries have GDPs of more than $1500." Look up the data on their per capita income on your own. I think the objective should be to reach Andra Pradesh's (province in South India whose capital is Hyderabad) current real per capita income in 20 years. Andra Pradesh, with its large muslim population was the last part of the Mongol Moghul empire to be dismantled in 1948 (an empire that included most of Afghanistan until 1700.) In 20 years Afghanistan will probably have many agrarian poor with large pockets of high tech prosperity (that generate most of the tax revenue for the Andra Pradesh), as well as mining and affiliated industries (exploration, mining equipment, mine construction.) Andra Pradesh use to be extremely poor and corrupt 20 years ago,similar to Afghanistan today. Unlike Afghanistan, Andra Pradesh didn't have substantial natural resources to develop.
Which part of this vision is unrealistic? Do you think the ANSF can't maintain internal security independently with $6.5 billion in annual foreign grants over 20 years (the transfer of security responsibility from ISAF to the ANSF would be gradual over many years)?
http://occident.blogspot.com/2009/07/video-of-american-pow-in-afghanista...
I know of no ANA unit that can operate on it's own. There are always caveats like "except for air support, logistics and medical" attached to the description of their capabilities. And despite what some Coindinistas think COIN in your own country is the lowest, least complex form of military operation. The Brits called it policing. I know this is shocking to some but securing a village against bandits is not as complex as a brigade amphibious landing or battle group delay etc.
The cash required may be low percentage of GNP but wasted cash is wasted cash and most taxpayers would rather have those amounts wasted at home than on ungrateful foreigners. It' s all borrowed (to our peril) and hopefully the voices of reasons calling for less spending will win out.
Afghanistan is not India. If it was the Brits would have added it to the Raj.
Western COIN campaigns normally have not ended well. Indigenous campaigns usually do. The difference is who is taking the lead. If you believe the Afghan government can replace (not reinforce, not be mentored, not take the lead) NATO forces then you should be optimistic. Even then with NATO gone the chances of a eventual back slide into anarchy are great.
Do I think the money spent on Afghan security forces has been well spent? No. If it had been, seven years on, basic and arm training of Afghans would be completely in the hands on Afghan officers. NATO would be left with command, staff and some technical training. We are still paying contractors to teach basic police training. Needing/ wanting American contractors to run conventional ranges is a sign of failure and or fraud.
"Some call him a policy whore
Because it's all half-assed 3-24.
COINdinistas' profits rise high
'Cept they can't look a mom in the eye
As she tugs the body bag in the door."
Real stylish, snli. Great contribution.
"@ Positroll on hating frogs and pronunciation...unless I'm having an identity crisis, I don't hate my own French half. As Gulliver said, the URL was taken."
Re-read my post. I guessed the automatic translation into "Ink Spots" occuring when you bookmark it was meant as a favor to the "froghaters", losely used for all those people who don't (want to) speak French ... Sheesh ...
"He has also explained pronunciation thus: tash [rhyme with "bash"] d'wheel and even as a former French pronunciation teacher, I find it easy and accurate.
"d'wheel" is kinda o.k. with me, though the version I learned in the South of Frnace was different (as I said, "depending on your accent"). "tash" on the other hand , is a very American way of pronouncing it. But it will work in Quebec ... ;-)
@Fnord-
Duuuuuuude, what is your problem?
I didn't see the original, i'm reading from the back end, your post was the first I saw, but what is the issue. that's freaking brilliant. It's a poem. A po-em.
It's alright
Jack
Keep your hands offa my
Back
It might even be one of them eskimo thingies. haiku!
Plus it's funny and in the war tradition. Never heard of The Somme, Fnord? C'mon, loosen up, Brother.
Why do you need to solve or "crack" corruption?
Welcome back. I just returned from a year in Afghanistan across the street from ISAF at CSTC-A. I left right when the changeover on ISAF occurring. I'm very interested to hear the thoughts you gathered during the course of your trip.
open.salon.com/blog/hipployta
im new but have a very important ?????????????????????????????????????????????/////
is anyone concerned about having their pic on news and web pages????????????????????????????????//
i mean theres a pic of a capt..or spec someone and alll the bad guys can see what they look like????????????/
im a mom and i wont want my pic there for the taking if there is anyone who can enlighted me i be grateful.
e-mail mnoudaranouvong@myspace.com thanks
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