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The Limits of Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan
Steve Biddle of the CFR has long been a friend and mentor, and I have often felt that his central criticism of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine -- first raised, to my knowledge, last year in Perspectives on Politics -- is the most relevant to understanding the difficulties of Iraq and Afghanistan. Biddle's problem with FM 3-24 is that it assumes our interests align with those of the host government. We, as Americans, typically wage counterinsurgency campaigns as third parties -- that is, we fight them on behalf of another government. As Rupert Smith
What happens, Biddle wants to know, when our interests are not theirs?
Many threatened governments are more committed to their own subgroup’s interests than they are to some abstract idea of national well-being. The existence of an insurgency in the first place is often a signal of an illegitimate government with strong leadership interests in an unrepresentative distribution of wealth and power. In many cases, leaders will see U.S.-sponsored reforms as a greater threat to their personal well-being — or even survival — than the insurgency. One thus cannot assume that the U.S. interest and the host government’s interest are aligned in COIN; what the United States wants is not necessarily in the self-interest of the host leadership.
Many of those who have studied Afghanistan closely over the past several years have come to the conclusion that a corrupt Afghan government represents as big a threat to U.S. and allied mission success as the Quetta Shura Taliban or the Haqqani Network. U.S. and allied efforts over the next year, then, will hinge on the ability of the international community to bring leverage to bear on Hamid Karzai following the election -- assuming Karzai wins, of course -- to retain effective governors and ministers and to not use the ministries to reward incompetent or corrupt cronies. Two problems there:
- Karzai has promised the moon to any and all in an effort to get elected. Do we have any real sense which promises are genuine and which are hot air?
- Karzai has been offended -- maybe not without reason -- by U.S. and allied diplomats embracing his chief rivals in an effort to stress the importance of a free and fair election. The U.S. ambassador, for example, has seemingly met with every potential Afghan presidential candidate under the sun. (Do you want to meet Karl Eikenberry? Easy. Just announce you're running for president of Afghanistan.) So how much leverage are we actually going to have after this election?
All of this, though, points to the need to actually have a post-election plan for Afghanistan. The United States and its allies must have a coherent strategy for making the Afghan government realize, in Biddle's words, "its own best interest by making itself into a legitimate defender of all of its citizens’ well-being." This goes beyond protecting effective ministers and governors, but that's a start.
The final truth is that even the most disciplined counterinsurgency operations in the world's history will fail in Afghanistan so long as the government of Afghanistan remains weak or illegitimate in the eyes of the people it aspires to govern.
Umm, are there any signs of a post-election initiative, then? Or are you venting frustration?
Your posts since returning from Afghanistan seem pretty negative. Perhaps, then, you could adress Bacevich's question: Why? Is it really all worth it? We know what needs to be done tactically in the realm of COIN to win in Afghanistna. But strategically, do we really need to win? You've never adressed that at Abu Muqawama. Perhaps you could now that you've seen things first-hand in Afghanistan.
Do we actually know what has to be done or can be done in Afghanistan? We may be able to describe it but can we do it?
Do we need to win? Exactly as much as we needed to win in Vietnam.
Of course, Andrew, the diversion of interests is not limited to Afghanistan. As I've said here before, the last thing Pakistan wants is a strong and independent Afghan state. And the Pakistani's don't seem to agree with our notions of what should be done in their colonies...er...provinces and administrative areas. Is there anyone over there who shares actually shares our vision?
So, again, I would ask you to please define "winning" in Afghanistan.
Andy,
" As I've said here before, the last thing Pakistan wants is a strong and independent Afghan state. "
Your wrong. Pakistan does want an Afghanistan that is somewhat strong and ruled by a central government. They see India as their main concern, so they already have a security issue on that border, they don't want another one on their border with Pakistan (which is what they get when there is chaos in Afghanistan). Taliban rule over Afghanistan was perfect for the Pakistanis, about as close to a centralized, ordered Afghani state as is possible. That is what they want and it makes sense from a Pakistani security perspective.
Your simply wrong to say that Pakistan doesn't want a strong and independent Afghani state.
This corruption thing -- I'm not sure I understand it. Don't elites need rents to encourage them to get onboard? Doesn't the government of, say, South Korea use its influence to enrich its favoured cronies too?
At the heart of all such questions and thoughts, is what the United States is up against in the 21st Century.
China is the core problem. China considers and/or portrays itself as Third World country. And China is trying to align itself, for its own strategic interests, peacefully, with much of the Third World. Thus far, China has had significant success with this initiative. In the pursuit of this mission, China's primary weapons have been (1) its credentials as (generally speaking) a non-imperialistic nation and a fellow historic victim of imperialism, (2) money, (3) technical assistance and, most importantly, (4) a foreign policy based on non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
The problem for the United States is that, in comparison and competition, it cannot portray itself as a Third World country -- nor as a victim of imperialism. In addition, American foreign policy, especially since the end of the Cold War, seems to be rooted in a determination to increase its imperialistic and interventional attacks on the Third World; so much so, in fact, that the world sees that the United States is massively and rapidly transforming all its instruments of foreign affairs statecraft (DoD and DoS, etc) specifically so that it can do Third World intervention/imperialism better.
Accordingly, in the eyes of the people of Afghanistan today -- and throughout much of the world in the years to come -- a government's strength/weakness and legitamacy will be determined by these simple tests: (1) Is this Third World government simply a puppet of the United States and (2) is this relationship maintained by threat or actual use of the United States' new and more powerful counterinsurgency forces and capabilities?
"We, as Americans, typically wage counterinsurgency campaigns as third parties -- that is, we fight them on behalf of another government. As Rupert Smith and others have noted, when fighting a counterinsurgency campaign as a third party, there is only so much you can do to win. Eventually, your efforts will succeed or fail based upon -- as Smith sees it -- whether or not the host nation sets the political conditions for success. You can create a window of security, sure, but they must ultimately be the ones who win or lose the campaign through political reconciliation or compromise."
This is a masterful argument. There is also a precedent in recent history cf. the IPKF in Sri Lanka, (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Peace_Keeping_Force). Invited by then then SL President Jayawardene, it was thrown out by the next President Premadasa (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_intervention_in_the_Sri_Lankan_Civil...) because the host governments aims (elimination of the ethnic Tamil insurgency) was not aligned with the Indian government's goal of getting the Sinhala dominated SL government and the Tamil insurgents to the negotiating table. Genral McChrystal, SecDef Gates and the President can learn a lot from this misadventure of the Indians.
Visitor,
By "strong and independent state" I mean a state that Pakistan does not at least indirectly control. Yes, the Taliban were perfect for the Pakistanis but you need to realize the Taliban was not really independent. The Pakistanis liked and supported the Taliban because there was no chance the Taliban would seek to be in anyone's sphere of influence but Pakistans. The Taliban also did not have nationalist notions of a greater "Pashtunistan" nor did it care much about where the border was drawn. Afghanistan is not simply a neighboring state to Pakistan - control of Afghanistan is necessary to provide strategic depth against India and to prevent another "East Pakistan" from occurring through creation of a Balochistan, Pashtunistan, or whatever.
So, a strong and independent Afghanistan is a threat to Pakistan for several reasons - at least from their point of view. You also need to look at what Pakistan has actually done the past eight years, which is the minimum necessary to keep the US happy and the money flowing. That alone should tell you something.
Replying to Visitor 07/24/09 1133 hrs
"Your simply wrong to say that Pakistan doesn't want a strong and independent Afghani state."
Unfortunately you are wrong and Andy is right. Pakistan has not wanted a strong and independent Afghani state because what it truly desires is a pliant client state in Afghanistan. That is why it
1. Supported the Mujahideen against the India friendly Najibullah (aligned via the then USSR)
2. Supprted (via the ISI) the Taliban to defeat the independent warlords (Ahmed Shah Masood, Rashid Dostum and others)and unite the nation under it.
Now why would Pakistan do that? There you come close to the truth when you say "They see India as their main concern, so they already have a security issue on that border,..." What Pakistan wants vis-a-vis India is "strategic depth". The distance between Amritsar and Lahore (second most populous Pakistani city) is just over 30 miles as the crow flies. Islamabad (the capital) and Rawalpindi (Army GHQ) are just over 50 miles from the Line Of Control.
As you can well see the major operational, command and population centres of Pakistan are very close to an unstable border. And therefore to allow the leadership a base if the above fall Pakistan needs a fallback position which is obviously Afghanistan.
Pakistan does want a stable Afghanistan but you are dreaming if you think it wants a strong and independent one.
Andy makes the key point here... any post-election strategy aimed at making the Karzai government more legitimate to the people is only half the problem. The strategy/ stated end game must also include and have buy in from Pakistan as well. I agree with fnord that AM's post are more pessimistically cautionary lately, but then even the news here in the States is getting more depressing about Afghanistan's and Pakistan's future prospects.
Wheatkings,
"The strategy/ stated end game must also include and have buy in from Pakistan as well. "
So then you have to explain why Pakistan would want to buy into such a strategy. They see the US COIN operations as making things worse then they already are., and as pushing Taliban elements into Pakistan, thus destabilizing certain tribal regions. They are perfectly happy with Taliban rule over Afghanistan, and have little confidence that the US is competent enough to do what it wants to do? Why should they bet on the US COIN strategy if they think it has 1) little chance of succeeding and 2) is not in their interests because it will only drive the Taliban into their territory, thus stirring up tensiosn there?
A strong, independent and non corrupt Afghan govt, until we get that, we're doomed.
"Without an actor, we're doomed" - Team America, World Police.
Andrew, we can't get strong, honest, independent govt in the States.
Dirty Jersey
JOO lovers and haters will especially like the part about organ trafficking Rabbis. Really. Syrian Rabbis at that.
Oddly enough, we don't have an insurgency in NJ yet. Actually, most of us love living here, in particular when we get such good publicity. Chicks from outta town (or from the Red Bulls) really dig it.
Maybe the problem in Astan is not enough corruption, and that it's not evenly distributed. Put us in charge, give us the concrete pouring money, and we'll grind them into powder. Into fucking powder.
"on May 19, Cammarano [Hoboken Mayor] allegedly told the witness, "hopefully, we, we, we, you know, we get to the point where I’m sworn in on July 1st, and we’re breaking down the world into three categories at that point. There’s the people who were with us, and that’s you guys. There’s the people who climbed on board in the runoff. They can get in line. . . And then there are the people who were against us the whole way. They get ground . . . They get ground into powder.”
Somebody get this fuckin guy outta the clink, and on the Fuckin Pope's staff. Pardon my fukin language, your holiness.
Seriously, if we're going to set the standard for victory as saving Astan's and AF/PAK's souls, we really can't win. And we may lose our souls in the process.
@ Visitor
I don't mean to imply that it is Pakistan's percieved self-interest to buy into a strategy that legitimizes Karzai. I'm making the point that for the U.S. to succeed in developing goverment accountability in Afghanistan at all levels, the U.S. strategy cannot operate in a vaccum of Afghan only.
The point that AM highlights here (through Smith and Biddle) has been ignored too often in COIN discussions. Providing pop-centric security and fostering growing relations in that space for locals and the government to work together and trust each other (highlighted several times in Kilcullen's book) requires a government that actually is able to reach out to the populace effectively, efficiently, and with percieved legitimacy. Providing space is one thing, having an Iraqi or Aghani government step into that void productively is more complicated, and I'd argue more important (See Tom Ricks concerns on Iraq).
moving forward, the U.S. needs to do a balancing act of 1. helping/ forcing the Afghan government become more accountable and less corrupt, and 2. convinving Pakistan's government that an accountable Afghan government free of the Taliban is not a threat. Obviously this is immensly commplicated, and may not succeed. I should also point out that accountability and effectiveness do not imply "strong" or necessarily "independent" as Digital Cabinet highlighted above. That is the key, convincing Pakistan that accountable and effective does not mean independent and unsympathetic to their concerns.
I have stumbled into an epiphany - what you need to focus on AM is how to make corrupt local govt work...and you'll need people with experience.
Dirty Jersey
"[Kabul Mayor Karzai] allegedly told the witness, "hopefully, we, we, we, you know, we get to the point where I’m sworn in on July 1st, and we’re breaking down the world into three categories at that point. There’s the people who were with us, and that’s you guys. There’s the people who climbed on board in the runoff. They can get in line. . . And then there are the people who were against us the whole way. They get ground . . . They get ground into powder.”
Just tell Karzai from da Pope dat it's a Syrian Rabbi, and of course we mean Rabbi in strictly metaphorical sense.
Part of the reason Pakistan is so suspicious of Afghans and their elected politicians is because 91% of Afghans had an unfavorable view of Pakistan in the Feb 9, 2009 Afghan public opinion poll. A major contributor to this is a widely held if increasingly inaccurate perception among Afghans that Pakistan backs the Taliban, Haqqani (and his Punjabi Taliban allies), and Hekmatyur against them. Almost every Afghan politician who wants to be elected has to prove that he/she can stand up to Pakistan for Afghanistan's national interests. This is one reason many in Pakistan are uncomfortable with a prosperous successful Afghan democracy.
In my view, the wise Pakistani response would be to try to reach out to the Afghans and demonstrate their friendship and goodwill. One way to do this is for "PAKISTAN" to publicly urge India to play a larger role in Afghanistan's economic development--transportation, electricity, telecommunications, healthcare, education systems. Pakistanis could publicly urge India to give Afghanistan far more than the $2.1 billion in grants it has pledged so far, unambiguously stating that increased Indian and other international aid to Afghanistan benefits Pakistan. Pakistan, for domestic consumption, might need to indicate that Indian aid should be focused on economic development rather than training and equipping the ANSF. Pakistan could couple this with widely publicized (if symbolic and smaller scale) efforts to train and equip the ANSF by the Pakistani Army, as well as Pakistani declarations of support and respect for the ANSF. Such gestures on Pakistan's part would go far to alleviate Afghan concerns about Pakistani objectives.
reading this raises the thought of a situation where a popcentric campaign is actively defending/securing the people against their government.
The fundamental factor that is being addressed in the United States today -- is how to shape and control the Third World -- in consideration of the ongoing challenge for influence in this area that is being made by China.
The United States has been forced to take a more aggressive hard power and soft power approach to this competition, specifically because China's "soft power-only" approach has proven so successful, thus far, in the Third World.
To address the mounting China challenge, the United States is at a distinct disadvantage, for it has had, until recently, only a great power or rising power focus; while China has been focused on the Third World for a very long time.
Because of this shortcoming, the United States is today forced -- not only to revamp its Department of State such that it offers more and better "carrots" tailored for the Third World -- but also to revamp its Department of Defense so that its "sticks" are credible (as a means to coerce and compel) to Third World fights.
As to which government (US sponsored and supported -- or Chinese sponsored and supported) will ultimately be considered as the most ligitimate in the eyes of Third World peoples, the Chinese model makes far fewer, if any, demands re: cultural and/or political change. The United States model, in stark contrast, often requires these changes be made up front. Thus, the need -- by the United States alone it would seem -- for hard power tailored for use in the Third World.
It's good to see this blog now focussing on Afghanistan. Even better when Captain Blogger now has the inside, on-the-ground knowledge.
A word on this interminable preoccupation with the corruption of the Kazai government - which mirrors the same fruitless preoccupation with the Allawi, Jafaari and Maliki governents in Iraq.
It's so unselfconsciously westernocentric! So called "corrupt" governments are a fact of life right through the middle east. And not only is "corruption" a fact of life it is also the CUSTOMARY way of life throughout every level from the village upwards.
When the Afghans next go to vote, their major issue will be security, a direct result of the power vacuum Nato allowed to develop - not "corruption". Hopefully if Kazai or the next ("corrupt") president is elected with a substantial majority the Americans will lose the corruption knots in their knickers and get on with the difficult job they have at hand. The big problem, surely, is not enough boots on ground, Afghani and Nato, and no prospect of more until the US gets the Afghan army up to speed?
SMG, my thoughts exactly. It seems most of these "corruption centric" folks have never visited a developing country. Hell, China, Mexico and Brazil are very corrupt too. Very corrupt countries can be very successful. The "Western" way is often a worse way.
Elf: The moneytrail leads to Israel. Thats a indisputablev fact. They were milking.
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1248277884952&pagename=JPost%...
@Fnord,
"indisputablev"
Dude, you are a riot when your...er..."off". Hey enjoy, it's the weekend. Tanqueray? Really, no offense. Someday we will have to break out the Arrack (which you can get here in NYC, greatest city in the world!!). And so close to our salvation in this matter - the indispensible state of fuckin NJ.
You're missing my point. Which is rather than arrest these guys, USE THEM. Send them to Astan. We'll just tell people they're Syrian, that Rabbi is a code name, like "The Pope". We can also send our local fukin mayor from Hoboken to "ground them into powder".
I am glad to see someone else on this blog take a stand for corruption. Tammany built NYC, ya know. Thanks to SMG and Anand.
And as far as the namesake and "stopping corruption" - Dude. You really have to unpack your bags and take a look around DC. Are you kidding?
Afghan corruption is an issue that affects US domestic support for the war. I understand that. But in developing countries like Afghanisation it is a customary way of life. At the moment, security is what matters to them.
The US military problem is insufficient troops at its disposal in an extremely inhospitable environment. Much harder than Iraq. That's why its going to take a long time, unless the Pakistani army can break the Taleban in the northern provinces.
The US would do better domestically if it more strongly articulated the stategic interests the US has at stake in stopping the Taleban from over-running Afghanistan again.
I agree that corruption is a terrible problem in Afghanistan but we shouldn't be too sanctimonious. Any country merrily taking on a trillion in deficit spending in nine months, whose congress lives by earmarks, whose legislators almost never read the laws they pass and has now taken to passing unwritten bills at 3 in the AM has nothing to crow about.
Our most favored ally has nothing to brag about either. The number of British MPs not caught defrauding the government could fit on a 40 pax bus.
Our corruption is worse than the Afghans it's just we're more sophisticated and at street level less obvious. No AK-47s for our crooks...it's alumni pins, MBAs, and corner offices on K street for our "commanders".
Yes, and Yes. Corruption is not the problem, it's somewhere between a distraction or even counterproductive to pursue it in an ally.
Poppies - it bothers me, but it is their only income to speak of. Let it go. Just tell them they're going to hell. That might work.
Elf takes a stand for corruption, thanks for your pro corruptions stance. Welcome to the club ;-) [For the record, there is corruption and too much corruption even by Afghan standards. We should ignore the first but facilitate Afghans tackling the second.]
I would argue, however, that Poppies are a larger problem. It is urgent and necessary to facilitate non Poppy private sector business development (which is the only real solution to the Poppy problem.) The GIRoA cannot spend $6 billion a year while collecting $800 million in revenues indefinitely. The only ways to increase the tax base are:
-facilitating natural resource exploration and development
-facilitating private sector growth more generally (improving the education system is a large part of this)
-a natural gas pipeline from Central Asia through Pakistan to India and Karachi. However, this would only generate $400 million in annual transit fees
Each of these measures would take many years to begin generating revenues; that is why it is urgent to start ASAP.
Poppies - non poppy development - I agree.
Interesting discussion. It's like there is a kind of macro-corruption (the central government rewarding corrupt cronies) and micro-corruption (the cost of doing business in a culturally specific way). Well, maybe "macro" and "micro" aren't quite the right words. General references, anyone?
@ ELF: I wonder if you and I tend toward the small gov/libertarian model because of the whole NJ/Illinois thing? Talk about culturally specific....
@Madhu,
Yep. Not that I was that impressed with DC, having gone to school near there, and having a brother work there.
Of course at this point, DC is being called Chicago's "51st Ward".
The good news is Madhu that we are now considered the most corrupt state in the Union.
(Shhh. Don't tell anyone. You bribed us to go first ;-)
Ha Ha, I read that Chicago Tribune article, too. It can't be easy being in power, can it? Everyone is after you. I wonder why anyone sane would go into politics, you will likely be crushed. That can't be good, either?
What is going on with me? I'm being nice to the political class. I better go, this is weird.
Madhu, your descriptions of corruption make sense. In any business class in the states, they would teach you that there are two types of corruption:
1) local corruption to grease the wheels to process something faster than it otherwise would be. This is legal.
2) Hi level corruption to decision influencers to win a contract. This is illegal.
US companies are banned from the second type of corruption by US law; but allowed to engage in the first type of corruption. Any US company that engages in the second type of corruption can and are prosecuted for breaking the law.
Macro corruption has to be an issue, because it discourages foreign companies from doing business in Afghanistan. The World Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank, and other international institutions greatly emphasize macro corruption and good governance. For this reason, the Afghans are going to feel substantial heat on the corruption issue. There is no way around it.
One result of this is that Chinese companies, and Indian/Iranian/Central Asian/Turkish/Pakistani companies will win a lot of Afghan contracts. They are better at navigating macro corrupt waters.
Anand: "Macro corruption has to be an issue, because it discourages foreign companies from doing business in Afghanistan. The World Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank, and other international institutions greatly emphasize macro corruption and good governance. For this reason, the Afghans are going to feel substantial heat on the corruption issue. There is no way around it."
Anand, this is true. But the flavour of Biddle's paper and AM's comments was that the corruption of the Kazai government is a stand or fall component in a COIN operation? This is like getting spooked by the trees!
The US , World Bank, IMF etc will only get effective leverage over macro corruption once security has been achieved and the Taleban has been marginalised. Then the Afghan electorate will put its mind to quality of government services. Even then it will be a slow progress, but it'll be kicked along by economic and financial realities. Not by virtuous US moralising.
smg, we agree. We can't tell the World Bank, IMF, Asian Development Bank, EU and others what to do. They are going to push corruption regardless. But we Americans should try to downplay the issue from our end. The Afghans would appreciate us doing that for them.
"it'll be kicked along by economic and financial realities. Not by virtuous US moralising." Yup.
I know we Americans haven't been paying much attention; but increasingly China, India, Brazil and Russia are lending money to; and influencing the policies of the World Bank and IMF. As one American, I say "THANK GOD." If these global institutions get too pushy on corruption, we should give the Afghans and knowing look and put up our hands.
I have tried to address these ideas in the unstated context that actually frames these questions and that significantly determines the decisions that are being made by many Third World host governments:
Specifically: These host governments perceive that they may not have to comply with the United States and that they do, in fact, have a choice:
a. They can work with and for the United States or
b. They can work with and for China.
Ultimately, these host governments -- often comprised as AM notes by "subgroups" -- ask themselves these basic questions:
Are our sub-groups interests best provided for/aligned with China (whose stated foreign policy is to keep us in power and not to go after us culturally)? Or are our sub-groups interests best aligned with and provided for by the United States (who is quick to do "regime change" and who often demands destabilizing cultural change)?
As these sub-groups in-charge of host governments make this analysis, they may determine that they should -- quite logically -- go with China. If their nation (Iraq and Afghanistan) is currently being occupied by the United States, then these host governments/ sub-groups may determine that it is in their best interests to frustrate this occupation and/or otherwise cause the United States to leave.
Today, as in the past, it may not be the government that is considered most legitimate and best addresses the needs of the people which will not prevail. Instead, as in the past, the government that may prevail may be the one that best provides for its own sub-group's and its great or rising power ally's selfish interest (and that keeps the people in check).
In all questions re: irregular warfare, stability and support, nation-building, COIN, etc., we must correct our thinking to acknowledge and take into account the other 800 gorilla in the room. You can bet that everyone else in the world is factoring this new option into their equations.
@Anand/SMG,
Agree. but the 945 Visitor has very good points. We may want to think the same way, and forget our principles once we leave our shores.
Oh, I am all for bringing the worlds other 800 lb gorrilla into the equation. Officer Han is much more practical and effective then Officer Hans of the EU/UN and increasingly Officer Sam. And of course we owe Officer Han a lot of money.
When this all began a certain guy named Bibi warned us we didn't want our allies. Apparently when it comes to the EU, NATO, IMF and the World Bank we didn't. The problem is they are attempting to enforce Western European standards onto a stone age culture at war. You need peace and then a govt before you begin to talk about good peacetime standards of government.
@Madhu,
They go into politics because there's something missing in their lives and maybe their pysches. A sane person would get crushed. Uh think Blago or Clinton or McGreevey. They like the abuse.
Or they're super rich and bored. Their straphangers and enablers go along for the power and the money. Which they'll make. Ya know Harding was bought down because his poker buddies rigged a couple of oil contracts. Jesus. Today we'd make him the Ombudsman.
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