Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS.
I generally approach op-eds in the Guardian on Afghanistan with a degree of fear and trepidation. (How many variations of the "Afghanistan is the Graveyard of Empires™! Get out now!" routine can one publish?) But this commentary from Julian Borger strikes me as highly relevant.
What distinguishes the foreign secretary's speech from earlier summaries of the Afghan strategy is the palpable impatience with the Kabul government at what he described as "a testing point" for the country. Miliband made it clear that while the troop-contributing countries were already restless, the pressure on Kabul to perform as a government will increase exponentially once the August elections are over.
One critical part of that performance will be the appointment of the roughly 400 officials who actually run the country day to day – the 34 provincial governors and 364 district governors. In the past, these posts have often been distributed as favours and political bargaining chips. The emphasis, Nato states are saying, should now be on competence.
The trouble is, it is far from clear whether anyone in Kabul is listening. Karzai believes Nato needs him as much as he needs Nato, and bristles at being told what to do. Relations between Britain and the Karzai government have been frosty in recent years mostly for that reason, and this speech will do nothing to improve them.
I expect this to emerge as a theme in the coming year. There is a growing realization that we can run the greatest counterinsurgency campaign in the world's history in Afghanistan and that it will all be for naught as long as the government of Afghanistan remains weak, catastrophically corrupt, or both. Assuming Karzai wins next month, one thing to watch will be the degree to which the international community uses its leverage to protect effective ministers and provincial governors from the chopping block -- either because they did not support Karzai during the election or because Karzai has made too many promises to those who are supporting him.
This is the real problem, though, isn't it?
Currently to avoid interfering with Afghan sovereignty, we hand over large amounts of support (all the ANA's funding to start with, the police, the schools), which the Afghans could never produce from their own resources, almost entirely without oversight, because any oversight would trample on that sovereignty.
If you did start to exercise that oversight (for instance, trying to fight corruption, or remove ministers, or appoint competent governors), the government would look weak as a result.
In Iraq, we can assume the government will have to remain at least somewhat engaged with the task of governing because they have another source of societal income in oil. that even if we left tomorrow, would still leave them something to haggle over with each other. There are rewards to a long-term view because of that. A potential alternate income also helps make "sort this out or we walk" a credible argument for the West. In Afghanistan it's simply not, because the whole village on stilts we've built would collapse overnight.
In Afghanistan, the government has no accountability to its income sources (because we'd defeat ourselves by trying to impose any), and no reason for accountability to its people, because they have don't and contribute anything in the way of resources on the scales that are seen as required. So for any given Afghan leader the only rational response is to direct the funding firehose in the most favourable direction for his constituency as long as it lasts. They know the state that's being built is economically unsustainable, and are acting appropriately.
Andrew, I think this goes back to Steve Biddle's point about the big weakness in our COIN doctrine: the assumption that the host nation governments the US supports in a COIN campaign share our interests. Afghanistan and Iraq may be two totally different types of counterinsurgency operations, but it seems to me they share a similar problem areafor us: a lack of good governance and political accomodation necessary for an end state favorable to US interests. Your colleague Tom Ricks make this point about Iraq in The Gamble that while the surge succeeded tactically, it failed strategically because the GOI couldn't come up with a political compromise. Afghanistan, it seems based on your initial observations since your return, is heading in the same direction.
Part of the problem with trying to combine a merit-system with a tribal system is the inherent differences between the two. Karzai needs certain tribes and leaders behind him, and the only way that can be done is by giving them a share of the power even if they are unsuited to wield it. In a related problem, leaders of those tribes are measured by how much they can get for the tribal group*. A leader who is forced to act in a different manner can lose power quickly. I don't like it, but I don't know if anything can be done about it.
*Tribal does not mean wandering nomads. It also extends to city-dwellers and the more technocratic aspects of life.
With the danger of sounding condescending, its like playing Burnout: You watch the crash in slow motion. The Rummy train havocing into the curb, slowly and heavily. We dont fo no nation building -> Uh, theres no nation to rely on .> Uh, we better try to build one -> Oh no, its too late. Causal chain of reaction, I think they used to call it at university. When you screw up the foundation, everythng built on top of it becomes shit. No beurocratschool in Year 1-3 after action means no beurocrats in year 5-7 after action. Big fat surprise.
" I expect this to emerge as a theme in the coming year. There is a growing realization that we can run the greatest counterinsurgency campaign in the world's history in Afghanistan and that it will all be for naught as long as the government of Afghanistan remains weak, catastrophically corrupt, or both. "
I know that this blog doesn't do strategy -- only tactics -- but what's the next logical jump? If this is the case, if all of our tactics might ultimately be pointless, at what point do we says lets move on?
Taliban is also losing patience with the GIRoA and pursuing a new commitment to their target constituencies by issuing their new code of conduct. Several COIN concepts are key themes including limiting civilian casualties, humane treatment of prisoners, and winning over the local population. Interesting timing after our recent release/directive on limiting civilian casualties.
english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/07/20097278348124813.html
Corrupt and / or weak, hmm...
@Visitor 414,
Move on where? Retrench to our cities and wait for the AF/PAK nuke to sail in? That's our problem. And maybe instead of trying to make a nation where one never existed, we ask ourselves a primary question - why are we there?
Because it was a staging area for attacks against the West. In particular 9/11, and they oh so were excited around the globe when it happened, and we had to at least burn off this part of it before we could move on. Let's remember as well how important Astan is to the enemy - like all real people they take corporeal form, and need a country to operate safely from, train in, not to mention it's (in their minds) going to be the seed nation of their caliphate. We laughed at Afghanistan, and Mullah Omar. The enemy didn't. Getting it back (the first step is we leave) is vitally important to them. Which is why they may be targeting Germany proper..
Terror Uber Alles
So...
1. We are there because we were attacked horribly from there, it wasn't a one off but the coda of a campaign. The campaigns against others have continued, we have been both diligent in avoiding another, and fortunate.
2. We then allowed either ideology, romance or (Bush's) religion to sweep us into this nonsense about saving Astan from itself. And hence we are drawn ever deeper in terms of blood and money.
3. Let Triage have it's year, and the Afghans have their election. If we don't have results in a year, we go back to CT. And propping up Karzai and Co, at least as a foil, sop to the enemies rage (as opposed to NY or London). And let Pakistan decide at it's peril if it wants to continue feeding Frankenstein (the noble Paks having apparently now realized their peril) or whether it wants to save itself. If they do, our troops in the south are there to exterminate the enemy on the Astan side.
4. Our interests come first. It's the protection of our homelands. Not nation building, or aid-fare. You'd probably have more luck in sub saharan africa. Where it didn't work either.
Trouble is, Elf, CT hasnt functioned either. The slow rage of the pashtuns is still evolving. Either we put some serious money into it, or we cocede defeat, and tacticaly withdraw, while leaving elements behind. Did you see the wounded stats on the british? Not good.
co*n*ceed, even
Gawd. What is the Pashto for "UK Parliamentary Expenses Scandal"? The massive rip off that almost brought down the Brown Government in June?
President Kazai must sit with glazed eyes when he is being lectured by David Miliband.!
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom_Parliamentary_expenses_scand...
Brown, Miliband, Obama, Pelosi, Clinton and Reid et al are where they are based on competence? Political cunning, bribery, nepotism, sycophancy and ward healing perhaps, which is the same system the Afghans use.
I suspect a criminal record check and an under graduate level civics test followed by a lottery among the successful applicants would produce a better government than the ones produced by our democratic systems.
And Pashto for New. Jersey. Democrats .Corruption .Scandal?
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/nyregion/27jersey.html
Indeed. The point almost no-one acknowledges is that from the Taliban's point of view, GIRoA has to be worth reconciling with. Yet the reality is that it is deeply split, helplessly corrupt and has little footprint in the Taliban's southern heartlands. As many of the key leaders are out of harm's way, comfortable and untargettable in Quetta and its surrounds, what is their motivation to throw their weight behind a mess like GIRoA? GIRoA's official reconciliation programme has been running for some years now and is an abject failure.
@Fnord,
I think I got plenty of rage myself. Don't know why the Brits don't. Let's review: America had no military intervention in the area prior to 9/11 other than giving billions in aid to help the locals expel the Soviets. When that was done we left them to their traditional raging dysfunctions. The Brits BTW left in 1947. So we left them largely alone, some economic aid, some protests at atrocities, some bitching about poisoning the world's children with opium. But largely alone. Then a marauding tribal raiding society discovered plane tickets...and....
And there was a response. In keeping with their apparently discovering Orwell as well history starts in Dec 01 with the Imperialists installing the Karzai govt to get a natural gas pipeline, or something....
My research on Astan, and my opinion of people in the drug trade, my opinion of peoples ability to change without overwhelming external events (like war) leads me to believe that security + aid does not equal development. We tried to develop Africa for generations with direct aid and we seem to have done as much harm as good. Made a lot of gangsters rich of course, destroyed local economies, went further into debt ourselves. And Africa is not attacking NYC or London. The Pashtu and their Arab sponsors are...
Because you found plane tickets- if you're reading- assholes. That's the only reason. Look at the common denominator of your Commanders targets in AQ & franchises. The common denominator is they visited or studied in the target countries. If you had studied somewhere else, you'd attack it. If you had stayed at home, you'd be attacking the next village.
I will say again let them have their year of Triage and elections to show progress. If not we start to rethink, step one is why are we there . And what do we intend to do to solve our problems ?
Read some Pashtunwali code Fnord. We are not their problem. They are. It just spilled over.
Apropos nation building, this just in: http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=925
Also, while it is true that aid does not equal development, it also true that no aid does not equal development, and that civil war (probably) equals more civil war, and therefore, no development.
CNAS is stealing my comments!
Something else that occurs to me, though this is probably not the best forum for its discussion, is the close relationship between democracy and debt. The fact that democracies can, as trustworthy borrowers, take on large amounts of debt is one reason for our continued (yes, continued) dominance. Something for those of us with soveriegn monetary policies to bear in mind as we contemplate the obvious short path...
@visitor 752,
Well, you're not the ordinary anon. Could you elaborate on "Something for those of us with soveriegn monetary policies to bear in mind as we contemplate the obvious short path..."
What short path exactly? More debt? Printing money? Cut and run? Maybe I'm a prisoner of my own prejudices against either...but what did you mean?
Also - my problem with aid is that it will continue to pave and develop the infrastructure in Swiss and Lux banks. This is kind of like the street joke in Sri Lanka after the Tsunami in response to the govt's " We will Rebuild" .
=========> Yes. You'll rebuild. In London, New York, LA and Geneva.
I am assuming it's the same visitor.
"I suspect a criminal record check and an under graduate level civics test followed by a lottery among the successful applicants would produce a better government than the ones produced by our democratic systems."
@ Visitor - that made me all LOLz. Funny. It also made me kind of sad, because, hey, our democratic systems are still better than the non-democratic systems. And what a mess.
@ Elf answers: I liked a lot of that answer.
From this and the other corruption thread, I'm thinking a certain amount of deal making is inevitable and may not be so bad, in all circumstances. The real world, as opposed to the theoretical white paper world, kind of sux, don't it?
Elf: states that borrow money in their own currency can easily reduce the real value of their debt by devaluing that currency.
As for aid, I think that the bigger worry is the potentially deleterious effect on governance, rather than anything that might or might not be happening in NY or Geneva.
vimothy
I asked Google the definition of "Astan" but she didn't tell me.
T'would be laughable if it wasn't serious - politicians telling other politicians to replace political alliances with technocrats -
We require civil engineers to be licensed, but we'll let any old body attempt social engineering, which is hazardous enough at home, let alone when trying to export it to unfamiliar contexts.
The difference between our governments and Kabul is that we have a formal system of rules, occasional enforcement of accountability, and checks and balances. Liberty in Europe did indeed grow out of debt: kings accepted limits on their power in return for loans and taxes to finance their wars. Yes, I believe I read that the Rothschilds required empowerment of the public before they would lend to the monarch.
McChrystal has a plan for the countryside. The countryside has to be linked to the capital in relations of mutual dependence for the plan to succeed, and I haven't heard what that is yet.
The ancient Persians understood empire so much better than we do today ...
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