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I don't know about you, but I spent my Independence Day catching up on my Foreign Affairs reading. The big red title of the current issue is "Saving Afghanistan," which seems pretty misplaced because one of its headline articles by Steven Simon, a combined response to Seth Jones' In the Graveyard of Empires and David Kilcullen's The Accidental Guerrilla, is most definitely not interested in saving Afghanistan.
Simon's piece is definitely worth a read, as it presents a very coherent and reasoned critique of the conventional wisdom surrounding the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I don't think there should be any mistaking that Obama's campaign in Afghanistan is somehow less ambitious than Bush's: Bush talked the talk about building a stable, democratic Afghanistan, but it's the Obama administration that is trying to walk the walk by devoting more resources and promising a "civilian surge" to improve Afghan governance. I tend to share Simon's concern that our approach in Afghanistan is perhaps guided more by sentiment than rational calculation. Afghanistan in and of itself is probably not that important to us, certainly not in the way that Iraq is, and there's something troublesome about spending a lot of national resources to stabilize and reconstruct a country that never had much stability or construction in the first place.
That said, I'm also not sold on Simon's take that our Predator drone strikes are a primary solution to our AQ problems there and in Pakistan. For someone who clearly has such a critical eye for U.S. policy, he seems awfully willing to take official statements about the efficacy of these strikes at face value:
"Thus, if the core concern is terrorism, Washington should concentrate on its already effective policy of eliminating al Qaeda's leadership with drone strikes. In what amounts to a targeted killing program, the United States uses two types of unmanned aerial vehicles -- the Predator and the faster, higher-altitude Reaper, which can carry two Hellfire missiles and precision-guided bombs -- to attack individuals and safe houses associated with al Qaeda and related militant groups, such as the Haqqani network. Most of these strikes have taken place in North or South Waziristan, as deep as 25 miles into Pakistani territory. There were about 36 against militant sites inside Pakistan in 2008, and there have been approximately 16 so far in 2009. Among the senior al Qaeda leaders killed in the past year were Abu Jihad al-Masri, al Qaeda's intelligence chief; Khalid Habib, number four in al Qaeda and head of its operations in Pakistan; Abu Khabab al-Masri, al Qaeda's most experienced explosives expert, who had experimented with biological and chemical weapons; and Abu Laith al-Libi, the al Qaeda commander in Afghanistan. Some 130 civilians have also been killed, but improved guidance and smaller warheads should lead to fewer unintended casualties from now on.
"The logic of this strategy is straightforward. "In the past, you could take out the number 3 al Qaeda leader, and number 4 just moved up to take his place," says one official. "Well, if you take out number 3, number 4, and then 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10, it suddenly becomes a lot more difficult to revive the leadership cadre." In consequence, "the enemy is really, really struggling," says one senior U.S. counterterrorism official, who notes "a significant, significant degradation of al Qaeda command and control in recent months." These same officials say that al Qaeda's leadership cadre has been "decimated" and that it is possible to foresee a "complete al Qaeda defeat" in Pakistan."
I'm no doctrinaire one way or another on drone strikes, but I do think there are at least some reasons (which this blog's founder has enumerated) to be wary of the possibility that they're self-defeating in the long run. The counter-terror crowd in government is really high on their effectiveness, and even Andrew Bacevich seems to endorse them as a means to deny terrorists sanctuary in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And, as Dan Byman says in this smart piece, there are so few good options here that "relying on bolts from the blue to keep al Qaeda and the Taliban weak and off balance" might be the best thing we've got going. But shouldn't we be at least a bit skeptical of this policy? As unpleasant as "nation-building" is, there's also something unpleasant about bombing Afghan and Pakistani villages without a really clear idea of what we're getting for it. I mean, we are America and we pride ourselves on ideals and humanitarianism--are we comfortable with a policy that offers Afghans and Pakistanis pretty much nothing but the occasional Hellfire missile? It seems like that deserves to be questioned, even as we also question the wisdom of trying to do nation-building in Afghanistan. There has to be more to our strategy than that.
Not being privy to any super-secret intelligence (please send some my way if you have any!), my novice questions are: how do we know we're getting the right guys, and as we keep killing them off, how will we be sure that we've got tabs on all the most dangerous up-and-comers? How can we be sure that this is having such a strong impact on al-Qaeda and the other radical groups we're trying to take down? (For all their alleged effectiveness, it seems worth noting that our drones have not bagged bin Laden or al-Zawahiri. And just how many times do we have to kill the al-Qaeda #3?) Are the civilian casualties caused by these attacks (usually dismissed as the inevitable "collateral damage") creating more jihadis than they kill? And what creates more terrorist sympathizers, drone strikes or the large-scale troop presence?
From the start I disagree with that man's take on Afghanistan and Iraq. If the future struggles are over South and Central Asia then having strong influence over Afghanistan is a good place to start, especially if its status as the Silk Road can be revived somehow. Besides that, if Afghanistan is permitted to fall back under the sway of the Taleban and affiliated groups we have no reason to believe that the area won't be used as a base for the training and propaganda parts of different terrorist groups. Finally if Afghanistan is permitted to fall back under the control of said groups then I would expect the stability of Pakistan to become even more precarious, with potentially lethal consequences for India and China.
On Iraq we are certain now that Al Qaeda wasn't there until the U.S was, unlike Afghanistan. Additionally, even if Iran is permitted to gain far more control over Iraq it isn't as though Iran can simply decide Iraqi policy any more than the USSR or China could with Vietnam. To end, to date Iran hasn't actually been involved with many attacks on the U.S or the West. It's true that Iran has played a role in arming insurgent groups in Iraq, Hamas in the Palestinian Authority, and Hizb'allah in Lebanon, but for the most part those groups have been more concerned with with nationalist or anti-Israeli politics.
For the real issue, see reuters:
http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE5640QR20090705
U.S. forces who have moved deep into formerly Taliban-controlled territory in southern Afghanistan this week say they are here to stay and will not leave until they have improved the lives of ordinary people.
But locals -- used to seeing NATO troops come through to fight but fail to follow through on promises of development -- may not be won over easily....
The elders listened, clicking their prayer beads. Then Mullah Zainuddin, the village's religious leader, listed their demands.
They want the provincial authorities to allocate more water for their irrigation system. They want a health clinic, and they want a school. Produce these things or leave us alone, he said.
"I do not trust you. There have been international forces that have come through the village and promised schools, promised clinics. When you are already (delivering) that, then I will trust you," he said.
So, look at that excerpt, and then consider the corrupt contracting deals run in Iraq by the Louis Berger group and all their subcontractors through USAID contracts - they had all manner of idiotic, bloated non-performing projects, and no real goods for the villages. A lot of that money was funneled off to build McMansions in Kabul for Karzai's shady heroin-dealing cronies, as well - so now it's time for a fresh approach that cuts out the dirty middlemen and gets relief supplies directly to the villages.
It has to happen - but will it? Here's hoping.
New al-Qaeda Major Video Release about "AFPAK"
The one factor we dont have info on is how the internal post-Swat mood is in Pakistan. Ideally, the offensive should have been proceeded by 6 months of mullah anti-Taleb propaganda. Is there any muslim info-op following the offensive? From what euro reporters tell, there has been no warning or "warming-up" boost of propaganda in advance?
The value of Simon's excellent piece is that he elevates the more limited so-called counter-terror methods like drone strikes to the same level as population centric coin, which by its nature in an age of limited war is as close to total war as this country has gotten since Vietnam. IM states that there "has to be more to our strategy than that." The "that" being the more limited operational method of drone strikes and other more limited military measures to accomplish the President's stated goals. This is precisely the problem. The nation building crowd--aka pop centric coin--cannot see any other way of proceeding ahead in Astan which is why our strategy there has become one of tactics and operations elevated to strategy and at times trying to even influence policy. Pop centric coin should be seen as one operational tool at the strategist’s disposal, but not the only one. The Coindinistas only see one viable operational method in these kinds of situations which is again why we have devolved to a strategy of tactics.
Well stated Col. Gentile.
I would add that the reason we're in Afghanistan to begin with is AQ and so an AQ-centric, not a population-centric, strategy is a viable option. Drone strikes inside Pakistan are certainly AQ-centric. The question that those who are set against them need to answer is this: What is the alternative?
One should also keep in mind that the drone operations in Pakistan are really an intelligence operation and not a military operation. That the killing instrument happens to be a drone is incidental and replaceable - any number of means could be employed to kill AQ leaders once they are found - drones just happen to be the most convenient and timely. The real challenge is developing the intelligence to target these leaders and the reason we've been able to kill #3 over and over is because, obviously, we are able to get solid intelligence to target them. So when IM complains the drones have not bagged al-Zawahiri or UBL he/she is missing the point - the failure is not the drones, the failure, if you want to call it that, is a lack of adequate intelligence.
"Afghanistan in and of itself is probably not that important to us, certainly not in the way that Iraq is, and there's something troublesome about spending a lot of national resources to stabilize and reconstruct a country that never had much stability or construction in the first place."
You're joking, right?
I wonder if perhaps the first portion of your quote is meant more to emphasize the US responsibility with respect to Iraq (the Pottery Barn rule, perhaps)? But the second sentence bespeaks a certain US arrogance/condescension when it comes to the lesser developed world. And we wonder why so many either do not trust or outright loathe us.
Stabilizing and reconstructing Afghanistan is critical not only to our long term security interests, but to help rebuild America's damaged credibility in the Muslim world. We can argue about the precise percentage of resources ought to be US versus others in the international community, but the crucial point is that there is a commitment to do so. And by playing a lead role in this effort the US will bring on board other members of the international community, sort of like start up capital or seed money. Other nations are waiting to see just how serious the US is about nation building/strengthening civil society.whatever buzz word you prefer.
Islam, Quran, & Debate about Violence
"Thus, if the core concern is terrorism, Washington should concentrate on its already effective policy of eliminating al Qaeda's leadership with drone strikes. In what amounts to a targeted killing program..."
Yeah, except the problem with portraying it like that is we know what amounts to "targeting".
If one goat herder gets in a beef with another and fingers him as Taliban to the US, then it's bombs away with no further intel necessary, scores of innocent Afghans killed and the mission undermined firstly by the strike and then moreso by the military insistence that it wasn't.
Now don't get me wrong, that IS "targeted killing", it just isn't the kind you ought to be pointing to as a success.
Shit pal, you listed like 5 aQ VIPs and then told us as an afterthought that it also killed 130 civilians. Well I'd have to question -- even with such a BS lowballed civilian casualty count -- how that's any more "effective" than an Iraqi car bombing operation.
"Some 130 civilians have also been killed...."
WTF is this shit ? Killed when ? Given that there was around this many in just one attack, I fear you may be lying like a mthrfkr there pal. Why not just not mention them if you're only going to include it at the end, with an inaccurate and misleading accounting.
"but improved guidance and smaller warheads should lead to fewer unintended casualties from now on."
Oh FFS. Tell you what, why don't you keep us all posted on that with some weekly updates on just how many Hellfire missiles have had this modification and how many haven't. Presumably this has has already started by the way you've described that. Keep us up to date on this completely non-PR development which will be completely verifiable via acquisitions and maintenence records.
Exum:
"Press reports suggest that over the last three years drone strikes have killed about 14 terrorist leaders. But, according to Pakistani sources, they have also killed some 700 civilians. This is 50 civilians for every militant killed, a hit rate of 2 percent — hardly “precision.”
alJazeera, Sept09:
"Thirty-eight people, including women and children, have been killed in the past week's missile attacks."
Wired:
"Just in the month since Barack Obama took office, U.S. unmanned aircraft have killed approximately 80 people in Pakistan."
BBC, 2 weeks ago:
"There have been more than 35 US strikes since last August - killing over 340 people - and most have landed in the North and South Waziristan tribal regions."
I tell you what, you stick to a rolling one week/month count and the numbers look just great.
The author on the other hand looks like he's full of shit.
Be careful of the propaganda. The Pakistani government has no idea how many civilians were killed in these strikes because there is no government presence in these areas. Civilians were certainly killed, but 700 is ridiculous considering the weapon employed and the number of strikes.
Um, that last comment was me. Not sure why it says" Kilo."
This may be old, but for those who haven't seen it: Eighty Percent Of Al-Qaeda No. 2s Now Dead
Fnord: For what it's worth, this PIPA/World Public Opinion poll conducted in late May suggests that there has been a public shift in sentiment against Taliban and Al Qaeda within Pakistan, although the United States is still viewed with extreme suspicion. An IRI poll, conducted in March before the peace agreement's breakdown, showed much higher levels of support for sharia and the Taliban. Reuters also noted that Pakistani authorities have tried to play "the Sufi card" by establishing an advisory council -- of whom the Sufi cleric Sarfraz Naeemi, killed in a Lahore suicide bombing shortly in mid-June, was a member -- that could give more ideological / spiritual backing to the fight, but raises skepticisms about its effectiveness.
Does anyone know what a strategy is any more? If it take more than 5 words to say it can it be a strategy – Containment – mutually assured destruction – the Monroe Doctrine – Island hopping – Europe First.
When the people who should be making the strategy can influence the tactics in near real time, why spend time on the hard work of building and supporting a strategy? After all isn’t it the sound bite we are concerned about, the opinion poll we are trying to influence?
In 5 words or less can anyone articulate what the strategy in the GWOT is?
"Be careful of the propaganda. The Pakistani government has no idea how many civilians were killed in these strikes because there is no government presence in these areas."
On the other hand, the people who live there, bury a certain number of dead after one of these strikes and then put on trial those who instigated the attack causing a certain number of deaths is credible.
As for propaganda about drone strikes, the Pakistani government ranks a hell of a lot lower than the US. At this point, what do we know about drone attacks with any more certainty than when they kill a bunch of people the US military et al is going to lie about how many civilians they killed ? Every single time this happens without fail. Any time a US figure is disputed by the locals it is a solid-gold guarantee that the US will admit they were wrong a couple of months down the track.
You can say that you think 700 is ridiculously high, but there simply is no alternative figure. Either you've done some calculations yourself or you've got nothing, because you sure as shit don't get to use any US figure. You don't get to lie about every single data point and then get your total taken seriously.
Does anyone know what a strategy is any more? If it take more than 5 words to say it can it be a strategy – Containment – mutually assured destruction – the Monroe Doctrine – Island hopping – Europe First.
When the people who should be making the strategy can influence the tactics in near real time, why spend time on the hard work of building and supporting a strategy? After all isn’t it the sound bite we are concerned about, the opinion poll we are trying to influence?
In 5 words or less can anyone articulate what the strategy in the GWOT is?
my novice questions are: how do we know we're getting the right guys, and as we keep killing them off, how will we be sure that we've got tabs on all the most dangerous up-and-comers? How can we be sure that this is having such a strong impact on al-Qaeda and the other radical groups we're trying to take down? (For all their alleged effectiveness, it seems worth noting that our drones have not bagged bin Laden or al-Zawahiri. And just how many times do we have to kill the al-Qaeda #3?) Are the civilian casualties caused by these attacks (usually dismissed as the inevitable "collateral damage") creating more jihadis than they kill? And what creates more terrorist sympathizers, drone strikes or the large-scale troop presence?>/i>
I think the answer to all your questions is, "We ask the ISI, and nominally take their word for it". Its been going on that way for a very long time.
my novice questions are: how do we know we're getting the right guys, and as we keep killing them off, how will we be sure that we've got tabs on all the most dangerous up-and-comers? How can we be sure that this is having such a strong impact on al-Qaeda and the other radical groups we're trying to take down? (For all their alleged effectiveness, it seems worth noting that our drones have not bagged bin Laden or al-Zawahiri. And just how many times do we have to kill the al-Qaeda #3?) Are the civilian casualties caused by these attacks (usually dismissed as the inevitable "collateral damage") creating more jihadis than they kill? And what creates more terrorist sympathizers, drone strikes or the large-scale troop presence?>/i>
I think the answer to all your questions is, "We ask the ISI, and nominally take their word for it". Its been going on that way for a very long time.
In 5 words or less can anyone articulate what the strategy in the GWOT is?
Sure.
"Get re-elected".
''how do we know we're getting the right guys, and as we keep killing them off, how will we be sure that we've got tabs on all the most dangerous up-and-comers?''
Well put. Just what exactly are our drone pilots looking for? Are they just targeting people with AKs in their hands or are they getting quality HUMINT? We should know the answer to those questions.
Wayne Z.
Actually the Good Dr Bacevich had an article in LA Times today about Strategy....
Strategy
@Wayne,
It's probably both...but of course that shouldn't be made public. especially HUMINT. I believe the targeting is well thought through, just not perfect of course.
And for those of you who haven't forgotten the Liberal Iranian Left....really guys....
Persepolis
I still really think it would be nice if the Euro and American Left linked up with the Iranian Left, maybe even the Arab Left.....instead of being the apologia for the most reactionary @ssholes in history.
"In 5 words or less can anyone articulate what the strategy in the GWOT is?"
Cannot end while Osama lives.
Seriously, show me the politician who's gonna declare this over while he's still alive and I'll show you someone who didn't even make it to the presidential primaries.
You can blow up Taliban until you're old and gray. Meanwhile, 8 years on we've got commentators and officials seriously promoting a number of dead aQ officials less than 20 as the upside of all this downside. As though you couldn't whack 20 aQ officials over the course of 8 years in any other way which didn't infuriate entire populations and contribute to destabilising a government.
@ Elf
I don't think that we are getting any real good HUMINT. The reason that I think so is that even with a $50 million bounty we still can't get anyone to come forward to turn in UBL. If $50 million won't get info, sitting cross legged on the floor and drinking chai won't get you much better. I would sure like to be wrong though.
To be honest I would think it obvious that the 50 million bounty would have virtually no effect along the Afghan/Pakistan border. In a place like that the ties of family and tribal unit* seem to way much more heavily than any amount of money, not to mention the fact that anyone in the area foolish enough to actually reveal Mr. bin Laden's location wouldn't live long enough to actually spend the reward. Drinking tea for several years might have more effect, but in the places he's likely to be you could drink all the tea in the world and it wouldn't matter.
Working under the assumption that Mr. bin Laden is somewhere along the border, the only reasons he would leave would be A. military offensives have had remarkable success and he's in danger, B. he's decided to go to another front and encourage fighting there (possibly Algeria or Yemen), or C. the Taleban win and he's returning to Afghanistan.
@Elf: It isn't as though the West has forgotten the reformist, it's simply that we're unable to do much. If the situation of Iran's economy wasn't enough already to turn the armed forces against Ahmadinejad, then sanctions would be useless. Right now military action is not only politically impossible, it also would probably strengthen his position. Finally we may not need to actually do anything, in the long run I can't see the actions of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad as anything but self-defeating. Give Iran ten to twenty years and the current system could easily go the way of the Shah, particularly if some form of practical renewable energy appears and sends the oil market crashing.
*As an aside on tribal groups, I would like to remind people that simply calling something 'tribal' does not mean it is small by any measure. I believe Kilcullen mentioned in his book that there are 40 million Pashtuns, even if they are split into many smaller groups that is still larger than the populations of some nations.
@Grant,
I agree that with the IGRC crushing them, it's over for now. Although I'd be surprised if it's not bubbling below..
As far as responses, I was talking about soft power (I believe Bush was accused of ignoring it). j
Recommendations:
1) The worlds 100 Democracies begin to treat Iran as a pariah state - no diplomatic relations, trade sanctions.
2) The EU is considering recalling it's ambassadors - *this would be key* that's 27 Democracies.
3) Solidarity style support updated for the modern tech - push em bandwidth, satellite broadcasts to TV telling them what's going on in their country, so it's not just word of mouth. All comms that can't be blocked, amp up the signals of what is being jammed. Let's see how resilient the Internet really is....and how much of North Korea Iran wants to be..
4) Military - yes. Start training and arming expats - beginning with the large diaspora here in the USA. Task an entire SF group to start training. It's worth it, someone else can do raids besides SF.
5) Get the international Left that doesn't romanticize dictators behind the Iranian Left (diaspora).
6) Use the MEK. They owe us (we guarded and got them out of Iraq, and got them out of "terrorist status").
What we should not do is just ignore it, because we're obsessed with the "tragedy" of a freakish deformed pederast second rate musician long since past his prime, no doubt by overdose.
Sometimes I really regret the First Amendment.
For Gian:
First of all, I really like the "coindinistas" thing. That's pretty funny an fitting now that I look back on it.
Second, I have to agree that we (the popcentric crowd) have probably done more to tie the hands of the killers out there. We do need to keep in mind that this is a war and that there will be casualties and collateral damage. I think what has brought me closer to your camp is the new directive regarding combat in population centers.
It's out of control, now.
What does this have to do with drones?
Simple. I have to step up and say that I'm a fan of the drones. However, I'm not a big fan as of yet to the way we are implementing them. We have learned from the Israelis that taking out key leaders with a missile is a good thing but we also need to follow that up with some kind of propaganda of our own. We are losing the propaganda fight. I don't see the drones as the issue, here. I see propaganda being the issue. Will civilians die in these attacks? Yes and there's little we can do about that. Does that mean we stop going after bad guys in population centers? Absolutely not. That's the impression that I'm getting from higher and the impression that those E6 patrol leaders are probably getting as well.
If we are saying that the decision to use drones is a good thing and that we're going to do it, let's get our second and third order effects straight and control the countermeasures.
I guess the bottom line is that, if drones effectively kill bad guys, let's continue the practice. We have to give the hunter/killers the ability to fight. What the "coindinistas" can do is plan for the second and third order effects and manage the propaganda piece. I mean, isn't this why I have an IO/Fires cell and CMO in my BDE HQ's?
Chris
This isn't the central premise of Ibn's post, but I think the following line in this post's second paragraph should be addressed:
"I don't think there should be any mistaking that Obama's campaign in Afghanistan is somehow less ambitious than Bush's: Bush talked the talk about building a stable, democratic Afghanistan, but it's the Obama administration that is trying to walk the walk by devoting more resources and promising a "civilian surge" to improve Afghan governance"
This kind of reminds me of the saying, "a rose by any other name, still smells as sweet" except replace rose and sweet with crap and that is more like it. Actually, I shouldn't be flippant so what I would like to say is the neo-conservativism of the Bush administration is now just being replaced with a neo-liberal interventionism of the Obama administration. While in name they are different, in practice they are much the same (at least in regards to how the US uses its limited reach and resources).
http://gringolost.wordpress.com/
Yes, it's gone to far, as it was bound to...it's in our natures. The Army I mean.
Gringo lost,
"the neo-conservativism of the Bush administration is now just being replaced with a neo-liberal interventionism of the Obama administration. While in name they are different, in practice they are much the same (at least in regards to how the US uses its limited reach and resources)."
Yeah, but the Dems were out of power, you see.....that's kind of like cutting off the Republicans from Private Enterprise, free markets, and religion all in one swoop. Also it's their livelihood. Most of them haven't done anything else.
Elf, crediting Chris, is right that it has gone too far and to point out as he says that it is in our nature; the American Army that is. We had this problem in the 1980s with Airland Battle and a hyper focus on tactics and operations, and the exclusion of strategy. We in effect are doing the same thing now. Problem though is that the Coindinistas think that they have moved beyond the problem of the 80s and have finally figured out the true political nature of war, which they see as population centric counterinsurgency. In reality though, theirs is just the opposite end of the pendulum swing. In the 80s and 90s they made a very important contribution to the Army by pointing out and writing on the importance of small wars and counterinsurgency. But now they think that they have achieved synthesis through population centric coin. And that view to me is most dangerous because it eclipses strategy and actually perverts the true American Way of War which is by nature one of practicality and improvisation, and not a one-way only approach to war called pop centric coin.
Chris; I too like the term coindinista along with its side kick term cointra; which of course we can credit the master SNLII. If nothing else it adds some light-hearted humor where it is needed.
More seriously, I too worry about the squad leaders and platoon leaders in the fight in Astan now who will have to make due at the business end of this New American Way of War with the implications from this policy to restrict indirect fires in order to reduce civilian casualties.
gian
For Gian:
Having been on the recieving end of the "if I shoot will I be prosecuted" debate on the ground, I can say that the idea of not being able to engage the enemy where he lives and/or operates will cost US military lives unnecessarily.
The propaganda war is as important as any other aspect of these conflicts. That's the part that gets reported. US Soldiers dying in Afghanistan gets a blip on the news. Civilian casualties get headline press. We must be able to counter that with facts. Tell a soldier he can't engage the enemy while he's hiding behind a skirt or a child only emboldens the enemy.
I don't have the answer only to say that, until we show that hiding behind them is destroying their way of life is much worse than the US attacking those civilians, we can't move forward with our strategic agenda.
I think that's the debate we should be having regarding drones, indirect fire, and direct fire in urban terrain.
"And that view to me is most dangerous because it eclipses strategy and actually perverts the true American Way of War which is by nature one of practicality and improvisation, and not a one-way only approach to war called pop centric coin."
'by nature one of practicality and improvisation' - I like that phrase.
Isn't popcoin a tactic born of practicality and improvisation? Of the necessities stemming from poor planning in Iraq?
As has been mentioned above, it's all about on-the-ground intel now and our inability to buy it. We're getting double-penetrated by duplicitous two-bit politicians in Astan and American contractors who aren't delivering the human services required to win the hearts and minds that will, in turn, deliver the intel required to win this thing.
As for Strategy in 5 words or less: Gates has it right-- "Hearts and minds".
I am not an expert, but I am intrigued by the skepticism of nation building in Afghanistan...I can see your point--however, my question is, how much is nation building in Afghanistan tied to eliminating the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, which is infiltrating Pakistan? Because I think it is very much in everyone's interest, not just the US, that Pakistan be stable. I was just there and I am very skeptical that stability there is coming anytime soon, and this is despite what's being reported by the Western media--and what I also sensed--that Pakistanis in general are turning against the Taliban. (Anyway that's only half of the "hearts and minds" battle since they still really hate Americans-- and their own military, for the way it handled the situation around Swat).
Certainly the drones aren't improving people's impression of America there, but only worsening it by the day. It seems like "nation-building" or building up stability in government anyway, and hopefully its effectiveness, while much more difficult, is the only real chance at improving the situation.
"50 million.... In a place like that the ties of family and tribal unit* seem to way much more heavily than any amount of money"
Be one hell of an episode of Cribs though wouldn't it.
@ COINoperator,
""if I shoot will I be prosecuted" Thank You . I have struggled inarticulately for years to put it that well. I think I failed because I was using the acronym ROE. Most people probably thought I was some kind of caviar snob.
I have suffered under that ridiculous regime. Must seem more reasonable at the clean end of the 10,000 mile screwdriver. Let me make a prediction. The people at the ground level will adapt. They'll learn to lie, especially if they were in Iraq for the really nasty part.
============================
As far as building up the tribes - reading "Koran, Kalishnikov and Laptop" now. Not finished, but he seems to be making the case that one of the reasons for the Taliban's success is the erosion of the tribal elders influence in Southern Astan, the Camps in Pakistan, etc. In some cases it may no longer exist as a unit. The youth enter the Taliban because the tribe can no longer fulfill their potential. I would be interested to know if that's the case.
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