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The Afghanistan Strategy Dialogue: Day Four
August 11, 2009 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 9:16am | 28 Comments
From reader Jeff:
To answer your first question about 'the war in Afghanistan' being 'in the interests of the United States and its allies', it is first necessary to make the point that only several of the countries involved in this conflict actually consider it a 'war' in the first place. Though it may seem rather silly to get bogged down in a semantic quagmire, understanding this distinction is crucial when trying to answer your second question about 'how much is enough'. As such, we must first identify which 'war' it is we are talking about, as well as which adversary we are fighting. Not to be clear on these points also impacts on your third question about 'the strategic limitations of US counterinsurgency doctrine and operations'.
There is little doubt a political consensus exists in the US and many allied capitols about the need to counter Al Qaeda. Beyond this, no consensus exists either in terms of how to fight Al Qaeda, which other Islamist extremist groups to counter, or how many resources should be devoted to this mission. Because of these differences in means and ends, your first question must be answered in the negative.
The argument in favor of continuing along the current path presupposes that a 'Western' withdrawal from Afghanistan would be a victory for the Taliban, which would then allow Al Qaeda a secure base of operations to target 'Western interests'. It also presupposes several other things. For instance, it presupposes that 'withdrawal' is the equivalent of 'total withdrawal'. It also presupposes that a ‘Western’ presence is the necessary and sufficient condition denying a victory to the Taliban, which in itself presupposes that the Afghan government, or anti-Taliban elements of Afghan society more broadly defined, would be unwilling or incapable of defending themselves.
Resulting from all these assumptions is the belief that ‘counterinsurgency’ is the best, if not only option, despite its high cost and long duration. But are there alternative low cost and short duration options? These have yet to be presented. However, there is at least one credible option for waging a low cost/long duration conflict to deny Al Qaeda a ‘safe haven’. Ironically, this option goes by the name of ‘counterinsurgency’, but is of a very different type of counterinsurgency than is currently underway in Afghanistan. It used to be the case in the US, and still is in most of the other ‘fronts’ of what used to be called the GWOT, that ‘Big Military’ was kept out of ‘counterinsurgency’. Instead, the intelligence services working in conjunction with special forces and aid agencies waged a relatively low cost campaign, while avoiding the ‘high cost’ indefinite commitment of the bulk of American land power. Inherent in this ‘low cost’ counterinsurgency approach is recognition that achieving ‘success’ can take decades, not years.
Adopting a ‘low cost’ approach necessitates disposing of the false assumption that ‘withdrawal’ equates to ‘total withdrawal’, and that Afghan-supported ‘Western’ methods to defeating the Taliban are superior to Western-supporting ‘Afghan’ methods. There are several obvious advantages to this approach: it is less visible, it is cheap, it is sustainable, and it achieves the minimum consensus objective of denying Afghanistan as a ‘safe’ base for Al Qaeda. Thus to address your final question, the current ‘war’ is not in the interests of the US and its allies, but this does not mean that ‘war’ more broadly defined cannot secure our interests in Central Asia. The bottom line is that the US must wage war in such a way that its global strategic interests are not jeopardized in the pursuit of regional ones.
Very thoughtful post. How
Very thoughtful post. How do you manage the credibility challenge in the transition from the "high cost" perspective to the "low cost" perspective. Presumably, AQ will spin it as a victory and use it for recruiting. Do you count on the fact that the "low cost" perspective will just be more effective at countering AQ to deal with that? Or would you challenge the assumption that it would help AQ with recruiting (which would be a perfectly reasonable argument to make as well)?
I think it is very important
I think it is very important that we get the context right in this debate.
What is the larger United States national security and foreign policy goal that is driving this discussion?
I say that this larger goal -- and the focus of US national security and foreign policy today -- is the need to transform the Third World such that it might better service the needs of the expanding global economy.
This explains why the Department of Defense and the Department of State are today being retooled so as to better accomplish this mission (transform of the Third World).
It is within this context (need to transform the Third World to better service the expanding global economy) that the cost / benefit analysis re: Afghanistan -- and other Third World projects -- is being and must be undertaken.
Thank you AM for opening up
Thank you AM for opening up the discussion. I have read your selected posts as well as a large number of comments. Of the three questions you originally posed, the third has in my view been left mostly unanswered. What (if any) are US strategic and geopolitical interests in Central and Southwest Asia? What implications if any does the US presence in Afghanistan have on these other interests? Disusing US interests in Afghanistan without placing them in a larger regional/geopolitical context is to remove the 'grand' from "Grand Strategy." The 'truth' I think is that when we begin to articulate those larger interests and the strategy for their attainment we do not much like what we see.
Another point I would like to raise: many of the posts arguing for our continued involvement cite the fact that the 9/11 attacks originated from Afghanistan. Preventing AQ from reestablishing a sanctuary there is undoubtedly an important goal. But as a number of those in the 'con-camp' have pointed out, Afghanistan is only one of many places where AQ can develop a sanctuary. Furthermore the 'cons' rightfully point out that there are other strategies and tactics besides nation-state building that may be more cost-effective in achieving that end. That argument, (divorced from other "grand strategic" imperatives) will, in short order, prove to be a week reed. I think those in the 'pro' camp need to acknowledge that US interests in continuing the war may not be the same as our interest in beginning the war and they need to articulate the larger geopolitical interests at stake even if that means taking a long hard look in the mirror.
@ Scott Wedman If we worry
@ Scott Wedman
If we worry about how AQ uses the US mission in Afghanistan as a recruiting tool then we will get caught in a credibility trap. Basically we are damned if we do, damned if we don't. If we stay in large numbers, AQ will say that we are an occupying force and global imperialist. If we leave then they will say we are retreating.
But, as Jeff says if we mostly leave but still have the capability in Afghanistan to pick AQ apart then we may avoid this credibility trap by both backing out and dismantling the AQ network.
In response to Scott
In response to Scott Wedman's query about the transition from a 'high cost/long duration' COIN campaign to a 'low cost/long duration' one without having AQ claim a victory, I would start out by saying that AQ spin is largely irrelevant in this context, and likewise Taliban spin. Unlike the Soviet withdrawal when the Mujahadin could legitimately claim a victory because the Soviets had 'totally withdrawn' (which was a spur to their recruitment), a 'low cost/long duration' approach means that there is no 'total withdrawal', thus denying the adversary a legitimate claim to victory (therefore more difficult to attract recruits since no outright victory has been achieved). As the consensus objective of US/Allied strategy is to deny Afghanistan as a 'safe haven', it would be very difficult for either AQ or the Taliban to claim victory while there is still a Western presence in that country, even if it is a fraction of its current size. Among the reasons why 'insurgencies' win is that in the end it simply becomes too expensive for the counter-insurgent to maintain their campaign indefinitely, with the result that the counterinsurgent may eventually be willing to negotiate and compromise (or in the case of a foreign force, simply get up and leave). If one takes the issue of expense out of the equation, and it is still possible to deny the insurgents a victory, a 'low cost/long duration' strategy has enormous merits. Recognizing that victory is impossible, the 'insurgents' are likely to be more willing to negotiate, especially if they understand that a strategy of 'waiting out' the 'counterinsurgent' is not in the cards. It is also important to consider that in the long term, the dynamics of the conflict may shift, to include the possibility that the lack of victory for the insurgent (in this case defined as a total Western withdrawal) may discourage Afghans from joining the Taliban in this first place (to say nothing of the Western presence itself which is a major recruiting boon for the Taliban and AQ at the moment, but would be reduced under the new approach). The crucial point is to make 'time' a disadvantage to the 'insurgent' rather than the 'counterinsurgent' By employing a 'high cost/long duration' approach, as we are increasingly doing, 'time' is definitely on the side of the 'insurgent'. However, coming back to your original point, I would rephrase slightly. Even though the Taliban and similar groups would be unable to claim a victory, they might nevertheless feel emboldened, while the Afghan government forces and other anti-Taliban groups might be disheartened. While this would almost certainly be the case, such is the animosity of large sectors of the Afghan population towards a return of the Taliban that it is almost certain this segment of the population could be mobilized and supported by the West over the long term. The bottom line is that even if the Taliban were to perceive a victory in the short run (though it should be understood that transitioning to a low cost/long duration approach could take a fair bit of time), in the longer term they would still not be able to achieve a complete routing of Western forces. Moreover, adopting a 'limited liability' mentality might actually have the positive effect of convincing Western governments to maintain a commitment to a campaign that will be of long duration in any event.
This seems like a cogent
This seems like a cogent rational for giving the Afghans hundreds of billions of dollars in grants over the next 20 years, and moving to entirely super embedded ISAF forces and ISAF/OEF special forces force within a short period of time (maybe 2 years, or some would say 3 years if they would like to give McChrystal's surge policy a try.)
I don't think there is evidence that the ANA and ANCOP, if not other ANP, will not fight if given battlespace and a mission set. Transfer all battle space, PRTs and reconstruction to the ANA and ANCOP. Fight through them.
On an earlier thread someone suggested that giving the Afghans 12.5 billion a year over 20 years was too much. Well, what alternative is there? What line items would you cut in the ANSF, the Afghan education budget, or the infrastructure CAPEX budget? If you cut the "economic reconstruction investment" budget, then the per capita tax revenue for Afghanistan will be too low for the Afghans to balance their own budget a generation from now. Afghanistan has $600 million in annual revenue for 33 million people. This is $18 in per capita tax revenue. Even if this increased to $100 in per capita tax revenue, Afghanistan would have a large budget deficit (that would need to be filled by borrowing or foreign grants.)
So the question is, how to win in Afghanistan with less money? Please propose a detailed budget for Afghanistan that requires less foreign grants, or a way to accelerate GIRoA revenue more quickly.
Scott Wedman, the GIRoA, ANA and ANP are perceived inside Afghanistan as fierce enemies of the Quetta Shura Taliban, Hekmatyur, Haqqani, the Punjabi Taliban, and other AQ linked networks. If the ANA and ANP are perceived as holding their own against their enemies, this will be a large public relations defeat for Al Qaeda. Losing to the ANA and ANP is far more embarrassing and harmful to Al Qaeda than losing to nonmuslims.
Jeff's strategy isn't an either or. You could transition to it gradually. Leaving one ISAF super embedded "advisory" brigade in each ANA Corps and large embedded ISAF in the ANP is hardly abandoning them. You could draw down the advisers slowly over many years. Transitioning all battlespace to the ANSF could also happen gradually.
If one's national security
If one's national security and foreign policy goal is to transform the Third World -- such that it might better service the needs of the expanding global economy -- then one must have the tools in one's tool box that are appropriate for this task.
Until recently, the United States had few such tools that it could use in this new "transforming the Third World" mission. For example:
a. The United States did not have appropriate "carrots and sticks" that could be used to convince, coerce or compel Third World nations to undergo the transformational process. The United States' "carrots and sticks" -- which had been designed for use against the former Soviet Union -- were of little use or utility in the Third World. (And the United States' Third World friends and foes knew this.)
b. Even when the United States was able to convince, coerce or compel a Third World nation to undergo the transformational process, it (the United States) did not have the tools needed to deal with the problems that typical arise when a Third World nation must be transformed to meet First World needs.
Today, because of the problems experienced in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq, these short-comings have been dramatically revealed. And, rather than abandoning the Third World transformational mission, the United States has undertaken the huge task of having its DoD and DoS, themselves, transformed -- so as to better accomplish the Third World transformation task. Such is the commitment of the United States in 21st Century to this mission.
The other lesson that has been learned in this initial stage has been that one must do a better job of picking and choosing which nation(s) will be targeted to initially undergo the transformational process. It has been learned that some nations will be more trouble than they are worth and that some will actually prove destructive to the overall mission.
But the mission remains the same (transforming the Third World to meet First World needs). How we do this (with greater discretion and with better tools) is all that has changed.
Jeff, one of the problems
Jeff, one of the problems with your piece is that you use the term "western" a little too much. Russia, China, India, Iran and the Stans, have more to lose from a Taliban victory than the "west." Right now they are free riding on NATO to the extent possible. But if they are asked, I think they could and would do a lot more. Defeating the Taliban and AQ is a global priority rather than merely a western one.
Let us remember that this is a war between the GIRoA/ANA/ANP and their allies against the Taliban and its allies. The only way the Taliban or AQ "win" is if they are perceived to defeat the ANA in the battlefield. This is why it is critical that the ANA not lose. If the ANA is perceived to defeat the Taliban and AQ, it could be devastating to them on the muslim street.
One analogy is the Iraqi Army during March-May, 2008. Letting the IA lose was not an option for MNF-I. Doing whatever it took to help the IA win was the mission. Similarly, doing whatever it takes to help the ANA win should be the mission in Afghanistan.
Bill, I couldn't disagree
Bill, I couldn't disagree more. Most countries around the world are striving to liberalize and globalize right now. This is because the tool set is working.
What is "first world"? Are China, India, Indonesia and Brazil first world? A better description would to enabling unstable autarchic parts of the world to stabilize and globalize.
Based on all available data, the Afghan public wants to stabilize and globalize. China, as Afghanistan's largest trading and investment partner, is playing a large role in facilitating this. The globalization of Afghanistan, which is taking place rapidly, is a major strategic defeat for AQ linked networks.
This comment was by me:
This comment was by me: "Comment by Jeff on August 11, 2009 - 12:29pm"
Fair points on how to
Fair points on how to navigate the transition. That makes sense. The idea of "who" it is worse for AQ to "lose" to is especially interesting, I think.
@Gringo Lost- I love your
@Gringo Lost-
I love your point that we are damned if we do and damned if we don't. The major point you relate is that the worst part of the US Army's counter-insurgency campaign, and our national security machinery in general, is the lack of ability to put out coherent messages and wage effective information operations.
However, I disagree with both you and Jeff that we could ever completely dismantle the AQ network. In our current struggle with extremist groups the best we can hope to do is delay future attacks and impair their ability to function. Much more important is denying AQ areas of sanctuary. Doing that requires a high-cost approach because effective counter-insurgency is usually high cost.
"Doing that requires a
"Doing that requires a high-cost approach because effective counter-insurgency is usually high cost."
At the risk of sounding too Fussellian, quit with the effin' weasel words.
When you say "denying AQ areas of sanctuary" you are really saying, "Clear their potential sanctuaries, hold them against the inevitable backlash, and then defend our building upon them against recalcitrant insurgents. This will entail many thousands of American soldiers blasted into bits, bled pale in the Afghan dust, maimed or driven mad."
That's what a "high-cost" approach is. Without resorting to the chickenhawk argument, I'm guessing that you won't be paying that cost.
So, could you at least use language honestly?
Jeff, I have to say I think
Jeff, I have to say I think your proposal for a draw down of forces in Afghanistan and and restructuring our force employment model there is the first one I've seen in this series that I think has real merit, since it seems to speak to the concerns of both sides of the debate.
I would like to raise one point, which is not so much strategic as operational. You advocate leaving the "big military" out of the issue, and focusing on FID and CT efforts through special forces and intelligence assets. However, it seems to me that Afghanistan is in many cases far too large a country to be handled by SOF units alone. US special operations forces have been highly overstretched for quite some time (hence the decision to add the Marines to US SOCOM), and the efforts of having SF A-Teams train the entire ANA to its necessary end strength might not be the best use of those resources. Most of us here will agree that Afghanistan is not the only important front in the fight against al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and it might be useful to focus SOF units on FID efforts in countries where the US presence must be of a much lower profile, as in the Philippines and north Africa. Everyone knows we are in Afghanistan, rendering moot the greatest asset of SOF units: the ability to operate covertly on both FID and direct action missions.
The military is developing the tools to train foreign forces using conventional troops. The Marine Corps is creating the Security Cooperation-MAGTF, and the Army is looking into some form of standing advisory units as advocated by Ex's esteemed boss, John Nagl. It seems to me that the use of these sorts of units to train and advise the ANSF on a large scale would be a better use of resources than just using SOF, and would still be a cheaper and more focused effort than what we have now.
OK, OK. I got an email from
OK, OK. I got an email from someone offline that said the "On Violence" guy is a CIB officer.
But, still, don't use language like that! Be intellectually honest!
@SNLII- I only used High
@SNLII- I only used High Cost because in my comment because that was the terminology in the post above. And, when you think about it, high cost is the only way to describe the situation. Creating a stable government in Afghanistan (not democracy, just government) will cost an exorbitant amount. In addition to the lives of US soldiers, the even more numerous lives of Afghan civilians, and the lives of US family members who bare the burden at home, it has cost our nations billions of dollars, will cost billions more and our failure so far has cost us international stature.
I think more to the point, the question is: is that cost worth it for the US? I don't think I can answer that in this short of a post. Email me on my blog's email address and I would love debate further, but I don't think we should take up any more of the comment space on this post.
VISITOR, Many thanks for
VISITOR,
Many thanks for your kind remarks. Regarding the issue of 'Big Military' versus 'SOF', I certainly do not want to suggest that no regular forces will be involved in the support mission, nor would I argue that SOF should primarily concentrate on Afghanistan while either ignoring other parts of the world or becoming dangerously overstretched. The main point I wanted to get across was that the notion of adding tens of thousands of troops, or even maintaining current force levels, sustaining them indefinitely, and engaging in the sort of clearing missions (using brigade combat teams) we are currently deploying for these operations does not seem to make very much sense, hence shifting to a 'low cost/long duration' approach in which Afghans are being 'supported' rather than 'supporting'. Now in terms of operationalizing such a strategy, with specific regards to the units involved, particularly to do the mission of training the ANA, quite frankly it makes no difference where they come from as long as they are reasonably competent (as such, they do not necessarily need to be SOF -- indeed the majority of US/Allied trainers are currently not). Needless to say, whether or not we are training them to do the right things (to act like – forgive me – a semi-Western army) is a rather important issue that seems to be missed in the current debate. In any event, the issue of trainers, and where they come from is only a very small part of the problem of building up the ANA. More important in my opinion are the issues of infrastructure, administration, and discipline (particularly when it comes to getting them off drugs). Where the recruits will come from to staff a 240,000 strong force is a question that never seems to get raised (indeed the notion of Kabul adopting a conscription system seems to be off the table entirely), not to mention the problem of finding and training the officer corps (which takes a bit longer than the short course we give Afghan enlisted personnel). Basing and other related issues are also quite central. The important point though is that we really have no idea at this stage how large of an advisory force will actually be necessary at any given time given that we don't really have any clear idea how many Afghans will be processed into the ANA. And again, what sort of training we should be giving them is not entirely clear either (apart from basic weapons handling), hence not quite sure which units would specialize in some areas vice others. One of the fundamental problems is that we feel we need an Afghan military that fits our image, though if left to their own devices, the Afghan government and other anti-Taliban forces (loosely defined) might prefer other methods, including a different force structure, that they feel might better allow them to defend themselves and which is sustainable.
JEFF
I couldn't agree more that this is a global problem, not just a 'Western' one. I must confess I very much dislike the term 'Western', especially as there is no good definition of it (for instance, does Russia count as Western?). As such, your point is well taken. That aside, the other point which I believe you are trying to make is that there needs to be a great deal more buy-in from countries in the region (and less freeloading). That being said, I doubt very much that any of the countries you mentioned would be willing to send combat forces (esp. not Russia), but they almost certainly would be willing to indirectly support anti-Taliban groups. Indeed, I think this is actually the case at the moment, but there is the broader problem about which groups are being supported by which countries and the geopolitics involved in this. Getting India more involved is quite tricky given the perceived necessity of not wanting to alienate Pakistan. Were either China or Iran willing to send their forces into Afghanistan, and thus relieve pressure on our own forces, I'd be very happy indeed for such an eventuality. Speaking purely from a geopolitical perspective, better that they drain their resources rather than the US. However, I’m sceptical either China or Iran would send any forces. Again, they are more likely to take an indirect approach, relying more on covert rather than overt methods. But you are quite correct this is a big problem for them as well. Likewise with your point about not letting the ANA lose on the battlefield, I do not consider this a major problem, since in any large scale engagement (for instance, a battalion-sized battle), we could still have the option of providing air support (similar to the US support for the Iraqi Charge of the Knights operation).
VISITOR, Many thanks for
VISITOR,
Many thanks for your kind remarks. Regarding the issue of 'Big Military' versus 'SOF', I certainly do not want to suggest that no regular forces will be involved in the support mission, nor would I argue that SOF should primarily concentrate on Afghanistan while either ignoring other parts of the world or becoming dangerously overstretched. The main point I wanted to get across was that the notion of adding tens of thousands of troops, or even maintaining current force levels, sustaining them indefinitely, and engaging in the sort of clearing missions (using brigade combat teams) we are currently engaged in does not seem to make very much sense, hence shifting to a 'low cost/long duration' approach in which Afghans are being 'supported' rather than 'supporting'. Now in terms of operationalizing such a strategy, with specific regards to the units involved, particularly to do the mission of training the ANA, quite frankly it makes no difference where they come from as long as they are reasonably competent (as such, they do not necessarily need to be SOF -- indeed the majority of US/Allied trainers are currently not). Needless to say, whether or not we are training them to do the right things (to act like – forgive me – a semi-Western army) is a rather important issue that seems to be missed in the current debate. In any event, the issue of trainers, and where they come from is only a very small part of the problem of building up the ANA. More important in my opinion are the issues of infrastructure, administration, and discipline (particularly when it comes to getting them off drugs). Where the recruits will come from to staff a 240,000 strong force is a question that never seems to get raised (indeed the notion of Kabul adopting a conscription system seems to be off the table entirely), not to mention the problem of finding and training the officer corps (which takes a bit longer than the short course we give Afghan enlisted personnel). Basing and other related issues are also quite central. The important point though is that we really have no idea at this stage how large of an advisory force will actually be necessary at any given time given that we don't really have any clear idea how many Afghans will be processed into the ANA. And again, what sort of training we should be giving them is not entirely clear either (apart from basic weapons handling), hence not quite sure which units would specialize in some areas vice others. One of the fundamental problems is that we feel we need an Afghan military that fits our image, though if left to their own devices, the Afghan government and other anti-Taliban forces (loosely defined) might prefer other methods, including a different force structure, that they feel might better allow them to defend themselves and which is sustainable.
JEFF
I couldn't agree more that this is a global problem, not just a 'Western' one. I must confess I very much dislike the term 'Western', especially as there is no good definition of it (for instance, does Russia count as Western?). As such, your point is well taken. That aside, the other point which I believe you are trying to make is that there needs to be a great deal more buy-in from countries in the region (and less freeloading). That being said, I doubt very much that any of the countries you mentioned would be willing to send combat forces (esp. not Russia), but they almost certainly would be willing to indirectly support anti-Taliban groups. Indeed, I think this is actually the case at the moment, but there is the broader problem about which groups are being supported by which countries, and the geopolitics involved in this. Getting India more involved is quite tricky given the perceived necessity of not wanting to alienate Pakistan. Were either China or Iran willing to send their forces into Afghanistan, and thus relieve pressure on our own forces, I'd be very happy indeed for such an eventuality. Speaking purely from a geopolitical perspective, better that they drain their resources rather than the US. However, I’m sceptical either China or Iran would send any forces. Again, they are more likely to take an indirect approach, relying more on covert rather than overt methods. But you are quite correct this is a big problem for them as well. Likewise with your point about not letting the ANA lose on the battlefield, I do not consider this a major problem, since in any large scale engagement (for instance, a battalion-sized battle), we could still have the option of providing air support (similar to the US support for the Iraqi Charge of the Knights operation).
SNLII, While always
SNLII,
While always compelling and intelligent (even more so than our gracious host at times), you really are a jerk to other posters. Easy with the confrontational attitude. We know you're smart, but you can "teach" instead of "preach."
I'm not your keeper, and I really do enjoy your insights, but your combative attitude--not unlike Foust's over at Registan--detracts from your keen observations.
Yeah sockpuppet SNLII. Quit
Yeah sockpuppet SNLII. Quit being mean to sockpuppet Michael C or sockpuppet RJWAR will point out etiquette.
Doesn't the picture Jeff is
Doesn't the picture Jeff is painting sound a lot like the Pakistani's 1990s strategy for Afghanistan viz a viz the Taliban? Pumping in money, guns, and 'advisers', hoping for a piece of the stability pie? Maybe that's not a terrible thing, as I've seen other comments where people wistfully recall how easy the Taliban made controlling Afghanistan seem compared to the current mess. I think that downplays serious differences between then and now, but I doubt anyone would argue that. Perhaps we could say that Jeff's strategy is more reminiscent of the American strategy in El Salvador?
Here's my immediate concern: isn't there something inherently problematic when we support a military in total disregard for the government that supposed to be controlling it? You could say we're already doing that, but I'm getting the impression is that this 'low cost COIN' boils down to us fractioning our expenditure by mailing a check for a couple billion for the Afghan security forces and hoping for the best. How would that turn out? I don't think it's likely we could could hold the ANA and ANP the human rights requirements even Mexico and Colombia are unable to meet when we send them aid. Given the state of civil society in Afghanistan, this seems like at best a recipe for a militarized state along the lines of 1980s Pakistan.
This is how the Vietnam War began right? Special Forces, unobtrusive aid and assistance, but it never added up into any real success, probably due to the often appalling characteristics of the government we were propping up. Eventually Americans went in precisely because this strategy failed. We did try again with Vietnamization, propped up by American air support, but that didn't exactly succeed in the end either. The Taliban may not present the conventional enemy the North Vietnamese did, at least at the moment, but is that a fact we can rely on? Or what about the CIA in Somalia? Paying for a bunch of Warlords pretty much backfired explosively. Using a more recent example, on the off chance we retain some sort of political control or influence despite restricting our domain to the Afghan security forces, could this strategy be compared to the early pullback in Iraq in 2004, when we wanted the Iraqis to stand up as quickly as possible so we get to the point we were fighting that war by mail? Again, not a stunning success.
I also wonder how long would we be able to support this 'low cost/long term' coin if ANA or ANP abuses started piling up on the front page of the New York Times, or all over youtube? If there's relatively few Americans even involved on the ground, wouldn't this mission be an even easier target for deficit hawks than it is currently? Is the Afghan state really prepared for us to simply start dumping money on their military with no oversight? I don't mean to sound paternalistic, but that sounds like a Cold War strategy for a time when it didn't matter that we created military dictatorships - which generally was how the old way of coin turned out, if it worked at all. Maybe we're on the same road now, but that's why we're asking these question in the end, isn't it.
Anand: If the tool set is
Anand:
If the tool set is working, then why is the tool set being so dramatically transformed? One might say that the transformation that is occurring in the Department of Defense and the Department of State today are some of the most extensive, most fundamental and most significant changes in these organizations' history.
I agree that the "First World" is a poor choice of words. A better characterization might be the First and Second Worlds, with the Second World, in today's context, encompassing nations such as those you have identified above.
The globalization of Afganistan and other Third World nations -- so as to better the service the needs of the First and Second Worlds nations -- is indeed the mission. But you do not radically transform DoD and DoS if you think that this mission will be (1) short-lived, (2) be easy to achieve and/or (3) easy to sustain.
Want further evidence that state building and/or state maintaining ("armed" when necessary) -- directed at the Third World and in the service of globalization and the First and Second Worlds -- are the order of the day? Look at the major investiments and transformations being made by such huge defense contractors as Lockheed Martin, whose recent purchase of PA&E is consistent with the mission statement I have outlined above.
Want further evidence of this general trend, then look at how "think tanks" such as CNAS have become so important and prominent today.
The hand-writing is on the wall -- in very bold letters -- for all to see. And this (the need to transform the Third World such that it might better service the needs of the First and Second Worlds) is the context within which decisions regarding Afghanistan, and other Third World nations, will be made.
Bones, I think you bring up
Bones, I think you bring up some very solid points about the dangers of only supporting the ANA and not reforming the Afghan security sector as a whole. I do think that it will be absolutely necessary to have a lot of oversight of the defense ministry, and make sure that an operationally functional ANA is linked to an accountable and respectable/legitimate Afghan government. However, the point still stands (as Jeff argued in his above clarification) that this option is a lot less costly both in blood and treasure than employing tens of thousands of US troops in front line COIN ops. I don't think anyone would seriously suggest training a competent Afghan military but leaving it in the hands of an utterly corrupt government, if we can possibly avoid it.
As an interesting corollary
As an interesting corollary to Bill's point (though it digresses a lot from the Afghanistan focused topic), Nathan Freier at the Army's Strategic Studies Institute has a series of papers on "Limited Armed Stabilization" as a focus area of US ground forces under the new QDR. Put simply, failing states and other unconventional threats will be a serious issue for the US in the near future, and finding a way to confront those problems in a limited way that is both strategically effective and financially efficient will be necessary, whether we like it or not.
The war in Afghanistan is
The war in Afghanistan is necessary to destroy the remaining al Qaeda targets in the FATA region of Pakistan. This was the main purpose for invading Afghanistan and should remain our first priority. By engaging the Taliban elements, who support al Qaeda, we apply pressure to the movement that continues in its desire to spread its vision of an Islamist society. Our current strategic thinking is that the presence of the Taliban in any region outside the FATA is unacceptable to the security of the US because of their connection to al Qaeda. If the US can make modest gains in stabilizing a systematic governing cycle of loose federalism in Afghanistan and pacifying support for the Taliban in the population then succeeding in our goal of denying a safe haven to terrorists improves dramatically.
http://thetruenarcissists.com/
The war in Afghanistan is
The war in Afghanistan is necessary to destroy the remaining al Qaeda targets in the FATA region of Pakistan. This was the main purpose for invading Afghanistan and should remain our first priority. By engaging the Taliban elements, who support al Qaeda, we apply pressure to the movement that continues in its desire to spread its vision of an Islamist society. Our current strategic thinking is that the presence of the Taliban in any region outside the FATA is unacceptable to the security of the US because of their connection to al Qaeda. If the US can make modest gains in stabilizing a systematic governing cycle of loose federalism in Afghanistan and pacifying support for the Taliban in the population then succeeding in our goal of denying a safe haven to terrorists improves dramatically.
http://thetruenarcissists.com/
We went to Afghanistan
We went to Afghanistan because of 9/11.
But we stay in Afghanistan -- or decide not to stay -- based on what is best for the global economy.
It is within the construct of the global economy that decisions like these are today being made.
We may determine in this cost / benefit analysis that Afghanistan is not crucial for the security needed by the expanding global economy -- or that it is not worth the price that must be paid.
We might also determine, however, that stabilizing and transforming Afghanistan is critical to the needs of the expanding global economy and, therefore, significant investment in blood and treasure must now be made.
But it is not American nation security, in the classical sense, that we are talking about here. Instead it is American national security viewed through the lense of globalization.
In this type of analysis, what is being said is that what is good for globalization -- is good for America -- is good for the Third World -- and is good for the world at large. And this may or may not be true.
By extension what today is being said is that aggression and intervention in the Third World -- in the name of globalization -- is good for globalization and for all concerned. But this also may or may not be true (for example: "wider wars" helps globalization, the Third World, the US and the world at large?).
Right now, we seem to be stepping out smartly in the direction of: Aggression and intervention in the Third World -- in the name of globalization -- is all to the good -- the new capitalist experiments in China, Russia and India depend of the success of this mission -- and we benefit also -- so let's get it on (maybe more smartly this time -- and with better tools -- but pretty much the same old "transform the Third World in the name of globalization" mission we have been on since at least the end of the Cold War).
Jihad in Afghanistan:
Jihad in Afghanistan: Defending Muslims or Defending al-Qa'ida?
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