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The Afghanistan Strategy Dialogue: Day Seven
August 14, 2009 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 4:20am | 81 Comments
This entry addresses the price of failure in Afghanistan, which is something I think gets glossed over my many who believe we should either withdraw or significantly reduce our operations and footprint in Afghanistan:
Question 1: This question is extraordinarily broad. Our allies, even if narrowed to NATO countries, for instance, have interests that will inevitably diverge with ours in multiple ways -- even on Afghanistan. The question could be addressed on so many levels, even days of informed blog debate could hardly scratch the surface. When we say interests, are we talking about resources? This opens the pandora's box of whether, to name two "interests," oil and natural gas may be more cheaply available, e.g., for European countries via a more friendly, non-Taliban-run Afghanistan. Or will Europe eventually sue for a deal with the Talibs if we leave Afghanistan, due to seeing business deals with the power-brokers as better than no deal at all? Or are we talking strategic interests in a geographic sense? Then we have to assess, for one thing, whether or how to impact the power struggle between India and Pakistan as it's playing out in Afghanistan (Pakistani strategic depth vs Indian encirclement). Not to mention what our interests are in maintaining some form of geographic hedge against Russia's desire to be unchallenged powerbrokers in their "near abroad." Or interests in a geopolitical sense? Is a "democracy" adjacent to Russia's "near abroad" in our "interests," as perhaps a way to increase influence for "democracy" in Central Asia? Or is it in our longer term interests to ensure there is a "democracy" in the heart of Central Asian, Pakistani, and even Indian militant taqfirist jihadis, against whom we would ideally want cooperation and support (covert and overt) from a US-supported, stable, state actor? These are only a few questions that come to mind on the topic of "staying in Afghanistan being in our interests." The real answer many of these questions seems to be, "It depends" (although it's hard to see how the answer isn't "yes" in some ways at least). And it depends not solely on predictable things, but on the most notoriously unpredictable things imaginable: people. One observation is probably relevant here, though: Leaving Afghanistan for the Taliban to overtake, and allowing it to return to its previous state, would have negative repercussions on several levels. Not as an immediate "existential threat" to the US (arguments centered on this term are superficial and barely scratch the surface of things), but rather, (1) as a further "demonstration effect" for imitators in the region or Middle East to emulate, (2) as an internationally perceived failure of US military power, (3) as a concession to Pakistan to continue a strategy of seeking hegemony and strategic depth in Afghanistan against India (perhaps raising the specter of another Mumbai attack igniting a hot-war between nuclear armed powers), and/or (4) as a training hub for militant, anti-US actors to refine, no longer merely "terrorist" tradecraft, but also paramilitary/insurgent tradecraft to employ elsewhere against US military forces.
Question 2: Too large a question to answer. A previous reply you posted, discussing "don't let the perfect become the enemy of the good," is apropos.
Question 3: Manpower is a significant limitation. Perhaps this limitation would best be mitigated by focusing on a big picture, strategic "economy of force" (i.e. employ more limited US forces to locations where US interests are under threat, but also where host-nation security/military apparatuses are already pro-US, honest, and respected among their populace).
Question 4: The war is in the interest of the US from standpoints outlined above. It may not be in the popular interest, however, for reasons unique to the post-modern American psyche, which has lost much of what the WWII generation gained through experiencing difficulties like the Great Depression. smime.p7s
Though we clearly have a
Though we clearly have a number of interests at stake in Afghanistan (and this post illuminates quite a few that don't often get much air time), it doesn't change the fact that we as a nation may simply not be able to afford securing all of them, and we will have to be ruthless in determining just what we feel we must accomplish in Afghanistan, and avoiding being overly ambitious about everything else.
There is a very big difference between pulling out all of our troops, and restructuring our force employment model for something a bit smaller and less extensive, such that it doesn't force us to bite off more than we can chew. The commentary on this blog has touched on this a bit over the past couple of days, but it really isn't discussed elsewhere amidst the great Beltway sphere of think tanks, policy wonks, and pundits who are so focused on AfPak policy these days. Given the plethora of reports from all these people about Afghanistan, its interesting that not a single major report (to my admittedly imperfect knowledge) has presented an alternative to the current COIN strategy that would still seek to secure US interests in the region.
I think the mission in Afghanistan would benefit greatly if at least a few experts were to "Red Team" the current AfPak strategy not only from the point of view of the Taliban (I'd hope at least someone has already done so on that particular front), but also from a grand strategy point of view, looking at its strategic weaknesses in light of everything else this nation is looking to accomplish, and what we can afford. This would allow us to debate up with some real, concrete alternatives to the current COIN plan, rather than just arguing back and forth about whether or not its viable/affordable/worth it.
I should clarify: I didn't
I should clarify: I didn't mean to impugn Ex's CNAS report (which I happen to think was top notch) or any of the other myriad AfPak reports out there today. I would just love to see one present a wildly opposing view about how we might deal with all of the problems we are facing in Afghanistan and Pakistan using a different strategy than we are now.
On the consequences front,
On the consequences front, there is also the question to what extent AQ has developed during the last 8 years, from an elitist network to a regional affiliation of various groups. If AQ get a real base in Kandahar as the guests of the Talebs, how will that influence the surrounding areas? The various -stans? How is AQ currently functioning in Afghanistan?
"The real answer many of
"The real answer many of these questions seems to be, "It depends" (although it's hard to see how the answer isn't "yes" in some ways at least). "
I'm sorry, Andrew, but that's fucking immoral. There isn't one of these pie-in-the-sky interests that's worth even on decent American soldier who will die trying to make it so.
Big picture? Why don't you focus on the small picture of NATO soldiers blasted into bits, bled out in such goat-shit village or beheaded on the internet by some quasi-Taliban outfit. Frankly, Andrew, this particular effort was sickening: Really, some half-assed Nietzsche "whatever doesn't kill us makes us stronger" crap is the strategic guidance you seek?
As an Afghan might say, "Kus-e-shir."
Don't let the insane, scaffolded by good doctrine for Malaya and other wars, become the new American way of war.
Your submissions are getting worse. It's probably time to just wrap up the round table. After Betz, it went down hill.
Really, Abu M? The "price of
Really, Abu M? The "price of failure" section seems pretty weak:
(1) Domino Theory!
(2) Unclear what the concrete negative consequences are here.
(3) A 20-year war in the region will contribute to stability between India and Pakistan?
(4) Seems like this "training" is more effective with actual US soldiers to practice against.
@SNLII: Exactly. From my
@SNLII: Exactly. From my point of view, even if I agree with every single (unrealistic) assertion of American interest in the author's argument, why is it that American soldiers are the only method that can credibly secure those interests? What are our other options? Do they provide 90% of the benefit at 50% (or less) of the cost of an escalated and extended ground war? In specifically economic terms, I want to know not just the alternatives in men, money and materiel as far as a value proposition, but the opportunity costs of the author's proposed plan? If our overriding objective is to ensure American national security by minimizing the threat posed by groups like AQ, Taliban, what else could we do with our these particular resources devoted to national security, and why is this particular proposal for resource allocation the best approach for achieving that objective?
@Brian: I agree wholeheartedly, especially as you were far more succinct than I'm about to be.
With regards to an American presence being needed in Afghanistan to secure the country and prevent it from becoming a central operating base for Taliban, AQ, etc., on what grounds is the author and those of like mind sure that it is our presence that is preventing this from happening? It seems we have ample evidence from the last seven years that our presence are not helping and is probably hurting this cause by providing constant provocation for groups that feed tremendously off of American offensive military presence.
This argument also fails to address the reality that Afghanistan is not a 'tipping point' geographical base for AQ operations. It was not essential to the execution of 9/11 and terrorist attacks before or since, and surely will not be in the future. By definition, terrorism, particularly as utilized by AQ, does not need a 'home,' like the author fears would be created in Afghanistan, as it was before the U.S. invasion. Even if we were to buy this argument, why is popcentric COIN or any other doctrine for application of ground forces the remedy? Isn't the natural downside to a 'training hub,' of which the author speaks, is that it is easily targeted by air attack?
As for points 1 and 2, are these legitimate reasons to keep and escalate NATO forces in Afghanistan? Many lessons have surely already been learned by anti-U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and how does staying prevent lessons from being learned? Isn't one of the key aspects of an insurgency adaptability? As soon as we adjust strategically and tactically, they will catch on, actually learning more in the process.
Also, the perceived failure of American military power? As another commenter aptly noted in another thread, remember Marcellus from Pulp Fiction. Pride isn't everything, and definitely not worth the smallest drop of American blood. It surely has no serious place in strategic considerations. Also, who is the one doing the perceiving of this failure? China? Russia? India? Pakistan? The implications are varied, even if one buys the author's argument that this perception is a factor. You cannot simply cite "perception of failure" as one broad rationale for continuing our efforts.
I also don't wholly understand the author's final assertion. Again, he/she refers back to some sort of psychic weakness in Americans that has evolved since World War II. I don't even understand that. Somehow Americans should just be willing to tolerate huge expenditures of blood and treasure for strategic interests that are marginal at best and non-existent at worst because the government thinks we need to make massive commitments to those interests for whatever reason(s)? I think not.
I'm going to agree with
I'm going to agree with SNLII a little bit -- the smaller the picture that's focused on, the better. Maybe it's just because a lot of the strategic stuff goes over my head, but I really like it when this blog gets down into tactical and operational issues.
(Not that SNLII said
(Not that SNLII said anything similar to that, but he did use the words "focus on the small picture.")
From Small Wars, by Colonel
From Small Wars, by Colonel C.E. Callwell, Third Ed. 1906. (Greenhill Books/Presidio Press, 1990)
Ch. IV: Difficulties Under Which The Regular Forces Labour As Regards Intelligence. The Advantage Is Usually Enjoyed By The Enemy In This Respect, But This Circumstance Can Sometimes Be Turned To Account.
"In irregular campaigns it is always doubtful how far the people of the hostile country, or in minor operations the hostile tribe, will put forth their entire strength. The attitude, moreover, of neighbouring peoples and tribes is at times a subject of great uncertainty. The very serious inconvenience which may arise when a neighbouring tribe unexpectedly assumes an unfriendly demeanour is singularly well illustrated by the Ambela campaign.
http://wiki.fibis.org/index.php?title=Ambela_Campaign
The difficulty of dealing with Orientals and savages, whether as informers or spies, is referred to in many textbooks and works of reference on reconnaissance and intelligence duties. The ordinary native found in theatres of war peopled by coloured races lies simply for the love of the thing and his idea of time, numbers, and distance are of the vaguest, even when he is trying to speak the truth. Most officers have experienced this during the ordinary course of foreign service." (pp. 49-50)
and from Ch. XI:
"The subject of how best to deal with an enemy who deliberately adopts guerrilla tactics and who persists in resistance in spite of such damage as regular troops can inflict in destroying villages, carrying off livestock and trampling down crops and so on, presents a very awkward problem." (p.148)
Remembering Vietnam is again
Remembering Vietnam is again very instructive. All of the concerns re: Afghanistan would seem much like those that were expressed re: Vietnam.
But with the United States in Vietnam, nothing positive could happen.
However, when the United States leaves Vietnam, everything becomes possible.
After a few years, resources flow out of Vietnam. Trade flourishes. The standard of living of the Vietnamese people moves up smartly. Vietnam becomes a quasi-ally of the United States and becomes a much better member of the international community.
America's leaving Vietnam was the formula for its success.
The people and culture we had identified as "stone age" (much as we characterize the Afgans today) "transform" almost overnight. And Vietnam becomes our partner in many endeavors.
If the US leaves Afghanistan, could something along these positive lines be possible for Afghanistan -- at least on some fronts?
I'm not sure I've ever
I'm not sure I've ever encountered quite that interpretation of Vietnam history....
Then you haven't read many
Then you haven't read many works by the Vietnamese.
I mentioned it yesterday but
I mentioned it yesterday but I think my request fell on deaf ears. We have this strategic debate on whether Afghanistan is of interest to the US, but it has always been a war against al Qaida.
So, if AQ is our enemy what are the best tactics we can employ to achieve our strategy of "disrupting, dismantling, and defeating" AQ (and other extremist terrorist groups)?
I wonder AM if you wouldn't mind starting a dialogue thread discussing various tactical approaches to countering the AQ threat. For instance, a post one day on pop-centric COIN, the next day on drone strikes, the next on international legal orders, the next on info operations, the next on Hawala finance, a post on Phoenix-like programs, etc., etc.
My above comment about a
My above comment about a tactics thread, should also include some cost considerations for each tactic. Because we all know that resources are finite and for some tactics employed the losses might be greater than the gains.
Everyone who reads this blog
Everyone who reads this blog should read "The Best and the Brightest" by David Halberstam, which really should be on the AM Counter-Insurgency reading list, accompanying Bright Shining Lie.
It's eery how little the American Security thought process in the 1960s vis a vis Vietnam differs from that of today in Afghanistan. In the 1960s, the "Best and the Brightest" justified staying with the same "price of failure/ need to safe face" logic. But what happened when we withdrew? Nothing. Not a damn thing. The only thing not withdrawing after 1968 when it was clear the game was up did was lead to the deaths of an additional 20,000 US soldiers.
What's different about Afghanistan? Most serious analysts of Afghanistan, plus just about anyone in Europe, think the war is a hopeless cause. (I should add that just about everyone in Europe in the 1960s thought the same exact thing about Vietnam, but noone in the US military wanted to hear that -- who got proven right?)
So do we stay in order to prevent some kind of "loss of face" or worry about the "price of failure?" 20 years from now will someone write a "Best and the Brightest" sequel on Afghanistan, featuring Exum, Nagl, Fick etc?
for those of you still wanna
for those of you still wanna help terps....Checkpoint one foundation.
http://www.cponefoundation.org/
Terps out
so far it seems to vet, check out. HRF (Human Rights Foundation) gave OK on them, no complaints I can find, people seem to check out...and most important terp relative put me onto them.
Sorry to interrupt, but while we are on the subject of lost causes ;-)
@Post, "Leaving Afghanistan
@Post,
"Leaving Afghanistan for the Taliban to overtake, and allowing it to return to its previous state, would have negative repercussions on several levels. Not as an immediate "existential threat" to the US (arguments centered on this term are superficial and barely scratch the surface of things)"
I know I'm talking to a Lefty when: the most important part of the issue, and the reason we are talking or acting about it at all: are swept under the rug, or down the memory hole.
Maybe we should start calling it the West Street Hole.
We got into, and remain in Astan/ AFPAK because of 9/11 and attacks since, because of AQ whom the Talib did and continue to host, sheild and succor. And no doubt will. I haven't been following the entire debate here, so sorry if I missed the end of history (again).
As far as other issues, let them keep their shitty little pile of rocks, their stone age shariah law, let them oppress their women (they deserve it, they gave birth to them), let them keep their meager resources of NG, oil, whatever. Let them even keep the opium pipelines open -- it's been proven now for centuries you can't stop it from being trafficked, or convince junkies to not kill themselves. It might as well center on the asshole of the world. A great triumph for the Caliphate. Just don't use your shithole as a breeding ground for killer bugs that fly around the world to kill us.
To whoever bought it up - of course they need a place to live, hide, hole up, gather strength, train and deploy from. If you read anything about what's most important to them it's getting a country to impose a true Islamic state on. They do take Corporeal form, ya know.
I really think dragging these peripheral issues is to draw attention from the main reason we are there, and the reason we remain - which of course the current administration affirmed and indeed made the mission statement.
And the comparisions to Vietnam are laughable, other than the confusion of our "elites" on how to deal with tribal marauders with plane tickets and some education. In this the reference to "The Best and The Brightest" which I have read is of course correct --- our best and brightest jumped the shark in WWII and have been headed south fast since. Time to cancel the show.
"The last gasp of the Eastern Establishment. Let's see them think their way out of fission" --Tricky Dick POTUS character- "Watchmen".
Karzai in Kabul, Taliban in
Karzai in Kabul, Taliban in their safe harbor of NW Pakistan. Increasing US troop numbers without a firm notion of how they can be used to tackle an increasingly complex internal and external enemy, and nettlesome questions (mostly from the left) on how to best tailor force and economic aid and governance help to a murky set of goals..
"Our best judgment is that he can't be successful on this basis. We hope that he comes to see that, but in the final analysis it is the people and the government itself who have to win or lose this struggle. All we can do is help, and we are making it very clear, but I don't agree with those who say we should withdraw. That would be a great mistake. I know people don't like Americans to be engaged in this kind of an effort. ...
"Americans have been killed in combat with the enemy, but this is a very important struggle even though it is far away.
"We . . . made this effort to defend Europe. Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate--we may not like it--in the defense of Asia. "
So, who said this? SecDef Gates? Either Bush or Obama? Stan McChrystal?
It was JFK in 1963, speaking to Walter Cronkite on the subject of Vietnam.
Vietnam - did not attack the
Vietnam - did not attack the homeland. Nor did their aspirations range beyond their own borders or near borders.
While the Vietnamese *may* have employed suicide sappers, they weren't exploding in NY, DC, PA, or the UK. Not to mention Madrid, Bali, Mooroco, Mumbai...etc.
I don't know why anyone else is in it, but I got back in fat ass and all to defend the homeland, however we were distracted or sidetracked.
Which doesn't mean we're on the right track, although I think Triage, the Pope and the current President deserve their year at bat. In particular since the Paks seem more on board then in the recent past. If now warts and all is the chance to squeeze these bastards from both ends then by all means.
"Afghanistan" (whatever that
"Afghanistan" (whatever that creature is) also didn't attack the homeland, Elf. Call the Taliban unindicted co-conspirators if you want, but they didn't attack the homeland.
Come to think of it, those who did attack our homeland did so FROM WITHIN OUR HOMELAND after doing much of the scutwork in Hamburg, Germany, the joint we bombed to ashes six decades ago, a large city in a nation that's also our staunch ally.
Is our goal to contain al Qaeda attacks against us and our allies? Or is it to umpire a civil war in Afghanistan that will continue, thanks to India, Iran, Tajikisan, Uzbekistan and Pakistan, whether we stay or go?
Is building a liberal democracy with a market economy in Afghanistan the ONLY means for us to achieve our goals? Or have our goals shifted since 2001 to something quite different?
When the mission creep is over (stopping Shiite Afghan family rape is currently being championed by Parliament, eradication of the poppy crop by our DEA), where will al Qaeda be? I suspect still in NW Goateffistan, across the border, waving at our drones.
On another point, Elf, there
On another point, Elf, there are about 12 largish militias currently comprising the many insurgencies (it's not a monopoly) in AfPak. Some are the Taliban armies, but others are local concerns exacerbated by the occupation or a disgust with Karzai's regime or sectarian flare ups.
Currently, a key strategic plan (hate to call it that) is to woo back some of the Taliban militiamen we can hack away from their movements, so it's not as if we're opposed to having predominately Pasthun Islamists return to share power with the warlords, Karzai flunkies and whatnot bepopulating a landmass the size of Texas but really ruling only Kabul (thanks to the French).
Not every Soldier or Marine killed this year in Afghanistan will die at the hands of the "Taliban." Often, the press will call them that, or some criminal or sectarian groups will appropriate the name (but not the leadership) of the Taliban militias or we will, by default, simply assign credit to the wrong party.
"Taliban" really has become a way to signify "enemy," in much the same way that "Mujahideen" became an inclusive term for what actually were a varied mix of different insurgencies, with different goals and different means of trying to achieve them against the Soviets.
"Fnord" in a previous thread
"Fnord" in a previous thread you mentioned that you think the Afghans should increase the education budget. Keep in mind that Afghanistan's education system already spends more than the annual revenues of the GIRoA.
My view is that Afghanistan needs to spend $60 billion over the next 20 years on education. This is necessary in my view for Afghanistan to generate $250 per capita in tax revenue by 2030, which is what I think will be necessary for the GIRoA to balance its budget. The $60 billion education outlay is one reason I think why Afghanistan needs $250 billion in international grants over 20 years to succeed.
Many in this thread say that this is too much money to be realistic. If so, what detailed strategy do you propose that could succeed with lower grants than $250 billion?
"there are about 12 largish
"there are about 12 largish militias currently comprising the many insurgencies (it's not a monopoly) in AfPak. Some are the Taliban armies, but others are local concerns exacerbated by the occupation or a disgust with Karzai's regime or sectarian flare ups." Great point.
SNLII, the ANSF, and specifically the 111st Kabul Capital Division (subordinate to the 201st ANA Corps HQs), manage security for Kabul. Isn't this a success story for the ANSF? Granted the vast majority of Kabul residents hate the Taliban, which makes success there much easier than in Kandahar and Helmand, where the Taliban have more popular support than they do in any of the other 32 Afghan provinces. {34 Afghan provinces in total.}
Jihad in Afghanistan:
Jihad in Afghanistan: Defending Muslims or Defending al-Qa'ida?
Anand, in the event the
Anand, in the event the French and the rest of NATO left Afgahnistan, it wouldn't take long for the Taliban to reach the gates of Kabul. Geography actually makes the defense of the capital difficult, but not as difficult as those who would be, well, asked to defend it.
As I said before, the day we leave and the Taliban begin their push, most of the security forces will dissolve, just as they did in the Soviet era when facing the Mujahideen.
While I hope this wouldn't occur, I have no reason to believe that it won't.
SNLII, the attacks on the
SNLII, the attacks on the homeland emanated in large part from extreme elements in Pakistan (Afghanistan was a semi ISI protectorate) and Saudi Arabia. Remember that the ISI sent a wire transfer to Mohammed Atta a month before 9/11. {One could make the case that the ISI did so to to solicit Mohammed Atta's help with respect to attacking India and did not suggest that the ISI supported the 9/11 attacks.} America couldn't take on the source directly, so we took them on indirectly in Afghanistan.
The policy has had significant successes:
http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/265.pdf
-87% of Pakistanis now say that terrorism is never justified; which might be higher than any other country
-The vast majority of Pakistanis dislike the Taliban, Osama Bin Laden, and Al Qaeda linked networks
-87% of Pakistanis think the Taliban shouldn't be allowed to attack Afghanistan from Pakistani territory
-By a 50% to 29% margin, Pakistanis now feel that their country should play a larger role in fighting global terrorism.
This has never happened before since 1947. Pakistanis have turned sharply and viscerally anti Takfiri extremist. The salutary affects of this on the world are likely to be enormous.
As an off topic aside, the poll mentioned that 86% of Pakistanis feel that their army is having a positive affect on Pakistan. Is this a good thing or a bad thing?
SNLII, you don't have
SNLII, you don't have evidence for your assertion that the ANA would melt away. I hardly think the 203rd ANA Corps would fold up. I think they would fight like heck for Kabul, in a way they wouldn't fight for Helmand and Kandahar . . . that they might see as enemy territory anyway.
Remember that the Soviet backed government lasted for two years after the last soviet troops left Afghanistan. Only when Dostum switched sides was the government brought down. This was despite the fact that US, Saudi and Pakistani aid to the Mujaheddin went up after the Soviets left.
"IF" the ANA and ANP continue to get substantial foreign funding, they would likely fight like heck for most of the country, but cede large parts of the South and smaller parts of the East to the enemy.
The ANA don't fight like
The ANA don't fight like "heck" now, but we always have to trot out a PAO who will chirp that they were "in the lead."
Yeah, the lead to the chow, then to a nap and then behind the nearest Marine shooting in front of them.
THe same thing will happen in a year or two when we leave. The ethnic divisions in the nation will return the forces to front lines similar to what were there in 2001, before the invasion.
I have no doubt about this, and I can't think of any US commander who imagines in otherwise.
Returning to my Vietnam
Returning to my Vietnam analogy at Visitor @ 11:26 am:
I'll ask a question I believe I have heard or read Dr. Bacevich ask or intimate:
"If the United States staying in Afghanistan is, like the US staying in Vietnam, not in the best interests of the United States, not in the best interests of the foreign nations concerned, and not in the best interests of the world economy and the world at large, then in whose best interest are we really talking about here?"
Who gains(ed) by our continued presence in Afghanistan (and Vietnam)?
The education and the
The education and the defense by Anand.
I only know what I read, here and elsewhere. And I don't plan to go to high altitude Hell to find out firsthand.
@SNLII. I know. I know. I don't care as long as they aren't going batshit in NY/NJ. Which for some reason, perhaps it's because we are going off in their crib that they aren't. Maybe not. I really don't hold any illusions I hope that we are going to build even the Philipines, never mind South Korea in SW Asia. My priorities are 1) the homeland - which they need a safe haven to attack from, and Hamburg isn't anymore, and 2) Our close allies (Brits).
Quite aware what happens since comes from our dear ally to the south. Not sure what to do about it, unless you can filch the launch codes. You can get closer than me. I looked for the WO at the town hall meeting, but he wasn't in view.* I wouldn't spend one drop of sweat or blood for the smack dealing hellhole, but I don't make policy.
AM and so many others have put some major time and effort (and blood) into this - and if the mission as articulated by Triage and the Prez are held to they deserve their 12 mos. Not to mention that at this point in time the Pakis seem to be getting serious, the enemy has lost some key leaders, and maybe we can talk. For awhile.
After Aug 2010 - reevaluate. And I predict declare a measure of victory, retrench to the Mayorality of Kabul, etc and resume CT/Drone strikes. Sometimes life is just buying time. Shitty answer. Shitty choices. I still favor plan A - massive punitive reprisals make the point. I don't mean Hellfires. I mean Hell. But Triage seems to be the plan now, and it will I think make some headway.
*now that should keep our watchers listers busy ;-)
SNLII – I ask what is
SNLII – I ask what is worth the life of one NATO solider. At what point do we have something that is worth expending both bold and treasure. Is a stable, safe secure Afghanistan not worth it?
Is the eradication of AQ, if at all possible, worth it? Just not sure what you consider a viable goal here is other then leave them in their rock pile with their family rape and opium crop.
That’s immoral. To spend the decade since WWII talking up America as the great bastion of freedom and liberty and then walk away from a deal you offered a backwards country.
And then there’s the quote from JFK, and maybe it’s been a hard week at work and study but that quote seems to serve my naive idealistic mindset quote well, “We also have to participate--we may not like it--in the defence of Afghanistan”.
Break it, bought it, and as I have said all along this should not be the US/NATO alone, if China wants a copper mine in Afghanistan then it better pony up the same young men to bleed out in the dirt.
Doesn't it seem a bit
Doesn't it seem a bit simplistic to assume that our withdrawal presumes a return to the status quo ante in Afghanistan? From what I'm reading here, people appear to believe that once we're gone, Afghanistan will again be the Taliban Emirate. Which means leads to argument that our interests can be more easily secured by essentially not making the mistakes the world made in the nineties in regards to Central and Southwest Asia. But why do we immediately presume that the Taliban would be able to occupy anything more than a rump Pashtunistan? Certainly the Northern Alliance warlords that held onto their mini-state during the Taliban's time in power are far stronger now than they were prior to the invasion. We make assertions about the how the security forces would melt, but doesn't that presume their aren't other interests and groups in Afghanistan that would fight as hard as the Taliban to preserve the prerogatives if the Taliban really do start 'marching' into Kabul? I even wonder how quickly the Taliban would be able to transform into a fighting machine designed to exploit NATO weaknesses into one of conquest and occupation.
How can we assume that the Pakistani calculus hasn't changed to some degree, especially after experiencing their own Islamic extremist nuisance? That's not to say the Pakistanis would not meddle, but we can't blithely say it would take the exact same form. Or India, whose support for the Northern Alliance does not get much play: would they be encouraged to start heavily supporting their own proxy in the event of a withdrawal? Afghanistan is not Vietnam, and the Taliban are not the North Vietnamese; their domination isn't exactly assured just because we're out.
Which is not to make an argument either way about staying or going. I just like Ex's comment on 'thoughts after withdrawal.' Would Balkinization be a wholly inappropriate term? Not that I want the encourage 'we need to stay to prevent even more bloodshed and ethnic strife' theme which became popular in Iraq in 2005 and 2006. Does anyone have some real thoughts on what a Post-NATO Afghanistan would look like, or is that just too many variables to even consider?
We offered the weak, rentier
We offered the weak, rentier "state" of Afghanistan a "deal?" What "deal" was that?
To bury a few thousand of our soldiers? To patch tens of thousands of their wounds? To provide security and economic development and schools and whatnot for the Afghans (so far eight years and counting) over the next few decades, all in apparently a vital need to turn the "nation" into the Burkino Faso of the Hindu Kush?
What "deal" is that? We didn't "break" Afghanistan. It was broken decades ago. Apparently, and despite our best efforts, it will be broken -- by the Afghans themselves in conspiracy with their larger, richer neighbors -- decades from now.
It's none of my business if Afghan wheat prices can't approximate what they can make from opium sales to Iran. It's none of my business if Shiite Afghans I don't know have strange and abhorrent folk practices. America is a great bastion of freedom and liberty, but get this pretty effin' straight: The deal begins when you cross our border, not when we cross yours.
We might be a shining city on a hill, but we shouldn't travel the globe spending our blood and treasure erecting franchises unless we derive some benefit from it, the chief asset being greater security for our own people or those to whom we're bound by treaty to defend.
We gain nothing from Afghanistan except, apparently, the enmity of many Afghans who don't want us there, especially when we force down their throats a government only about 15 percent of adults there will elect on first ballot.
NATO is an alliance that exists to mutually defend each other from outside threats. The threat to us doesn't come from the vast majority of insurgents in Afghanistan (most of whom are actually in Pakistan, where we can't get them), but rather from a group of foreign fighters safely scratching their asses in some cave we can't find or, even if we did, take.
In the meantime, we're tossing on the pyre of alliance the volunteer militaries of our dear friends in Canada and Denmark and the Netherlands.
Ask not what we can do for Afghanistan. Ask, finally, what Afghanistan is willing to do for themselves.
"AM and so many others have
"AM and so many others have put some major time and effort (and blood) into this "
CNAS apparently is in some competition with AEI to produce the best Walt Rostow imitation for the next beltway think tank picnic. I really don't give a crap how much time and effort they've put into "Triage" or whatever.
Time and effort don't feed the bulldog. Results do.
We're now up to, what, our fifth strategic review? That's one every two months, and they seem no closer to determining reachable goals or articulating a strategic means of arriving at them except defaulting to expensive, time-consuming nation building for a nation that doesn't seem capable of building anything except opium barns, IED holes and coffins.
Exum is a bright, hard working and patriotic American who put his ass on the line for our nation and I applaud him. But we've got soldiers dying in the field today, Elf. They're our buddies and, for some unlucky families, fathers, sons, mothers and daughters.
We owe those who die in the name of this democracy a tad bit more than some fuzzy talk about al Qaeda, a line of BS pawned from a NGO who could go elsewhere to do some good and some applause for the narcotic kleptocracy of Karzai and his kin.
If you can't explain to them why they have to die, why their deaths matter, or that they were able to do something that progressed whatever goals we have left in Afghanistan, then we've failed as a nation.
"Doesn't it seem a bit
"Doesn't it seem a bit simplistic to assume that our withdrawal presumes a return to the status quo ante in Afghanistan? From what I'm reading here, people appear to believe that once we're gone, Afghanistan will again be the Taliban Emirate. "
I don't have a map in front of me, but geography and the ethnic topography of Afghanistan determines a lot of this. Whether the various (there are more than one) Taliban militias or the many localized revolts rule their roosts is none of our concern.
We apparently have no problem secretly trying to woo Taliban defectors back to stay Pasthun Islamists on the right side of the Durand Line instead of the left, so I get the feeling that anything short of giving Mullah Omar the deed to Afghanistan is acceptable.
For far less cost in blood and treasure, we offer CAS and other beneficial uses of force to the Karzai kleptocracy or whatever vaguely similar scrubs replace them to keep the Taliban sufficiently at bay. Or we could just let India and Iran go back to doing that.
Maybe Russia and China can split the pile of poo, competing to be the biggest fly on the turd.
Frankly, I don't care. I just fail to see why WE have to be that fly.
20,000 Americans died in
20,000 Americans died in Vietnam after 1968, when the war was essentially lost. How many more Americans will die in Afghanistan to fight an equally pointless war?
Hey, I'm not saying OEF is
Hey, I'm not saying OEF is lost. I'm willing to "win" it. I just need some definition of "win" that's cost-effective and ends up helping us meet our security objectives.
I so want the CNAS car salesmen to put me into an eight-year-old Strategimobile, complete with a Carfax report that will tell me what to expect.
I can think of a certain think tank director who didn't make that case today on NPR.
http://www.npr.org/templates/rundowns/rundown.php?prgId=2
"The problem with the
"The problem with the asymmetric mismatch between the U.S. and it’s foes is that we bring so astronomical a flow of resources in our wake that we end up “growing” our enemies" - that's from the following zenpundit post, which I imagine a fair number of readers here have, er, already read.
http://zenpundit.com/?p=3181
I like the articulation of 'minimalist' goals and I also like this, "While state building as an objective fascinates diplomats and the academic-NGO set, it is actually the least of our priorities and if we ever did build a strong state in Afghanistan, it’s first order of business would be to interfere in our making war on al Qaida and second, to kick us the hell out of their country."
But, as I've stated often, I have, like, zero subject-matter knowledge of any of these subjects. Which never stops me from flapping my blog-comment gums......well, the internet is a low form of discourse according to many folks. I mean, everyday people and stuff say just what they think. Good heavens.
@SNLII, OK, I'll go along
@SNLII,
OK, I'll go along with CONPLAN 6:13 PM. Not that it matters what I think, really.
And I think the 68K troops are going to be fighting until Aug 2010 on the Pope's encycilcal Humanae Goatshagus Protectus. Then a conclave. Then white smoke from the chimney, then a new Supreme Pontiff.
And we'll still be there.
But I think you are better informed than me. Thanks for info.
Look, I've been for "launch codes, please" all along. You can't get much more bloody minded than that, unless CERE has perfected some sort of black hole weapon, or we have Doctor Manhattan on ice somewhere.
@Madhu - keep plugging. BTW the stuff on health care holes great.
Oh, Elf, I was just joking
Oh, Elf, I was just joking around. This must be a very difficult time for some people in more serious positions than mine - I can only feel sympathy and wish them the best.
(Yeah, I know I promised to 'pay attention' and whatnot, and I hope I am doing due diligence to my promise, but I will probably move back to the healthcare stuff and spend a lot less time around here and other milblogs. Healthcare is my main area of interest and lots of docs are so very, very energized. It's something unusual - we are so apathetic, generally, which is a big part of the problem. We are more responsible for the problems than we would like to admit, I'm afraid. Sorry about the OT).
"Comment by SNLII on August
"Comment by SNLII on August 14, 2009 - 4:18pm"
:lol:
Love your style SNLII. Keep in mind that the Taliban's soldiers will not be as motivated to fight in Kabul and other parts of Afghanistan where they know the locals hate them. What makes you think the ANA is any less motivated than the Taliban? Especially Taliban fighting outside their local area. I stand by the assertion that with money the ANA and ANP would be able to hang on to most of Afghanistan, excluding large swaths of Helmand, Kandahar, and other provinces near the Pakistani border.
Right now the Afghans, 91% of whom have an unfavorable view of the Taliban, 92% of whom have an unfavorable view of Osama Bin Laden, 91% of whom have an unfavorable view of the Pakistan, are free riding on ISAF blood. They won't be able to do this after ISAF combat troops leave. When is the last time the ANA lost a company level engagement in Afghanistan? Losing has few negative consequences to ANA soldiers and to Afghans, because the ISAF will bail them out of any real trouble. Many of them might not feel motivated holding on to villages close to the Pakistani border, but will feel a lot more passionate about fighting in the interior of Afghanistan; in parts of Afghanistan where the ANA is loved, and the Taliban is hated. I think the ANA will fight when they know that if their unit is overrun, they will be killed; and when they know that if they lose, Kabul and other major Afghan cities will fall.
SNLII, the reason the ANA hasn't been tested in a real heavy fights is because ISAF won't let them get into one without rushing in air support and QRF. How do you know what the ANA will do in a heavy fight?
A few months ago, the ANA got into a major fire fight with 200-300 or more Taliban (the ANA and ANP claimed they were "Pakistanis" and other "foreigners") in Farah. The firefight lasted 12 hours or so. ISAF didn't let it play out. Close air support was called in to support the ANA and ANP. Some allege it was the worst civilian deaths incident since 2001. Do we really know that the ANA and ANP couldn't have held out without close air support?
SNLII, you do have a point, that America shouldn't bear the burden to defend Afghanistan alone. Iran, Russia, China, the Stans, and India would lose more than America if the Taliban defeated the GIRoA, ANA, and ANP. America should threaten to withdraw support form the Afghan campaign, unless they step up more than they have. Keep in mind that in many cases they have stepped up, and their offers of help have not been accepted.
The recent Russia/US joint statement specifically stated that the US and Russia would cooperation on training and equipping the ANSF. Several past Russian offers to train the ANSF have not been taken advantage of (I have seen Russian officials complain about this publicly. {For understandable reasons, the GIRoA would prefer that Russian help be inconspicuous.} Indian offers to train the ANSF have not been taken advantage of; although India is involved in training the ANA and ANAAC on a smaller scale. India would almost be willing to give the Afghans several times as much as the $2.1 billion they have pledged if they felt it was necessary to defeat the Taliban. Iran offered to train 20,000 ANSF under US supervision in 2001 and 2002. I suspect they would be willing to play a much larger role if asked. I suspect China, as Afghanistan's largest investor and trading partner, and as a country that Al Qaeda threatened to attack in the last week, would be willing to do a lot more if they couldn't free ride on ISAF.
Madhu: this strikes me as dead wrong: ""While state building as an objective fascinates diplomats and the academic-NGO set, it is actually the least of our priorities and if we ever did build a strong state in Afghanistan, it’s first order of business would be to interfere in our making war on al Qaida and second, to kick us the hell out of their country."" If the Afghans formed a powerful state, that state would try to milk ISAF for as much foreign aid, foreign trainers, and foreign advisers, as they possibly can. Remember, Madhu, the GIRoA's annual revenue is about 10% of their steady state expenditures. Any strong GIRoA will need massive foreign help to have a prayer of getting re-elected by the Afghan people. We shouldn't forget that Afghans dislike the Taliban and Al Qaeda linked networks much more than Westerners do. A strong GIRoA would likely be eager to show voters that they are fighting AQ linked networks.
SNLII might be right that the Taliban have popularity and legitimacy in Helmand, Kandahar and some other places near the Durand line. But this is not the case in most of Afghanistan.
Sigh, this website! Let me
Sigh, this website! Let me retry posting something and apologies if the other comment goes through, too.
Elf, I'm only joking with the 'low form of discourse' stuff - seriously, I wish only the best for all the people who have much more difficult decision making jobs than I do. All of this must be difficult and stressful.
Elf: "If you read anything
Elf: "If you read anything about what's most important to them it's getting a country to impose a true Islamic state on."
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/22731
June 11, 2009
"Bush's presidency represented an upheaval because it was both guided and blinded by a rigid ideological outlook and because of its uncommon proclivity to choose military over diplomatic means."
Morph to: If you read anything about what's most important to [the US] it's getting a country to impose a true Judaic-Christian state on.
But the principles that underlie the formation of the US were not meant to create a nation specifically Judaic-Christian. They were meant to create a nation wherein choice of religion was not constrained, one in which difference in religion did not lead to civil war or the burning of buildings in which were locked a group who followed an unpopular religion.
A characteristic of the British Empire was this mindset, as exposed in Callwell: "The ordinary native found in theatres of war peopled by coloured races lies simply for the love of the thing and his idea of time, numbers, and distance are of the vaguest, even when he is trying to speak the truth."
It is one Bush shared. It is a mindset that underlies the identification of cultural differences as qualities that make others different, absolutely, in ways that prevent cooperation.
Consider, Elf: if you lived in Christian France, would you have thought it cruel necessity when the Huguenots burned? Would you have fought for the Protestant or Catholic faith in Scotland and England? Are we to ravage the world now, to make it safe for our religion or our business interests, 'our way of life', abandoning all notions of freedom?
You would save a few, rather than eliminate the circumstances which require they be saved? Noble as your passion is, it is limited in those it favors, and condemns the rest to what you would save those few from - the imposition of a different way of life, because we have sufficient power to attempt such an imposition.
Remarks by Secretary Clinton, August 2009
state(dot)gov/secretary/rm/2009a/08/index.htm
Secretary's of Remarks: Pakistan Independence Day Message
On this historic occasion, let me reaffirm the commitment of the United States to stand with Pakistanis in their struggle against violent extremism. I look forward to visiting Pakistan in the fall and continuing to work toward a stronger relationship with both the Government of Pakistan and its people.
Secretary's Remarks: Indian Independence Day Message
"I had the honor and pleasure of visiting India only weeks ago, and experienced firsthand the warmth and vitality of the people of India. On this historic occasion, let me reaffirm the deep commitment of the United States to work together to build a stronger partnership between our two nations based on common interests, shared values and mutual respect."
Common interests such as these? http://www.piramalpharmasolutions.com/about-us/piramal-group.html
Business news: "27 January 2009 Piramal Pharma Solutions (Informex Booth 1220) is on schedule to commission a new state of the art formulations development and clinical trial materials (CTM) supply centre at Ahmedabad, India. The centre will have GMP supply capabilities from March onwards."
"Jul 6, 2009 ... Piramal to be first pvt company to process opium - Jul 1, 2009"
Oxycondone is made from opium.
I do not intend to link Secretary of State Clinton to specific interests, or to attribute to her specific motives. Rather I intend to illustrate a business interest which easily could be perceived as of sufficient "value" to serve as a reason to support warfare which opens up new terrain for expansion of those interests. However, in order for business to continue on in its course, "violent extremism" - originating from those who are the victims of war waged for economic dominance, or perhaps from a rival economic interest - must be eradicated - if possible.
If possible.
@Madhu, I know you can't
@Madhu,
I know you can't mean me. My most difficult decision in the next couple of hours will be whether to go with Coors, Coors Light, or Bully Hill. Don't worry, I don't think the people with the difficult decisons to make mind hearing from an intelligent, educated vox populi. Trust me if they did they wouldn't come here...and you probably have had to make a lot of difficult decisions yourself, Doc.
Low form of discourse - I'll take it over the Bland Corporation boilerplate any day. If the language of the marketplace was good enough for Socrates and his student Plato....
@Visitor 747, --if you want
@Visitor 747,
--if you want to continue dialogue for some reason, please get a handle, so I know who I'm talking to....
Bush was Christian. The NYT asserted that this guided his FP. The Times dear Visitor is not to be trusted on matters Christian, or partisan. Do you have any other evidence that he was on crusade? Like when he invited CAIR to the White House, for Chrissakes? Ooopps...I meant "Wallah". Where is your work, as the math professors used to say?
If by business must continue you mean not being incinerated while sitting at work at NYC or London, yes. The only business that continued that we should have interrupted was Al-Saud, whom we should have eradicated. I like that word BTW.
You kind of leave out a certain Tuesday a few years ago. That usually gets left out, it doesn't fit the narrative. Casus Belli must somehow be our fault. Somehow.
They don't have enough on that rockpile to fund ops there for a month. Never mind 7 years.
Clinton quotes - not sure what to make of that....
"On the consequences front,
"On the consequences front, there is also the question to what extent AQ has developed during the last 8 years, from an elitist network to a regional affiliation of various groups"
You don't seem to be aware that Alq had its regional affiliated groups well and truly established BEFORE 9/11.
It was quite a shock to we Australians to realise that AlQ's jihadis had been well entrenched in the Phillipines, Indonesia and Malaysia for some years. This came to light for Australians when we learnt that an AlQ-affiliate Jemaah Islamiya attack on the Australian embassy in Singapore had been narrowly aborted as a follow up to 9/11.
I guess that's why Bush called it a "global war on terror".
JI basically sprang out of Afghanistan training camps as far back as 1993. It turned out they had recruited fans here in OZ too.
I get the feeling the memories of many commenters here reach back only 8 years. They appear to have memory lapses about the ALQ terror attacks that started against Americans and other nationalties as far back as 1992?
I
SMG: The US has been in the
SMG: The US has been in the Philippines since... well, when?
Elf: You like the word eradicate. I'll identify myself as Visitor 747 when I address you, how's that.
"SMG: The US has been in the
"SMG: The US has been in the Philippines since... well, when? "
Interestingly, it was AFTER the US quit Subic Bay in 1992 that the Alq inspired Islamic terrorist groups got traction.
http://globalsociology.com/20
http://globalsociology.com/2009/04/12/heroes-and-villains-in-a-chosen-co...
SMG - The Philippines have
SMG - The Philippines have been of interest to the US, sufficiently to merit attention in terms of foreign policy, at least since the 1800's. There are significant difference between the world of the 1800's and that of the 2000's. One important difference is that the security afforded by geographical isolation no longer protects the inhabitants of a country which invades others. Another is that it is possible for observers outside a country being attacked to observe the cost to those attacked, in terms of personal experience and in terms of the destruction to the county. A third is that sources of information are so varied that the ability to limit the narrative of an event to one side, only, is not as great.
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