Abu Muqawama: Post
Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS. Abu Muqawama retains the right to delete comments that include words that incite violence; are predatory, hateful, or intended to intimidate or harass; or degrade people on the basis of gender, race, class, ethnicity, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or disability. In summary, don't be a jerk.
Afghanistan: A war of choice? And what is the alternative?
Wars of necessity must meet two tests. They involve, first, vital national interests and, second, a lack of viable alternatives to the use of military force to protect those interests. World War II was a war of necessity, as were the Korean War and the Persian Gulf war.
Then he sketches some alternatives:
One would reduce our troops’ ground-combat operations and emphasize drone attacks on terrorists, the training of Afghan police officers and soldiers, development aid and diplomacy to fracture the Taliban.
A more radical alternative would withdraw all United States military forces from Afghanistan and center on regional and global counterterrorism efforts and homeland security initiatives to protect ourselves from threats that might emanate from Afghanistan. Under this option, our policy toward Afghanistan would resemble the approach toward Somalia and other countries where governments are unable or unwilling to take on terrorists and the United States eschews military intervention.
I don't know how much Haass knows about training security forces, but his first "alternative" would require an investment in Afghanistan as massive as the one we're already making. So I think it's more an operational alternative than a strategic one. But what about the second option? Do you guys think it would protect U.S. and allied interests? Thoughts from the readership?
Here is what Col. Pat Lang
Here is what Col. Pat Lang has advocated for some time now:
I think that the program in Afghanistan should be to secure the capital and a coalition redoubt around Bagram and then use those areas as a base for counter-terrorism operations aimed at truly international Muslim zealot groups rather than the Taliban confederation of rebels. Numbers of our troops in this? 20,000, 30,000, something like that. Forget about building an Afghan nation-state. That task would be so large that it might bleed us dry. Some infrastructure projects would be a good idea but only in the context of an international consortium. Buy the opium crop. Destroy it, use it in the pharma industry, something. The offensive operations against the international terrorists should be intelligence driven and consist largely of raids against specific people and organizations. We should rely on CIA and the Special Operations people in the military. We should take advantage of the "rentability" of many Afghan groups to use them as auxiliaries in this struggle. This would be money well spent, just as it was well spent in Iraq.
"... withdraw all United
"... withdraw all United States military forces from Afghanistan and center on regional and global counterterrorism efforts and homeland security initiatives to protect ourselves from threats that might emanate from Afghanistan."
Strikes me as the "Team America: World Police" approach...
How are other countries going to react to "regional and global counterterrorism" run by the United States on their soil?
What would "regional and
What would "regional and global counter-terrorism efforts" be, if not operations like what we are doing in Afghanistan? Afghan-like missions, run in other countries, to protect us from threats emanating from Afghanistan? This idea, to me, needs some clarification before its merits as a way to protect American (personal bias: Canadian) interests can be evaluated.
If we play good defense, and
If we play good defense, and given the resources available in the DoD, maybe we could prevent most terrorist attacks on the US.
I think there is something to be said for thisstrategy--ultimately our intelligence agencies were damn close to uncovering 9-11 before it happened, and maybe $10,000 in strong locks on airplane doors would have prevented it. It is reasonable to suggest that minor tweaks in our defensive posture rather than counter-insurgency and nation bulilding in Af/Pak would be a better use of resources to protect America.
THowever, a fully defensive strategy would take a complete revision of American foreign policy; one that is unlikely to take place.
"One would reduce our
"One would reduce our troops’ ground-combat operations and emphasize drone attacks on terrorists, the training of Afghan police officers and soldiers, development aid and diplomacy to fracture the Taliban."
Leaving aside the question of how striking at terrorists, training of ANSF and increasing development aid and diplomacy would be possible without doing something to reverse Afghanistan's security slide, how is this at all an alternative? Isn't this essentially what the Obama administration has pledged to do?
How convenient to select
How convenient to select successful wars to be the wars of necessity. Would the United States be any different if we didn't engage in the persian gulf war. What if we didn't engage in Korea? Would the United States be different? Probably not.
I like the Vietnam option.
I like the Vietnam option. Just leave.
The difficulty in this area of the world would now seem to relate to American boots on the ground.
Without American boots on the ground, the wind is taken out of the sails of Al Quida. And the Taliban, like the North Vietnamese communists after the United States' departure from Vietnam, have to start dealing with the other realities of their existance.
With foreign boots on the ground, as in Vietnam, you only get perpetual and generational war.
With the foreigners gone, other possibilities immediately become available.
Why should we not believe that what happened in Vietnam after the America's departure (country becomes more modern, quality of life improves dramatically, Vietnam becomes a quasi-ally of the United States) not also happen in Afghanistan if the Americans leave?
There were dire predictions of what would become of Vietnam -- and the region -- if America left "the job undone;" these predictions did not come true.
There are dire predictions today of what will become of Afghanistan -- and the region -- if America departs.
For what reason should we believe that the positive outcome for Vietnam (when the Americas leave) cannot also happen -- at least in part -- for Afghanistan, if we depart sooner rather than later?
I guess I don't know much
I guess I don't know much about training security forces. Can you explain why it would require 100,000 men and $60 billion annually to do it?
How is that dozens upon dozens upon dozens of countries have effective security forces, even though none spends anywhere near that much?
I imagine we're just talking past each other... but the notion that a training mission in Afghanistan would be as costly as implementing a full-blown population-centric COIN campaign is hard for me to understand.
Visitor @ 12:15pm would do
Visitor @ 12:15pm would do well to remember the other, not-so-positive, outcomes of American evacuation from Vietnam (400,000 South Vietnamese killed, 1 million+ boat people).
Or is that somehow not our policy concern?
There are a lot of strawmen
There are a lot of strawmen in these discussions. We are not facing a choice between total commitment and total withdrawal. There is a lot of middle ground there and sometimes less is more.
All we have to do in
All we have to do in Afghanistan is kill or capture AQ when we can. Everything else is peripheral.
Why/How are we going to try develop a country the size of Texas into something that resembles Chad as a nation-state?
Ditto what Bernard Finel
Ditto what Bernard Finel said. If we just trained ANSF & enclave ourselves into strongholds where we could conduct counterterrorism... then we would meet our national security goals for much less than $60 bill a year and without having to stretch our forces thin.
Bernard: I cant. But if one
Bernard:
I cant.
But if one is determined to hope for the best that better counterinsurgency tactics will work in Afghanistan making such a proposition by logic would mean stay the course with population centric coin, aka nation building.
Your previous point about the "incoherence" of the Coindinista argument for Afghanistan applies in the case to Exum.
But then this is what happens when dogmatism rules; incoherence abounds.
gian
For those wanting to get
For those wanting to get down:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OE6s92f7ep4
First few seconds are funny, and then it gets old.
Visitor @ 12:15 answers
Visitor @ 12:15 answers amagi:
I think your concerns are correct and well-founded.
But I associate these drastic outcomes in Vietnam with the United States leaving later rather than sooner.
As in Vietnam, the longer we stay in Afghanistan, the harder it will be for us to leave, and the worse it may fare for certain groups of the indigenous peoples when we do leave.
I believe that we must take a long moment -- to properly factor such extremely negative outcomes into our decision-making process re: Afghanistan.
The longer we stay in what again may be an "endless war," the more likely it may be that many Afghan people pay a very terrible price.
I posted a version of this
I posted a version of this comment on SWJ, it looks relevant here:
In my personal opinion, the real issue is not Afghanistan, its Pakistan. Lets imagine that the US leaves Afghanistan in disarray, right down to the iconic helicopter takeoff from the Kabul embassy roof (maybe with Karzai hanging on to the rope ladder); even in that scenario, the real loss for the US is mostly loss of face (it would be terrible disaster for the Afghans, and I am not saying that does not count, just limiting myself to the US right now). There is no oil in Afghanistan and no EASY way to have a functional modern country in the foreseeable future. Taliban ruled Afghanistan would become a haven for the world's adventure seeking jihadis, but the taliban would not have peace. The Northern alliance has been revitalized and will continue to get Indian and Iranian (and probably Russian and American) support and will likely hold the North. The rest will be one big mess, Somalia X 10, occasionally bombed and cruise-missiled as the need arises. How many international terrorist plots have been launched from Somalia? probably zero. Without Pakistan, the jihadis have nothing except endless brutal war in the world's poorest country.
The real question is Pakistan. If Pakistan then reverts to helping the taliban, one can even imagine a revitalized taliban holding most of Afghanistan, but how would Pakistan do that without incurring some NATO displeasure and other costs? Anyway, my question to you is this: do you think the US has finally flipped the Pakistani army or can the Pakistani army go back to training and arming jihadis?
If they dont go back to being jihad central, can the US live with an Afghan version of Somalia? Maybe China and India and Iran and Russia and the saner elements in Pakistan will all have trouble with that notion, but what about the US? (And I will admit I am trying to start a conversation and learn, these are not necessarily my final views). The Pakistani army could be fighting the jihadis for decades, but as long as they hold the major cities and control the ports and airports, is that any worse than what is happening now?
Should we not consider that
Should we not consider that the recent destabilization of Pakistan is specifically due to and caused by our current involvement in Afghanistan?
Sure, its caused by the US
Sure, its caused by the US invasion of Afghanistan in the sense that the invasion has gradually made it difficult for the Pakistani army to operate its jihadi proxies and this has finally led to open warfare between some of those proxies and their past masters....
Since we are seriously
Since we are seriously talking about serious "nation-building" and "societal transformation" here, I think it is important to actually outline what normally is required (from an American perspective) in pursuing and achieving such a goal.
The essential task, in our minds, is that we make these nation more "open" to international market penetration and trade, and more "market-friendly" as to their overall orientation and functioning.
Routinely this requires:
a. The need to deal harshly with those portions of the general indigenous population who do not want to be "transformed" and who do not wish to orient their lines around market needs.
b. The need to overthrow, replace or circumvent leaders and officials (elected or otherwise) who seek to thwart the required market-based reforms -- or who prove ineffective and/or inefficient at making such reforms.
c. The need to marginalize, compromise, circumvent or destroy those portions of the long-sustaining indigenous culture which are contrary to or get in the way of optimum market-servicing requirements.
Essentially the task is to make a non- or less than optimally market-oriented society into one which is significantly grounded in, dependent upon and proficienty at meeting world market needs.
Democracy (if it works specifically to meet overall world-market requirements and needs) is considered an excellent governing choice.
I think that this (above), from an American perspective, is "nation-building" and "societal transformation" in a nut-shell and what this process is all about.
There once was a choice --
There once was a choice -- that of hardening the US against terrorist attacks by means of creating redundant infrastructure, protected infrastructure and a more consistent immigration and visitation policy. I am not sure that we still have the money to initiate these long term infrastructure changes but I think instead of going to two wars, there would have been a good start. A terrorist attack is primarily a one sided means of communication, a provocation whose value rises or falls with the response. Our infrastructure provides fat targets and the predictable response is war. IMHO sorts like AQ needs to be dealt with covertly and quietly.
Since we chose different we have to at least restore or help restore some kind of civility for the Afghan people. This does not mean nation building by our standards, since these standards don't apply in Afghanistan or Pakistan anyway. We need to end up to be seen by the Afghanis as the folks that helped them back on their own feet. Then we step back and mentor -- when asked.
Well, at least Haas is
Well, at least Haas is honest enough to term the Afghanistan adventure what it rightly is: a war of choice, which, as he points out, gives rise to a whole number of options, almost none of which have apparently not been considered seriously in the past. They're obviously not being considered by CNAS and the Coindinista community, all busily engaged in selling what's proving to be an exceedingly naive or duplicitous president on the fiction that this "small war" has somehow been promoted to WW2 status.
I continue to be disappointed at the paucity of military thinking these days. Even Jones, the NSA, is revealed as a one-trick pony when it comes to strategic looks at the AfPak mess. It's all about massive combat formations and "hearts and minds." There is no evidence that any military "thinkers" have ever considered that, as Haas points out, even in the best of all worlds—Hurray! A democratic Afghanistan with decent security forces—there is still of plenty of room out there in the wilds of this large country for the entire AQ brigade to meet and greet, especially considering the state of the neighboring nation.
Why is the military and the Coindinista community—which now effectively speaks for the military—so determined to refrain from any mention of robust CT operations, supported by equally robust offensive intelligence efforts? No medals? No glory? Who knows? All I know is this enormous blind spot on the part of defense "planners" and "strategists" has placed this nation into the situation where the decider, the president, is clearly not getting the benefit of clear-eyed strategic thinking from those upon whom he unfortunately must rely. Enjoy your time in the sun, folks. If this guy ends up being a one-term president, you'll have a lot to do with it, and you'll be radioactive.
As military people, we learn that if we're going to do it right, the first thing that has to go is emotion. Emotion colors judgment; it leads to errors. Too many people are still searching for that payback for 9/11, understandable on the part of the man on the street, but deadly on the part of professionals.
Thinking of what might have been done with the billions—over a trillion by now—squandered in Iraq and Afghanistan in fruitless military endeavors is very depressing. There will always be terrorism, but we might have been able to properly shore up our internal defenses—still weak—and we might also have been able to directly address the bad actors efficiently and lethally if we hadn't found it necessary to divert ourselves to dealing with the 99.999 percent of Iraqi and Afghani people who never meant us any harm.
Not to mention we'd owe a lot less to the same nation—China—our defense "strategic" planners and the hardware mafia, which are actually one-and-the-same, assures us is a major strategic threat. Why in the world would the Chinese dirty their hands to bring us down when we're doing such a fine job of it ourselves?
So start taking me seriously
So start taking me seriously when I post irreverently (and drunk!).
The Sri Lankan Army is going to train the Pakistan Army...
Fonseka vs AQ- Core
Wow. I didn't realize I had that kind of juice ;-)
I now semi seriously wonder how much the Chinese had to do with this, if anything.
Consistent with my outline
Consistent with my outline above re: what nation-building and societal transformation (from an American perspective) would actually look like and require for Afghanistan, note the credentials of Ashraf Ghani, who has been talked about as being the new Chief Executive under the next president:
From TED.com: "He is considered an expert in state-building and societal transformation. He believes that Afghanistan should be approached not as a charity but as an investment. With Clare Lockhart, he runs the Institute of State Effectiveness (ISE) which examines the relationship between citizens, the state and the market and which advises countries, companies and NGOs worldwide. And he has held executive positions with the World Bank."
Thus, this is to be nation-building and societal transformation -- to our standards and needs -- and not just "getting Afghanistan back on its feet."
This, the true extent and intent of our overall goal and mission re: nation-building and societal transformation in Afghanistan -- and what this will actually require (items [a] - [c] at "Bill" above) -- must understood, before we embark further.
..."He believes that
..."He believes that Afghanistan should be approached not as a charity but as an investment..."
LOL. I bet he does. so do these bums from Chicago.
Bill, the problem with your narrative: that's not what we do, are trying to do, or even dream we could. Unless of course the world legalizes opium, so that they could have a revenue stream.
Oh, and it ignores 9/11 and AQ. And all the attacks since.
China suits our needs. they make cheap shit, and give us the debt to buy it.
Visitor @ 7:18am on Aug
Visitor @ 7:18am on Aug 22nd, et al:
I think this is what we do now and what we do in the future. This is the new American way of war.
This, I believe, is what "war among the people" is really be all about.
Its war in the service of development (of the Third World), which, in turn, is war in the service of the expanding global economy or world market.
In such a war, as I have noted above, you must, charateristically, (a) deal harshly with any "old school" common folk and fighters who resistant market-based change, (b) deal harshly with "old school" leaders and leadership systems who/which do not come on-board or who/which are inept at making market-based change, and (c) deal harshly with the other aspects of the society and culture that, likewise, are outdated and which tend to get in the way of the changes needed to put the nation and people on-line.
This, we must come to understand, is really what nation-building and societal transformation is really all about.
Thus, in Afghanistan (and other such nations in the future) we will not be committing American blood and treasure to simply restore some short-lived minimal degree of order and stability to an "old school" primitive, outdated and constantly troublesome society.
Instead, we will use Diplomacy and Defense in support of Development, and commit American soldiers and resources only if we intend do the job right, to wit: make fundamental change and transform these "backward" societies completely, finally, as a whole, and to our overall needs.
We do not intend to have to go back and forth to these places constantly and forever. And we nation-building and societal transformation as the way of not having to do this.
I think that one of the
I think that one of the major shortcomings of the "hole up in megaforts and just conduct kill/capture missions" is that it delegitimizes our presence in the eyes of the host nation's population. The growing resentment would then feed the fires of radicalism, increasing the threat to US interests. We were seen as occupiers by many in Saudi Arabia through the 90s. Heck, that was one of AQ's main "complaints" and recruiting points.
Bill, I think you're off-the-mark as to what we consider a successfully built nation-state. I think we look first and foremost for legitimacy as defined as a monopoly on the use of violence external to the state and rule of law internally. Second, we want supporters of basic human rights and a state that is favorable to us. Yes, the US, at times, must pragmatically balance this with other national interests (a disruption in natural resources, like it or not, IS a national interest). I do, however, find it an absolutely thought-provoking view.
We COIN-supporters in the military have had to fight long and hard to get our voices heard over the past eight years. Not until '07 were we able to gain any real ground in the discussion as to how to execute operations. The question is-"is it too late for COIN to succeed in Afghanistan?" I think we'll know within a few years. I sincerely hope not.
Anyway, I feel that pursuing an effective counter-insurgency operational model is the only possible way to succeed in Afghanistan. Success being measured as follows: 1) legitimate government 2) maintenance of a base standard of human rights 3) making Afghanistan far less able to be used as training ground and sanctuary for terrorist, takfiri, jihadi, and other radical purposes.
Captain Monkey: Your goals
Captain Monkey: Your goals seem pretty minimal to justify $100 billion up front per year with another $ 200 per year down stream and 70,000 troops. This is the problem with the Petreaus COIN doctrine it is very expensive in cash and troops. It might even make sense if the US military had the draft or a mass citizen army and could put 500,000 poorly paid soldiers in the country for a decade or so but it can't and on that score is divorced from reality.
Cpt Monkey, Your goal # 3 -
Cpt Monkey,
Your goal # 3 - "making Afghanistan far less able to be used as training ground and sanctuary for terrorist, takfiri, jihadi, and other radical purposes." --- is actually casus belli, and the jus ad bello that got us in there....why put it last?
Especially as you could not achieve #1 or #2 with 20 years and a million men with a trillion dollars. Does that base standard of human rights include decent rights for women? You'd have to kill or intimidate into total capitulation every male from 8 to 80.
BTW -- what country? Land of 10,000 Wars
[I disclaim expertise, I haven't been there. And don't care to go]
I still day give Team Papacy their 12-18 mos ( I do note AM went abruptly from Aug 2010 to Dec 2010). Then re-evaluate.
@Bill. Your POV is stimulating. I think wrong, since it ignores 9/11.
Yer not gonna get me to bite off on 9/11 was a response to our consumerist threat to "backwards" rich Yemeni, Egyptian and Saudi brats on a murder safari. But it's an interesting consideration. Might make more sense if we weren't broke and had something to sell other than "human capital" (read - worthless paper).
What can we realistically
What can we realistically achieve that can be sustained while still being the inherently corrupted true Badland
Korea was a "war of
Korea was a "war of necessity"? Gulf War 2 was a "war of necessity"?
If you're going to start a discussion with those canards, we're already done. They, too, were foreign policy adventures begun for reason other than national existence. C'mon.
And I have to say, it is disappointing to see the immense, bleating following the "we MUST send in 40 (70, 100),000 troops or Troy wll fall!" nonsense still has. There are lots of ways to skin this cat (including stopping pestering the damn cat). I had hoped that six years of inanity would have cured us of the notion that a foreigner with a gun is a magic fairy that can sprinkle pixie dust on a 12th Century tribesman and turn him into a cell-phone toting, Armani-suit wearing venture capitalist.
@308 visitor, We were
@308 visitor,
We were leaving the damn cat alone until they blasted the shit out of us. Previously we had helped the cat with their local Bear problem. To pay us back, The cat started helping their alley cat friends (and spoiled brat adventurer kitties) shit on our rug for awhile before, the day of days, and since 9/11. All the while whining and rubbing against the leg for more attention and kitty treats.
Now I don't think they're worth 100K troops, 10 years, 5K dead and a cool trillion (gadzillion? gotta allow for the hyperinflation). But since my plan is the Rapture without the Redemption (and these jokers absolutely fit the term "Left Behind") I don't think you'd care for it much.
Let's give the Papacy the 12/18 mos. At that point we declare a conclave and elect a new Pope if Humane Triage ain't packin in the faithful.
I vote for Urban II.
Visitor 3:08 makes the
Visitor 3:08 makes the point. Also, how many can remember the ORIGINAL purpose for invading Afghanistan had nothing to do w/ the Taliban? We climb into bed with worse daily, have done so, & will continue to do so.
I remember the excreble W informing the "Northern Alliance" , our, um, democratic allies, not to head into Kabul .....down the memory hole.
Just like the oil/gas pipelines that still, when you cut thru the crap, is our sole actual reason for being there, as far as I can tell.
We are foriegn to the point of alien, have betrayed these people often enough, and have racked up quite the pile of kills.
While we owe these poor devils, we need to withdraw, carefully & deliberately. Its not going to be a "free" market nation state. It dosnt HAVE to be.
And to look at the bloody, inevitable aftermath of French/US mass murder in defense of colonialism - a fight that should have ended around 46 dragged out til 75- and say the LOCALS are barbarians? Its clear thinking like that which is propelling this new public war for private profit. IMHO.
"I think that the program in
"I think that the program in Afghanistan should be to secure the capital and a coalition redoubt around Bagram and then use those areas as a base for counter-terrorism operations aimed at truly international Muslim zealot groups rather than the Taliban confederation of rebels. Numbers of our troops in this? 20,000, 30,000, something like that. Forget about building an Afghan nation-state. That task would be so large that it might bleed us dry. Some infrastructure projects would be a good idea but only in the context of an international consortium. Buy the opium crop. Destroy it, use it in the pharma industry, something. The offensive operations against the international terrorists should be intelligence driven and consist largely of raids against specific people and organizations. We should rely on CIA and the Special Operations people in the military. We should take advantage of the "rentability" of many Afghan groups to use them as auxiliaries in this struggle. This would be money well spent, just as it was well spent in Iraq."
-Col. Lang
I read a comment a long while back that has stuck with me even till this point, and have yet to see anything that has rebuked it. The comment went a little something like this:
"Were we to reduce our force in Afghanistan and seek to conduct primarily intelligence-based CT missions, we would be met almost instantaneously with insurmountable problems. Namely, where would the intelligence derive from? We would have few, if any units in the field away from the protection of the mega-FOBs. In a country like Afghanistan, intelligence is mainly reliant upon on-the-ground knowledge. We can't just track every Mr. Ahmed's IP address and roll up in force to 123 Kabul avenue, or drop a hellfire on his ass. What incentive would the locals have to give us actionable intelligence? Those that did would be quickly killed off or displaced. In fact, without units actively making their presence felt in the field, the Taliban (and other groups) would be able to quickly cement their power. Would you be able to get rid of the Mafia in Italy by having 20,000 troops in a big FOB in Rome? Are you serious? It would be a descending cycle of intelligence, and it would simply get worse and worse until we hit rocky, Afghan mountain bottom. Without boots on the ground, properly making strikes against AQ/radicalized groups’ infrastructure would be increasingly difficult.
"Next, there is the issue of radicalization. The population would first see a massive withdrawal of coalition forces as an unmistakable Taliban victory. With a super FOB located mainly in or around Kabul to sustain a disconnected central government from the other 98% of the country, both the coalition forces and the central government would lose legitimacy and garner hatred faster than Jenna Haze's panties drop."
I doubt how much our limited COIN mission in Afghanistan will accomplish. I really do. However, this counter-terrorism, based-out-of-Kabul-commando shit won't work either. It's a far greater pipedream than any COIN talk I have heard thus far. In fact, if COIN fails, our best bet would be to pack up and leave, and return with the hammer if the need arises in the distant future. We simply cannot stop AQ from gaining sanctuaries. It is not feasible. They will have sanctuaries in Pakistan, Afghanistan, certain spots in Europe, multiple other countries in the Middle East, as well as multiple countries in SE Asia.
On a completely different note, Korea and the Gulf War were wars of necessity? Hahahahahahaha. Panama, too?
Elf @ 3:48, "Let's give the
Elf @ 3:48,
"Let's give the Papacy the 12/18 mos. At that point we declare a conclave and elect a new Pope if Humane Triage ain't packin in the faithful.
I vote for Urban II."
I really enjoyed that comment. It just had to be said. deus vult!
And since good old Urban wished "to destroy that vile race from the lands of our friends," I'm with him! Pick up your cross and follow me, straight leg infantry!
I don't know if it is
I don't know if it is realistic to separate "vital national interests" from "vital administration interests" as I suspect many administrations would have felt that they were the same thing.
Quibling aside, for everyone who would see a more limited role in Af-Pak: do some homework for the rest of us. My recollection is that even without a heavy Soviet troop presence, the PDPA was able to stalemate the Muj until Soviet support was entirely cut off. Would stalemating the Taliban by supporting the current gov't control of the cities (but not fielding combat NATO forces) so absorb the Taliban locally that we would achieve our national interests? Could Karzai be our Najibullah? Or, could (and are) we be replicating an Israeli blunder by allowing Darwin's Ratchet to assemble a Frankenstein?
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mohammad_Najibullah
Deus Ex is right to flag Pat
Deus Ex is right to flag Pat Lang's comment (even if to disagree with it in the end), because it really is the most probable strategic alternative to fighting a long COIN war to prop up the Afghan government.
In the darkest version of this scenario, it may not even be necessary to maintain a US presence in Afghanistan, or to have a functioning central government. Rather, you do containment Somali-style: throw resources at friends during a ongoing civil war, directly or indirectly strike at high value targets as they appear, keep local jihadists so focused on the local fight that they don't have the time or energy to export anything, deter, and do what is necessary to prevent the bad guys from consolidating any meaningful victory. You play for a winning draw, a long war of attrition with minimal military exposure, rather than a victory.
There has been a great deal of attention to the use of failed states as terrorist sanctuaries, but it rather misses the point that failed states have usually not been the most important sanctuaries for international terrorist--these plots have usually not been organized in Afghanistan 1992-96 (when it was at its most failed), Liberia -2006, Sierra Leone 1991-2000, or the DR Congo, but rather in Afghanistan 2001 (when 80% of the country was under fairly stable Taliban control), Sudan, Kenya, Germany, Indonesia, and the UK. Indeed, while a context of on-going civil war has some advantages in terms of sanctuary (the collapse of the local security forces and the rule of law), it also has other disadvatanges (vulnerability, uncertainty, poorer communications and travel infrastructure). AQ learned this in its own attempts to build a cadre in Somalia, as evidenced by its own accounts of the effort. To some extent we've drawn up a narrative of sanctuary to fit what we're doing, rather than vice-versa.
Of course, there are lots of costs associated with this approach. First off, there is the massive human cost, in terms of civilians killed and displaced, and infrastructures destroyed. Second, there is the risk of further destabilizing Pakistan. Third, there's no guarantee that your local clients will be able to deliver. In my personal view, it is unacceptable for all of those reasons.
However it remains striking to me that while this is undoubtedly the implicit Plan B that the US would adopt in Afghanistan should COIN efforts fail or public support evaporate, it is almost never addressed in debates on policy options.
I guess I don't know much
I guess I don't know much about training security forces. Can you explain why it would require 100,000 men and $60 billion annually to do it?
How is that dozens upon dozens upon dozens of countries have effective security forces, even though none spends anywhere near that much?
I imagine we're just talking past each other... but the notion that a training mission in Afghanistan would be as costly as implementing a full-blown population-centric COIN campaign is hard for me to understand.
I'm with Bernard on this. (Let's see if the comment software still hates me today...)
Maybe a stalemate is the
Maybe a stalemate is the best we (the NATO coalition) can hope to achieve.
By all accounts the Pakistanis still view elements of the Taliban as potential proxies or allies (again), and at best they are hedging their bets about the outcome. I'd like to think their views have changed since the rollback of the Taliban in Swat, but the last time we trusted them to act in our interests (vis-a-vis Afghanistan), they intentionally funnelled American aid to some of the worst extremists they could possibly find.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/22/world/asia/22pstan.html
Why? Because they thought it was in Pakistan's national interest.
Whilst we may immediately think nation building will help stem greater regional involvement (i.e. a threat to the stability of Pakistan), maybe a large proportion of the Pakistani elite still view a radical Islamic neighbour as the best option.
This scenario makes any attempt to eliminate the Taliban's control of at least some parts of the country seem pretty futile. In combination, of course, with the effects of Pashtun nationalism, and the corruption of the Karzai government.
Trying to train 400,000 Afghanis also seems to be an entirely quixotic goal. Most recruits are no doubt illiterate, many are ethnically incompatible with the regions they are forced to operate in (i.e. non-Pashtun), a great many are afflicted with drug addiction, and desertion is rife. The ANP are probably becoming just as despised as the warlords.
Haas is right to discuss the alternative options to an ever increasing foreign presence.
For radical ideas, how about junking the programme to expand the ANA, and instead focus on training a much smaller number of elite Afghan special forces to carry out CT missions utilising airborne assault and the limited resources of the ANAF to their greatest potential. If the Karzai government cannot be trusted to rule with integrity then do not attempt to expand its influence. Bypass it and revitalise local tribes and mullahs undermined by years of Taliban rule by giving them limited training and very basic weapons. Continue to support the Northern Alliance as a rival proxy to the Taliban, and how about balkanizing Afghanistan to better reflect its ethnic make-up, thereby alleviating tensions between the Pashtun and non-Pashtun elements? Pakistan gets its radical Islamic buffer, and Kabul doesn't fall.
These are the ideas of a layman, but is it not possible that nation-building in Afghanistan may have to come from the ground-up? Maybe we can make the best of a bad situation without spilling more and more of our own blood.
M. Shannon: You think?
M. Shannon: You think? First, I ask at what price are you willing to sell your rights, or your brother's, or any member of your family's. Beyond the touchy-feely Wilsonian internationalism that I suggest, I think there is also a realist strategic value to be gained in Afghanistan. I did mention making it harder to create training camps, but also there are significant natural gas fields as well as coal deposits in the country.
Secondly, I don't think it requires 70,000 troops. Yes, we are ill-structured for counter insurgency. As such, we currently have a ridiculous tooth-to-tail ratio for supporting our troops. We discourage foraging and living "off the land," with the notable exception of Special Forces. I don't think that the ratio needs to be at its current levels and that we can drop the committment. It will take time and a fundamental shift in how we conduct business. Furthermore, I feel that the current need for increased number of troops is a direct result of poor previous decision in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because we relied on large base camps and complex armored convoys to move equipement between them, we ignited the TTP of IEDs. Now we need 20+ route clearance packages in Afghanistan to protect ourselves from the threat. That's well over 1500 soldiers.
As far as money goes... I think there is A TON of wasted tax dollars. Walk into any dining hall in Bagram, Kandahar, Baghdad, or Balad and you'll see 30 cakes, a permanent Baskin Robbins set up, etc. Yes, those are nice to have at times but they don't justify the expense--especially when the soldiers that most deserve the treat (those in the remote outposts under constant fire, like the Korengal or Bela or Aranas or Kamdish or Wanat or... or... or...) don't get the benefit, but those living comfortably on the "tail" side of the ratio do.
Elf: I can understand why you question my putting the original jus ad bello as number #3. I put it as #3 because I believe that while we have disrupted it temporarily, we can only transform those gains into permanent gains by accomplishing 1 and 2.
I don't feel that you're spot-on with the comment about having to coerce all the males in the population. Yes, there it is paternal society, and there is still total respect for women. I remember getting raked over the coals while trying to buy some land, because the village men did not want me to underpay a widow for her land that we rented. There was at least a 100% mark up on the land, relative to what I paid the men in the village for their land (and yes, the money did indeed go to the woman).
Human rights cannot be gained instantaneously. It comes slowly and there is always resistence to progressive change. I'm still willing to risk MY life and MY soldiers' lives for those three causes. I'm also willing to continue paying my tax dollars to support the mission.
I spoke openly against going to Iraq in 2002 and 2003, because I thought it was a "war of choice" and the wrong choice. I think Afghanistan, now more than ever, is a "war of necessity."
Deus Ex @ 4:25: I think your
Deus Ex @ 4:25:
I think your assessment of Col. Lang's statement and idea is spot-on. That line of thinking terrifies me. Scary, scary, scary. Also, your analogy re: Jenna Haze was hilarious.
Good on you!
Deus Ex said: "We simply
Deus Ex said:
"We simply cannot stop AQ from gaining sanctuaries. It is not feasible. They will have sanctuaries in Pakistan, Afghanistan, certain spots in Europe, multiple other countries in the Middle East, as well as multiple countries in SE Asia."
We are partners in crime of long standing with the parties that support them. As long as our policies are designed to weigh in on the Sunni side of the Islamic street by seeking to weaken AQ's Shiite infidel enemies, they will find sanctuaries ever closer to the borders of the little country so much is designed to "protect".
"Human rights cannot be
"Human rights cannot be gained instantaneously. It comes slowly and there is always resistence to progressive change. I'm still willing to risk MY life and MY soldiers' lives for those three causes. I'm also willing to continue paying my tax dollars to support the mission"
Capt. Monkey,
You can't have it both ways. The all-volunteer force has all but ensured that those with recent, first-hand military experience or family members with such experience remain miniscule portions of the voting and tax-paying population.
What you or members of your company/battalion/brigade want is irrelevant. If this endless sacrifice can't be sold to the 95%+ of the US population with no skin in this fight, your opinions are ultimately meaningless.
I'm unconvinced by your arguments and I think you will find a growing portion of the American public is as well.
Uh, give the Papacy 12-18
Uh, give the Papacy 12-18 mos. Then it's RB for Pope, or his candidate. I know you said you don't like it. I do.
CPT Monkey,
Thanks. Willing to listen to on ground. You got your shot, Sir. Please call back on SITREP 2010.
on the tooth to tail....don't get me started. I wrote a raging rant blog (blant) for six months on it (free-our-fobbits). you are right of course. Especially since there's risk involved in bringing that crap into country, and cost. We need to check our compasses, Pentagon. People are dying for AAFES incorporated. WTF? Live Spartan, or God forbid get it local. God forbid we support the economy locally. Or interact with anyone but fellow fobbits.
BTW Old Blue was hysterically funny about "Pogadishu" on Afghan Quest.
Elf: 9/11, while being
Elf:
9/11, while being exceptionally tragic, when seen through the lense of the "Transforming the Third World" mission, can also be seen as (1) a reason for and (2) a way of -- getting our foot in the Third World door.
"Terrorism," generally, when viewed from the "Transforming the Third World" perpective, can be seen as an unprecedented opportunity and basis, and an unprecedented reason and justification, for doing Third World transformations -- when and where we chose -- world-wide.
Capt. Monkey:
Thus, when the United States intervenes in the Third World today, it does so -- not to simply get the country back on its feet with adequate security, legitimate government, better human rights, etc.
When the United States intervenes in the Third World today, it does so to accomplish a much more significant, much more entailed and much broader and more long-term mission, to wit: to bring about fundamental change (market-based state-building and market-based societal transformation). Think of AFRICOM, for example, within this context.
This is the true scope of this new 21st Century project and imperative.
And it is the true context within which COIN must be understood in this new century.
When one nation and society decides that it is going to bring about "fundamentally change" to a whole host of other nations and societies, then insurgency(ies), up the wazu, are what is to be expected, planned and prepared for. The COIN guys and gals will be dealing with all the "deal harshly" stuff I have identified (see "a" - "c" in my comments above).
That is why we see such significant changes being made and such initiatives being undertaken by DoS, DoD and private enterprise today.
We are looking at a very big and a very long term project (transforming the Third World) which will require a new way of thinking, significant new capabilities and a new commitment.
I agree with your point,
I agree with your point, please share with us more good articles.1998 Buick Estate Wagon AC Compressor
Add your comment