Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS.
From reader David Betz:
‘Is the war in Afghanistan in the interests of the United States and its allies?’
No, I don’t think it is. It is useful to observe, however, a key point which is that whether or not their interests (broadly speaking) are aligned the major security challenges which face the United States and its allies are not really the same. John Mackinlay’s argument on this is encapsulated in this post at Kings of War: http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009/08/10/to-be-or-not-to-be-on-expeditionary-campaign-in-afghanistan-that-is/#comments
Money quote: ‘The NATO campaign in Afghanistan had got seriously entangled in a Taliban uprising that was only marginally relevant to eradicating a globalised movement which threatened us . Unlike the US, Europe is connected geographically and through its migrant communities to the Muslim world; whereas the US can shrug off the consequences of its international unpopularity, the interconnected Europeans cannot. Huge spending on homeland security has made America almost impregnable , but Europe’s open frontiers cannot be secured in the same way. Above all, the entire concept of the adversary in the US’ Global War on Terror does not fit the European reality. Europe’s Muslim communities were less well integrated, and more antagonised by the Global War on Terror. They are the centre of gravity in our campaign ; Europe is less threatened by a net flow of terrorists entering its territory from the overseas sanctuaries than by terrorist attacks arising from within their own population; attacks which are fomented by the presence of British troops on Muslim lands.’
2. ‘If so, at what point do the resources we are expending become too high a cost to bear?’
There is room to debate here. The question is to a large extent subjective. It’s hard to say whether the cost is too high or too low because that judgment depends on what it is that is being purchased. I’d say that the costs are probably too high already for what has been achieved and what seems likely to be achieved by the time we do what all other occupiers of Afghanistan have done—give up and go. But they’re way too low for what politicians in the UK and the US have been asking for. If the quality of Afghan governance improved by 100 per cent where would it rank on transparency and corruption index? Probably about 185th in ordinal ranking. If it’s GDP per capita doubled where would it rank? Still in the bottom third. So there’s a wide spectrum of plausible answers to this question. There is a LONG way to go. General Sir David Richards said the other day that the UK’s commitment to Afghanistan would last 40 years. David Kilcullen, on the other hand, was quoted a couple of days ago saying that we had two years left in the tank after which either we’d hand over to a capable Afghan force or ‘lose and go home’. Yesterday it was reported that ‘Helmand was a sideshow.’ I don’t disagree; in fact I’ve been saying so for yonks. But if it’s a sideshow what was OP Panther Claw about? Are we going to hold that ground? With what? Why? For my part, with great reluctance, I am on the verge of concluding that we’re done. Further thoughts here: http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009/08/07/afghanistan-two-years-from-now-youll-be-saying-marcellus-wallace-was-right/
Money quote:
‘indisputably one thing that the army is fighting for is pride. And that is entirely correct–a fighting tradition is more vital to an army than practically anything else. Napoleon said so too... But then again there’s no point beating a dead horse either. At a certain point, to quote the wisdom of Marcellus Wallace, you’ve got to recognize ‘that’s pride f***ing with you. You’ve got to fight through that s**t.’
3. ‘What are the strategic limitations of U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine and operations?’
Good question. I hate to come over all Socratic-like but I think it’s best answered with another question. Does anyone think there is a counterinsurgency strategy for Afghanistan which stands a snowball’s chance in hell of beating the Kilcullen clock? If no, then there’s an almighty great strategic limitation.
4. ‘And if the war is not in the interests of the United States and its allies, what are U.S. and allied interests in Central Asia – and how do you propose to secure them?’
Well, now you’ve got me by the short and curlies because on the first part I’m not sure (Pakistani and Iranian nukes loom large in my consciousness, I also think the relationship with Russia is quite important, and anyway discussion of Central Asia inevitably brings out my inner-Mackinder) and on the second I’m also not sure but reckon that what we’re doing at the moment is not helpful. Thus on the logic of the immortal principle ‘when you’re in a hole the first thing to do is stop digging’ I think we need to stop digging.
Andrew:
I have asked this question before but I will ask it again since this running dialogue is about strategy in Astan:
You use the term "counterinsurgency strategy." But how can population centric counterinsurgency be a strategy? Pop centric coin is a set of tactics and methods, rolled up into an operational concept called clear, hold, and build. But those things are not strategy, at least as I understand things.
So if you don’t mind, please comment on what exactly "counterinsurgency strategy" is, and how such a strategy is different from pop centric coin tactics and operations.
Thanks so much.
gian
Gian if I may,
What is strategy? Loosely speaking, an integrated collective of methods and approaches to achieve policy goals – or more simply, a plan to achieve a goal. If so, isn’t our strategy a version of COIN adapted to Afghanistan?
Just b/c COIN clearly plays out on the operational and tactical level, that does not mean it isn’t a strategy. Our strategy is to implement means to contest and counter the ability of the insurgent to win the support or acquiescence of the population, and in doing so stabilize Afghanistan under its government.
Operationally, that is: clear, hold, and build; protect the population; train the ANA
What is strategy? Loosely speaking, an integrated collective of methods and approaches to achieve policy goals – or more simply, a plan to achieve a goal. If so, isn’t our strategy a version of COIN adapted to Afghanistan?
Just b/c COIN clearly plays out on the operational and tactical level, that does not mean it isn’t a strategy. Our strategy is to implement means to contest and counter the ability of the insurgent to win the support or acquiescence of the population, and in doing so stabilize Afghanistan under its government.
Operationally, that is: clear, hold, and build; protect the population; train the ANA
I think people either mistakenly or deliberately misuse the term "strategy." There is a national strategy which ought to identify those actions required at the strategic level to acheive certain political objectives. Or to use JP 1-02, strategy is "a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives."
Then there is the term military strategy, which people sometimes use as a general phrase to include all tactical, operational, and strategic actions undertaken by military units. These two things are not the same. Gian is correct in that COIN is a tactical and operational tool to enable military forces to support the acheivement of strategic objectives. The challenge is that, in Afghanistan in particular, we haven't seen government officials identify good strategic objectives - or if they have, they have not been measured and actions taken to better acheive those objectives.
While al Qaeda, the Taliban, LeT, etc. are the physical presence on the battlefield, let's not lose sight of the fact that the real enemies of Western civilization (and our myriad freedoms) are political/militant Islam, Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia. Since the advent of petrodollars, the Saudis have funded as many as 20,000 madrassas in Pakistan, more than 1,500 mosques in the US along with imams grounded in the Wahhabist doctrine, provided outreach programs in our prisons for conversion of inmates to the Wahhabist ideology, as well as direct financial and materiel support for nearly every Islamist terrorist organization, including the Taliban and AQ.
You can't defeat this adversary without understanding the underlying issues and calling it by its name. Once that it done, COIN can proceed along proven courses towards success.
Is Afghanistan worth the effort? All of the above problem sources are found there, as well as western Pakistan. We should not allow any sanctuaries regardless of their location irrespective of the cost.
This post says many sensible things. However, the way it describes the relationship of Europe to its Muslim minorities seems a bit misplaced. Put another way -- while the author is right about the difference in threat, he explains it in a way that makes it sound like it is America's fault, as opposed to Europe's own fault for creating the conditions through its citizenship, social welfare, and other policies, that made Muslim populations in Europe willing to take up arms.
A better question is why are Muslims in the United States better integrated and why is there this very small percentage of Muslims in Europe willing to fight against European countries?
This seems to reveal an interesting intersection between domestic politics and foreign policy, one that does not look good for many European countries.
But their "challenges" on the domestic front, as the author accurately describes, I think, do lead to different threat perceptions and therefore different beliefs about the utility of the war in Afghanistan.
I think an endless debate over the definition of "strategy" might obfuscate more than it reveals. There are always interconnections between tactics/operations/strategy/grand strategy, etc.
A term like "counterinsurgency strategy" could mean "a preference for utilizing pop-centric COIN due to a belief that in this particular situation, using it is more likely to succeed." A shorthand for that is saying "counterinsurgency strategy." You can claim it is not really what the term "strategy" means, but what is the point.
Or put another way -- if you can come up with a better phrase that, just as concisely, conveys the information the phrase "counterinsurgency strategy" is supposed to convey, I'm sure people will use it. What do you have?
We went to Afghanistan because of 9/11.
But we will stay in Afghanistan now -- or leave -- based on a different concern -- one which is central to United States foreign policy and grand strategy determinations today, to wit: What is best for the global economy.
It is within this context (what is best for the global economy) that overall goals will be set, strategies to achieve these goals conceived, and tactics and methods to support this strategy developed.
And it is within this context (what is best for the global economy) that the cost / benefit analysis re: Afghanistan will be made.
Actually, Andrew, I think Gian is right about this. But I also KNOW that you know the difference, so it's just a typo.
If I may, gathered, I think Andrew is saying, "Does our counterinsurgency doctrine in its pursuit of our common strategy of defeating the Taliban and pacifying Afghanistan have a shelf life that's less than the political timeline that will allow these efforts to work?"
Which would lead me to ask this: Andrew, why aren't you making a more impassioned plea for more troops and other resources and a longer time span in which to accomplish the strategic goals you believe can be met with this doctrine?
On another point, where, exactly, is that Clausewitzian "center of gravity?"
In the past, Andrew, you and I have shared, I think, the belief that the true center of gravity in this AfPak war is the large Pasthun population in Pakistan which currently is giving the various Taliban militias their safe harbor, from which these men-o-war sail to destabilize Pakistan and Afghanistan.
But our allies might not share this perspective. To them, the center of gravity might very well be their own potentially restive Muslim populations within Europe, even if most of them are NOT from Afghanistan or Pakistan.
I'm not sure that this is so, but that might very well be their perception. If this is the case, and we know of the very large Pakistani populations in the UK, should we not at least tailor the use of British arms against forces that aren't likely to stir up political dissent in London?
Why not shift them, say, to Nuristan. I'm sure that there aren't many Nuristani or Pashyahi peeps in UK, right?
Gian, I think you're referring to my use of phrase 'counterinsurgency strategy' not Andrew's -- though perhaps he has said it too? In any event, my bad. You are quite right.
Oh, dear. Then I apologize to you, Andrew. And, yes, Professor Betz also would know the concept, and far better than I would.
@Scott Wedman:
Do we know for sure that American Muslim populations are better integrated than European Muslim populations?
I don't have definitive numbers in front of me, but from a quick search it appears Muslims represent a significantly larger percentage of the overall population of Europe (ranging from 2-10% in western Europe) than they do in the United States (probably no more than 2%). On nothing but a speculative basis, I'd guess that the proportion of European Muslims having immigrated to Europe over the last 10 years is greater than the proportion of American Muslims that have immigrated to America in that period.
If these two assumptions are accurate, I think the original author's suggestion of a unique European Muslim experience (with consequent political ramifications) is a more potent force than you may suspect. I certainly agree that these countries must accept responsibility for conditions within their own borders, especially as they induce disenfranchisement and anger among Muslim populations, but I think the impact of participation in American-led military actions in Muslim countries on those participating European countries cannot be underestimated. This is especially true considering that the two most deadly terrorist attacks in Europe after 9/11 were directed against Spain in 2004 and the UK in 2005, the two biggest European supporters of the invasion of Iraq.
This is a subject that I find very interesting, but on which I am not particularly well informed (though this obviously did not impede my bits of speculation and suggestion), so I welcome additional comments and criticism on this issue.
SNLII,
Let me respond to many of your comments on previous threads here.
Afghanistan has 34 provinces. About 65% of all violence in Afghanistan is in two provinces, Helmand (12 violent incidents per day) and Kandahar (4.5 violent incidents/day.) In these two provinces the GIRoA, ANSF, and ISAF are losing. The Quetta Shura Taliban and their allies are becoming more popular.
Is the GiRoA, ANSF and ISAF losing in 32 of 34 provinces? Maybe you could argue that they are losing in Konar province (3.5 attacks/day) since it has probably the worst quality 201 ANA battalions operating in it; but is the war being lost in 31 out of 34 Afghan provinces?
If the ANSF get sufficient funding, trainers and advisors, I don't see how they lose in 31 out of 34 provinces, even if Haqqani, Taliban, Hekmatyur and the Punjabi Taliban get substantial support from parts of the Pakistani establishment. Can't the GIRoA, ANSF and ISAF yield part of Helmand and Kandahar provinces, and focus coin on the parts of Afghanistan where the Taliban and company are less popular?
Here is a related question: For many years, and in every Afghan poll I have seen, the Taliban and her allies were significantly more popular among Southern Pashtu than they were among Eastern Pashtuns. The 2.09.09 and 06.09 polls both bear that out. Why is this? Could answering this question be relevant to determining whether Helmand/Kandahar should be part of the initial ink spot for COIN?
SNLII, why do you feel time is on the side of the insurgent in Kandahar and Helmand? Is it because you think international aid to the GIRoA and ANSF will be greatly reduced? If the GIRoA and ANSF got a 20 year funding commitment from the international community, wouldn't time then be on the side of the GIRoA? Couldn't the GIRoA and ANSF wait out the Taliban?
a quick search it appears Muslims represent a significantly larger percentage of the overall population of Europe (ranging from 2-10% in western Europe) than they do in the United States (probably no more than 2%).
That's definitely on the high end of the estimates.
FYI, a great action/distopia film set in future Euro ghettos: Banlieue 13. Made five years ago, it's set in 2010, so you'll be able to see what things will be like 6 months, and which parts of Paris to avoid.
SNLII, would be cruious about your perspective regarding Kapisa province:
http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/08/12/kapisa-teeters/comment-page...
This is an anti Taliban area that is under Hekmatyur, Pakistani Pashtu and Punjabi Taliban attack. Parts of it have little ANA or ISAF, and only low quality ANP for security.
Is your prognosis for how the war can be won in Kapisa different from you perspectives on Helmand and Kandahar?
I don't like the binary "winning" or "losing," Anand. It posits an either/or that confuses what is murkier.
Is the evidence of violence itself an indication of "winning" or "losing?" Well, maybe. But perhaps it depends on the nature of the violence.
Let me give you an example. IEDs and mines are defensive weapons. They help the insurgent because they can be manufactured cheaply and emplanted usually without detection. Their detonation might or might not kill counterinsurgents, but each one is a deed that echoes the insurgent's message: I am here. I contest this ground and the people who live here. I remain a potent force. I might not be winning, but I'm also not losing because I just exploded an IED on your ass.
But we begin to defeat the IEDs by a combination of technology (electronic jammers, perhaps) and, better, HUMINT that helps us roll up the bomb-maker and those who supply him with the materiel, procure the funds necessary for their existence, protect him from both counterinsurgents and civilians who would rat him out and help him emplace the devices designed to show that the insurgency is still out there.
Does violence drop now? Well, maybe not yet. First, the insurgent is faced with a stark problem. As bombs become less effective, the population realizes that not so many IEDs or mines are going off. The insurgent, however, still must show that he's there.
So he grabs other devices, the RPG perhaps, or the mortar or, more likely, the AK-47. But this creates more problems for the insurgent. He is now attempting to match firepower with US-led or US-advised forces. His actions are going to create a greater lethal risk for him, so his friends begin to die. The more violence they cause (and the rates will go up), the more likely they are to get capped.
From the military standpoint, are more attacks "winning" the fight for the insurgent? Or are they an indication that he's beginning to lose?
Sure, that's just an example of attrition. But it's an important distinction.
When I see that shadow goverments exist in the majority of provinces, what I'm really seeing is that through intimidation and the propaganda of the deed, the Taliban and the other militias can effectively show up, pop off some rounds or emplant an IED that won't be pointed out by the population before one of our vehicles rolls over it. That doesn't mean that their "winning," only that we haven't reached a point that they fall into a lethality spiral or that the population will rat them out with less fear of retaliation.
The key to winning that fight, therefore, becomes "security." Now, when I say "security" I don't mean actual security. What I mean is the ability to fracture the insurgency's infrastructure and cleave the revolutionary (if not his legitimacy) away from my target population. It's not securing my force, or even most of the civilians.
It's the incrasing perception that I am cutting the ties between the insurgent and his people, that I'm going to beat the bastard, and that it might behoove the locals to get on board now rather than later. The best way to guarantee this perception is by actually doing it.
As for the ANSF, just remember that tens of thousands of the Soviet's proxy Afghan security forces defected when the Red Army pulled out. Even if resources are everlasting, I doubt very much the willingness of ANSF to go pound-for-pound against the Taliban and win.
The ANA sure didn't beat back the Taliban. Neither did many of the mujihadin warlords currently defacto "officers" in the ANSF today. Indeed, one might suggest that it's the very presence of these jackasses in the ANSF and various provincial government that is driving some of the insurgency.
"Is your prognosis for how the war can be won in Kapisa different from you perspectives on Helmand and Kandahar?"
All COIN is local, Anand. I don't see many valid comparisons between the Taliban militias and HiG. Sorry, but I don't.
"The ANA sure didn't beat back the Taliban." Couldn't you say the same thing about 1st and 7th IADs in Al Anbar in late 2006? How would you rate the performance of ANA 203 Corps? My view, which coincides with the views of several advisers, is to give the ANA battle space and responsibilities and let them fight. I think many ANA brigades are ready for it.
"Neither did many of the mujihadin warlords currently defacto "officers" in the ANSF today. Indeed, one might suggest that it's the very presence of these jackasses in the ANSF and various provincial government that is driving some of the insurgency." Here you have a point. But this is solvable if Defense Minister Abdurrahim Wardak and Chief of the General Staff, General Bismillah Mohammadi Khan, choose to solve it. They could bribe these "jackasses" as you called them to retire, and replace them with much younger officers. There is no law stating that some of the 84 officers who graduated from 4 year academy this past January, or other Lieutenants serving in the ANA can't be rapidly promoted to company commanders, or deputy battalion commanders. There is no law stating that good quality NCOs can't command platoons (to free up their 2nd Lieutenant or 1st Lieutenant commanding officers for promotion.) There are several of those in the ANA. There are several young captains in the ANA that could be rapidly promoted to battalion commanders and deputy brigade commanders. {Brigade commanders in the ANA seem to be political appointments.} In WW2 there were rapid promotions through the ranks in many cases.
Officers and quality NCOs could be transferred from quality ANA units to problematic ones.
Why are the problems in the ANA not solvable? Why can't the better quality ANA brigades improve the way 1st and 7th IADs did in Iraq in 2006 and 2007?
"All COIN is local, Anand. I don't see many valid comparisons between the Taliban militias and HiG. Sorry, but I don't." Bingo. This is why extrapolating from Helmand and Kandahar to the rest of Afghanistan is spurious; as is the assertion that the "Taliban is winning" in Afghanistan merely because the Taliban is winning in Kandahar and Helmand.
To get back to the broader discussion, "fighting the war in Afghanistan" can mean many things:
1) Send the GIRoA and ANSF money only (then the question is how much money and for what purpose)
2) Send the GIRoA and ANSF money, and sending civilian advisers to the safe parts of Afghanistan under the protection of the ANSF
3) Sending the GIRoA and ANSF money, civilian advisers, combat advisers and trainers, and special forces
4) Sending the GIRoA and ANSF money, civilian advisers, advisory brigades super embedded in ANA Corps and ANP formations, and special forces (what I favor)
5) Abu Muqawama's and McChrystal's strategy
Let us say we transition from the current strategy to strategy 4, for example; then the ANSF and GIRoA would have to temporarily cede parts of Afghanistan to the Taliban to the enemy and gradually expand the areas of stability with COIN operations. In this scenario, what areas should the ANSF and ISAF partially cede to the enemy? Should they yield Kapisa or other locations where they are popular and the Taliban/HiG/Haqqani are not? Or should they yield parts of Kandahar and Helmand where the GIRoA and ANSF are not popular, and the Taliban are (at least according to SNLII ;-) )?
Shouldn't this be a part of the discussion? Especially for those who favor a rapid withdrawal for ISAF combat forces.
I guess I'm confused, Anand. You seem to be suggesting that I believe the very complex wars in AfPak come down to the US-led forces versus the Taliban.
First, there are more than one army of the Taliban. Second, depending on how one counts them, there are about a dozen armed groups currently in revolt against the "government" of Afghanistan, and the vast majority are NOT affiliated in any meaningful way with the Taliban militaries.
So, I'm not suggesting that the Taliban will ever take over all of Afghanistan and rule it. They didn't accomplish this by 2002, and the reasons for this have a lot to do with the ethnic composition of Afghanistan.
To be fair to the Taliban, in the vast territory that they did control in various capacities before 2002, they didn't have to operate all that often as a counterinsurgent. This gets back to Dr Finel's astute observation: How did the Taliban manage to rule over so much with so little compared to the resources in man and materiel and bribery (errr, "economic development") that we must expend to reach a far less satisfactory state of affairs?
Ultimately, I believe this comes down to legitimacy. This doesn't mean necessarily the same thing as "approval," but rather a tacit acknowledgement that love them or hate them the Taliban were more acceptable to the "people" of often diverse parts of Afghanistan than other options, anarchy or warlordism included.
So in the event of the US departing Afghanistan, I wouldn't imagine that the Taliban would take over the entire country. I think that eventually one would see the same sort of lines forming -- often based on geography as much as the human topography -- as existed in 2002, probably with the same sectarian alliances, too.
I'm also bemused that you have detected some "strategy" in the various discussions of Exum and McChrystal. This very stream of consciousness on his blog seems to be the workings of people thinking, "What, Andrew, IS the strategy?"
He hasn't told us yet. I think that there's some wagering going on.
Good point highlighting the strategic divide between the US and our European allies. These differing notions of which strategies should be enacted are related to the geographical location of these powers. Again, the immigration factor for European states is well displayed in the response.
While he hints at the notion of having a favorable position geo-strategically in Afghanistan, the response fails to capture the essence of what (if any) off-shoot benefits the US has in maintaining a force in Afghanistan to pressure nations in the region.
a coming article on this point at:
http://thetruenarcissists.com/
@ Andrew Kaplun
I don't disagree at all. I absolutely think the GWOT has inflamed things with the Muslim population in Europe. My point was that it's not all America's fault. Many countries in Europe have had terrible relationships with their Muslim minorities for a while and for lots of different reasons. There is huge underlying social tension.
My point is that the GWOT was a spark, but that the post made it sound like, if not for the GWOT, everything would be great between various European countries and their Muslim populations. I don't think that is true.
Or put another way -- yes there is a unique European Muslim experience. But I think many of the reasons why it is negative and susceptible to escalation have to do with factors internal to European societies, not the GWOT. But yes, the GWOT is also a factor.
Since i live in a mostly muslim neighbourhood and have grown up with those folks, I have to say that Palestine is a greater radicalizer than Afghanistan. Its the one inter-muslim unity cause among the lads, all else is open for discussion. It is true that there is a internal euro muslim scene. But at least in my country, many of them serve in the army and police.
European governments should tell their muslims that they are training and equipping the Afghan security forces, helping the Afghan economy, and otherwise helping the Afghans win. The failure of Eurpeans governments to do relfects their own incompetence.
"the essence of what (if any) off-shoot benefits the US has in maintaining a force in Afghanistan to pressure nations in the region." What benefits? I don't see any. I see it at AQ linked and Taliban information operations to suggest that the ISAF presence in Afghanistan is not related to Afghanistan and them.
SNLII: "there are about a dozen armed groups currently in revolt against the "government" of Afghanistan, and the vast majority are NOT affiliated in any meaningful way with the Taliban militaries." Couldn't have said it better myself.
SNLII, any response regarding the ANA?
With respect to "legitimacy," you seem to imply that the Quetta Shura Taliban (and maybe Hekmatyur and Haqqani?) have legitimacy among a majority of the 37% of Afghans that are Pashtu. I think you might concede that the large majority of the 63% of Afghans who are not Pashtu do not regard the Taliban as legitimate.
Let me press back on you with the legitimacy argument among Afghan Pashtu. See this 70 page poll from June 2009:
http://www.iri.org/newsreleases/pdfs/2009%20June%2016%20Survey%20of%20Af...
Where does this poll suggest that Karzai and the ANA are not broadly popular and legitimate among Afghan Pashtu, or that the Taliban are viewed as legitimate by a majority of the Pashtu? (although arguably a majority of Pashtu in Kandahar and Helmand view them as legitimate.) To save you a read, here are some of my notes from the poll:
# Karzai is popular, by far the most popular figure in Afghanistan
# Karzai's popularity has fallen in the West
# Afghans now overwhelmingly want negotiations with the Taliban (68%.) By far the largest percentage I have ever seen in a poll yet. What Afghans are willing to give the Taliban remains uncertain.
# Security remains by far the number 1 priority, followed by the economy
# Page 58; 57% are satisfied with international aid projects, 30% are not satisfied. 13 percentage points out of the 30% (43% of the 30%) said that they felt international aid projects had "too much corruption/abuse of power."
# ISAF should speak to elders and head of tribe more than they speak with others.
# 67% want increased foreign troops. {I guess they don't like them, so they want more of them to fix the mess they created.}
# The poll found that 10% of Afghans saw themselves as Pashtu first, Afghans second.
* these held more extreme views
* 39% of these viewed foreign troops very negatively (versus 23% of other Afghans)
* 66% of them intend to vote. Good news.
* 60% view the Afghan government negatively, versus only 34% of other Afghans
* 62% say that they are willing to vote for a non Pashtu as president. Good news.
* Page 65 shows that 49% think they have more freedom now than under the Taliban. 19% think they had more freedom under the Taliban. Good news.
* page 64 describes their education, income and demographic breakdown.
# 10% of all Afghans saw themselves first as not Afghan but as Tajik. No subbreakdown was provided for these people. I didn't know that so many Tajiks were not nationalists.
SCOTT WEDMAN -- "A better question is why are Muslims in the United States better integrated and why is there this very small percentage of Muslims in Europe willing to fight against European countries?"
Because the US hasn't had refugee immigration and post-colonial immigration the same way Europe has. US muslims are, to grossly simplify, black Americans and Pakistani academics. European Muslims are by and large poor gastarbeiter communities, economic immigrants and war refugees from Turkey, Pakistan and the Arab world. Obviously the mistreatment and marginalization of them could have been avoided to a large extent (if not completely). That it hasn't been is entirely the fault of the nations involved, and rooted in racism, impractical social/economic models, slowness to react, etc. But that's not the whole picture, there's also geography and history much else that the US hasn't had to face: there was no Algerian war in the US in the 1960s, there is no way for Moroccans to immigrate by boat to Florida, etc. You could add that many European nations have had a much more welcoming stance to refugees from this region than the US, whether you want to consider that a fault or not. (Iraqi refugees accepted to the US since 2003: less than 1000. To Sweden: more than 20,000.)
Consider: if there was a Hispanic/Catholic "al-Qaida" operating with the same methods and claiming to be fighting Yankee imperialism in Latin America, and Europe was cheering madly for the immediate invasion of Cuba, Chile and Mexico -- what would the US do?
Anand, at some point you're going to need to confront why the Taliban aren't losing this war. If you believe that there's widespread support for the Karzai government and the US-led occupation, and that these phenomena are NOT driving the insurgency, then fine.
But I think that you're selectively cherry picking from the very poll that you cite.
More people, not less, seem to think that the country is going in a bad direction and that, despite the increase in troops by June, it's less stable. Only 21 percent of those who responded would say their lives are peaceful and stable. The overall performance of Karzai is about as low as that of the ISAF, in their opinion. Only 39 percent of Afghans think Karzai has done a good job in office.
These same people are overwhelmingly concerned about the nation's endemic corruption. Yes, they have more freedoms, but they also have less security. And saying that Karzai is the most popular person in Afghanistan is like saying someone is the world's tallest midget. Where it matters (which is to say, where the insurgencies are breaking out), the polling data show that Karzai basically is unloved in the east and south.
He does, however, play well in Khost. Gosh, I wonder why!
For the counterinsurgent, it's not always who is likely to give support to a government, but rather who is willing to let the insurgents do what they want to do. They don't support the Taliban, necessarily, but they also don't oppose them in key provinces.
You know this so I don't wish to belabor the subject, but it's obvious from all the metrics I've read that the perception of Karzai's weak, feckless and corrupt government is driving the insurgency and, perhaps more important, allowing fence sitters to fail to slide over to his side.
There are all sorts of reasons for this, including the belief in key provinces that the Taliban might win this thing or, at least, outlast the US-led forces and the worthless Karzai kleptocracy. His winning a run-off election probably boycotted by many Afghans, or disrupted by endemic violence in concerted Taliban attacks, won't change that.
For the insurgent, widespread popularity isn't necessary for seizing power and gaining a people's consensus to lead. There are all sorts of equations that lead those within a population to cede authority and legitimacy to a shadow government.
Key to the Taliban is their understand that the center of gravity in this very long war is NOT fellow Afghans. Rather, it's the US and, to a lesser extent, the UK. Last month, 70 percent of Britons decided that this war was unwinnable. In the US, more people believe Afghanistan is an enemy of the US (40 percent) than friend (15 percent). I guess the rest can't tell whether Kabul is a friend or an enemy, which is probably about right.
The trendlines in US domestic opinion are bad, and I'm not sure that they will improve sufficiently over the next two years to matter. Eventually, the Obama administration will have to either show (not necessarily create) "success" in AfPak, which likely will mean kicking the can down the road in order to build up the ANA, using troop rotations to artificially lower the violence without resolving the underlying causes of the rebellion.
I take a longer view of all this. I don't think it ultimately matters if the US can reach some level of pacification because I know that the center of gravity no longer is in Afghanistan, but rather across the Durand Line. Without a chance to take out the Taliban there, we're really just delaying.
When we leave, the fighting will resume, probably with the same sort of results we saw in the 1980s when the Soviet-built security forces in Afghanistan bolted, a weak regime carrying on for perhaps a few more years, then more devastation and degeneration into what the nation has been for three decades -- a proxy war fought on behalf of neighboring rivals and stoked by the nation's internal jousting for control.
I also continue to remain unimpressed by any "interests" we supposedly have in Afghanistan. I can't see any of them, and I'm waiting for Exum to inform me which ones are worth even the life of one decent American soldier.
Well, here we have the 'metric" for victory:
http://washingtonindependent.com/54803/holbrooke-on-success-in-afghanist...
I dont care how many acronyms we occupy the place under. There is zero reason to kill Afghans or get our guys killed when THIS is the thinking of the wankers in charge.
We are dealng with tribal blood fuedalists. Im sure they will enjoy avenging various family members by serially going after or strung out chain of op's 7 such, and will get a real kick out of ambushing the LOC we will be tied to.
for the sake of a government as corrupt as the one we propped up in Saigon.
thats not what our best & brightest take an oath to do, dammit.
When idiots like this call the shots, its a gratuitous exercise in piling up the bodies.
and we'll get endless reports about how victory is right around the corner.
its not what free men should do, if in fact they are free men & not the property of some autocrat.
At this point, we are over there simply because we CAN be over there. No "freedom" or "democracy" will come of this.
its only a question of how many miserable peasants we destroy before we leave.
I vote for fewer.
Mutt, been there, done that, got the VVAW T shirt.
SNLII, this poll suggests is that many Afghan Pashtu do like Karzai and view him as legitimate. Trust me, I am as surprised by Karzai's support among Pashtu as you are. At the same time, the Taliban is less popular among Afghan Pashtu, especially Eastern Pashtu, than many on this blog are suggesting.
I personally hope that one of Karzai's two rivals win the Presidency. But it isn't up to me. We have to deal with the reality on the ground.
There only a few of the reasons why I believe the GIRoA is doing so poorly:
-Karzai's personal administrative incompetence (related to the fact that many "technocratic" positions are not filled with "professional technocrats")
-GIRoA corruption, linked to Karzai's incompetence
-Organized crime
-Massive inefficiency in the international aid effort to Afghanistan which facilitates GIRoA administrative incompetence, corruption, and organized crime
-The fact that a nation of 33 million people and some of the toughest geography in the world only had 3,000 trained ANP at the beginning of 2008. Most of the ANP remain a disaster, with the notable exception of the ANCOP.
-Haqqani, Quetta Shura Taliban, and Hekmatyur have foreign funding, support from a significant minority of Pakistan's people, and support from some parts of the Pakistani security establishment.
However, balance this against the ANA's popularity and legitimacy among Afghan Pashtu. The ANA is by far the most respected, honored and popular institution among Afghans, including Pashtun Afghans. There are some good quality ANA units (and some that less good quality.) This suggests that the military situation can be turned around if the ANA are sufficiently funded (over the long term), trained and mentored. You can ask why the ANA has not performed better so far. Because the entire ANA operations budget in 2006 was only $242 million. By comparison the IA that you mentored has an annual budget of $10 billion.
This is why your pessimism about the medium term military situation in Afghanistan puzzles me.
The fact that Afghans are upset about corruption is also a good thing. The fact that Afghans want to participate in their democracy and elect better leaders is a good thing. This suggests that the quality of governance in Afghanistan will likely improve over time.
The bigger problem, in my view, is the fact that steady state GIRoA expenditures are ten times current annual Afghan revenue, with the balance funded by foreign grants. What is the long term plan to balance the GIRoA budget?
SNLII - "Without a chance to take out the Taliban there, we're really just delaying."
Is this a valid strategy, even if it cannot be publicly articulated as the rationale?
ie stave off defeat until some deus ex machina changes the narrative?
Dear David:
If I am not mistaken I think Andrew has used that term before, but no matter because it is a term commonly used in many different ways.
I should say that I did not write that question as a sort of "stump the chump," or as me as the oracle who knows the answer and is testing the good Sir, AM. I actually find it a very difficult one to answer and one of extreme complexity because as one of the earlier posts said that strategy does take into account tactics and operations; but then again it is and must be still something different, or to use current terminology a different level of war.
After the Vietnam War and in the 1980s many in the Army came to believe that we failed to understand and do the operational level of war; in a sense as a military we were unable to relate tactics to strategy via the operational level. But now I am not so sure, and in fact I am starting to conclude that our real failure in Vietnam was strategy; that level where the nature of the war is conceived relative to policy objectives, choices and priorities about resources are made and choices about operational concepts as well.
I re-read Sun Tzu a few weeks ago and I can’t get a couple of things that he said out of my mind about strategy and tactics. He said that strategy without tactics is the slow road to victory, and tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat. I am not sure what our strategy is in Astan right now; but whenever I hear about our strategy being that of clear, hold, and build or of protecting the population I think of Sun Tzu's maxim about noise and worry where we are headed.
I think SNLII's earlier post got at it when he talked about time and resources for Astan perhaps being out of whack with an operational method of pop centric coin which by its nature is heavily dependent on lots of time and lots of resources. Also David, as a matter of strategy I refuse to accept the default and seemingly accepted automatic condition of wars today and in the future; that conflict will be persistent and protracted. Accepting those terms seems if nothing else to eclipse strategy, or in other words, removes the consideration of alternatives. If wars now and in the future are as we define them to be protracted wars fought amongst the people, well that condition essentially defines a very specific operational method of pop centric coin.
I and SNLII keep harping on CE Callwell for his insights and that is because unlike Galula and the other pop centric coin theorists who accepted protraction, symmetry, and attrition as natural and unavoidable conditions of their modern wars, Callwell thought like Sun Tzu and so his book was about speed, superiority of will, and most importantly INITIATIVE. Those concepts are not bad to have in mind when thinking of strategy, especially compared to what seems to drive strategy now that being the principles and dictums of population centric coin. Sun Tzu said something else too: that no nation ever benefited from a long war.
But to my friends in the pop centric Coin community please, please do not come back and say “oh Gian, don’t you get it, you don’t get to fight the wars you want.” The more I hear that phrase, as a consideration of strategy, the more ridiculous it sounds. Most of the time of course we do get to chose how and when we will fight wars and that is the point that I am trying to make about strategy. In Afghanistan today because the Army seems to know only pop centric coin I honestly think it is eclipsing out ability to do strategy which is why I have been thinking a lot about Sun Tzu and noise.
Thanks for listening.
gian
i forgot that when this blog gets interesting, it gets depressing.
it sure is interesting again.
I am a Civilian not trained in any military tactic. I have keen interest in this war due to Country, family and belief that once we send our soldiers into combat we support them. Bottom line no excuses.I have read blogs for many years about tactics and our current implementations of such.
I have a bottom line question:
When date certain do we get off the fence and decide a course of action on and agreement of GOALS. I understand that a battle evolves. It has been 8 years and to my understanding we have not set the goals. How do you set tactics if you have not set the goal? Like I said I am just a civilian.
"But now I am not so sure, and in fact I am starting to conclude that our real failure in Vietnam was strategy; that level where the nature of the war is conceived relative to policy objectives, ..."
i get this a lot. If you mean the strategy of trying to reshove the French down the Viets throats, then trying to shove various puppets- defined here as existing solely because a FORIEGN MILITARY POWER keeps them from being swept away and a long standing , respected, been fighting foriegn occupation for generations political movement come into its own, well then, yes- bad strategy.
If you mean we use this acronym instead of THAT acronym, or should have flattened THIS province instead of THAT province, or we should have back degenerate family B over warlord G, well, then, no, thats not the stategy that doomed the effort.
We were wrong. Period. From that, flows everything else. Truly.
Anand, I just don't see where you're getting all that support for Karzai. If he has so much support compared to the previous election, why is there going to be a run off vote?
If the government of the Mayor of Kabul has so much support, why do the vast majority of Afghans consider it completely corrupt? I could go on and on, but the truth remains that he's part of the problem and we haven't found many solutions.
At some point, we need to face the obvious: There's a reason that the Taliban have gained ground, even while US troop levels have gone up, even as ANA recruitment and training has escalated. Spending even more money on a security force Afghanistan can't afford fails to strike me as a sustainable option. Giving the people of Afghanistan more of that great "government" they don't seem to trust also fails to feed the bulldog.
I don't know if the poll you presented published the data, but our own ongoing surveys continue to show that most Afghans want to negotiate with the Taliban. By "negotiate," they mean to say, "Bring them back and they can share power if everyone agrees to quit fighing. We will trade security over justice."
Why can't we use the utility of our force to reshape that sort of Afghanistan? Listen, I don't love the Taliban. But they're not going away, and for political reasons we can't go get them. So why not see about bringing some or all of them back to Afghanistan so we can leave?
Let's make a deal. If the Afghan variety of the Taliban bring back al Qaeda, we will reinvade or reprise Linebacker II or whatever. But if they don't, why not let them and their Afghan cousins work out these issues?
How is it in our national interests whether the jackass Taliban or the jackass Karzai flunkies have some power in Afghanistan? All we should care about is limiting the effectiveness of al Qaeda and saving Pakistan from any more destabilization that didn't exactly exist in Islamabad's NW provinces on Sept 10, 2001.
How do we further those two paramount goals by continuing the present policies? Explain that to me because I guess I just can't figure it out.
I don't have any idea how this argument has gone off onto tangent's about what a COIN strategy is or is not. Does it matter, in the end? COIN is a means to an end and the end, at least in these discussions, seems not to matter so long as the military has a job to do. I submit that the point of our presence in A'stan was to enable us, as a country and a military force, to eliminate al-Qaeda as a threat to our existence. So why are we engaged in combat with the Taliban at all, except in those instances when and where they are providing comfort and support to a-Q? Are we even really fighting the Taliban, or are we actually engaged in a series of battles against Pashtun tribal forces who are attempting to carve for themselves a secure segment of their own country in which their families can live with a modicum of security and stability?
The enemy is al-Qaeda. Sometimes, though from press reports it would seem less often these days, the Taliban in Afghanistan act as a force multiplier for those who do protect members of a-Q who have lived among and married into their own families. But that isn't as important, it seems to me, as the fact that once again, in Afghani eyes, non-Muslim occupying armies are waging a war against the Afghani people. Can McChrystal and Rodriquez and all the kings men put Humpty Dumpty back together again? Really? I have serious doubts unless it comes to be decided that this generation of soldier's children, and maybe even their children, are going to carry on the good fight for the sake of our military reputation. By then of course, due to the fact that the country will have been bled financially dry, it might be that that would be the only work available to them.
SNLII, Karzai's popularity has fallen more among the maybe 62% of Afghans who are non Pashtu than it has among Pashtu. I was surprised by Karzai's support among Pashtu in the poll, which was my reason for sharing it with you.
"If he has so much support compared to the previous election, why is there going to be a run off vote?" Let's just thank our lucky stars that there might be a runoff vote. The fact that Afghans want a choice for President is a good thing.
"why do the vast majority of Afghans consider it completely corrupt?" Because it is. For that matter so is Pakistan's, Bangladesh's and Vietnam's governments. Indonesia use to be very corrupt until recently. Without a doubt GIRoA corruption is a huge strategic problem.
"the truth remains that he's part of the problem and we haven't found many solutions." Yes, true. However, if he wins the election, it will be because many Afghan Pashtu vote for him; we would then have no choice but to deal with Karzai. Remember that Iran and Russia strongly back Karzai. He can't be supplanted except through the ballot box.
I think we should push the Afghan government to negotiate with local warlords, tribes and "local Taliban." Our hard core enemies are Haqqani and the Quetta Shura Taliban (not sure about Hekmatyur), because they are almost completely intertwined with AQ linked networks. Many of the local Taliban are only loosely related to them. The fact that Afghans support negotiations with their enemies shows flexibility and maturity on their part. It also indicates the possiblity of persuading "local taliban" to join the political process the way some former Sunni Arab resistance fighters did in Iraq.
The largest threat of global extremism comes from Pakistan, and that has to be the largest priority. Afghanistan is a damage containment strategy. This is why long term international funding of the ANSF to contain Pakistani instability makes sense. There might come a point when the ANA might need to enter Pakistani territory, although we are far from that now. It is better for us to have a capable military ally in the event Pakistan further destabilizes.
I think that America should commit to $150 billion in additional grants to Afghanistan over 20 years. This will be the cost of a long term containment strategy for Pakistani instability. It would also be a lot cheaper than the cost of another 9/11 or larger scale WMD terrorist attack on North America, Europe, Russia, China, India, or on some Shia population center that emanates from Pakistan. Once the Congress appropriates this pledge, the US government should be very judicious in how it is spent and demand Afghan economic reforms and governance reforms in return for the aid.
You might have a point that "winning" in Kandahar and Helmand might not be so essential in the short run. It is important that the ANA and the ANP "wins" in most of Afghanistan, and continues to be able to engage its foes for the long run in the contested parts of Afghanistan. This might be sufficient for the terrorism containment mission.
It is also true that the ANA and ANP will probably need a $5 billion annual budget indefinitely as long as instability in Pakistan persists, which could be a long . . . long time.
SNLII, what is your plan to deal with Pakistan instability? If the Pakistani army lets up on its campaign, there likely will be a spike in terrorist attacks inside (directed against the Shia and Sufi) and outside of Pakistan (India, Chechnya, Afghanistan, China, the West.) Pakistan's Army created these Frankensteins to use against foreigners (Russia, Afghans, Iran, India), and now they are attacking the Pakistani state and the Pakistani people (not just Shia and Sufi anymore like in the 1980s, but mainstream Pakistani civilians.)
@ SNLII
I also continue to remain unimpressed by any "interests" we supposedly have in Afghanistan. I can't see any of them, and I'm waiting for Exum to inform me which ones are worth even the life of one decent American soldier.
That’s a very fair point, it’s not so much the treasure but the blood that affects us the most. With a relatively small casualty count so far even the Australian populace is starting to question long term involvement in the war.
But for me it comes back to the promises made to the Afghans, to the Iraqi’s etc by the American government – which correct me if I am wrong are elected by and speak for the American people. You offer freedom of choice, a change for betterment and a change to move from disconnected ness to connection and integration and then walk away because it cost too much in both blood and treasure.
Idealistic yes but I feel that if you talk the talk you have to starting walking and keep on walking till the job’s done. I am not asking for an in-country, dominating presence by the US military, just that the country’s in a better shape then when you found it.
And it shouldn’t; be the US alone, that is a burden to much to bear for both the US military and the population, that’s why we need to see China step up and protect its interests there, and why the US needs top allow that to happen, uneasy relationship as it may be.
“There is, as I argued in The Bottom Billion, an essential difference between a poor family in China and an equally poor family in Chad. Although both enter into the global headcount of families living in extreme poverty, the poor family in China has credible hope that its children will grow up in a society of transformed opportunities”
Paul Collier, Boston Review
Further to my idealistic spout about reasons why we should stay the course in AFPAK. Over at Tom Barnett he links to an article by Collier quoted above. The same reasons apply to Afghans, as they apply to Chadian and the Chinese. Some have the opportunity to grow up connected, some do not, and all deserve the chance. It’s leaving Afghanistan a state where a better future is a possibility, beyond that I really don’t know how effective anyone can be but we owe them the opportunity
We owe them, certainly. We owe the Iraqi's, also. We still owe the Viets- then theres the bodies we piled up, directly or thru proxies, in Latin America thru the 70's & 80's. We promised the Nicas 300 million to repair the destruction our
"Freedom fighters" racked up if the FSLN was voted out of office. They were, joke was on the Nicas. And so friggin on.
We are pretty good at oweing people- as least as good as we are wrecking third world countries and lives.
I dont suggest for a second we walk away from the wreckage- tho we've gotten it down to a science- but military occupation, death from above, and the inevitable slide into murder with impunity that goes with being unlike & unwanted by the bulk of the population.....do we really need to do that again?
We have been thrust into bad choices by the previous pack of criminals in office, I opt for the one that results in fewer dead Afganis. They dont get to vote in our elections.
This is a friggin disaster. Profitable, perhaps, & a great lab for testing theories, but a disaster for those who have the least say in it.
Im hardly a pacifist. Im just not into killing people when it has zip to do with the actual security of the US.
"I think Andrew is saying, "Does our counterinsurgency doctrine in its pursuit of our common strategy of defeating the Taliban and pacifying Afghanistan have a shelf life that's less than the political timeline that will allow these efforts to work?"
Close to a perfect mission/strategy statement, imo. With the addition of a clause which might remind Americans of what national interests are at stake.
That is:
"In pursuit of our common strategy of:
DENYING AL QAEDA SAFE HAVENS IN SOUTH ASIA FROM WHICH TO SPRINGBOARD ATTACKS AGAINST US
by
defeating the Taliban and pacifying Afghanistan.
Anand, you need to also consider the possibility that the ANA's popularity and their relative lack of activity are connected.
They're an object of national pride at least in part because they don't do anything. They live on cloistered bases, which keeps the corruption manageable from the public's perspective; left to their own, they tend to conduct as few combat operations as they can get away with; they have passed house rules forbidding troops from participating in house searches or taking detainees. When I was there only the ANP could do either of those things, by Afghan government decree.
Leaving aside what that meant re their effectiveness as our COIN adjunct force, it did mean that there was almost nothing the ANA could possibly do so long as they stayed within their own rules that could ever harm their popularity with anyone.
The ANP is unpopular for all kinds of other reasons, obviously. And I agree that having an organization that personifies nationalist feelings is a good thing for a central government to have. But if the ANA ever started participating in detentions or searches and seizures along with Western forces and the ANP in the South, one wonders whether the ANA's relative popularity would last quite so long. Frankly, I'm not convinced their organization is the one for which a further spurt of rapidly accelerated growth is justified at this point.
Re rapid promotion of the competent, ISAF/OEF has no influence, zero, over ANA promotions. There is no lever by which we could encourage the rapid promotions of ANA 2nd lieutenants you're looking for. They will be promoted, in most cases, on the basis of patronage connections, graft, or because they've learned to play the Afghan army game well in other ways (how exactly do you think they were selected for the military academy in the first place?). The best we can hope is that whenever they are finally given responsibility they themselves will be more inclined to reward competence in their subordinates because of their Western training.
As far as NCOs leading units, I never saw an NCO, even an E-9, trusted with as much as a section on his own, or a responsibility higher than vehicle marshalling. The idea they would be given companies or platoons (if the Afghan army had platoons, which they don't, but that's another story) if there was anything even remotely resembling an officer in the vicinity is simply not realistic at present. You need to give it a few more years.
David, I agree with your statements to leave Afghan a better place for the people is a good desire. It is up to the Afghans to decide what is better though. And that is one of my quandaries.
My main issue is we have no stated goals by the governments that have committed troops in Afghanistan that the public is aware of. Without the support of the people of these countries I do not see how we will be in Afghanistan long enough to help the people. In my opinion the first strategy must be the commitment of governments to set goals. Then set them and announce them. Until then I do not see how any military strategy will work because there is no clear target to shot at.
I would like to see blogs like this push the governments for proper strategies/goals not the military. Not in battlefield goals but in political goals. Politicians need to do their duty and serve first, how else can our militaries serve the governments. This war is not fought for the benefit of the military. Politicians have huge issues, still the burden needs to be placed on them first to define the goal.
"Comment by BruceR on August 12, 2009 - 11:54pm"
I have heard other comments similar to yours about ANA avoiding combat from other advisors or ISAF. Is this a function more of some ANA battalions than others? The reason I ask is that before July 2009, the ANA consistently took higher KIAs and casualties than the entire ISAF/OEF combined. How could this be happening unless at least some ANA battalions were showing initiative in the fight?
The ANA that seem to be showing initiative (not discussing effectiveness for the moment) are 1-203 ANA perhaps some other 203 ANA bns, some 201 ANA bns, 1-205 Bde (you mentioned that they have a high tempo of operations), and ANA 2-207 (which is performing significantly better than 1-207 even though it is two years younger.)
One reason ANP casualties are three times ANA casualties is probably in large part because unmentored ANP have a nasty tendancy to get overrun. Mentored ANP have casualty rates similar to the ANA and ISAF. Could there be some reason for the high ANA casualties that I am missing?
What are the thoughts of the commentators here on the Afghan Parliament passing a bill authorizing the ANA to detain people for perhaps up to 168 hours without charge, before having to turn them over to the ANP? Something like this would significantly aid McChrystal and Andrew Exum's new strategy.
SNLII, what are your thoughts on Bruce's comments regarding ANA promotions (he knows his stuff on ANA 205)? How did you handle the IA promotion issue as a MiTT adviser for 1st or 7th IAD (I forget which you advised)?
BruceR, the entire MoD and MoI budget are funded by foreigners. I think it is entirely fair for the principle aid providers to the GIRoA to collectively insist that the President of Afghanistan and MoD deal with this issue. McChyrstal (after listening to the wise Abu Muqawama's council) should directly ask the heads of state of the ISAF contributing countries for their help on this matter.
If MoD Minister Abdurrahim Wardak and the ANA Chief of the General Staff, General Bismillah Mohammadi Khan, strongly insist on this, and push it through the chain of command, why can't they succeed in changing promotion policy?
Sanmon – agree clear articulated goals are highly desirable. As much as I support the current administration governing my antipodean paradise, our PM Mr Rudd has fallen back on ‘eliminating terrorists’ as the primary reason for Australian SOF and ADF personnel in theater.
That’s as a result of the latest attacks in Indonesia and the CT arrests in Melbourne, once again terrorist are in our midst so we fight them there.
All good and well but I still think most people will respond better to a nation building - humanitarian rationale than a straight capture or kill mentality.
Not to say that capture or kill doesn’t play a part in all of this, as far as I see it there are some individuals hiding in caves that need a double tap.
Everybody knows my position by now.
Which is straight on, on the mark... and everybody that's been reading this blog knows it
About the only thing Exum can do right is get the blog software to work. But that is CNAS, ain't it?
Exum is a liar and a cheat. His regular defenders and groupies verify that every day. Exum is still trying to get his fuck on, without the benefit of a penis or date-rape drugs. (I'm telling you. Try Rachel Maddow.)
Bacevich and Gentile are the only sane intellects in the US/America.
Someday these heroes are gonna run for office. Then where you gonna stand?
I'll take Bacevich/Gentile in 2012.
Bacevich has his shit together and I'd sign all three of my sisters and my mother over to Gentile.
They READ. While you blog.
Gentile is awesome. He just flanks everything in his site. (Hint: bring him in)
mslater:
Strategy is everything. If you don’t have it right in war you fail. Look at the United States in Vietnam.
Let me repeat what Sun Tzu said:
"Strategy without tactics is the slow road to victory; Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat."
I thought the point of Exum's series of dialogues on strategy was to talk about strategy; instead it seems that there is still an overriding desire drop back down into the nitty-gritty of population centric coin tactics and methods, certainly a worthy discussion but one in my mind that has been completely worn out to the point of being stale. In terms of Astan, perhaps Exum after reading Bacevich's piece got this sense too. I don’t know, but it certainly is mine and has the feeling of Sun Tzu's "noise" which is why a discussion on strategy is very refreshing.
gian
Anand:
On the sharp end in the South, ANA casualties were mostly incurred on IED sweeps (stepping on or driving over stuff) or in the defense of outposts (our ANA fatal casualties were about 50% getting blown up checking a road, and 50% from their post being shelled). These are both high risk activities, if entirely reactive in nature. Neither generally involves significant interaction with the local population. One can take significant casualties in those activities and still be participating very rarely in kinetic or other COIN operations.
Agree this is a problem where the Afghan government could play a role. As far as budgets, imposing Western expenditure controls that rewarded effectiveness by specific ANSF units or formations would be something of an innovation for Afghanistan, one that would undoubtedly be interpreted as some as interfering with their national chain of command.
"The reason I ask is that before July 2009, the ANA consistently took higher KIAs and casualties than the entire ISAF/OEF combined. How could this be happening unless at least some ANA battalions were showing initiative in the fight?"
Or they WERE NOT showing initiative, and instead got sniped, mortared or smacked with IEDs while performing basic labors that weren't exactly seizing the initiative, like driving into the village to buy vegetables because their own central government can't manage to feed them.
"SNLII, what are your thoughts on Bruce's comments regarding ANA promotions (he knows his stuff on ANA 205)? How did you handle the IA promotion issue as a MiTT adviser for 1st or 7th IAD (I forget which you advised)?"
The US didn't have a call on IA promotions. Officers tended to be very weak (not in my battalion). Even the best units were dominated by a certain sectarian slice of Iraq, despite some attempts to change this. Many of my wards had fought us in Najaf when they worked for al-Sadr.
That said, there actually was a tradition of combined arms on which to build with the IAs. Many of the NCOs were outstanding soldiers, albeit ones who had previously been poorly led during the Baath years.
Is this so with the ANA? I have grave doubts. I strongly urge anyone to read many of the Soviet appraisals of their proxy security forces in the 1980s. They are eerily the same in tone and, too often, on describing Afghan security forces, their commanders and their tactics precisely.
The day the US leaves and the Taliban push I wouldn't be surprised if 70 percent of them quit.
Whether al Qaeda follows them is beyond me. Maybe not.
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