Center for a New American Security

Maybe I'm confused by this

Maybe I'm confused by this format.

I assumed it was going to follow some sort of Dear Abby model: A question or concern would be offered, and then you would respond with an explanation about how Stan the Man's "plan" is going to answer that (apparently, now with fewer troops and a tighter timeline).

While the past two submissions might be good "conversation starters," at some point one must begin conversing.

While you do this, I'm counting on you to explore how we shall tailor force to achieve whatever political ends are being discussed, with an eye toward quaint concepts like how this fits into our grand strategic designs elsewhere (include lost costs by continuing down this goat path).

On another note, you end quote in the Figaro article was hilarious. That was the best you could offer? My, you have become reticent at CNAS!

The old Abu M would've said something downright controversial and funny, perhaps with an odd reference to your flatmate's gangly cousin's cricket skills added to make it truly memorable.

"Even the so-called

"Even the so-called influence on Afghanistan on Pakistan is overstated. From 1996 to 2001, when the Taliban controlled 90% of Afghanistan, Pakistan was more stable and under less pressure from Islamist radicals than at present when we and the Karzai regime control most of Afghan territory." Untrue. Pakistan was close to an AQ linked (or Punjabi Taliban) takeover before 9/11, and its nuclear weapons arsenal was less safe than now. The largest single reason for the current Afghan policy is Pakistan. It is only a partial oversimplification to say that the policy in Afghanistan is about "Pakistan containment."

"As I have written elsewhere: “Afghanistan has a pretty well established pattern of governance. Securing the loyalty of local elites provides stability." This isn't even true post Darrani, let alone before 1747. The center has to demonstrate that it was a highly effective military and then use this military as leverage, and cash, to reach a series of agreements with the tribes. What is happening in Afghanistan now is a in large part foreign financed (Gulf money) and supported insurgency out of Pakistan (nonstate actors.) There is also substantial "poppy financing."

"But instead of trying to take advantage of this, we’re seeking to overturn it in order to try to implement an operational doctrine that requires establishing a monopoly of force by the central government along with efforts to build popular loyalty through good governance." Does this have to be so? Can't the Afghan government have elected provincial and district governance and devolve power to them? Perhaps this is more a critic of President Karzai than anyone else.

I would also assert that the GIRoA, ANSF and ISAF do control all of Afghanistan aside from pockets in Helmand, Kandahar and Konar. That is 31 out of 34 provinces.

Did 2001/2002 disrupt AQ linked networks? Tactically yes. But strategically? Strategically, what better way to disrupt AQ than educating millions of Afghans? Afghanistan now has 2 1/2 million girls in primary school versus perhaps a tenth as many in 2001; and 45,000 freshman in college versus perhaps 1,000 to 2,000 in 2001. Just imagine how much this Strategically disrupts the Taliban and AQ linked networks.

Strategically, the primary struggle with the extremists is ideological.

When I was a 30 year old

When I was a 30 year old Special Forces officer, I took De Oppresso Liber seriously. By the time I became a 38 year old civilian, I had realized De Oppresso Liber was a farce. We were the "cutting edge of foreign policy?" Hardly. We were more likely the cutting edge of immunological research, with all the crap we brought back in our bloodstreams from various sewers of the third world.

Now, after 17 years of natural science and conservation, I'm trying to get back into the loop of my old profession by reading the war blogs and the books, for reasons that aren't all yet clear to me, perhaps nostalgia, but mainly to understand as a citizen, not as a policy analyst. The nuts and bolts of policy aren't as important as the why's and wherefores.

As I catch up, I don't see that things have changed very much in the Army, Special Forces, or the military from my days of service, unfortunately. (For example, are we any more purple now than we were 20 years ago?). But when you add what all you contemporary defense professionals are writing about to what I've been studying for nearly two decades, the depletion and destruction of natural resources in service of empire and capital, well, I'm not exactly sanguine about the future unless we find some way to pull back from an imperial interpretation of what our legitimate interests as a country are. That's the question that interests me as a citizen.

Andrew has struck me as a highly intelligent young man trying to make his way in the official policy wonk world, which we all know is fundamentally amoral and callous, even more so than the Army--there's no Ranger Creed in DC, and damn few friends. The creed in DC and government is "do unto others before they do it to you." Policy is calculus rather than philosophy until it becomes history, as we try to explain what went wrong and why. There hasn't been much that's been right during my lifetime. We've had a lot of thinking and explaining to do. Not that it's made much difference in policy, especially where Afghanistan, Iraq, and Islamic "extremism" are concerned. Are Takfiris truly more extreme than the neo-cons? Al-Qaeda blew up the Twin Towers. The neo-cons and the Bush administration tried to blow up the US Constitution, and may have succeeded. Which is the greater threat?

That's why we're here--to make sense of immoral, irrational, and impractical policies in central Asia and the world. Our actions don't match what we claim our ends are. It would be more honest if we admitted imperial ends; at least we'd have a firm foundation for our debates, instead of the bullshit ideology.

In any case, intellectually, COIN and related political-military topics can be a rush, and one can appreciate Andrew's excitement in discovering this field of study. Weren't we all so excited all those years ago? I appreciate very much that he started and maintains this blog; I've learned a tremendous amount from it, not only from his comments, but from everyone else's. I think it's one of the top 3 or 4 such blogs. Certainly, its quality dipped when he moved to CNAS, and I would agree that that problem arose from his moving into the establishment. How many times have I seen CNAS referenced as the administration's national security think tank in the WaPo? That's a real limit on independence. Nevertheless, it was clear to me from Andrew's first blog posting after he returned from his recent sojourn with Stan and the boys that he had learned something important--that things in Af'stan were both FUBAR and irretrievable and that no amount of massaging COIN doctrine and operations would change that. We really do need to dig more into strategy, grand strategy, and what America's ultimately about.

In short, I think Andrew's realized in his gut, which is what really counts, that perhaps the critiques of Andrew Bacevich and others of similar mind have real weight. Andrew, and CNAS moreso, given its current establishment status, need help in getting this message across in a way that no one has to fall on his or her sword after speaking the truth.

EMN

I am the author of today's

I am the author of today's piece.

@anand: What empirical evidence can you present about your claim that Pakistan was close to an AQ takeover prior to 9/11?

More significantly..."Just imagine how much this Strategically disrupts the Taliban and AQ linked networks." Look... that sounds good. But what evidence can you present for this? Is there any evidence that the "Taliban" or AQ are having trouble recruiting? The problem is that radical groups are tiny in comparison to the population. They require maybe a couple of thousand recruits per year and maybe a few hundred million dollars in funding. It is virtually impossible, if you stop to think about it, to affect macro-economic or macro-political factors sufficiently to shut constrict their ability to function.

The problem is that most people misunderstand the meaning of the word "strategic." Attacking "upstream" factors sounds strategic because it is BIG. But a strategic argument is merely one that connects actions with desired outcomes. If you concluded, for instance, that UBL was the absolutely lynchpin of the "jihadist" movement, assassinating him would be a "strategic" action, even though it appears "small" and hence would be called tactical.

--BF

I am the author of today's

I am the author of today's piece.

@anand: What empirical evidence can you present about your claim that Pakistan was close to an AQ takeover prior to 9/11?

More significantly..."Just imagine how much this Strategically disrupts the Taliban and AQ linked networks." Look... that sounds good. But what evidence can you present for this? Is there any evidence that the "Taliban" or AQ are having trouble recruiting? The problem is that radical groups are tiny in comparison to the population. They require maybe a couple of thousand recruits per year and maybe a few hundred million dollars in funding. It is virtually impossible, if you stop to think about it, to affect macro-economic or macro-political factors sufficiently to shut constrict their ability to function.

The problem is that most people misunderstand the meaning of the word "strategic." Attacking "upstream" factors sounds strategic because it is BIG. But a strategic argument is merely one that connects actions with desired outcomes. If you concluded, for instance, that UBL was the absolutely lynchpin of the "jihadist" movement, assassinating him would be a "strategic" action, even though it appears "small" and hence would be called tactical.

--BF

To conclude: a. The United

To conclude:

a. The United States continuing involvement in Afghanistan does nothing to preclude the emergence of a Eurasian hegemon. In fact, US involvement in Afghanistan is more likely to continue to destabilize the region and, thereby, require even greater US effort in this un-ending and counter-productive cause. This results in an even greater and quicker weakening of the United States -- relative to new rising powers. As such, America's continuing involvement in Afghanistan is counter-productive, in that it makes the emergence of a Eurasian hegemon more, rather than less, likely.

b. The continuing involvement of the United States in Afghanistan does nothing to enhance the extraction of maximum economic benefit from Afghanistan and from this region. As was the case in Vietnam, such involvement by the United States actually delays and precludes the achievement of optimum economic activity and precludes the conditions necessary for such activity to take place. When the United States leaves Vietnam, the "stone age," rabidly "anti-capitalist" people of Vietnam are "transformed" almost overnight -- becoming more modern and better members of the international community. Economic benefit -- for the Vietnamese people, for the United States, and for people throughout the world -- skyrockets once the Americans leave.

Andrew, Could you at least

Andrew,
Could you at least post your formal answer to these questions, so we can have an understanding of your rationale?

I want to clarify a point. I

I want to clarify a point.

I am indeed proposing a sort of "repetitive raiding." But I am not suggesting it as a substitute for COIN. My view is that adversaries seeking to engage us with "asymmetric" means should, as much as possible, be refused battle. The fact is, a bunch of guys with AK-47 and caches of old 155 shells are not a threat to the United States, and it does not make sense to stay for years abroad in order to convert them to pro-American views.

The sort of raiding I am proposing involves destruction of capabilities to harm the United States. A "rogue" state building WMD in example. A terrorist state that allows the construction of open terrorist training camps is another.

My point is that we had achieve our goals in Iraq and Afghanistan within 9 to 21 months in Iraq and within 6 months in Afghanistan. At that point, we had ended the direct threat they posed, and we then got into a process of trying to prevent threats from emerging again from those places. My objection with COIN is that it is a form of the "war to end all wars" argument. We have to remain until Afghanistan is never again a threat. Well that is too costly... and anyway won't work.

A great tragedy that no one mentions is that the notion that regime change must involve nation building as its follow-on corollary makes is less likely that we will be willing to regime change again in the future... when there may be circumstances when regime change is actually warranted.

Dr FInel, there was a point

Dr FInel, there was a point you made on your blog that I had heard in a different manner posed by several Pakistani generals with whom I've been discussing COIN: The Taliban in its Afghan form in Kabul held close to 90 percent of a landmass the size of Texas with a mere fraction of the number of troops necessary for the US to prosecute its verison of COIN.

Why is this so?

Beyond the obvious mention about tooth-to-tail in our force structure, the generals and you make a very good observation, and perhaps it's best understood as a paradox: The US and our allies and the Afghan security forces 1) lack legitimacy, which compels them to use vast numbers and spend vast dollars to compensate; and, 2) This compensation in the form of more occupation, more of that great Karzai "government" and more dollars spent helps to drive the anti-colonial, anti-Karzai insurgency AND adds about a third of what the Taliban take in for revenues, since their tax collectors skim a percentage of the development dollars in order to allow it to continue; and, 3) While we continue to try to recruit internal support from the warlords who already have guns (but who are detested by the people) or the returning diaspora (mostly western educated professional who are considered not exactly Afghan), we fail to deliver in a grammar the mostly illiterate rural farmers currently lending their tacit support to the Foco rebellion well understand (which is to say, engaging them through Islam, Pasthunization, et al).

It becomes a circular problem: As we "Surge," we bring more money (which goes to the Taliban in the form of taxes), more troops (which furher enflames the anti-occupation backlash), create more refugees (which stream to rickety provinces already hard hit in Pakistan, such as the exodus most recently to Balochistan), which further destabilize Pakistan's tenuous government along the frontier; but we have to "Surge" or yada... yada... yada...

Or at least this is the way the generals explain it to me.

Let's say that a great many troops and a great many dollars over a great many months can pacify Kabul and environs and keep the twin Taliban forces at bay on the Afghan side of the border for a year or more. Is that enough "success," or will we inevitably always have to contend with destabilization from across the other side of the Durand Line, perhaps aided by our allies in Islamabad for their own internal reasons?

"Untrue. Pakistan was close

"Untrue. Pakistan was close to an AQ linked (or Punjabi Taliban) takeover before 9/11, and its nuclear weapons arsenal was less safe than now. "

Anand, I'm sorry but I just don't see this. For all sorts of domestic reasons, the Pakistani military and intelligence service used the movements of both the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban expertly to dissipate those sorts of tensions. The push for jihadist solutions in Afghanistan against the NA and to consolidate rule in Kabul really was a means of drawing the Pasthuns into the sphere of Pakistan's influence without exacerbating sectarian differences.

The reality is that Pakistan has long considered various Salafi-inspired cells within its borders or under Islamabad's influence in Afghanistan as strategic chits, to be redeemed against neighboring rivals (most especially India) in lieu of total war (which now includes mutual assured destruction by thermo-nuclear bombs).

The nation that felt the hard hand of this violence wasn't Pakistan, but India and, to a lesser extent, Iran, the nations that clandestinely supported the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.

If the US left today, Pakistan would try to revert to a more open support of the Taliban in their fight against the sectarian and past mujahideen entities within the the Alliance. Some might complain that Pakistan is trying to ride a tiger, and sometimes the tiger bites.

To which a Pakistani would say that it's better to be atop the tiger than in its mouth.

See also Syria's handling of the foreign fighters streaming to Anbar, longtime Iranian support for the anti-Baath (and anti-Shah) Kurdish sectarian movements and India's previous acceptance of the LTTE.

And some point, one might mention the story of the scorpion...

Well, ISI understands the nature of these scorpions perhaps better than we do.

@G.D. I wasn't actually

@G.D.

I wasn't actually taking a stand on whether Saddam was a threat or not. I was just pointing out that whatever definition you wanted to use, the "threat" from Iraq was eliminated by -- at the latest -- Dec. 2004 when the ISG report documented conclusively that Iraq did not have WMDs. Until that point, it could have been argued, I guess, that the uncertainty about that was a threat.

We can, in short, neutralize threats relatively cheaply. The massive cost comes in when we try to "lock in" the future.

Bernard: Hello! I like your

Bernard:

Hello!

I like your point about "refusing battle" when the US is faced with asymmetric threats. Doug Macgregor a few months ago had an excellent front page article on just this very topic in Armed Forces Journal. I often ask when I hear Coindinistas and other new age unconventional warriors always move to the default position of persistent conflict and protraction as the natural condition of war nowadays and that American strategy must conform to this condition which means an acceptance of protraction on our part. Why would we do this as a matter of choice, or if nothing else as a default position for our understanding of the nature of war? But when we do, we fall into the strategy of tactics trap that the Coindinistas have us in now which is a dogmatic acceptance of protraction then an automatic operational imperative of implying the tactics of population centric counterinsurgency. We have no strategy, only tactics.

Moreover, what population centric counterinsurgency has done is to attempt to create a theory of total war in an age of limited war imposed by nuclear weapons. I don’t know how much more total one can get in an age of nukes, but without using them, when one talks about using the American Army and other forms of national power to "change entire societies." But to use a favorite (and worrisome) term of SNLII, "goatfuristan," why should we commit to total war to change the societies of these kinds of places when a cold look at our national interests demands a much more limited response, which I think of course is the point that you have been making.

gian

Visitor on August 9, 2009 -

Visitor on August 9, 2009 - 12:21pm
United States foreign policy and grand strategy is generally framed by two specific goals:
a.)To preclude the emergence of a Eurasian hegemon.

Iraq invasion explanation #2. "to keep the wolves from getting resources that should be OURS."

b.)To ensure that the United States can achieve maximum economic benefit from all countries, regions and peoples throughout the world.

Which is restated with the addition of a significant word in the conclusion:

b.The continuing involvement of the United States in Afghanistan does nothing to enhance the extraction of maximum economic benefit from Afghanistan and from this region.

As EMN says: depletion and destruction in the service of empire and capital.

Visitor on August 9, 2009 - 2:21pm I'm sure a number of this blog's readers will argue that this is simply the cost of doing business, and the benefits of keeping al-Qaeda and the Taliban disrupted and on the run are worth the risks of public outrage.
To those blog readers who so argue, I would point out that the lessons of history include ample warning against discounting the wrath of the public. The "cost of doing business" has become much higher than many people seem to want to acknowledge, the reasons for which appear to include training (someone else is balancing the books; I just do what I'm told), ideology (we are the Forces of Good, they are directed by Satan), and systems of cost accounting based on concepts of value which have limited application or are morally bankrupt.

Dogma is and always will be

Dogma is and always will be inflexible and therefore useless in a world that requires flexibility – just my way of saying that perhaps we need a little of this and a little of that, not necessarily a solid COIN centred view point but certainly not one that ignored the lessens learned from previous conflicts.

If we look to shift the debate from just CT/COIN framed argument to one that holds nation building as the primary reason for staying the course then COIN becomes an important part of that debate.

And yes as an Australian it’s easy for me to peg the US and the primary responder on the scene here but as I see it you built the global economic system, you have a responsibility to make it truly global, If that means stating in Afghanistan then so be it, a Afghanistan where girls get to go to school is better then one where they don’t.

Freedom isn’t free, and yes, I dare say that there are a series of valid arguments that say that the US should not shoulder the burden of nation building in the Congo, or Sudan or anywhere else, but really if it’s not you guys then who is it, I don’t see the Chinese stepping up to the plate.

Dave, There are a lot of

Dave,

There are a lot of factors that went into the rise of the so-called "Pakistani Taliban" and driving Afghani Taliban into Pakistan is only one. A much bigger factor, IMO, is that Pakistan's century-old methods of administering these areas (inherited from the British) have not changed while the reality on the ground changed. Pakistan has historically sought to placate its tribal areas through a patronage system to tribal maliks to preserve Pakistani interests and, most of all, prevent the Pashtun tribes from uniting. Over time, this system broke down primarily because the maliks became more interested in the patronage and less interested in maintaining the credibility to influence the tribes. In short, the maliks got greedy, were viewed as Pakistani stooges (not far from the truth) which provided space for more credible leadership to step into the fray. Enter a variety of leaders most notably the recently deceased Baitallah Mashud. It remains to be seen if Pakistan, once this latest offensive is over, will try to continue with business as usual in its colonial administration policies.

A Euro-weenies take on the

A Euro-weenies take on the issue, trying for balance. Its a shame that this has become a binary discussion, btw. I would also add that this is a funny time to have this discussion as Mc Chrystals surge is just beginning, and an evaluation is due in a year.

The pro-side:
1) The "once you break it, its yours" issue. The US went in and is still in with a considerable chunk of your state-resources and those of your allies. If the cut and run-crowd gets their wishes and we disentangle at greatest possible speed, those resources will have been wasted.
2) The quaint concept of honour: The US has made huge promises during the Bush years, promises a large amount of the Afghan nation has believed. By cutting and running instead of making one final serious effort we abandon all our local allies to the tender mercies of an Afghan civil war. We remember what happened to the soviet collaborists at the hands of the mujahedin. While Kabul may no fall immediately after a US withdrawal, then oddsa are for Kandahar to become a defacto capital for the resistance, and it will run with blood of those we promised loyalty.
3) International NGOs have also sunk a huge chunk of capital both human and economic into the effort. Abandoning the game in midplan means also abandoning this capital.
4) The AQ-Taleban relationship seems to have changed during the last 8 years. I dont have acess to proper intel, but it seems from reports that AQ has adapted the role as the Talebans SF, while at the outset of the conflict they were merely "guests" of the Talebs. A win in Afghanistan means a win for AQ just as much as it means a win for the Taleban. What such a win may resuløt in 20 years long the line is a open question, but it wont involve ponies for everyone.

The contra argument:
1) The west can not afford it, both in terms of military forces and economic. The brits are being bled dry, as is the rest of NATOs home-defense capacity.
2) The new world order has turned out to be the ancient world order: Every man for himself and a goodbye to such quaint concepts as multinational efforts. Since from this perspective the rest of the world are our deadly enemies, a winding down of the conflict in Afghanistan is the only possible solution to our lack of manpower.
3) The UN does not exist anymore, and so that body is hugely irrelevant. Hence, the only alternative is US unilateralism, and that is in a cost/benefit analysis just not worth it. Rather a thousand dead Afghan schoolteachers than a weakening of our position in the percieved ratrace for survival that is the new world order.
4) There is no middle-gear between fast forward and full stop. Either the US unlateraly prepares to do a full nationbuilding effort for all of Afghanistan, or it must leave. Mc Chrysals plans for approaching the country region by region, valley for valley is naive and stupid.

Ill admit to being a limted pro, if these are the parameters. If the choice stands between Obama imposing an Afghan war-tax and abandoning the ones we promised protection to the Talebs, I would recommend the former. (Good thing about the republicans being so bat-shit insane these days: They hate everything he does, no matter what, with an equal intensity. SO he might as well do radical stuff.) If not, it will be a repetition of the kurds and shias in GW1: Massive betrayal followed by deep mistrust and hatred. Also, since the log-train decides the pace of a withdrawal, those of you who think that the Israel-cause is more important than the US cause and want to pull out in order to hit Iran are too late in the timeframe. Israel will attack within 6 months, and so the target enviroment will be the same as it is now for the Iranians no matter what is decided.

B. Finel: Sorry to say, but

B. Finel: Sorry to say, but the US and the west did *not* provide the level of economic and structural aide that your own O-plan demanded. Hence, a lot of todays problems.If you look at curves for promised vs. delivered emergency relief and reconstruction funding, you will find a huge hole in the years 2001-2006, when the real window of opportunity was. What would happen to the terps and the ANA who has trusted the US if Taleban came back into power? Thats a botom-up perspective, and sits uncomfortably with all "realist" geo-politcians. Also, how do you visualize a pullout without a exertion of strength in advance? Rooftop evacs are hard in inland countries.

B. Finel: If by royally

B. Finel: If by royally screwed you mean castrated and hung or herded into pens and shot, youre right. Youre comment that this will prove an incentive for their fighting spirit is too cynical for me to stomach. "Hey buddy, were dropping you to the wolves, should do your running skills good!" Talk about honour. Wich, to get back on subject, goes back to what exitplans are acceptable and wich are not. Can we in good conscious leave before the ANA is at least at an acceptable operational level? If not, it makes perfect sense to define a timewindow when this is supposed to be done (Kilcullen gives it two years) and re-evaluate after that and within this period try for a serious real structured limited "state-building" exercise in paralel, since we will be there anyways.

And with regards to rooftop evacs, agreed that its a cliche but: Since you are advocating a withdrawal of the military in orderly fashion, do you mean to take with you all western NGOs and US advisors and personel as you go? Who is going to wind down the log-train? No embassy left in Kabul?

At the risk of sounding

At the risk of sounding crazy, I really thought that the format was going to be something akin to "Dear Abby." Someone would pitch a suggestion to Exum, and then he -- you know, the bloke fresh off a strategy review tour, the author of "Triage" and an all-American boy -- would tell us how he envisions us tackling this problem with the utility our forces (and other methods of power) could provide.

So far, I'm just getting Bernard Finel arguing with a Norwegian anarchist and my friend Gian reminding us that, well, Exum hasn't actually answered anything yet.

This is like stumbling drunk into the back seat of your car and realizing that you're dry humping the team's mascot and not the head cheerleader you thought you brought to prom.

Exum, you're our perky, nubile cheerleader. Give us some rah.

"What I am not sympathetic

"What I am not sympathetic to, though, is the use of emotional appeals to distract from the weakness of other strategic arguments."

Newsbuzz: We are not discussing wether to invade Afghanistan in the first place. We are discussing how to deal with the fact that NATO invaded, put in a puppetgovernment and then sat on our collective arses while the situation fell apart. I dont see pointing out that quite a lot of folks have put their trust in us as an emotional appeal, and never mind the girl-schools: Its a cold hard fact that certain promises have been made and our discussion is how to deal with this. Your answer is screw them, US first and never mind the darkies, all else is emo-speech. Well, good luck with that.

Bernand, excellent piece!!

Bernand, excellent piece!! I think we have to constantly challenge our assumptions and continue to assess and re-assess our policy in Afghanistan based on empirically-based data, not become wedded to a calcified cw about what works. I haven't heard much from you since freshman/sophomore year in Carmichael Hall. Hope you're well and I'll be checking your website.

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