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The Afghanistan Strategy Dialogue: My Thoughts
When I started the rather grandly titled Afghanistan Strategy Dialogue a week ago, I decided that after listening to and reading the thoughts and opinions of the readership, I would then weigh in with a few thoughts of my own to close out the exercise. Some of the readership was a bit impatient for me to offer my own thoughts, but if you get one thing out of this exercise, remember this: the war in Afghanistan is complex, as are the consequences of any policy choice, and anyone who wades into this discussion full of confidence in his or her own assumptions is not to be trusted. I wanted to hear the thoughts of my readership before I offered my own. The people who have contributed to this debate thus far have advanced propositions for discussion -- and that is how it should be. I would hope that you would all take what follows to be in the same vein.
Richard Betts has argued that military officers often make bad strategists -- in part due to the complexity of contemporary military operations. Because war is so damn hard to manage at the operational level, in other words, military officers often lack either the time or the distance to step back and consider war at the strategic level. I wonder, as a way of offering a caveat emptor to begin these thoughts, whether I too have been so deep in the weeds in the operational complexities of Afghanistan and of counterinsugency warfare in general that I am now hindered from offering anything approaching coherent thought on strategy in Afghanistan. Indeed, during the three times I have traveled to Afghanistan (2002, 2004, 2009), my time has been exclusively consumed with the realities of the war at the operational and tactical levels. (This last trip was a bit of an exception, of course, but I think anyone who served with me on the strategic review would agree that most of my pet concerns revolved around ISAF's operations and operational culture(s).)
I should also start out by saying that my thoughts on our strategy in Afghanistan are not fully formed. Over the past week, I have been impressed and influenced by some of the arguments offered up by the readership. (We received over 40 submissions for the dialogue, for example, and nearly all of them made at least one or two intelligent points about the war worth considering. I should perhaps publish a "best of the rest" post compiling them.) I should also say, though, that, again, anyone who is a bit too confident in either their support for or criticism of the war in Afghanistan should be approached with wariness. Although my internet persona is often casually arrogant and impressed with himself, Afghanistan is a country and a conflict that rewards humility. Those who have spoken with me in person about Afghanistan know how deeply I feel that.
This may come as a surprise to some of you, but I have been deeply influenced by the writings of Andrew Bacevich over the past year. His calls for we Americans to live within our means both in terms of our personal expenditures and the way in which we spend our collective blood and treasure are, I think, correct and necessary. But I find his arguments on Afghanistan a little too confident. Like many who have robustly questioned our presence in the country and how it serves U.S. and allied interests, he often gives short shrift to the costs of withdrawal. I have been reading Seth Jones's book
That unknown colors my own thoughts. I believe, contrary to many of this blog's readership, that Steve Biddle really does get our interests right in Afghanistan:
The United States has two primary national interests in this conflict: that Afghanistan never again become a haven for terrorism against the United States, and that chaos in Afghanistan not destabilize its neighbors, especially Pakistan. Neither interest can be dismissed, but both have limits as casus belli.
I also believe that both interests can be secured, and I believe that neither interest is worth unlimited U.S. and allied blood and treasure.
When we started on the review for General McChrystal, we were asked to determine whether or not NATO could succeed in its mission. Our answer was "yes, but..." Yes, we can succeed in protecting the interests articulated by Steve -- and by the president in his own review. But many of us felt -- as I know General McChrystal feels -- that only a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy stands a chance of succeeding in Afghanistan. Other operational and strategic choices -- such as a counter-terror campaign designed to either decapitate or reduce transnational terror groups -- were not seen as viable in terms of protecting stated U.S. and allied interests. (Remember, General McChrystal and others among us have tried -- and failed -- to kill our way to victory in Iraq and Afghanistan.)
So we are on a path to carry out a population-centric counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan, which should make exactly no one happy because both proponents of such strategies and their critics understand how very difficult they are and the risks involved. In order to operationalize such a strategy, we will need more troops, more money and resources dedicated to building the ANSF, and strategic patience from both Washington and the capitals of our allies. A realistic timeline for Afghanistan, as I discussed with a colleague a week back, would be ten years -- two for fighting; three for transition; five for overwatch and support. And as David Richards correctly noted, we are likely to be committed to Afghanistan in some capacity for decades.
Again, I believe the United States and its allies have clear interests in Afghanistan and that those interests are worth protecting. Are there problems with trying to fight counterinsurgency campaigns? Oh yes. Are there big weaknesses and gaps in our own counterinsurgency doctrine? Absolutely.
Prosecuting a counterinsurgency campaign as a third party, for example, carries with it serious risks. We are trying, in such a campaign and to quote Rupert Smith,
to establish a condition in which the political objective can be achieved by other means and in other ways. We seek to create a conceptual space for diplomacy, economic incentives, political pressure and other measures to create a desired political outcome of stability, and if possible democracy.
But as a third party, we are limited by what the host nation's government does or fails to do. Which is why, if Afghanistan's government and institutions do not develop to the degree we need them to develop in the next few years, we should reconsider the nature of our engagement in the region. It is also why our efforts to develop certain key institutions -- namely, those that provide rule of law, such as (but not limited to) the Afghan National Security Forces -- must be the main effort over the next 18-24 months. We cannot afford to do anything in Afghanistan at this stage that does not develop capacity in Afghan institutions.
I believe, having replaced the commander in Afghanistan with the military's so-called "A Team", we now owe the command in Afghanistan the time and resources to be successful. I believe that policy-makers and the public alike have the right to expect a shift in momentum over the next 12-18 months. But they must give the men on the ground those 12-18 months. It is unfair to both the Afghans and the allies to demand a dramatic U Turn in our policy at the very moment when Afghanistan is now being given the kinds of resources and personnel so long denied to it by the war in Iraq. Politically, the deficit and health care policy are going to determine who is and is not elected in the 2010 midterm elections -- not the war in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the president can afford to be patient. He should allow the commanders and ambassadors on the ground time to develop the situation.
[If change is not evident by Christmas 2010, President Obama, then direct the Department of Defense to shift its strategy in conjuntion with that of the NATO alliance. But until then, allow your new commander -- the guy you put in charge because you fired the other guy and after you promised to properly resource the war on the campaign trail -- to develop a plan for winning and to execute that plan.]
Again and in conclusion, I want to stress my previous caveat emptor. I have been involved with the war in Afghanistan at the tactical and operational levels since it began. And this blog has been following counterinsurgency at the operational and tactical levels nonstop for the past two and a half years. So my own ability to see the big picture here may be clouded, and again, Afghanistan -- the country and the conflict -- encourages humility in anyone who studies it. But at the very least, I hope this post will at once conclude this strategic dialogue and also continue it in the comments section. Despite what I have written in the above paragraphs, I remain open to being convinced of another argument -- and would hope that you too would be open to considering other arguments and perspectives.
Tomorrow, though, we will resume our regular service of Scottish football news, SEC football, the Red Sox, Lebanese bars, etc. Sorry for the interruption.
So basically you are
So basically you are sticking to the same exact position you maintained before the so-called "Strategy Dialogue."
A very interesting post.
A very interesting post. Just one simple point. Why 12-18 months? If our strategy fails, for whatever reason, surely the underlying rationale for staying the course remains. By the logic of your argument wouldn't we still need to be committed to that country even if things continued to decline? What sort of new strategy would the US/NATO adopt in a year or two from now that could not be adopted today? After all, were we to increase our forces now and still not make any meaningful progress, will our politicians admit to wasting a lot of blood and treasure, and then change to some radically different strategy? By most indications, there is no meaningful progress that can be made in the next two years, even with an expanded effort. Will we not then be guilty of simply pushing defeat/stalemate that much further into the future, rather than taking the prudent step of having an immediate and fundamental rethink of the assumptions driving our policy.
". . . and what we did and
". . . and what we did and did not do in the early 1990s -- cutting aid to our friends in Afghanistan and Pakistan alike -- have had dire consequences that were not forseen at the time. Anyone who confidently glosses over either the cost of failure in Afghanistan or the effects of disengagement should be viewed with suspicion, and as much as I like and admire Bacevich and Rory Stewart, I think both men do this to varying degrees. The cost of failure really is the big "known unknown" of Afghanistan. (h/t DHR)"
Well, strategy is about means and ends - and I think our striving for "certainty" outstrips our means. That's Bacevich's argument, is it not? We want to be certain we are safe from nefarious al-Qa'ida plotters or any threat. But I think that's the height of hubris, and one that courts disaster. How can we be "certain?" This is the problem with the "one percent doctrine" and everything else. Politically expedient, of course - what politician is going to say "we're going to protect American citizens as much as we can for the bare minimum cost"? - and we have a moral responsibility to make an effort. Total disengagement is indeed too dangerous. Therein lies the dangers of uncertainty.
But certainty has its dangers as well. You've totaled the possible costs of turning Afghanistan into "Chad" - or I think SNLII substituted Burkina Faso. That's an awful lot of lives and money. It's a price Europe won't pay, nor do I think it's in their strategic interests to pay.
We don't want Afghanistan becoming al-Qa'ida's, well, qa'ida. (Bad, I know. I'm sorry.) But the price to pay in making that a total certainty are quite high. Probably too high. Especially given that Pakistan, where we cannot fight with our troops, remains the key.
Strategically, there needs to be an option between total disengagement and a the world's greatest COIN and development effort to make Afghanistan into only a solidly third-world country. For while we fear the unknown of a continued aQ presence, for the greatest power in the history of mankind to have been morally, politically, and financially bankrupted chasing after a few hundred murderers living in caves would be an equally great folly.
Matt
"But many of us felt -- as I
"But many of us felt -- as I know General McChrystal feels -- that only a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy stands a chance of succeeding in Afghanistan. Other operational and strategic choices -- such as a counter-terror campaign designed to either decapitate or reduce transnational terror groups -- were not seen as viable in terms of protecting stated U.S. and allied interests."
AM, why is this the case? You clearly state that the United States has two specific national interests in Afghanistan: preventing Afghanistan from becoming a haven for terrorism and securing regional security and stability. I need more of an explained linkage between "these are our interests" and "Popcentric COIN is the only viable tactical approach we have to achieve those interests" than "for unstated reasons, we eliminated everything else." The heart of my question is this: what's the specific rationale for popcentric COIN in Afghanistan, and what were the deciding factors in the elimination of alternatives?
Many questions have been raised about the expenditure of blood and treasure through popcentric COIN in Afghanistan, and rightly so - we need to know why complete achievement of strategic objective X is worth 100% expenditure of resources Y and Z, instead of why some partial achievement of X is worth some partial expenditures of Y and Z. But it seems to me that the easiest way to make the case for popcentric COIN, especially from a value-oriented point of view, is to say that every other possible approach is not viable, which then justifies any amount of expenditure of resources Y and Z because objective X is our overriding national interest, period. Was it asked whether we could achieve 75% of our objectives at 25% the cost of achieving them at 100%? To me, that seems like something at least worth considering, but because all the other alternatives are not "viable," we're not considering it. Ultimately this seems like a confusing bit of logic that ties into the ambiguous rationale for AM's favored tactical approach, and doesn't even answer the question of "Why is popcentric COIN the only way to achieve those goals?" I welcome responses from all on the exact reasons why popcentric COIN is the answer rather than just the assertion that everything else is not viable.
ANdrew, "but because all the
ANdrew,
"but because all the other alternatives are not "viable," we're not considering it. Ultimately this seems like a confusing bit of logic that ties into the ambiguous rationale for AM's favored tactical approach, and doesn't even answer the question of "Why is popcentric COIN the only way to achieve those goals?" I welcome responses from all on the exact reasons why popcentric COIN is the answer rather than just the assertion that everything else is not viable."
Noone at CNAS can seriously deviate from the COIN. Sure, maybe they could but that wouldn't be very smart career-wide. They are locked into a certain narrative and lack the ability to seriously discuss these other alternatives.
anyone at CNAS can actually answer that question
Private Richard Hunt, 21,
Private Richard Hunt, 21, The 2nd Battalion The Royal Welsh, from wounds, at a military hospital in Selly Oak .
Sorry to hear
Sorry to hear that....metric.....
=========
Yes on give them the 12-18 mos......then re-evaluate.
I don't want to be overly flip now, but that remark that soldiers may too be busy to attend to Strategy....
1) That's why we have Flag Officers.
2) It sounds disturbingly like Jack Ripper explaining his "logic" to Wing Commander Harrington.
Good news also on FP side for AFPAK "First Team"..
Conference AFPAK First Team.
So cheer up. Remember how Iraq looked in late 06. I am NOT saying it's the same, I will say the seemingly impossible can happen with good people.
And you're one of them.
[yuk. I hate being nice]
Go poor yourself a nice grain alcohol martini with pure rain water, and remember that in late fall 06 Iraq looked like the bottom of the Med from inside Das Boot. It will get better.
@Jeff: exactly, if you're in
@Jeff: exactly, if you're in a hole, the first thing to do is stop digging, not dig with double effort for another two years. If we fail in two years, the underlying rationale for escalating our involvement remains the same, and so do we continue? If we do continue, what is the long term strategy? If we are not ready to continue, why are we escalating in the first place? What are the chances we are actually successful within two years? These questions remain unanswered. The conditions upon which involvement is justified (Pakistani stability and security, Afghanistan not being a terrorist haven) can and will exist regardless (and possibly because) of American involvement in Afghanistan. So if the conditions for involvement are perpetual, so too is our commitment, yet AM suggests otherwise. If we don't commit indefinitely, why should we commit at all?
@Matt: I couldn't agree more, and wanted to echo this point with my comment - the certainty of security is an illusion, nothing more. What expenditure of resources is worth the accomplishment of an illusion? Very little, in my mind, especially considering the opportunity costs, and if we wish to pursue this illusion to the fullest, why not invade and "stabilize" Somalia, Sudan and countless other places in Africa, central and southeast Asia and elsewhere? What about Afghanistan individually is so critically important to our national security that we absolutely must undertake the level of involvement AM suggests is necessary? It seems that if we are unwilling to match our efforts in Afghanistan in those other areas (and I believe that almost everyone would share in that unwillingness), we must question the justification of involvement in Afghanistan on an "antiterrorist" rationale.
I do not buy into this idea
I do not buy into this idea that we are prosecuting this counterinsurgency campaign as a so-called "Third Party."
This is our show. It began as our show and it will end as our show. We are the ones that are "in-charge" of this "transforming Afghanistan" initiative. Thus, if we fail in Afghanistan, it is our failure -- not theirs.
And I do not think that we are limited to what the host government does or fails to do. Routinely, in the matters, when a so-called "host government" does not perform to our liking, we simply find a way to replace it with a host government that does.
Thus, if Afghanistan is important enough, and Karzai cannot perform as expected or required, then we should expect that he will be got rid of -- as we have done with other leaders who have failed us in the past.
And, as we know from our past, if Afghanistan is imporant enough, even the idea of "democracy" can be sacrificed if it does not serve the best interests of the United States.
So if Afghanistan is important enough, the we should let everyone know where we stand right now, to wit: We will do what it takes to achieve our objective.
But if Afghanistan is not this important, then we should be prepared and determined to leave sooner rather than later -- for the sake of all concerned.
What's this nonsense I'm
What's this nonsense I'm hearing about the terps SIV (Special Immigrant Visa) program being choked back to 50 a year? Great move if that's true, what with Iraq on the verge of more "civil unrest".
Tomorrow, though, we will
Tomorrow, though, we will resume our regular service of Scottish football news, SEC football, the Red Sox, Lebanese bars, etc. Sorry for the interruption.
And don't forget scotch. After all, "We are, indeed, at the dawn of a golden age for whisky." http://bit.ly/T4Vqv
I read that article, Herbal!
I read that article, Herbal! Now if I could just get Nirav to replace the bottle of Bushmills he stole...I suppose its good to hear
I suppose its good to hear we are at a golden age for something...
I'd like to echo @Jeff and
I'd like to echo @Jeff and ask about the rationale behind your timeframe. I see two interpretations:
1) Our goals are definitely achievable given unlimited time, but we can only afford (for financial/personnel/political reasons) another 18 months.
2) If McChrystal can't get it done in 18 months, then nobody can.
Andrew Kaplun asks the
Andrew Kaplun asks the questions I wanted to ask. I have yet to hear the COINdinistas explain why an operationalized COIN strategy of nation and capacity building is markedly superior than alternatives. One other question I would like to ask is how much research into Afghanistan's history, cultures, etc. AM and the rest of the strategy review team did prior. Too often the COINdinistas put out arguments that appear doctrinally sound but display a scary ignorance of the peculiarities of Afghanistan. In other words, it appears to me the COINdinistas are, at times, relying on COIN dogma instead of adjusting doctrine to realities on the ground. AM, your point about our "disengagement" from Afghanistan in the early 1990's is a case-in-point.
A couple of other points/questions:
1. At the end of ten years, what can we expect Afghanistan to look like? I ask, because we can compare it to Pakistan next door, a country that cannot control its own territory despite a powerful military, mature institutions and nuclear weapons. Why, specifically, do the COINdinistas believe Afghanistan will turn out any better, assuming the rosy ten-year project pans out? The flaw, I think, is the ASSUMPTION that the United States has any hope of creating a stable, multiethnic, centralized state where one never existed. Notice I didn't even mention a democratic state. That some seem to believe we can not only do all that, but do it in only ten years, is, IMO, the height of wishful thinking. Why, AM, are you and the other COINdinistas so wedded to the idea of a strong central government and what is the basis for your belief that such a government can provide good governance?
2. Related to the point above is this: COIN may be the way to go, but not how it's currently being "operationalized." Rather than build capacity at the national level with a national government, a COIN strategy that focuses on the local and regional level is more likely to work because of Afghanistan's problems (to put it mildly) with national cohesion and a national identity. We don't seem to mind the independence the Kurds gave themselves in Iraq, yet in Afghanistan we insist on a National government providing almost all the solutions?
3. Biddle's interests are good ones. On the second, I wonder if AM and the other COINdinistas have considered that an independent, Pashtun-dominated Afghanistan could be more destabilizing for Pakistan than alternatives? Have they considered why Pakistan is both working with us and against us at the same time? Forget the tripe you hear about the ISI going off the reservation. The reality is that Pakistan does not want an independent Afghanistan that it cannot control. How will the COINdinistas operationalize a COIN strategy when a key ally is fundamentally opposed to your end-state goal?
4. On Biddle's first and primary interest we first need to define "safe haven." Biddle also explicitly states "terrorism against the United States" and that is an important distinction. The haven Al Qaeda enjoyed until 9/11, under the protection of a quasi-state government, is quite a bit different than the current haven in NW Pakistan. My point is this: Even if the US withdrawals from Afghanistan tomorrow, no one is dumb enough to allow that former kind of haven to rise again. AM in the post above essentially presents this strawman.
Finally, given the realities in South Asia (and other parts of the world), I think it's unreasonable to expect that havens can be eliminated. Havens will always exist (indeed, the cities of Peshawar and Quetta are havens that rarely get discussed), so the goal should be maintaining the capability to interdict and suppress any threat to the United States coming from a haven. That is exactly what our drone war in Pakistan is doing in conjunction with Pakistani and other efforts worldwide - which the COINdinistas are fundamentally opposed to.
"(1) That Afghanistan never
"(1) That Afghanistan never again become a haven for terrorism against the United States and (2) that the chaos in Afghanistan not destabilize its neighbors, especially Pakistan."
# 1 requires an occupation and nation building effort on the grandest scale and for the longest term imaginable -- which provides that # 2 cannot be achieved as Pakistan -- even now -- is being destabilized by this very effort.
However, should the United States boots on the ground depart Afghanistan -- as they departed Vietnam in an earlier era -- then, as the example of Vietnam illustrates, all things become possible.
"Firsters" - as in blame
"Firsters" - as in blame America first. It's our fault, not theirs that 9/11 happened. Of course that happened because we ignored AF/PAK by not giving them more aid to steal. We should just leave, because it's just like Vietnam (?which makes all things possible? I guess that means we cede Manhattan, Jersey City, Pater-stan?). Only a guess. And of course our presence is adding to their recruiting, and de-stablizing Pakistan. Nothing about it being the second most corrupt country on earth (they bribed Nigeria to go first). If we go everything will be alright. Just keep sending the aid please. It will help us build - in LA, London, France, and of course Luxembourg and Geneva. Maybe even a nice flat in Beirut.
I still advocate giving my former comrades their 12-18 mos, hell I advocate giving Bammy, Holbrooke and Mommytrix their 12-18 mos. This is out of regard for them and their judgement, sweat, blood, tears.
I'd stablize the region either with a Grand Bargain with Russia, China and India that leaves our treacherous, murderous little friends we did nothing but help until 9/11 (the predictable ROI for the help) riding bitch in cargo, not even coach. Or I'd stablize it at 200 Rads. They want nukes? Here you are.
President Obama told a group
President Obama told a group of veterans today in Phoenix that the war in Afghanistan is:
A "War of Necessity" and not a "War of Choice."
(Thus, the President would seem to disagree with Richard Haass of the Council of Foreign Relations, who has said that Afghanistan is Obama's "first war of choice.")
If the President says that the war in Afghanistan is a War of Necessity -- at least to him -- then that would seem to eliminate any of these "18 - 24 month" and "next few years" limitations we have been discussing above. .
If it is a "War of Necessity" were talking about here, then it would seem that we are in for the duration.
One would think that should answer all the questions that we have.
Now, just to get it done.
I agree with Visitor @ 1:48
I agree with Visitor @ 1:48 PM.
Look what is happening in Honduras. A coup ousts Zelaya and the United States does nothing.
Why? Because the coup was in the United States' best interests. Zelaya, although democratically elected, had gone all leftist on us.
So, if he is "gotten rid of," even illegally, then we are happy to see him go.
If Karzai continues to move in the wrong direction, then we will be glad to see him go also.
But, as the case of Honduras illustrates, neither "democracy" nor "legality" will ultimately stand in our way.
Elf - "The second most
Elf - "The second most corrupt country on earth" was enabled to reach that status in your estimation by the previous US administration. Do you believe the corruption starts and stops at the border of Afghanistan? For you, corruption in New Jersey is deplorable. What makes it a better form of corruption than that which occurs in Afghanistan?
Your "treacherous murderous little friends" have as a 'friend' a coalition of nations inhabited by people who are equally susceptible to being treacherous and murderous. Why do you consider others worse than us?
That popcentric COIN is the
That popcentric COIN is the best tactical and strategic option for Afghanistan is something that I am still gathering data one. It is an unwise student who thinks a few weeks reading through a new blog he was directed to gives him a thorough understanding of the subject. But 10 years studying and reading about COIN and CT and long term strategy does allow me to make one point with conviction. The US as well as others like my old countrymen the Brits and my new countrymen the Australian, have a tendency, grown through the 90s and into the new century , to demand rapid solutions to problems that can only have long term resolution.
One of the reasons I like Dr Barnett is that he writes a long term strategy, agree or disagree with his ideas he does articulate and remind us that certain issues are solved in the long term.
Afghanistan, so long relegated to second string issue is one of those issues that will take some time to resolve. And for a fair portion of that time we may see no discernable improvements, that is no reason to dump the strategies, that given time can see a solid base of operations extend through to the country. Garner the support of the population and start to give Afghans some semblance of security. What they choose to do with that is up to them.
"Those who have spoken with
"Those who have spoken with me in person about Afghanistan know how deeply I feel that."
This, actually, is true. But that's also why it's so frustrating to contemplate your privately expressed doubts and recriminations (now outed by yourself, so I don't feel constrained on this issue) and then see what your avatar, Abu Muqawama, says in this forum.
Often, it appears to be little more than salesmanship.
On a number of nettlesome issues, you simply bypassed introspection today. Beyond your sincerely expressed caveats, you again haven't discussed how pop-centric operations will accomplish key US geo-political goals, such as the eradication of al Qaeda (currently in Pakistan).
The final irony is that we know that it's the president, his SecDef and the CJCS who have demanded faster solutions to the war in Afghanistan. This is why McKiernan was fired, according to the Washington Post and. This curious belief that you have that we should give the "A-Team" time to implement their plans, preserve the Atlantic alliance and get Osama bin Laden by providing plumbing to people who for thousands of years have gotten by with wiping their asses with their left hands seems a bit much, eh?
Apparently, the administration does NOT have the patience you seem to believe that it should have. Perhaps, what the administration really is doing is finding a means to sharply reduce violence (clearing with many new troops bound for the theater) and then just as quickly mustering Afghan security forces to stand up to attempt the holding. This, we hope, is what will pass for strategy for us and our frankly battered allied militaries to leave in large numbers.
In other words, we're looking at a timeline of political convenience and doubtful prospects. The various Taliban militias might wait us out, or not. As you know, the literature on this subject (both on previous Afghan strife and with insurgencies throughout the modern world) would indicate that time isn't on our side.
I thought you might explore these and other questions -- not because they're of interest to me, but because they bedevil the strategists attempt to confect operational policies from them.
As for firing the old commander, that's just ludicrous. The old commander-in-chief couldn't have run for re-election. SecDef Gates, being appointmented, isn't in this democracy "my" commander any more than Ronald McDonald is. Nor is the CJCS. Nor is McChrystal.
They're hired help bespangled either in ribboned uniforms or tailored suits, but they're not elected. When the commander-in-chief who is elected basically defaults to the "strategy" of the Bush White House, adding only a bit faster implementation and a tad more resources (but with less regard for NATO allies and their opinions), I'm supposed to now assume the package placed before me really secrets inside a precious pony?
I so want a pony. I was told today that Abu Muqawama believes I shall get on over the next year, 18 months (Christmas of 2010?) or wherever the can lands after our mysteriously invisible pony kicks it.
"Politically, the deficit
"Politically, the deficit and health care policy are going to determine who is and is not elected in the 2010 midterm elections -- not the war in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the president can afford to be patient. He should allow the commanders and ambassadors on the ground time to develop the situation."
Ha, I tried to argue the opposite in another comment thread, and another commenter, Kilo, quickly put lie to my arguments. I got it EXACTLY wrong, I suppose. Not the first time for that, sadly, and won't be the last.
Well, here's hoping the people on the ground are able to do what they need to do. Whatever that is. I'm not snarking, I *am* being sincere, best of luck to you lot with the tough jobs, you know?
Madhu, Exum isn't getting
Madhu, Exum isn't getting that right.
Even if we assume that the issue of the everlasting war in Afghanistan won't hurt Obama or the Democrats during the midterm elections (a point I'm not exactly sure anyone but Exum believes, but I agree that he seems to hold to it sincerely), that doesn't mean that the war isn't a major issue (perhaps the largest issue) for many of our allies.
To these democracies, what transpires in Afghanistan is important. How they are treated by the US is important. Timelines for nations with quite small militaries are different from those of the US, which is blessed with a relatively larger force.
When he discusses the need for patience in the US, he forgets that some of this is ordered quite differently in Ottawa or London or Copenhagen. Canada is being forced to stop operations by 2011, the Dutch in 2010. Australia has balked at sending more troops. New Zealand is sending back its version of SAS, but the war hasn't remained popular there.
Polls today show that a majority in the UK, Canada and in the populations of several of our allies no longer believe that it is worth fighting this war. In the US, we have learned that perhaps up to 45 percent of our people no longer assume fighting there is worth pursuing.
This is forcing another timeline for the US: Can we soldier on without many of our friends in the Alliance? And for all the talk about Bush's unilateralism, what does it mean when we fire a general who was striving to diplomatically save the alliance, McKiernan, in favor of someone many critics say doesn't care so much about NATO?
The other day, Professor Betz of Kings College suggested that we consider Europe's strategic perspective on what continuing this war means to them.
I agree. It ain't all about us.
The problem is, SNLII, I've
The problem is, SNLII, I've kind of been 'guilted' into shutting it, for a bit, because I am not an expert in any of these areas, and, like, I'm not THERE. Guilted isn't the correct word, perhaps shamed is better. Screaming on the internets doesn't help, does it? Unless it's health care. I refuse to apologize for that screaming. That IS my line.
I can understand a sort of short term pacification where violence goes down (am I getting the terms right?), but I still don't understand the longer term stuff. At KOW, today, wasn't there a post about how even if we do everything we say we should do, and execute it properly, then what? What are the outcomes even if we are successful?
I still don't understand, but I feel like I should shut up, a little, which is impossible for me, hence the 23 comments I've posted on this blog, today.
(Also, in terms of Drs. and Professors, and titles and stuff, if I am too informal, it's because I don't know any of the 'names' in this area, so if I don't address anyone properly in the comments, sorry about that. Well, I don't make any of you address me by MY title, do I? How would I do that, anyway, I don't even make the students or residents do that.)
Good grief, Madhu, you don't
Good grief, Madhu, you don't think I'm an expert, do you? I'm not at all.
And yet I think that everyone can add to a dialogue, so long as it is moderately competent (I don't always reach this bar).
Personally, I think that many of the "experts" on these issues are frauds. The more loudly that they extol their "expertise," the more likely they are to be charlatans. This blog was the outcome of a man's frustration with "experts" at warmaking who didn't know what they were doing and got decent soldiers killed by dint of their hasty, fervid incompetence.
What is so refreshing about Exum is that he does NOT hold forth as an expert all that often, and when he does (on television) it makes for a swell drinking game.
That said, he's been drafted as an expert by McChrystal's staff (to build DC political consensus amongst influential think tanks or to actually listen to them seems a bit sketchy at the moment), so as an expert he shall be judged.
Because I'm not an expert at anything all that terribly important -- and certainly not grand strategy -- my judgment is based on a sole criterium: Does he sound less impressive than I would if I were trotted out to be his stand in? This works quite well with any declared "expert," by the way.
In this case, I think Exum gets high marks for introspection and honesty, but, at least to me, he still isn't feeding the bulldog. Thomas Rid (outstanding book, by the way) makes some cogent points for Exum to reconsider, and I trust that he shall.
I also hope that the "new metric" continue. It should serve as a footnote that these arguments about "strategy" (still don't think he's gotten there) have real meaning.
That metric points to a volunteer to the British infantry who died as a result of wounds suffered in combat. I should have liked to have heard from Exum a ballpark figure on how many we could rightly consider affordable (the blood part of the double entry bookkeeping along with treasure) to accomplish whatever goals remain of the AfPak misadventure, but I'll settle with what he provided today.
How the heck would I know
How the heck would I know whose an expert? A credibel one, anyway? Do you see the problem everyday people have, and also, why I speak up so much around here for forums like this? Patients have this problem all the time - trust us, we docs say, trust us. Why? Because we are credentialed? It's all trust. And we shouldn't ever forget it.
Civilian-military divide, indeed. How are we supposed to know?
awesome
awesome
I hope one thing is learned
I hope one thing is learned from all of this. You must engage the civilian population of Coalition Countries better. I think we all can agree(or not) that this war on Jihad is a long war. Civilians do not understand this. The best hope in getting civilians to support this effort is another major attack at the wrong place at the wrong time. Sad but you can see how quickly Coalition Forces are leaving.
The fact that supporters of
The fact that supporters of the campaign can talk about dead lines proves that even they don't really believe it is vital to US security or probably even very important. The Europeans have known that their security isn't actually enhanced by being in Afghanistan from day one. They have other goals but believing that "fighting them there so we don't fight them here" isn't something they really believe. The Brits say they do but their main concern is saving face for the Labour Party and not being run out of Helmand to confirm their plummet into third rank status. Even the Canadians, at one time very bellicose and gung-ho, have become tired of the whole business and are busy looking for ways to blame the US and Europeans for their failure in Kandahar as they very slowly leave.
If there are "Principals of Insurgency" one must surely be that when the occupying power starts to talk about deadlines or withdrawal timetables the war is done and the sooner they can ge
The best hope in getting
The best hope in getting civilians to support this effort is another major attack at the wrong place at the wrong time.
Do you *ever* spend time thinking about anything except how to destabilize other societies?
Sanmon - I am beginning to
Sanmon - I am beginning to have less doubt about as time goes on and experience increases regarding the possibility that the wrong enemy was identified in the GWOT. If I'm beginning to figure that out, it must be far more plain to others.
Andy, "Andrew Kaplun asks
Andy,
"Andrew Kaplun asks the questions I wanted to ask. I have yet to hear the COINdinistas explain why an operationalized COIN strategy of nation and capacity building is markedly superior than alternatives. One other question I would like to ask is how much research into Afghanistan's history, cultures, etc. AM and the rest of the strategy review team did prior. Too often the COINdinistas put out arguments that appear doctrinally sound but display a scary ignorance of the peculiarities of Afghanistan. In other words, it appears to me the COINdinistas are, at times, relying on COIN dogma instead of adjusting doctrine to realities on the ground."
Yes, that's 100% correct. Just about every single one of the COINdinistas are functionalists who don't know shit about Afghanistan. Theyre glorifed tourists who are basing all of their thoughts on pure COIN theory. Notice how every single member of Mchystyal's Review team is a Think-Tank pundit. None of these people know anything about Afghanistan.
What strikes me is how its the COIN functionalists who are the only ones who think the US has any chance in Afghanistan. On the other hand, if you go and talk to actual experts on Afghanistan, ie people who have done field work there outside of a military context, who know the languages, and so on, will tell you its a lost case.
And I agree that this
And I agree that this statement is a bit unsubstantiated:
"Politically, the deficit and health care policy are going to determine who is and is not elected in the 2010 midterm elections -- not the war in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, the president can afford to be patient. He should allow the commanders and ambassadors on the ground time to develop the situation."
1) Gee, what might be contributing to the defecit? Perhaps, long, open-ended wars endorsed by the people at CNAS?
2) Its simply baseless to say that Afghanistan might not have an effect on the 2010 mid-term elections which are still 15 months away. Ask Lyndon Johnson how Asian nation-building campaigns can, umm, put a dent in your domestic political agenda.
This is off-topic, but I
This is off-topic, but I really want to express my frustration at the lack of awareness of what our servicemen and women are going through in Afghanistan. I just watched a video on the NY Times site produced by Patrick Barth. I am absolutely filled with pride in our armed services. This should be mandatory viewing for all Americans - unfortunately, most do not have a clue.
What options were
What options were considered, other than counter-terrorism and population-centric COIN?
Biddle is concerned about destabilizing Pakistan and Afghanistan becoming a haven for terrorists. Would a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan destabilize Pakistan? If this Taliban control were distinct from terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, would that meet the "not a haven" criteria? I can certainly see how those might be politically objectionable. But as for meeting Biddle concerns...?
Though we've stumbled around
Though we've stumbled around and lost precious time in Afghanistan, we seem to be realizing a strategy finally. As to where that strategy leads us, will have to be seen. One thing is certain - time and funding is again a consideration, as it became with our involvement in Vietnam, and the political reality of that should be taken into account along with this strategy.
The American public may not feel the anguish of the daily American dead arriving back home as in that bygone era, but they do feel the pain of diminishing take home pay checks while we continue to charge up huge amounts of national treasure on a credit card - deferring the balance to another generation - for goals as yet ambiguous, and failure an unknown.
Everyone should be in agreement - counterinsurgencies are labor intensive and time consuming, and at some point, if the end game looks in doubt in Afghanistan, my hope is we'll have the generalship in place to step-up and say so, and simply not say, "just a few more troops."
"Why? Because we are
"Why? Because we are credentialed? It's all trust. And we shouldn't ever forget it."
Well, yes. That's about right. At Exum's digs, the executive director is very, very big on credentials. Often, one sees many PHds bepopulating think tanks and universities, and the layman typically assumes that the letters actually mean that they're experts on what they were hired to think about.
Indeed, the layman would consider himself callow for not assuming that this is so.
But all too often, many "experts" don't disclose how their work has been challenged by others, even within their own field of study.
Kilcullen, for example, holds forth often on issues about anthropology and warmaking, but within the field of anthropology his notions about "tribes" in Iraq has met with a great deal of learned challenges that might have some merit.
Exum's boss, Dr Nagl, is well known for his disssection of the insurgency in Malaya. But some of his core arguments have been challenged by researchers such as Karl Hack.
Andrew Biddle is a very gifted strategist. But he's not an expert on Afghanistan or Pakistan. Indeed, his quickly written "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare" of 2003 is almost painful to read in hindsight.
That said, I have a great deal of respect for all three of these men. I just don't think that they should be put on a throne and crowned "experts" in fields beyond their immediate research, mantles they're often provided anyway by the various media.
To be equally poisonous to myself, I should reiterate that in no way am I an expert on anything (except, maybe, experts, it seems).
I don't know as much about Hezbollah as Exum, for example, but I do seem to know a bit more about Israel. I don't know more about Malaya than Nagl, but I think I get Anbar and most of Africa better than he does. I shall never have the understanding of Indonesia's "accidental guerillas" that Kilcullen has accomplished, but I do think that I might have experienced other insurgencies directly that could challenge some of his assumptions about other movements.
In the end, with me, it's all bricolage, and it's not particularly well-informed at that. But isn't that true of everyone? We make judgments about the sagacity of someone's expertise based on how it seems to resemble the reality we experience. WHen it doesn't match up, we rightly should shrug off their expertise.
Interesting that you mention
Interesting that you mention Betts. For some great strategic thinking I suggest checking out the larger volume in which this appears (Tellis's intro is particularly good). http://www.nbar.org/publications/element.aspx?id=29
Note that one of his recommendations is "Toning down pressure on Moscow and reducing U.S. involvement in Central Asia may assist in discouraging strategic Russian-Chinese cooperation against Washington."
Now, perhaps its a chicken and egg problem, but I could just as easily see why staying engaged in Central Asia (read: Afghanistan) would be justified on the grounds that it is important not to 'cede the space' to potential competitors.
Like I have said before, the reasons we might have to stay may not be the reasons we went in for. Perhaps one way to better understand what are our interests/strategy in Afghanistan (and Iraq as well) would be to look at it from the point of view of our 'competitors' (i.e. China and Russia). When they examine our interventions they see a lot more at work than goodwill, liberal evangelizing or the mere elimination of terrorist 'safe-havens.'
I find it interesting that
I find it interesting that several of the supposedly well-informed posters here decrying COIN supporters' lack of historical knowledge about Afghanistan, state blankly that Afghanistan does not have a history of strong, central, multi-ethnic government, and imply constant warfare.
In reality, except when invaded by a foreign power, or during a short period time when Afghanistan was kicking Indian butt back in the day, there are plenty of examples of long periods of peace and relative tranquility in Afghanistan's past. Of course, you need to accept a certain amount of feuding among tribes as Afghan standard, but it's not lack Afghanistan does not have clear examples of prolonged periods of relative peace, and there is no reason to assume they will always be at war, from this time forward.
@ Schmedlap "Biddle is
@ Schmedlap
"Biddle is concerned about destabilizing Pakistan and Afghanistan becoming a haven for terrorists. Would a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan destabilize Pakistan?"
I thought the following SWJ was kind of getting at the controversy around that question: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/07/this-week-at-war-the-domino-th/
I never get the binary-ness (for want of a better word) of much of the AfPak discussion. Lots of things can be destabilizing, I suppose, and who is defining stabilizing, anyway? I mean, we probably think all sorts of things are destabilizing to Pakistan that certain elements* in Pakistan think are all, 'but that's a feature, not a bug.' Hey, I can speculate just like everyone else, can't I? It's a free country and all that.
*Elements is such a 'desi' word in this context, I suppose I am horribly biased about South Asia given all the, er, propaganda I grew up with...okay, propaganda is too strong a word. Just an 'India' lens instead of a more worldly one that included the Pakistani POV, to use a fnordism.
@ Visitor 11:43 - "This is off-topic, but I really want to express my frustration at the lack of awareness of what our servicemen and women are going through in Afghanistan. I just watched a video on the NY Times site produced by Patrick Barth. I am absolutely filled with pride in our armed services. This should be mandatory viewing for all Americans - unfortunately, most do not have a clue." Yeah, absolutely yes, I agree, it's not even so much not a clue, but that the interest isn't there, somehow. Am I misreading this? I also thought, from some of the discussion around here, that maybe the administration would prefer a low profile on all of this anyway. Easier to get the job done, however the job is being defined?
@SNLII - forget my expert complaints, I'm just cranky because it feels (and I use the emotional word feel on purpose) that the profession I love is under attack, somehow, which is not the case. There is a genuine political disagreement about healthcare. It still *feels* like an attack, hence my irritation at 'experts,' or, even, experts. We need 'em, I supposed to be one in the clinical diagnostic realm, and yet, it's still irritating. I have only respect for the people you mention, because, well, they've earned it by the credentials and by experience. The thing is, experts get things wrong all the time. It's the nature of having academic or real world expertise - if you are asked to weigh in on difficult questions, the probability that you will screw up goes way, way up. Just part of the gig, and I don't mean to discredit anyone.
So, my shutting up sure didn't work, did it? I am incapable of SU, it seems.
The one thing that "experts"
The one thing that "experts" in war and "experts" on medicine share, Madhu, is that when they screw up, people die.
More decent men have been killed by bad generals, asshatted politicos and charlatans at think tanks than we should contemplate, lest we mutiny.
The fact that someone earns a Phd does NOT qualify him or her as an expert on prosecuting wars any more than a man who wears a uniform for 20 years without shedding blood gets instant recognition as a savant.
If that sounds like something Bonaparte might have said, oh well. War is the true test of the so-called warrior. How he plans for battle and then, amidst its confusion, responds shows the manner in which he (or she) should be judged.
The jargony, credentialed humbuggery of so much of the COIN establishment would be tolerable, if the stakes weren't so high. It's why historians, bonafide strategists and real terrorism experts pull out their hair when they hear "experts" in this newfangled field put al Qaeda or even a non-global aspirant like one of the Taliban militias on par with the Soviet Union as an existential, ideological threat to the US.
When you hear an "expert" do this, you have my permission to guffaw openly, while weeping for the men and the civilians amongst him who shall die to appease his blowhard narcissism.
Sorry for being Tardy
Sorry for being Tardy visitor 747...busy...
You wouldn't describe the behavior of the Paks and Afghans towards the USA as treacherous and murderous? I am talking about succoring and literally marrying our murderers 1990's to 9.11. WTF did we do to you but help you? We should have broke bread (and you) with the Russians. Instead idealism clouded judgment.
The previous administration enabled a corrupt Pak govt: HA HAH HA!!! It's been corrupt since day one, 1947. If the Kabiles hadn't stopped to loot (and rape, torture, bugger) they would have had Kashmir in 47. For example.
I actually recommended the NJ model of corruption as a example of democracy that works. I really think we should spring the 40 some indicted and let them to to Astan for .....Community service. Time to pour some concrete. Worked in Bosnia.
Not sure whom others/us are...Are you?
"The one thing that
"The one thing that "experts" in war and "experts" on medicine share, Madhu, is that when they screw up, people die."
Ah, but I was making a different point - even good experts, well-meaning experts, 'real-world' as opposed to PhD-credentialed experts, will make mistakes. All human systems contain error. It is unavoidable. The only way not to make a mistake, is, well, wait: there really is no way to avoid error. Even doing nothing can cost lives. I know this is all obvious to you, but my point was that maybe it's a, er, mistake to think about such pivotal decisions in a 'great man or woman' way. If you just have the right person in the right job, everything will go well! This is the sort of sophomoric dramatics that lead to breathless articles about this General or that heroic doctor saving the day. Er, no. The hope is, if the system is working correctly, the system will correct itself. And, yet. That's not correct, either. Good systems still require excellent individuals. Hmm. I have no idea where I am going with this.
Three retired spooks wiegh
Three retired spooks wiegh in on Afghanistan. Fellow nails it in the opening sentence....
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hjE2wMWMJwI
and just to remind how crazy & bloody our intentions- and "democratic allies" can get:
http://www.drugtext.org/library/books/McCoy/book/33.htm
The entire book is worth a read by the Imperial minded commentators.....
just because we can occupy a country and rain hell down on balky peasants dosnt mean we should....
Combat engineers, RVN 68-9
A couple of issues: (1) I
A couple of issues:
(1) I think it is reasonable to ask President Obama to be patient with his team. It was his choice to buy into the expansion of the American commitment, and it is his war now. I am not sure how the politics will play out -- I'm less sanguine about Afghanistan being irrelevant to the 2010 election cycle. That said, *I* didn't make that choice. So, as an outside critic, I should still be free to speak out if I see mistakes being made. Or is dissent harmful? Does it hurt morale? Does it embolden our enemies? I think we've seen that argument made too often over the past eight years, no? So how about a moratorium on calls for moratoriums on debate about Afghanistan?
(2) I still don't understand why the COINdinistas insist that the choice in Afghanistan is between escalation and abandonment. Surely, even if there is a consensus that muddling through along the same path as we've seen over the last few years is problematic, there are still a wide range of diplomatic/military/economic options other than the escalation/abandonment dichotomy. If you want to make the case that withdrawal will inevitably lead to wholesale abandonment, make it. But I don't think you can use the example of 1993 as a definitive warning against any policy other than escalation. It is just too stark a choice.
BF, you said, " there are
BF, you said, " there are still a wide range of diplomatic/military/economic options other than the escalation/abandonment dichotomy"
Rory Stewart talks about an alternate option in his NPR interview yesterday.
Sorry, wrong link above.
Sorry, wrong link above. Here is the correct NPR link for the 8/19/2009 Stewart interview.
Sorry, wrong link above.
Sorry, wrong link above. Here is the correct NPR link for the 8/19/2009 Stewart interview.
Stewart describes his
Stewart describes his tactical option at 31:00. (Please excuse the double post above).
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