Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS.
Dr. Andrew Bacevich has been working overtime lately, with yesterday's Los Angeles Times op-ed and an "appreciation of Graham Greene" piece in the new issue of World Affairs. The Graham Greene article is Bacevich at his best and most biting, but I was thinking about a lot about his op-ed. I don't have time to address everything there (like the questionable historic implication that the British would have been better off abandoning World War I) but wanted to raise one point that's bothered me for a long time. Bacevich recommends:
"...forget the Bush Doctrine of preventive war: no more wars of choice; henceforth only wars of necessity. The United States will use force only as a last resort and even then only when genuinely vital interests are at stake."
So how do you tell a "war of choice" from a "war of necessity?" That's entirely dependent on your definition of "last resort" and "genuinely vital interests," and I think there's a legitimate debate to be had on both. Let's not forget that most Americans probably would have called the Afghan war a "necessity" not long ago, even though we might have continued to try negotiating for the Taliban to hand over bin Laden. Even in the seemingly clear-cut case of the invasion of Iraq, there was at least a substantial portion of Americans who would have called that war a "necessity" too. Go further back to the 1991 Gulf War, which is commonly thought of now as a clear-cut war of necessity (Richard Haass has just written an entire book about this), and you'll find that many people considered it a bad war of choice at the time, arguing that we needed to give sanctions and diplomacy more time to work. I've never found the "war of necessity/war of choice" dichotomy useful, because the relative prioritization of "vital interests" is always subject to change depending on who is defining them and one can argue either way whether we've really reached the "last resort" at any given time. The difference may be clear in hindsight but rarely so when decisions are actually being made. That's not meant as a justification for any war, just a suggestion that maintaining a strict Powell Doctrine-style security strategy is not as simple as I think Bacevich makes it out to be.
"What we are talking about here is to step out of the enclosed box of Coin tactics and operations and into the realm of strategy. Once in the realm of strategy..."
Which, of course is a problem for at least another 3.5 years. Since the COINquistadors refuse to believe that what you call a mish-mash of tactics and ops are anything but strategy... or even Grand "Strategery."
I can sum this up and predict the next few years quite succinctly. Platoon and company operations backed by laser-guided drone and F-18 strikes won't cut it, and we don't have the troops to support any other type of sustained operation. So basically the Taliban wins by default. But it doesn't matter, because the prize is the Northwest Frontier. Two Hundred plus years of history should have taught us that this is a 100% useless piece of territory. Unless you like black-clad women or have found a way to make a profit on the local opium trade.
POM - Osama was counting on people like you when he attacked in 2001.
well done, keep it up.
"So is it that you put little to no credence in strat comms, that it was misplaced in this case, or that you just prefer the term "counter-revolutionary"?"
Well, I guess I have a problem when rebranding committees change terms to make the reality more palatable to Senator Hornswaggle, R-Who Give's a Crap, and the tender ears of civilians who aren't going to be the ones doing the "counter-insurgency" toil.
But, to be honest, I just like to be difficult.
@ POM,
I can see both sides - look when we were in Iraq the insurgents often (in fact all the time) persuaded the locals with truly horrific measures. Read Michael Yon's "Moment of Truth" if you want a less bloodless, clinical rendering of COIN than what we are getting, uh, uh....
I guess what I asking: would you really bring all measures say against Italian troops who want to quit and dump their fascist thug dictator - would you treat them as say the recalcitrant, diehard Germans? It doesn't make you a pussy - Hell my reading of Livy has the Romans (pretty ruthless) offering mercy, undermining the enemies conscript troops all the time.
I don't know Astan - but here's what I am getting from what I read, watch...I think the Taliban may have deep and genuine support, mainly because they are the last positive force standing. Karzai and gang blew it, we're tied to them, the tribal structure and intelligensia decimated. And they don't like foreigners, and it seems the good fighters Afghan wise seem to be the ones shooting at us. I would love for someone to post back and tell me I'm wrong.
All I can offer as a possible solution is to roll like the enemy - recruit locally by tribe, use the human terrain, play the game. Forget this nonsense about a central govt. It hasn't existed for decades, to the extent it ever did.
And it is so F*cking depressing watching this movie again, even at a distance. And the casualties mounting is noticed by so few who aren't involved. Johnny Rico has a point.
and to lighten up with some input on Iran...
Twitter
SNLII: I'm not sure who this Jason fellow is of whom you speak. You must have me confused with someone else.
I am all too well aware of your penchant for being difficult. I see your point on the indignity of parsing words when men and women are fighting and dying. But I don't see it as an unimportant action - if conflicts that require pop-COIN tactics are necessary for the security of the nation, isn't a spoon full of sugar palatable to make that medicine go down? Especially when trying to wrest billions of dollars out of the hands of the tax payers to make it happen? Just curious before you prove me wrong, such as with the use of the term "bribe" when referring to the Sons of Iraq.
Now before everyone jumps on me, "conflicts that require pop-COIN tactics" is meant as a useless hypothetical, not to refer to any specific conflicts.
@ diablotakahe - UBL counted on...
If you mean he wanted to do his rather romanticized version of the Afghan 78-89 war again, there's some evidence of that, I'm not sure it's conclusive. Not likely to have the same outcome in any case, without a superpower pumping in aid, weapons etc...you must also consider the USSR was collapsing at the same time for reasons quite apart from the failed Afghanistan intervention.
Don't be too certain he was counting on another sort of person - the kind who would give up, or leave like Somalia and Lebanon, or do nothing like after the Cole, or handle it as Law Enforcement/Intel issue, or just lob a few cruise missles at a goat farm.
We should consider it may indeed come to Fonseka-sizing Astan.
I know AM is busy, but I would love to hear him weigh in on this question, or someone who is there. Specifically - is the ANA as worthless as we are beginning to think, or should we buck up?
Elf - I meant that sometimes it is an opponent's objective to incite you into smashing him in the face.
People who lose themselves to the easy energy of anger and scream 'kill them! bomb them! nuke them!", denouncing any opposing voices as faggots and nancy boys are losing us this war.
sometimes its best to walk away from a bar fight.
"I know AM is busy, but I would love to hear him weigh in on this question, or someone who is there."
I'm hoping one of these days Bacevich will start a blog. He does seem to be the real star here.
Good gravy, I can't keep track of these AKAs. Sorry, Gunslinger. I got you confused with someone else.
And, no, a spoon full of sugar isn't required to make the medicine go down. Such methods are designed for children. I'm an adult, so I want my policy -- and the packaging in which its placed under the tree -- to be designed for adult consumption.
I don't want rebranders to rebrand reality for me, and I refuse to use their inventions when they're placed in my stocking. If I see another western reporter using the term "protecting the population" I'm going to blow chunks over the newspaper.
Quand on refuse on dit non.
SNLII - the point I just made was the one I was trying to make re IDF actions in Gaza, where you destroyed my 'piles of bodies' argument.
the worst thing about arguing on these blogs is the chance that someone can change your point of view.
In any case, I've been working on the bar fight metaphor as a replacement, but i can't get past that fact that there is no equivalent for the fact that if there are too many fights in a bar, the cops come and close it down.
in which it's...
The problem with your argument is that you are an adult who is intelligent and rational. Most of the nation and especially the Congress are not. They should be, but they're not. And I'm not sure DoD is the group that should be making them grow up.
It Was Fantastic
"Look, we dropped three to four times the tonnage on that tiny little area as were dropped by the Allies in all of the theaters in World War II over a period of five years. It was unbelievable. We killed--there were killed--3,200,000 Vietnamese, excluding the South Vietnamese military. My God! The killing, the tonnage--it was fantastic. The problem was that we were trying to do something that was militarily impossible--we were trying to break the will; I don't think we can break the will by bombing short of genocide."
- Robert McNamara
Well, Diablotakahe, Clausewitz would suggest that states/races fight wars for either of two reasons: Passions or Interests.
On Sept. 12, 2001, the U.S. went to war in Afghanistan under the (rightful) sun of passion, and lo, did it ever burn so brightly as to blind our gaze of interests.
Today, eight years later, perhaps it's time to consider interests.
Now, I take a different view of Israel's actions in Gaza. Certainly, the Israelis were so irked by the constant terror bombings from Gaza that they wanted to exact revenge. But they also had valid interests, limited ones to be sure, in responding as they did to punish HAMAS, and so deter the leadership there from continuing the missile shots.
I might suggest that the IDF's highly successful operations in Gaza were just so because, well, there haven't been many missiles arriving from Gaza lately, eh?
In the tool kit of warfare, there once was a gadget called the "punitive expedition." This was designed not only to cool the passions of those demanding vengeance, but also to ensure that an enemy thinks twice about trifling with us again. Blackjack Pershing and a very young George Patton once sallied into Mexico to perform a quite successful punitive expedition against Pancho Villa's insurgents.
The brainy hero of the endemic insurrection in the Philippines, Pershing didn't see fit to set up a COP every few miles, launch PRTs to help the Mexican womenfolk learn how to eat corn tacos with a knife or otherwise meddle in the Mexican culture except to shoot some banditos.
Pershing, famously, strapped a few to the hood of his sedan and drove back to Army lines, thus sending a message to potential wannabe insurgents that it might be a poor career choice.
But we can't talk about punitive expeditions today, lest we lose valuable contacts at CNAS or find ourselves shunned at the cocktail parties of various European embassies. No, instead we must continue to traffic in the lies of "spreading oil" and "nation building" and whatever else Galula wrote on a napkin while on RAND's dime.
Ibn Muqawama (like The Denominator, one of the most poorly disguised AKAs in the history of DC) challenges us above to recall that Americans didn't shirk from considering Afghanistan in 2001 a war of necessity. But I would argue that intoxicated with passion, those Americans wanted a punitive expedition or, perhaps, a longish but successful CT manhunt to get bin Laden.
As in Iraq, I'm not so sure they were sold the line that they would be the new sheriff in town FOR NEARLY A DECADE. At some point, buyer's remorse sets in, especially when one didn't buy the widget that was shipped.
IM further questions whether adults can guess when one sees a war of necessity or a war of choice. I might suggest that it becomes a "choice" when the shelf-life is going on NEARLY A DECADE, with no demonstrable results and, moreover, with few results so impressive that it's worth spending another decade there.
Call the Israelis nutty if you like, but they learned enough about Gaza during the First and Second Intifadahs that they're not likely to keep pressing their hands to the hot Palestinian skillet over and over -- just to do it or because some retired colonel thinks that crawling into the hornet's nest and trying to live amongst the stingers, offering a few a great many shekels along the way, is a prudent policy.
And, speaking here as I often do on behalf of Fatah, I'd also suggest that for all their sins, the Israelis are paying the Palestinians the ultimate honor of refusing to co-opt them in a colonialist program. For what else is "hearts and minds" if not the carrot/stick attempt to make someone govern himself as you want him to do?
Israel, truly, doesn't wish to govern Gaza, but it's nevertheless hit at times by volleys of missiles from same. How does Israel respond? I guess if CNAS ran Israel, you would see Tel Aviv/Jerusalem (take your pick) return to the 1970s-era efforts in Gaza to induce support for occupation by economic development and offering lucrative employment across the armistice line (or border, take your pick) in Israel, all while continuing the settlements, which were there own sort of COP, I guess, or at least one that required a great deal of IDF protection.
No. Israelis, unlike many Americans, have learned that passion has its place, and interest her own, too, but that when one grows too old for the former one learns to appreciate the latter.
Just like scotch, Brooks Brothers suits and Miles Davis, we learn to enjoy other interests that perhaps aren't as passionate as were our teenaged lusts for Mad Dog 20/20, Chess King and The Communards.
THEIR, not there... Ugggh...
'Pershing, famously, strapped a few to the hood of his sedan and drove back to Army lines, thus sending a message to potential wannabe insurgents that it might be a poor career choice.'
Damn it. PATTTON famously...
I need to go home.
great stuff.
"I might suggest that the IDF's highly successful operations in Gaza were just so because, well, there haven't been many missiles arriving from Gaza lately, eh?"
the proof of the pudding, unfortunately. still, gotta call them as seen them at the time, the learning is in the being wrong - sure didn't look like it was going to work.
"For what else is "hearts and minds" if not the carrot/stick attempt to make someone govern himself as you want him to do? "
Can also be read as "please stop killing us long enough for us to leave - I want to go home now"
Well, yes, and that was the lesson taken by the Algiers.
Oh, no, not Galula's Algerians. But the ones who fought their own anti-Salafi campaign in the 1990s. If one looks at the lessons the men in mustaches learned whilst fighting the men in beards, it was that they could make life unlivable for everyone to the point that the population finally decided to be rid of the FIS/AIS and all other Islamists.
Collective punishment? Check. Widespread detention polcies? Check. Large numbers of civilian casualties? Check. Press restrictions? Check. Disdain for international law? Check.
Now, the generals might have erred by failing to give the moderately Islamist parties some role in the post-war mix, a policy that, ironically, has led to a GROWTH in Salafi influence amongst the people today. But, one must concede, the generals won their war.
I might suggest that similar lessons in war weariness might be discussed by Sunni Arab Iraqis who met the flail of Sadrists and Badrists from 2006-2007 and pretty much everyone my age in Beirut.
I met Alex in D.C. this past April. Told him I thought it was unfortunate neither of us got the attention Scott Beauchamp did at the time. Right or wrong, good or ill, and absolutely ironic - 'twas Beauchamp who became the real time voice of the surge.
@diablotakahe,
I didn't take it personally, and hope you don't either. I just don't think we should rule it out. I am glad people are rethinking the punitive expedition part. But in 2001-2002 a few banditos wouldn't have been enough for those with the smell still in their noses. Maybe we have made our point.
=====================================
I know the enemy reads this - so- understand. Much more so than Bush, this man has to prove himself if we are assaulted again on our own soil. He won't have the cowboy rep flexibility of being restrained, Bush did, and was.
He really will shithammer you. Or fail and fall into disgrace. And he don't want that.....
"Now, I take a different view of Israel's actions in Gaza."
Perfect timing. Speaking of Bacevich (that is what this thread is about). In "The New American Militarism," Bacevich takes the rather original view that our military policy and confidence are partially derived from a relationship between American evangelicalism (or however you spell or interpret that) and Israel.
He specifically avoids passing judgment on Israeli behavior, but rather analyzes how it has effected American action for the last 42 years.
Very early on in this analyses Bacevich points out the difference in American and Israeli defense concerns. They have them all and of the worst kind. We have virtually none. As "Anon" has pointed out with his superior discussion about the need for the F-22.
The relevant pages are 131-134 in the paperback, Chapter "Onward."
@SNLII -
Damn, you write a lot. You are tough to keep up with. Thank God I agree with you most of the time.
@ diablotakahe
I will reply one last time to you, you respond like a politician, and as you all know by now I have very little respect for men who sent us and then leave us on the field of battle with orders to not "anger the enemy" McNamera was great for that shit. (yes I know I misspelled his name, I really don't give a shit) First my little friend you talk to me as though I am a lower species, which does not engender my tolerance. Take lessons from the man from Norway Fnord. When he disagrees he does so with aplumb and grace.
@ elf sir , don't lose hope!!!! that's what Obama wants you to do, as well as the rest of these "gentlemen" who espouse a tactic that is proven to be a waste of lives.
@ the rest of you who ignore me, rest assured while you espouse theory, I speak proven truth. When you waive your "education banners" I can do so as well, but I have learned that practical application, coupled with education, trumps politics and theory.
So let me open my argument with this. We have , over the last 230 some odd years, had some of the most brilliant proponents of the warriors art. Grant, Lee, Patton, Nimitz, Puller, just to name a few. So tell me now, why are you ignoring the advice of the MEN who actually planned the battles, fought the fights, and won the wars? They weren't fools they studied the wars of 6000 years. After that kind of education, as well as practical application don't you think they know more than you do? Or is that a bit of a reach for your combined ego's to handle?
I am most times very dismayed by the evident loss of common sense when a degree is given. Before you all start on me about that let me say I hold several degrees myself if it was up to me I'd wipe my ass with em cause thats all they are good for. It doesn't prove a damned thing except you got through all the classes.
Virtually all of the Generals I mentioned espouse the same winning strategy and tactical application. Patton used tactics of the heavy horse first used in the middle ages, to develop armored doctrine. Infantry has been the same for 6000 years albeit the adaptation of more modern weapons. The only real change in the face of the dogs of war came with air power. Then we had to rethink our basic tactics simply because it was a new and promising weapon.
Naval forces were the most affected by this as most major engagements were fought with aircraft carriers rather than the classic crossing of the "T" by surface battleships. The submarine also was a fundamental change in naval warfare. The Navy however does not typically put boot's on the ground ( with the exceptions of the SEAL's and the Sea Bees.)
Why reinvent the wheel? Especially when it has been proven over and over and over again? You are costing lives for theory's, trading proven fact for political influence and it's costing us more than it's worth. Why are you extending wars for your theory's? Is it Ego? Is it bloodlust? Or is it that you have an agenda that gives YOU status and position?
Yes, we learned to out VC the VC yes I agree we became better at jungle warfare than those who fought there for thousands of years. What did it take to accomplish that? Many thousands of lives and years of war. Experimenting with lives for your pet theory's? Once learned the lesson should NEVER have to be relearned at the cost of lives and time. I like what Patton said. "no creature is lower than an officer who asks his men to do something he wont do, or uselessly wastes the lives of his men" Shooting them is too kind.
@POM
"Grant, Lee, Patton, Nimitz, Puller, just to name a few."
Just to name a few. This is just goofy. This ONLY names a few. This is called cherry-picking.
What about Napoleon. Rommel. Stilwell?
Name your battles.
Vietnam?
Try Giap. Dien Bien Phu and Khe San.
POM,
Your historical analysis of what should have been done in various conflicts suffers from the benefit of 20/20 hindsight. The reason things escalated was because...things escalated! It all seems very clear and obvious now, but back then, not so much. What leader would send 750k troops to conduct a coup, even assuming it was possible to deploy and supply that number (which it wasn't)? You also have to keep in mind what is politically possible. Andropov would have been laughed out the Politburo if he demanded 100k troops for a coup and some rebels in 1979/1980, much less 750k.
Regardless, you earlier claimed the Soviets did not wage total war in Afghanistan which is simply not true. Well OK, the Soviets didn't use nukes, but they tried pretty much everything else - as I noted before, 4/5 of the entire population was either killed, maimed, wounded or displaced over the course of the conflict.
The same flaw is evident in your criticisms of Korea and Vietnam. The reality is that in both those conflicts the Cold War loomed large and policymakers didn't go the full monty because they were fearful that doing so would turn Europe and large parts of the US into a glass parking lot. Maybe someone has already done so, but it would be interesting to look in the Soviet archives to see where their red lines were at those moments and therefore discover how sound US decisions were at that time. You may be right that the US could have safely escalated, but then again it could have cost hundreds of millions of lives. Such is the long-history of limited wars.
@Andy-
I have mudderfuckers on my tail. I would appreciate it if you were more specific.
Andy! I'm not kidding.
@ POM, good points to consider. The most burning question morally re AF/PAK is this: do the people more or less freely support the Taliban or not? If they do they are irredeemable, and let all the dogs off their leashes.*
*[Don't worry about the UN. We'll tell China that unless we get to go Slingblade we can't honor our debts. That will be the end of that.]
If the Talib are only supported because there's no alternative, then we should consider COIN, both the narrative and the (shhh) reality. Let's give Triage a chance. They asked for 12 months to make progress and implement Triage. Let's support them, and support the boys in the field.
==============================
With this caveat POM, and all - I am getting the feeling that the ROE-sters are implementing "If you shoot, we'll prosecute" again. Went through that in 06/07. In no small part I fear this specter because of what I have read here. I am afraid there is a lower form of life than the Officer who won't suffer the same hardships as his men. It's the one who will gutlessly hand them over to the hyenas at CID, NCIS and JAG, to be sacrificed to save the system.
If that's happening at this juncture, then it's over before it starts. And this time someone should sound the alarm to the American people. Your sons are being wasted because lawyers want to play games.
Ok....
I'm a simple tanker who begrudgingly turned CMO. I'm still grappling with this whole COIN thing and have even successfully used it in Baghdad 06-07. By the way, I started doing it (quite by accident, actually) before it was the new "fad".
Here's my take....
Although I consider myself a "coindinista", I also understand the other aspects. As in every war in history, there have been Army regulars, militia, and skirmishers. At some point, did the regulars ever say, "we don't need the militia and skirmishers. We are fighting war our way because it's the only way!". (Granted, I know many on the Active Duty side of the house tend to believe the Guard guys can't do the job and treat us like second class but that's for another time...)
What if the skirmishers said, "war is being waged at our level and there is no longer any need for a force on force fight when we can go straight to the people."
Does any of this sound familiar?
Counterinsurgency should be part of the strategy and not the strategy itself. Also, I fear that we may be blurring the line between counterinsurgency and counter terrorism.
Look, I'm all about winning hearts and minds but you have to know when enough is enough. Do you REALLY think COIN is going to work in the Korengal Valley, for example? At some point, protecting the population can only be done if we are willing to hunt and kill bad guys. COIN only works from a position of strength and that comes with kinetic warfare. At no time should we fool ourselves into believing that we can pay people to be our friends. In a simple nut shell, that's basically what we're doing. Again, I believe in the concept of COIN but I do think we can do this better.
We only endanger the population when we try to force them to break long standing tribal or religious ties. This puts them at risk with the insurgents who live there permanently while we rotate every 10-12 months. What's the good in that and are we only looking at winning the war during our "rotation"?
We (the US government) must come up with a much more comprehensive plan that for COIN on a much more strategic level. It's not just a military thing. It should include the State Department as well. (IMHO, however, they seem to struggle with getting the right people for the jobs) If we're going to be in the nation building business, let's at least be the best at it. Either embrace it or abandon it.
Let me go back to everyone's favorite subject, the Surge. When it's all said and done, all we did was put just enough soldiers on the ground to actually hold ground. We changed the business rules. Instead of driving through West Baghdad and waving at kids, we actually got out of the vehicles and conducted dismounted patrols. We lived in the communities. I found it ironic that we called them Combat Out Posts or COPS since that is also what we seemed to be, cops.
There is no argument that, after the surge, the war changed. What precipitated that change is the debate. Was it the troops? Was it the projects? Was it the fact that we were enlisting former insurgents? Was it the fact that Sadr took his boys and toys underground?
The answer is yes.
In all my rambling, all I'm trying to say is that COIN is part of your planning when the invasion is over and the war is not yet won. It's not war itself. We don't need to change our force structure to reflect nation building or COIN but we do need to be flexible with how we assign assets.
We are nation building pure and simple, like it or not. Again, we either embrace it or we abandon it. We can study all the history we want for examples but we're not fighting Mao.
Counterinsurgency is this. Kill bad guys, protect the innocent, kill the bad guys, help the people, gracefully wave as you leave. Did I mention that you MUST kill bad guys?
Damn it, I didn't even mention indirect fire in urban centers and drone attacks.... War is Hell. Never, ever forget that part. Sometimes, I think we tend to forget that part in COIN.
Johnny Rico,
What part would you like more specificity on?
@ Andy, my point should be large and clear by now. Sun Tzu states that your forces should by twice theirs to assure victory, Three times if possible. Of course my diatribe was 20/20 where history is concerned. That WAS the point, why make the same mistakes over and over? IF you are a student of history, you should know that particularly in the ME it's the most committed that wins. Not the most "PC" or "diplomatic".
After the mistakes of Korea and the Nam , it should be obvious. By the way No...... they would not have used nukes.
That's a step that only the religiously insane about the Koran would take. You wonder why we don't want nukes in their hands?
It is proven through 6000 years of human conflict if you bring overwhelming force to the theater there is only a token resistance , then acceptance. If occupation is involved over a long period then there is rebellion.
The key is to be happy with what you have........... live and let live........... till war is critically needed then absolute war.
We fight to avoid a fight.
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