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Afghanistan: Easy to Lose, Hard to Win
General McChrystal's assessment of the war in Afghanistan was forwarded to the Secretary of Defense and the NATO Secretary-General today, so it's as good a time as any to flag two must-reads from yesterday and today. In the first, Tony Cordesman writes just how easy it would be to lose this war -- though he admits there is also no clear path to victory. Not surprisingly, given that Tony and I traveled through Afghanistan together for a month, I am sympathetic to his analysis. In the second, Dexter Filkins gives us an idea of how hard it will be to win the war. I have never met Filkins, but I think he gets it right too.
The next several days could prove decisive, and in more ways than one. The votes are expected to be counted by the second week of September. By then, officials on the Election Complaints Commission should have a better sense of how substantive the election fraud was. And this week, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the top American commander in the country, is expected to deliver his assessment of the Afghan situation to President Obama. That report could lay the groundwork for a request for more troops.
The situation on the battlefield is difficult on its own. But it is, of course, inevitably bound up with the political stalemate in Kabul. As American commanders and diplomats have said repeatedly here, no amount of troops can substitute for a lack of political consensus among ordinary Afghans.
In this way, the politics in Kabul and the fighting in the south feed off of each other, for better or worse.
“If people decide that we could not give them anything through the democratic process, then the insurgency will be strengthened,” Mr. Abdullah said. “And then the United States will need to bring more troops and more resources here — and for what?”
That’s a question that President Obama, General McChrystal and, ultimately, the American people, will have to decide.
Of course Cordesman also
Of course Cordesman also misses THE big point:
What is "winning" in Afghanistan?
And how much is it worth to "win"?
B: Correct, which points to
B:
Correct, which points to a post I made on his piece on SWJ this morning. For whatever it is worth, here it is:
Dr. Cordesman's didactic lecture reminds me of General George McClellan during the American Civil War and his rants and raves against the intrusions by President Lincoln and other pesky politicians and civilians who had the temerity to tell him how to conduct war. As McClellan in so many words might have thought then, it seems many experts think now; “hey you American public and non-believers, trust us, leave us alone, we know what we are doing, we are the experts, give us what we want and then shut-up about it.” It also sounds a lot like Walt Rostow in the latter years of Vietnam frustrated by the skeptics who dared to challenge the experts. The United States lost the Vietnam War not because its Army failed at counterinsurgency tactics and operations, but because it failed at STRATEGY. Sun Tzu said that “tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.” When I read lectures like this one by Dr. Cordesman, I just hear noise.
Readers of SWJ blog [and AM] should pay attention to a below post [on SWJ] titled “Is the War in Afghanistan in the Interests of the United States and Its Allies” by Major Jeremy Kotkin. You see the good Major is talking strategy, and Cordesman (like Rostow and McClellan before him) is so mired in the world of tactics and operations that he cannot see the level of noise that he is creating to the detriment of good strategy.
Of course Cordesman also
Of course Cordesman also misses THE big point:
What is "winning" in Afghanistan?
And how much is it worth to "win"?
If reports about the nature of ISAF's metrics are accurate, then it tells us something about what "victory" is: transitioning responsibility to capable ANSF and getting the hell out.
It would be nice if
It would be nice if supporters of escalation would be more precise in their numbers. A brigade may be 5,000 troops but it takes far more people, military and civilian, to put it in the field. I would estimate another soldier or airman for every man in a brigade along with one Afghan civilian and .25 expats.
Don't forget the thousand or so civilian "experts". How do they move around? Will they have different, much less heavy force protection measures than DOS has now? So please add in several thousand expat PSDs. You'll also need thousands of Afghan security forces to guard the new FOBs and convoys. These folks will come from existing ANSF so the new US forces may actually be a drag on building Afghan forces.
Then there are the thousands of Afghan and Pakistani truck drivers bringing in supplies for 50-60,000 additional westerners. I think it's becoming clear that the "Taliban's" main source of funding is factually from looting NATO convoys and shaking down drivers, so the escalation will endanger NATO logistics while increasing funding for the enemy.
The strategic problem of Afghanistan is the cost to the US. Cordesman's ideas will worsen the situation. 120,000 US troops along with 30,000 civilians sitting in Afghanistan for the next five or ten years isn't sustainable politically or if the enemy get their act together, logistically. (see Seven Pillars of Wisdom on the mechanics of bleeding a superior enemy who is tied to a few supply routes).
NATO should concentrate in providing tactical reserves for ANSF defending major population centers, improving the quality of the ANSF they already have and making life miserable for the enemy in remote districts with Afghan and NATO SOF, tribal forces and air power. The days of driving around in a MRAP waiting to hit an IED should end. Low profile and covert ops should be the norm. This will take fewer troops at considerably less cost. The notion of flooding Afghanistan with "experts" should be canned and western help in rural areas left to true NGOs. Coalition partners deploying less than 2,000 troops should be asked to go home both to improve unity of command and reduce logistic burdens. The above isn't quite "masterful inactivity" but it's well on the way.
Gulliver's right, which is
Gulliver's right, which is of course the problem: mentoring militaries doesn't normally benefit from a overt focus on metrics, especially when political pressure to succeed is involved. In Afghanistan, we'd managed to get the Afghan National Army largely to CM1 status, without asking ourselves what that really meant in terms of actual capability.
Cordesman has written on this elsewhere, saying the only true test of a new military is combat. In like vein, K in Kunar Province's farewell post with the ETT there this weekend argues for the transfer of security responsibility to Afghans. Perhaps the real metric should be not CM status, or new ANSF recruits (which the Iraq experience shows will be gamed, viciously), but the number of districts where Afghan security forces are operating with mentor and enabler support only.
SLA seems to know what
SLA seems to know what winning is, and they also have a plan to win the peace. IDP camps - guarded by an even larger military which is going to grow 50%.
An SLA 'politcal solution'
And Bacevich would love this part...from above link...
"...the Sri Lankan state is attached to its military..Slogans on the wall of the defence media centre say "It's the Soldier,
not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press; It's the Soldier, not the poet, who has given us the freedom of speech."
I think I have heard similar sentiments in the USA, or course it's true ... BUT
I am an active duty officer,
I am an active duty officer, and although I have not served in Afghanistan, I follow this issue with much enthusiasm on AM and SWJ. With regards to Col. Gentile's comments on tactics/strategy, can someone tell me where I could find a piece of paper that clearly outlines our strategy in Afghanistan? What about winning? I'm not asking sarcastically...has Petreaus, McChrystal, Mullen, etc. said what constitutes a "win"? Thanks.
"I think it's becoming clear
"I think it's becoming clear that the "Taliban's" main source of funding is factually from looting NATO convoys and shaking down drivers"
Sounds interesting. Any numbers on this?
"and Cordesman (like Rostow
"and Cordesman (like Rostow and McClellan before him) is so mired in the world of tactics and operations that he cannot see the level of noise that he is creating to the detriment of good strategy."
Lets add Nagl, Exum and the rest of the COINdistry at CNAS to this list too.
From Cordesman
From Cordesman link...
"Unfortunately, strong elements in the White House, State Department
and other agencies seem determined to ignore these realities. They are
pressuring the president to direct Eikenberry and McChrystal to come to
Washington to present a broad set of strategic concepts rather than
specific requests for troops, more civilians, money and an integrated
civil-military plan for action. "
Uh, aren't they supposed to in broad strokes tell them? Or is Grand Strategy the responsiblity of the CDR on the ground
"They are pushing to prevent a fully
integrated civil-military effort, and to avoid giving Eikenberry and
McChrystal all the authority they need to try to force more unity of
effort from allied forces and the U.N.-led aid effort."
Well, preventing C/M intergrated effort is a classic mistake, and probably reflects internal DC interdepartmental politics and a turf war. Or it's " we wash our hands of this loser, like we've been doing since 89"
Ex: A commenter "B" points
Ex:
A commenter "B" points out, Cordesman never defines "victory."
And since when are wars "won" or "lost"? Even in major conventional wars, the outcomes are never quite so dichotomous. In COIN campaigns they NEVER are.
Just as I respect Biddle, I really, really respect Cordesman... but there is something going on here that is making all of you guys lose your bearings. I really have trouble taking people seriously who talk about "winning" and "losing" in Afghanistan as if those terms had any meaning. They don't. Nonsense goals like ensuring that Afghanistan is "never again" a "safe haven" for terrorist is almost as bad. They are just convenient ways to avoid grappling with specific achievable goals.
And while I also acknowledge the importance of operational debates, I just don't see how you can plan operations in the context of strategic incoherence.
--BF
What leaps out at me in the
What leaps out at me in the debate over dramtically upping our commitment in Afghanistan is that none of the proponents of the "up the ante COIN" option actually think it's going to work.
I've seen, heard or read Kilcullen, Cordesman, Biddle, Exum and others COIN proponents as well as Douglas Alexander of Dfid and Andrew Wilder, who certainly knows a thing or two about Afghanistan, opine on what a full fledged counterinsurgency operation in Afghanistan would look like. What strikes me as totally fukced in all this, everyone I mentioned ,to varying degrees, has implied that the strategy they are propogating probably isn't going to work.
On this blog, upon returning from Afghanistan, Exum wrote something to the effect of, "we can run the best COIN operation ever, but if the GOA doesn't get their shit together it will all be for naught."
Well, I'm yet to hear any optimism from anyone that the GOA can get their shit together. On a press call Biddle suggested taking away corrupt Afghan officials childrens student visas when someone asked him to get specific on how he intended to get these guys in line. Wilder said something to the effect of, "we should incentivise our military and financial aid, though generally I'm not a fan of incentivising, I don't think it will work and frankly I'm grasping at straws."
I want to hear more of proponents of the "up the ante COIN strategy" define success and quantify our chances of success if we adopt this strategy.
Out of all the furious
Out of all the furious online discussion on AM, SWJ, Inkspots, and others blogs (ever since AM returned from strategic review) about:
1. What is a win in Afghanistan?
2. What is exactly is our strategy in Afghanistan?
3. Is what we are doing in Afghanistan stabilizing or destabilizing in Pakistan?
4. Will all of this prevent Al Q from having a safe haven in Afghanistan (or Pakistan)
the most interesting question comes, for me, out of a Kings of War Post in which Thomas Rid asked, basically, okay, so what if we do what all the grand things we say we are going to do? What then? A capable ANA/ANSF (I hate all these acronyms), a centralized government with legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people, what then? I'm paraphrasing and probably getting that all wrong, sorry, too busy right now to find the post and link it here.
I'm with ELF, aren't these sorts of questions supposed to be answered by the WH? Isn't a vision out of the WH supposed to be driving all this? it's you lot sending men and women in harm's way. If you really believe it is a war of necessity, and make that case with vigor and passion, then the political questions fall out in a very different way, don't they? Or do they? I confess, I don't know.
Also, I do take Greyhawk and Old Blue's points from prior comments that this sort of discussion is disheartening to people on the ground, but I don't know how it can be avoided, because so many things are happening in the fall. Requests for who knows what? And, you all know my thoughts on the Kerry-Lugar bill and throwing money around, thinking it will make a difference, when who knows what it will do?
*That link at SWJ about our interests in Afghanistan is a power point?
@Bernard Finel - can you
@Bernard Finel - can you expand your point about, " I really have trouble taking people seriously who talk about "winning" and "losing" in Afghanistan as if those terms had any meaning."
For a layperson, that is very confusing. I guess it is very unsophisticated of me, I haven't your education or background in all of this, but when I think of wars, I think of winning or losing. At least in the sense that we have a goal, the goal is a vital one in terms of our national interest, and the goal is achievable. Hence, a win. What's wrong with this thinking? Help us everyday people out here, because we have to fund this thing, our husbands and daughters and sons and wives are fighting this war, we vote, and our opinion matters. Not that I should broaden 'me' into 'we'. Well, duh, I suppose..........
Why does good strategy, in
Why does good strategy, in particular broad strokes have to come from CNAS? And for that matter Why T F should the in country CDR and Ambassador have to present it to POTUS and his brain trust?
They should be telling the CINC Astan and the Ambassador what the strategy is, then they tell POTUS (or dare we say CENTCOM 6) how they plan to win and what they need.
Which they did, as did Triage/CNAS. If anyone should be briefing POTUS it's CENTCOM 6, NSC Director, SecState, SECDEF, etc....
POTUS wanted the job.
If A.C is right and they DC-crats are dragging their feet and trying to drag back El Papa and the Nuncio, then POTUS can take a page from Gates book and start firing people.
Well, what say you Ex? We
Well, what say you Ex? We are back to that pesky realm of strategy again.
I'm with Madhu. While
I'm with Madhu. While there are many inconclusive conflicts in history, there are just as many totally decisive conclusions = victory. Or defeat.
I'd venture: WWII, The Indian Wars, The American Civil War, All of Genghis Khan's campaigns except Europe, The Mexican/American War, the Spanish American War...etc...etc...were pretty conclusive. And a couple of them were "COIN". After a fashion.
Not sure if the postmodern mind can accept this.....
Ex is President? Really? I
Ex is President? Really? I thought he was a think tank staffer....
[Hey ol Buddy, ol Pal...can I get a tax cut? Remember when I saved your life? Or maybe we just got drunk somewhere, somehow? Yer old piezo}
;-)
@Madhu: Let's say you had
@Madhu:
Let's say you had goals you wanted to accomplish in a conflict. And let's say you accomplished 9 of them. Would that be a "win"? Or would it be a "loss" because #10 eluded you? How about if you accomplish 6 goals, 2 partially, and 2 not at all. How about if you went into a war wanting to accomplish 3 goals and willing to accept X casualties as the cost, and end up getting all 3 but at the cost of 2x casualties? How about if you get 2 out of the 3, but at .5x casualties? How about if you have 3 goals before the war begins, but then because the war is going well you decide to add 2 more.. and the fail at those 2? If you really want, I can put actual conflicts to those example, but I'd rather not get into off-topic debates on why I consider, say, the Korean war a victory rather than a defeat.
Think about Afghanistan. We drove the Taliban from power. We scattered al Qaeda. We destroyed AQ's fixed infrastructure, captured a ton of intelligence, and killed a bunch of AQ leaders. If our goal was to punish the Taliban and disrupt AQ and demonstrate our capability and commitment to strike out and punish those who attack us... we did it. In 2001. Now that we have remained for the better part of a decade, does our failure to turn Afghanistan into a stable ally somehow take away from those accomplishments? How can it be considered a loss, even if the Taliban does claw its way back into power 5 or 10 years from now?
War is not like a baseball game. There are no "winners" and "losers." The question is whether you have accomplished goals you aspire to at a tolerable cost. It is also about whether you have bought time, attained a better peace, enhanced your credibility, and all sorts of other factors.
Most importantly, as Clausewitz wrote, "In war, the result is never final." Even the most dramatic victory is almost always just temporary. The quest for "never again" or a "war to end all wars" is the province of the hopelessly naive or the lunatic.
--BF
"If reports about the nature
"If reports about the nature of ISAF's metrics are accurate, then it tells us something about what "victory" is: transitioning responsibility to capable ANSF and getting the hell out"
That's the most realistic goal the DoD or the White House could hope for.
Very well said, Bernard.
Very well said, Bernard.
Our current goal is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaida. If we could kill every single al-Qaida and Taliban member at a cost of killing hundreds of thousands of civilians, i highly doubt that we (or especially the international community ) should/could/would call it a "win".
aarun, I would. Ah, there
aarun,
I would. Ah, there is no international community, not one we could live without (Europe, the International Left - the only actual International Community). Europe needs us, not the other way around.
And once they saw the new/old us...they'd fall silent quickly. Like they did over Russia...uh...forever, the Chinese in Tibet..., Burma....and Sri Lanka.
Simply answer the International Community the way the above do...with silence. And retaliation if they get uppity.
Don't get me wrong. I do think we're going to leave with the enemy soon to take, ah...whatever they want. Because we listen to the International Community (the Intl Left) and have lost our stomach for war. Or survival.
I think Mark Lynch makes a
I think Mark Lynch makes a good point in his latest post:( http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/08/29/top_ten_bloggables )The pro-escalation COINdanistas MIGHT have a slightly better tactical arguement, but strategically Bavevich and Co. have a better arguement.
"The pro-escalation side probably has the better of the tactical argument, in terms of the best response once the U.S. decides upon the strategic necessity of combatting the Taliban "insurgency". But the anti-escalation side probably has the better of the strategic argument: U.S. vital interests in Afghanistan to justify the expense remain vague, the arguments made for the costs of "losing" the counter-insurgency war in Afghanistan are relatively far-fetched (please, no more "credibility of the West" or "flytrap" arguments), the critical "safe havens" argument suffers from the profound weakness of the availability of alternative safe havens all over the broader region, and the costs of waging such a war successfully aren't being taken sufficiently seriously."
"Also, I do take Greyhawk
"Also, I do take Greyhawk and Old Blue's points from prior comments that this sort of discussion is disheartening to people on the ground..."
:)
Then I didn't make my point clearly. I was urging those who would engage in debates about strategy here not to be surprised when they heard from those involved in implementing said strategy, this being the sort of open forum where such things can happen. I'm certain most of those people on the ground can take any perceived criticism in stride, and few would offer a response longer than two words.
Elf- So are you saying that
Elf-
So are you saying that because we could get away with it fairly easily, as the other states you have mentioned have, we should ignore the international community ? Or more importantly, the values we claim to uphold?
Lets just say we did kill every al-Qaida and Taliban member, at the expense of a several hundred thousand civilian casualties. We withdraw from Afghanistan feeling pretty proud of our "win". And we all live happily ever after because surely the killing of so many civilians wouldn't come back to haunt us in any threatening way. Is that how you see it?
If survival is the goal, its pretty absurd to think thats a prudent way to ensure it.
"few would offer a response
"few would offer a response longer than two words."
Uh oh, what would those two words be?:)
(Actually, a commenter at Old Blue's kind of said the above, I should have been more specific).
@ Bernard Finel: Thank you for the answers to my questions.
Big Cordesman fan here, but
Big Cordesman fan here, but the assumptions of the piece speak for themselves. He's talking to US about THEM, them being the Afghans. Why isn't this a piece addressed to Hamid Karzai about what HE needs to do differently?
For that matter, why is it incumbent upon Gen. McChrystal to come up with a new strategy at all? Shouldn't that be something the Afghan government should release, and we should announce we're enabling? Exactly what kind of alliance with GIRoA do we think we have? Assuming winning is possible, is there a definition of winning that excludes them from the victory parade? Just asking.
@aarun, thanks for
@aarun, thanks for answering...
I'm saying we should not rule it out, as I have said all along. I've also said give Triage/COIN the 12-18 mos they asked for to show results. Not win the final victory.
Then consider other options. Including the actual nuclear one (if you've missed my other comments). This would be a punitive option in case of further aggression against our homelands.
[the smack trade doesn't endear me to it either]
Being haunted if we did terrible things to win.....yes, in the same way Germany, Italy, and Japan haunt us today. Or the Plains Indians....or....the way the Picts haunt the Scots...the Aztecs the Spanish.....Carthage haunted Rome...Kharazem haunted the Mongols....
We are ignoring history (and the present) to save a endearing narrative. Which if you've been following for awhile, people have been pointing out is just a tad too rosy. Not that I mind, it worked. As IO.
I have said this before in
I have said this before in other comments and I will repeat it here. The issue is Pakistan. IF the Pakistan army is now fighting against the taliban/Jihadis and IF that can continue even after the US draws down in Afghanistan, then there is absolutely NO good reason why the US should try to increase forces in Afghanistan. Then, the US should focus on the Afghan govt, see that they can hold Kabul and Herat and the North, and get the hell out and let the Afghans fight it out for the next 20 years. IF the thought is that such a strategy will be followed by the return of the ISI-Taliban-Jihadi axis, then the question is: what is the most cost effective way of preventing that? The answer may not be a surge in Helmand....Again, I am trying to figure this out, not saying A or B is necessarily the best option..
"Being haunted if we did
"Being haunted if we did terrible things to win.....yes, in the same way Germany...
We are ignoring history (and the present) to save a endearing narrative."
You really are pushing for civil war in the countries of the NATO alliance and class warfare on a global basis, aren't you, Elf? What purposes do you seek to fulfill, what ends suffice you?
You keep forgetting the big question, embedded in the issue you ignore: is it possible to achieve your goals without losing all that you ( and just not the roseate) cherish.
Hey, Israel WON; how could we have failed to notice?
In your spare time, you should take up study of some areas of knowledge life didn't bring your way. Focus on physics, first.
If, and I say If , we can
If, and I say If , we can define what constitutes the win in the war in AFPAK, then what constitutes the peace.
If as Clausewitz wrote, "In war, the result is never final.", then what allows the US and allies to pull out and walk away knowing that the place is better for Afgans and others with an interest in Afghanistan.
Mission Accomplished needs to be more than just the eradication of AQ.
Other wise just let the trigger pullers get going, pull everyone else out. Of course we’ll still need good Intel, and the best Intel comes from guys on the ground actually hanging with the locals, so they have to stay. And those guys will need someone to look after them, better the local army than us, but they need at least some mentoring/partnering until they can do that, so that’s another lot that need to stay.
Easy to walk away, harder to stay the course, but to me walking away just seems wrong.
"Comment by omar on August
"Comment by omar on August 31, 2009 - 5:10pm" Do you favor America limiting itself to embedded advisors, trainers, special forces and combat enablers for the ANSF + economic grant to Afghans over the long term? Might simply ensuring that significant capable security forces (Afghan and Pakistani) are engaging the Quetta Shura Taliban, Haqqani and AQ linked networks over the long term be sufficient for US interests? {I think so.}
To Andrew Exum:
-Why must we practice COIN over such a large part of Afghanistan initially. Can't we choose a smaller ink spot, temporarily yielding much of Helmand, Kandahar and other provinces to the Taliban and her allies? Let the ANSF retake these areas a couple years from now when they are larger and more capable.
-Such a strategy would enable ISAF to limit itself to advisory division HQs, brigade HQs, battalion HQs, and companies that are super embedded in the ANSF. ISAF could limit itself to facilitating and encouraging the ANSF to fight COIN over decades.
-This strategy would require going "long" on ANSF combat enablers (continuing them over the long term), and the international community committing to hundreds of billions in military and economic grants for Afghanistan over decades conditioned on difficult Afghan economic reforms.
To Elf:
The idea of America paying 100% of the costs of helping the Afghans indefinitely is madness. Why let NATO, the Chinese, Japanese, Russians, Indians, Iranians, and others free ride? Rather think of creative ways to more effectively involve them in the international effort.
What is "winning" in
What is "winning" in Afghanistan?
The same as Iraq: to leave the country in a weakened state that best serves the interests of American corporations. It is to shape the economic terrain in such a way that the host freely gives up resources to the parasite.
Visitor at 12:15. The word
Visitor at 12:15. The word in Jalalabad is that it costs $1000 to get a NATO contracted truck through NWFP. My rough guess from random observation is that the FOB there gets approx 50 trucks a day. Extrapolated and the "Taliban" cut (of course not all of the extorted cash would necessarily go to them) would be more than enough to fund their operations. This is quite logical; how else would a NATO supply truck get through Pakistan if it wasn't profitable for the assorted criminal gangs and insurgents to let it. There are other "fees" to be paid once a truck gets into Afghanistan but those go to our "allies". There are numerous scams the drivers can pull to assist in making payments: fuel theft (the fuel is removed from the tanker before the insurgent attack which torches the tanker and insurance fraud is part of the game) and breaking and re-sealing containers to remove goods. The amount of pork and rap music consumed by the US military must make this at times frustrating.
There is no more chance of "winning" in Afghanistan than you can win an earthquake. At best to can limit damage and wait for the next one.
(Okay, I don't understand
(Okay, I don't understand how I thought that the Kotkin article was a powerpoint, must have had too many browsers open....)
According to Bernard Finel, and the SWJ Kotkin article, we DID win the Afghanistan war - the first one envisioned. We removed the Taliban and scattered Al Q, to use BF's phraseology, and far more quickly than anyone thought at the time. Remember all the protests and articles and fevered talk about how long it would take and how we would be bogged down against the Taliban, and then it took only weeks? (What did some of you predict around here back then? What's the track record? Do political scientists and historians, and the like, keep scorecards? Hey, I kid, I kid. Sort of.)
Anyway, the SWJ article, which I see many exhortations to read in other threads, states that mission creep, or a 'second' war, or expanding OEF, or however you want to put it, is the problem. We keep coming up with justifications to do more and more and more! The US can't say we won and recognize a win for what it is! Did I get that right or am I misreading? Ugh. Confusion.
Cordesman's a professional -
Cordesman's a professional - but he's also connected, and needs access to do his job and demonstrate his prestige as a go-to guy in the Beltway for this stuff.
Neither party is ready to deal with a straightforward assessment of the strategic situation in Afghanistan which is, to say the least, extremely unfavorable. So he, like many others, avoids the strategic assessment and goes to the nickles and dimes tactical stuff.
Of course, it makes no sense to concoct tactics without determining a strategy, but that's effectively what so many of these people are doing. One's easy and plays into the newly manufactured conventional wisdom regarding COIN, the other opens up a huge can of political and strategic worms, with the possibility of getting serious egg on your face. Better to play it safe, avoid the potentially dangerous conclusions, and preach to the choir.
Unfortunately, there's only so long this charade can go on before the entire Potempkin village falls apart. We're going on eight years now and the structure known as a self-supporting Afghan government with national-buy in is looking awfully fragile.
I'm sorry. I forgot to add
I'm sorry. I forgot to add that extortion from contractors within Afghanistan is also a excellent source of funding for insurgents and NGO medical clinics also provide second line treatment for wounded "Taliban".
"Nonsense goals like
"Nonsense goals like ensuring that Afghanistan is "never again" a "safe haven" for terrorist is almost as bad. They are just convenient ways to avoid grappling with specific achievable goals."
Yep. And don't get me started on the "I can't tell you what's going to happen next year, but we're going to be here for years, even decades" political prognostications.
It's an admission that the person doesn't know what the heck is going to happen, and is simply operating on faith. And hoping that by pushing the conclusion as far out as possible, they can avoid having to describe what it will resemble, or how we'll get there.
Thanks M Shannon. I just
Thanks M Shannon. I just wondered whether anyone had actually crunched the numbers on that and come up with a percentage of estimated running costs (70% from the opium trade is bandied around most often).
It would be an interesting investigative piece to say the least.
>>The US can't say we won
>>The US can't say we won and recognize a win for what it is! Did I get that right or am I misreading? Ugh. Confusion.<<
That is my judgment. What we are trying to do now is lock-in the future. Make sure that Afghanistan is 'never again' a threat.
It is a fool's errand. There is no magic 'never again' button.
I am going to stick my neck
I am going to stick my neck out and make some predictions (as an amateur with nothing to lose):
1. Af-pak is a cash cow for the Pak army, the insurgents, the afghan govt and assorted warlords. They have been in this trade so long, they are really really good at it. They will keep the temperature warm enough to keep things flowing, but not hot enough to scald. There is also a lot of US prestige and credibility at stake (such things do exist). Then there is the bureaucratic inertia of the US establishment. Maybe we should factor in some actual corruption (in the sense of US officers whose direct financial interests are tied with this policy). Finally, India and China and Russia and Iran do NOT want a jihadi takeover of Afghanistan, but are OK with seeing the US bleed a little in the process (well, maybe not India, not the bleeding part; they are probably the closest thing to a genuine ally in this endeavor, but they are also the most rickety state on that list, so they count for less). SO, the prediction is that all these forces will conspire (sometimes literally, mostly indirectly) to keep the US in Afghanistan doing recognizably similar things to what it is doing right now, for at least 2 more years.
2. The really mad cow jihadis are enough of a headache for pakistan that they will need to be fought. The army will try to convince some to go to Kashmir and others to join the "good taliban" (aka Haqqani network??) but there are true believers in that party and they are the wild card. They can upset the best laid plans of mice and men. 0ne really big attack in India or the US and all bets are off. No prediction.
3. I think the US is not impossibly far from a workable afghan govt but if the current Karzai setup is the best they can do, then it doesnt look like it will work. On the other hand, maybe the embassy is not clueless and they have a cunning plan. Prediction: I am unable to decide so I tossed a coin (literally) and came up with this: Miracle Max will deliver. The US will stabilize a near-workable Afghan govt enough to make a legitimate drawdown in 5 years (not a Saigon embassy helicopter scene). A jihadist insurgency will continue, just as it does in Iraq, and in time India and china and Pakistan and iran will have more to do with it than the US does, but it wont be a defeat. It will cost a hell of a lot of money and will finance many mansions in Pakistan, Afghanistan, England, and back in the US itself, where blackwater investors will be joined by discerning warlords and Pak army generals (who will buy ranches to escape the disorder back home).
Wishful thinking?
Comments?
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