Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS.
A reader of the blog flagged this interview conducted by Salon's Glenn Greenwald with Jonathan Horowitz, a researcher in Kabul, on detainees in Afghanistan and the detention facility at Bagram. It will surprise exactly zero members of this blog's readership to learn that at the time Horowitz was on the phone with Greenwald conducting this interview, I was in an adjacent room enjoying a really excellent gin and tonic.
I do not know Horowitz well, actually, but I was talking with him (and a friend of his, who I do know) about detention before the interview. Our concerns, as you might expect, are quite different. I have all the sympathy in the world for folks like Horowitz who worry U.S.-sanctioned detention policies are harming the U.S. and allied mission in Afghanistan. I am thus anxious to see what my buddy Phil does with Bagram, and I am similarly anxious to see what impact Gen. Stone's report has.
But one of the things that I worry about that Horowitz probably does not is not so much the procedures under which we detain but rather whether or not ISAF can detain at all. (It cannot.) As ISAF begins a pretty intense year of operations, it would be nice to have the ability to detain -- to take combatants off the battlefield and then exploit them for intelligence. Removing the enemy from the battlefield is a pretty common-sense thing to do, and the exploitation that comes with a well-run detention center and legally and morally appropriate interrogation procedures (.pdf) is invaluable. Instead, we are banking on the Afghans detaining and not releasing combatants -- and our ability to build up effective Afghan detention facilities. But how long will that take? How much longer do we have left in Afghanistan to defeat this insurgency?
Without enough lawyers, we're doomed.
The best way of course to avoid prisoner abuse scandals is to release the prisoners as fast as possible. Never doubt NATO did too figure out the priorities. We played a similar game in 06/07. We just didn't write it down, so it didn't get light, or debated.
I don't know whether keeping it quiet instead of raising cowardice for debate is better, or worse.
Dr X, what did you see in Astan that gives you so much hope about the Astan govt? You do seem to be betting pretty heavily on their DNA changing.
I'd say that, if there are any sharks around, this blog has now officially jumped back over them. Here's a string of posts, in a single day, that are challenging, engaging, and thoughtful. There's no orthodoxy being propounded, and contrasting views are being aired.
So for those who are constitutionally predisposed to seek out minority positions, to take the contrary side of any argument, to look always for the next fashion, I understand why they might want to move on - although the conversation will be poorer for their absence. Speaking for the rest of us, I think I'll stick around here for a while longer. Getting interesting (again).
Yes,
Glad to have you back and back to a failr hevay posting sched.
The authority for detention in Afghanistan sounds a lot like Iraq after the Security Agreement went into effect at the beginning of the year. As most of your readers probably know, the Coalition had the authority to detain anyone deemed to be a "security threat" under UNSCR 1790 until this past JAN. Now, operations there have to be coordinated with and approved by the Iraqis, and a warrant must be had to detain. Very few detainees are going straight into our custody since the SA went into effect. The difference between what TF 134 (the detainee ops HQ that Maj Gen Stone led in '07-'08) was able to do in Iraq, and what can be done in Afghanistan lies in who is actually doing the care and custody part of detention and what resources are allocated to it. The basic education, religious discussion, and vocational training done in the Theater Internment Facilities (TIFs) in Iraq that helped cut recidivism rates from 7-9% through '03-'06 down to less than 1% in '08 was done by Americans (and was manpower intensive and was not cheap). We recruited and paid the instructors and local imams and oversaw the programs. Will the Afghans allow us to do that in their prisons? If they run the programs, can they fund and man the guard force? Just like the "Awakening" in Anbar can't be recreated in Afghanistan, the success of the "COIN Inside the Wire" campaign in Iraq can't be exactly replicated there either. It will be interesting to see how this plays out.
That being said, I'm glad to see that you're addressing detention operations. It's a critical part of COIN that doesn't get discussed very often. Helping to establish/prop up Rule Of Law is at the core of counterinsurgency in my opinion.
Horowitz states, The majority of the people who I have spoken to cite the way that the US captures and detains people as their main complaint against the US, second only to civilian casualties. They don't just complain about past torture. It's the whole present-day process that's creating problems for the relationship between the local Afghans and US troops.
That's not a failure of detention policy. That's a failure of information operations.
With a country of 28+ million people, only ~600 U.S. detainees, and a very restrictive capture policy, we simply do not detain enough people in Afghanistan for this it to be experienced by a significant percentage of the population. I have no doubt that Horowitz is making that assertion with a skewed sample of the population, however it is nevertheless believed by large number of Afghans. Any effort to correct detention policy must by accompanied by a supporting information campaign to publicize the effort.
@Nick
I agree with you, the information on why the detentions occur and how they're done is a critical component of maintaining the support of the locals. I suspect that the actual detentions are technically done by the Afghan forces (pardon me if this is incorrect) but that the US is there conducting the mission as well. If the Afghan / US forces are "rounding people up" with little or no explanation given to the locals - then there is bound to be resentment about that. And a "catch and release" detention policy does little for the credibility of the US or Afghan security forces. Commanders can help themselves by talking with local leaders and explaining the evidence against someone suspected of insurgent activity and be as specific as possible about who's being targeted. Get the local leader's buy in. Granted, sometimes someone will be detained and it'll turn out that they're innocent. Instead of just letting them go without so much as a "have a nice day", someone should sit down with them and explain what happened - but then use that as an opportunity to engage with them and ask them for their help in combatting the insurgency. You can catch more flies with honey than with vinegar, right?
Roger Carstens! I want your testc... credibility for food? The Wanted? wtf?
@Fnord,
WTF are you talking about? Whose Roger Carstens, and what did he do to become your Moby Dick?
Wee bit into the Norse Arrack, are we?
Why do we suck at I.O and P.R? I realize there's some 60+ year old legislation from after WWII cockblocking us, but whatever happened to "make it happen"? Does anybody really think we'll be prosecuted under Smith-Mundt for getting the word out that we are not torturing ??
Something happened to the Army to change it from the old mission accomplishment Army of the 80's and 90's to this ass-covering bunch of twerps nattering on about the rule of law (speaking of cults). If you want to know what's coming down that road look at NATO. Or worse, the U.N Blue Hats.
@ Elf
Had to look this up myself. If that's not an April fools article I don't know WTF is going on.
Speaking of of lacking a testicle though, this describes a target who I've seen on multiple TV interviews in his home. Berated as a terrorist by regular journalists. I'd like to hear he took up someone more challenging off those journalists' playlists. See you in Burma will we Roger ?
Why do we suck at I.O and P.R?
1. Because we take more than 24 hours to respond to negative media accounts. "Be first with the truth" is a damn fine goal, but needs a time limit. Four weeks later on Friday at 5PM is wrong. We can win every damn COIN battle and lose the war on this point alone. (Reference the "American public won't give us more than x months" talking point that's starting to catch on these days.)
2. We have to overcome a culture predisposed to think of us as the bad guys. That ain't gonna be easy. Fortunately most members of the tribe in question speak English, some as the native tongue. (Actually, that works against us, too.) I'm only half joking here.
Not to say "teh MSM iz teh sux" (because I respect the hell out of reporters who get it right, whether the news is good or bad) but anyone who thinks all bad press is a result of us doing bad things is in for a shock. Atrocity tales will not stop just because we modify our tactical directive - but we will be under even more pressure to answer questions quickly. I've seen no evidence of a plan for that, or even thinking beyond saying "be first with the truth". Maybe next year the idea of some sort of a high speed "IO QRF" will catch on.
Found this:
Al-Qaeda Releases New Video Message from Senior Leader in AFPAK on Swat
Sorry for G&T imposed howl of rage above. On Topic: I think its not so much that we are detaining, as much as *how* we are detaining. No lawyers, no monitoring, no oversight sounds like old school Cheney to me. What are the operative reasons for letting that continue?
PS: If your brother was at Bangram, dont you think you wouldda been pretty anxious to find out what was happening to him?
Thats the level of thinking we gotta apply t turn it around.
sorta...Kilo bad link, but google indicates to me this may be about that show "The Wanted". Still not sure why private terrorist hunts would piss off Fnord, but I'm sure there's a reason.
Or maybe Fnord was trolling for a date ;D
More on thread, thanks for clarification @ Greyhawk. I bet the timeline is cuz it goes up the chain, thru meetings, back down...everyone stay on message, we must overcentralize and centrally plan message. It worked great for USSR economy.
Getting back to the original purpose behind Ex's post, I would really like to know the genesis of the current ISAF detention policy. I've read the most of the different policies since 2006 and experienced the changes over deployments to Afghanistan. What I'm most interested in however is the thinking at ISAF and JFC Brussnum that has led to the near total prohibition on both detention and interrogation. I realize the sensitivities involved with many of the ISAF partner nations, but I think the policy has multiple negative consequences that outweigh whatever is actually intended.
First, a restrictive detention policy is going to cause a shift towards killing-focused operations. If you cannot take the enemy off the battlefield with a capture, then the military naturally gravitates towards other, often more severe options. I've seen this in practice at every echelon in Afghanistan. While killing operations have similar approval requirements in Afghanistan, it is much easier to get around these restrictions to achieve the desired effect. This largely eliminates the potential intelligence benefits and often has many more significant negative COIN impacts than a detention. Second, Kill/Capture/Interrogate/Exploit operations are a critical component of the COIN fight. You can conduct a textbook perfect population centric, development focused campaign, but if you cannot improve security, the entire effort is certain to fail. The ability to remove insurgent leaders and support personnel from the battlefield, while never pretty, is fundamental to providing security.
We can't treat the Afghanistan like it isn't a war, not matter how distasteful to European and American domestic audiences. War has always involved killing and capturing the enemy; Afghanistan is no different. The policy should enable all approaches while providing safeguards against their abuse. Anything else will only prolong our defeat.
Nick
Elf, re: Wanted. It featured a senior CNAS fellow skulking around approx 700 meters from where I lived, talking about how he could get killed if he was not careful. And also the most idiotic cross-editing in the universe. And the only politicans interviewd pro-Bush idiots.
Nick: I think the flipside to that issue is the terms of detention. Bangram isnt exactly following Geneva standards. Its the whole "terrorist" judicial issue. The red cross are allowed in, but only under oath of secrecy? 5 years detention without acess to lawyers? Torture? Agreed that restraint on detention may lead to increased kinetic solutions, but surely there is a middle way?
@ Fnord,
Ah. I decided to miss the little tidbit of a show, cuz I had a hard time taking seriously the concept of 3 white guys taking down the real thing on their own. Maybe I'll look for it on Utube.
He was after you then ;D ?? I thought all the Viking terrorists had retired, like the Watchmen.
This will teach you to be an autonome.
=============
Detention: someone go and get the enemy to start following the basic spirit of Geneva, with regard to us or their own civilians. Or ours. I'll waive uniforms and non state actors. It was their deeds which condemned them. I'm certain the new fatwas condemning the counterproductive practices of atrocity by policy could be communicated. In return we implement Geneva. And frankly, stop the trials. You can't really mix Geneva with the criminal courts anyway. In line with the dictum that the enemy tells us via propaganda what they fear, and what they want - they want the courts and Geneva. The ensuing confusion makes us look like fools (rightly) and for them to escape.
Oh, their mob lawyers, er... ACLU tell us as well what the enemy wants.
No something for nothing. In fact what's being proposed is mercy for terror.
Access to lawyers - that doesn't happen in war. It just doesn't. It can't. It can happen afterwards if you want to dress up the law as a trollop to mask victors justice. But the traditional solution is military tribunal, or courts martial. You kind of accept your fate when you become a soldier, of whatever stripe. It comes with the gun.
CNAS, in my own self interest as well, leave Fnord alone. Sending Commandos after painful blog commenters represents an escalation against free speech. If you really want to stalk someone other than the ex-wife, go after that long missing ANON BOLD fellow.
Who I still suspect was indeed be a fellow .
@Nick:
This is true. It is effectively impossible for a regular insurgent to surrender themselves off the Afghan battlefield at present. Afghan custody being what it is, it was generally only a 72-hour timeout pass in my experience, no matter what the circumstances of capture were. You have to have really ticked someone off to stay longer.
During my tour (ending in April), both the Afghan army and the police stuck by the rule that they have 72 hours to remand detainees to a civil court or release them: no exception. That kind of efficient prisoner transport being effectively impossible in most circumstances (lack of lift, detainee injuries), that means battlefield detainees often got released rather than remanded at the end of that period. Most that did make it to a court were reportedly immediately thrown out for "lack of evidence", it being rather hard for prosecutors to develop any kind of case in that time period. Obviously bribery and family ties play a role, too, and certainly somebody's being held in Afghan jails now: I'm just not sure any of the guys we captured still are.
Obviously other than biometrics the intelligence value of an ANA detainee under these conditions was zero.
The good news is that because the stakes in Afghan custody are so low, there's very little abuse of prisoners by the ANA that I saw, no likelihood of escape, no physical or visual restraints, etc. Every ANA intelligence mentor has stories of unknowingly sharing a office bench, tea, etc. with a guy who was recently picked up planting an IED. Of course that also means that insurgents are hanging around military headquarters through regular working meetings, and so on. They always seemed very attentive and curious, to me...
We should be under no illusions that when Afghans say they want us to have different detention methods, they mean they want us to have Afghan detention methods, for all detainees. In the absence of significant Afghan judicial/correctional reform, obviously that would making either a COIN or a counter-terror mission effectively impossible.
And so, yes, at present we do have to kill them all, I'm afraid.
@BruceR Well, it's wonderful to know that nothing has changed for the better in Afghanistan since I left a year ago, though it's not surprising at all. On my current deployment train up, it seems like I sit though another "attack the network" briefing every week where the briefer cannot articulate how one can "attack the network" without the ability to detain or kill targeted individuals. I can think of multiple possible methods from co-option to tribal justice, they are but a small part of a toolkit that should not be artificially restricted.
While it's an exaggeration to suggest that under no circumstances can ISAF kill or detain in a targeted manner, it certainly cannot do so at a dynamic enough pace to make a significant difference in the security situation. Does one expect the police to fight crime without arresting and detaining criminals? No, of course not. Are kill/capture operations a panacea in policing or counterinsurgency. Also no. Nevertheless, Counterinsurgency history from the Philippines to Iraq definitively demonstrates that killing and detaining insurgents is essential to improving security and buying space for political, economic and social growth. Afghanistan is no different.
On top of all of this, it's not really about OUR ability to detain or kill in the long term. Ultimately, there must be Afghan solutions. In the short run though, as long as ISAF is conducting the vast majority of operations and represents the only effective combat force, it has to be a part of the toolkit; in a humane and relatively transparent manner.
@AbuM Where does this fit in the strategic review? Is this too politically sensitive for ISAF partners along with "interrogation" and its associated baggage?
Nick
Elf: Lol, no, it was that dastardly mullah Krekar. They stalked him for three days (incidentally copying a known mission, that the US folks had to back off...) and then SMSd him, got an interview and doctored it, totaly. We have the originals, and it was bad heavyhanded US propaganda, like always. The US doesnt do smart very well after 8 years of Bush appointments.
If individuals are truly interested in detainee operations and or interrogation in Afghanistan --they should check the ISAF 8 hour rule for detainees and then look deeper in the "detainee shopping" that is ongoing in order for US units based in ISAF to get a detainee held.
You have to love the ISAF detainee concepts----detainee can be held for only eight hours, only TQ (tactical questioning (only for a max of 30 minutes) can be used and then when doing TQ no question can be asked more than once.
I challenge anyone but a fully experience professional interrogator with prior Afghan or Iraq experience using spiral questioning to pull off those requirements and make a guess as to whether the individual is an insurgent or not.
Miranda is not far behind if not already in use in some locations---how I long for the simple days of the GC and the POW status as even in IW a Taliban fighter who carries and ID, carries a visible weapon and who wears a visible uniform (beard and man dress counts as did VC black pajamas) can in fact be held has a POW and being a POW does not stop anyone from interrogating him for as long as one wants to.
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