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Thinking about balance
Secretary of Defense Gates has been beating the drum of "balance" between conventional and irregular warfare as an organizing principle for quite awhile now, but despite the defense budget proposed a few months back, we'll have to wait until the QDR comes out to see how he plans to operationalize this. In the meantime, check out a couple interesting pieces on this (aside from Krepinevich's Foreign Affairs article) to tide you over:
- Frank Hoffman's latest in Armed Forces Journal
- Tom Mahnken's blog post on Foreign Policy (link fixed)
If those traditionalists
If those traditionalists want the United States to remain a major power it is short sighted of them to not want at least some focus on irregular warfare. Given the fact that most of them were probably alive in the 60s and 70s they should be expected to know how badly a nation can be damaged if it cannot defeat an insurgency, especially when so much military and political power is brought to bear on defeating it. I personally don't advocate abandoning conventional warfare as much a realization that conventional and unconventional warfare are becoming increasingly blurred.
I should research this but
I should research this but instead I'll just pose the question? How long does it take to manufacture the costly systems that all of the traditionalists want, i.e. the F-22, FCS, and the like. If we already have 187 or so F-22 and we don't really need any of those other systems at the moment. Why don't we just shelve them till the day or time comes when we do need them?
It seems dumb to me to build something, not use it in combat, just spend tons on maintaining it while it depreciates and then just build more to replace. I imagine if shit really hit the fan, we could build the things we need and operate them well without blowing the money right now.
Gringo Lost, I'm not arguing
Gringo Lost,
I'm not arguing in favor of more F22s, but much of the problem is that you can't have an assembly line (or assembly pipeline) and workers standing by to produce more at the flip of a switch. Valid arguments can be made regarding cost to make X more now compared to some undetermined time in the future.
Per your second paragraph: training and experience matter.
From a commie pov, thats one
From a commie pov, thats one of the things they had going for them: They could have put the F22 folks on state-payroll for the next 5 years , makin one F22 veeeeery slowly for the next five years. So that you could pop it up when needed.
@ Grant, You are right
@ Grant, You are right warfare is blurred particularly where what is proven is concerned against what is theory but touted as effective when it isn't.
We tried Coin in 63 it didn't work then, it won't work now. The best men in the United States Army, possibly some of the very best in the world, multi talented, cross trained, multi lingual , Brilliant men tried it. They were called Green Berets.
While they were successful in the short term, They ultimately failed. Not because the men did but because the Philosophy was flawed in the first place. You can't keep killin the men........... you have to kill the ideology.
Grant: Frank Hoffman in this
Grant:
Frank Hoffman in this piece characterized my position on these matters poorly. One comes away from reading his piece thinking that Gentile and the s0 called "Traditionalists" want to step into the time tunnel, recreate the soviet union, move his family back to Germany, so that he can prepare all over again to fight the Soviets in the Fulda Gap. Simply not true. I have argued publicly in multiple places that the United States Army must have the capability to conduct irregular war and we must institutionalize the lessons that we have learned in Iraq and Astan. But we should organize as a general purpose fighting force that cheats in the direction of conflict at the higher end of the conflict spectrum. What the hybrid warriors and the coindinistas get wrong is their belief that general purpose forces, trained and organized to fight at the higher end of the conflict spectrum, cannot step fairly easily into a different direction to do irregular war. One can find many historical cases to disprove this notion. However, it is dangerous to think that this principle operates in the inverse. Just ask the Israeli Army about Lebanon in summer 2006 and what they did to correct their deficiencies in Gaza last winter.
@ Greyhawk I kind of figured
@ Greyhawk
I kind of figured someone would say that, but it still strikes me as curious because for WWII, Vietnam, etc... we could build these things and operate them in a relatively short period of time. Of course, I really don't know the details about timing and training but intuitively I feel that we had quick turnarounds in these instances.
gringo lost, It was damn
gringo lost,
It was damn near a year from Pearl Harbor to Torch. Rick Atkinson (An Army at Dawn) describes soldiers training with broomsticks, arguments over the validity of horse cavalry, and other horror stories. (A good thing the Atlantic Ocean meant something back then). Even the most devoted COIN proponent should ponder a 21st-century version of that from time to time.
(But I don't favor any additional F22s this year.)
I guess that's what I'm
I guess that's what I'm saying Greyhawk.... 187 F-22s is good enough for now. It's best not to build more and let them sit on the shelf or test run them for an 1.5 hours before you have to do 30 hours of maintenance.
And the Atlantic Ocean meant something then just like it still does now. Unless we're really worried that China or Russia or Iran is going to try to storm the beaches of Malibu or Daytona.
"Why don't we just shelve
"Why don't we just shelve them till the day or time comes when we do need them?"
Excellent question. This has been tackled in many books and by many thinkers... No answer.
One of my favorites, an old one, this was assigned when I was at BU by a defense journalism professor from East Germany... long story... the book was "Wild Blue Yonder" (?) I believe, about the B-1.
Defense procurement can only be tackled by a Lincoln-like figure.
personally, I would say you are on the right track. Shelve them. Convert detroit into a "flexible" manufacturing facility.
Develop F-22s and Ospreys, built prototypes, test them, but don't go down the road of manufacturing. Only start thinking about that when you NEED the system.
I just saw a great movie. Overlord. 1975. Just got screened in the US in 2004. basically covered up. Again, long story. It is about Overlord, obviously. Superb film. I've moved it to the top of my "Best War Films Ever" list.
The guy that made it used about 1/3 real footage. And this is the best stuff you will ever see on WWII. By now we have all seen the documentary shots of the various mine-clearing devices thought up by the allies and their test runs. This film had an extended (I believe never-seen-before-version) version of one of them. The crux is it didn't work. But that is not to say that the technology and the knowledge gained in developing it didn't save lives and create a stronger punch at some later date. I don't know. My guess is it did. We learned.
My own feeling is that the F22 and the Osprey and several other ideas are stupid. Not because of what they can do, but because of how much they cost versus what we theoretically think they can do in some yet-not-named theoretical future conflict.
This is what makes your question probably one of the most important the US can tackle this century.
"I'm not arguing in favor of
"I'm not arguing in favor of more F22s, but much of the problem is that you can't have an assembly line (or assembly pipeline) and workers standing by to produce more at the flip of a switch."
This is also a great point. It is the classic (only) counter-argument to what I was saying above. I've never been able to square this with my own thoughts, and this is why I feel the original question has never been sufficiently answered.
That same defense journalism professor always pressed home the concept of "preparedness." I rarely see this in contemporary discussions of military stategy. (Is it taken for granted?)
The military concept of "preparedness" is what American policy since WWII has been all about without explicitly ever saying so.
Preparedness says you don't build what you need when you suddenly encounter the need, but that you already have it and the trained personnel to fly it, drive it, or shoot it.
Because if you don't, then you've already lost.
Of course this question begs the question of our adversaries' "preparedness."
I say we can wait and we should try to reduce the defense budget. This might be one of the few points I agree with the esteemed representative from Massachussetts on.
"But we should organize as a
"But we should organize as a general purpose fighting force that cheats in the direction of conflict at the higher end of the conflict spectrum. What the hybrid warriors and the coindinistas get wrong is their belief that general purpose forces, trained and organized to fight at the higher end of the conflict spectrum, cannot step fairly easily into a different direction to do irregular war. "
I haven't committed to running in 2020, but I can tell you right now - Col. Gentile will be my National Security Advisor.
No ifs, ands, or buts.
"Develop F-22s and Ospreys,
"Develop F-22s and Ospreys, built prototypes, test them, but don't go down the road of manufacturing."
I've heard that stuff like that does go on. ;)
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