Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS.
The counterinsurgency guidance issued by Gen. Stan McChrystal to his units in the field has been finalized and released -- and it's very good. I would say it incorporates most of what the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have learned about counterinsurgency warfare over the past eight years and gives a good hint as to how Gen. McChrystal expects his subordinate units -- U.S. and allied -- to fight over the next 12-24 months. One thing that jumped out at me as being particularly important is the emphasis on partnering with the Afghan National Security Forces. Partnering is not the same thing as mentoring. Partnering means that you pair units together and do everything together: live, eat, train, plan, operate. This is a big change from the way we have engaged with the ANSF in the past and will require a shift in thought and deed among ISAF units and their commanders. Unless you are skeptical about counterinsurgency as a broader exercise, I think you will find this guidance to be smart, clearly explained, and worth reading yourself.
Mentor -- a wise and trusted counselor or teacher.
Partnership -- A relationship between individuals or groups that is characterized by mutual cooperation and responsibility, as for the achievement of a specified goal.
Square that with the second and third sentence of Partner with ANSF on page 5: Our job is to hold them accountable for performance in serving the Afghan people and protecting them from harm. Build their capacity to secure their own country.
Doesn''t that sentence reflect the need to continue some sort of mentoring with the need to establish/maintain accountability? I agree with your partnering statement as a physical manifestation of what the current relationship should be, but the document clearly anticipates the continuing "mentoring" aspect of that relationship, obviously with the objective of eventually reaching a relationship fully based on "partnership". There is no mention of mutual accountability that a "true" partnership, of equals with equal responsibility, would bring. And I don't think anyone would argue that currently exists, or that the ANSF has the ability to do that currently. I think you can argue that, unwieldy as it is, with the introduction of the current legal framework for US operations in Iraq, we have made a transition over the last several years from "mentor" to partners. There is now a legal basis, granted limited by the litteral language and greater policy and political issues, for Iraq to hold us accountable for our actions there.
Point being, that I think throwing out the "mentorship" aspect is premature, though it clearly should be based on movement towards partnership, not the latest manifestation of the rejected colonial style "mentoring" that so much affected the previously centuries of western adventures in that country. And as ungainly as it is, Iraq might show some sort of glide path to that partnership, though it remains to be seen if that can be grafted into Afghanistan's cultural and political structure.
So what happens to this guidance? Who all is it being issued to?
I find it interesting that our goal is to create "responsive and credible governance" in Afghanistan, when we seem to have immense difficulty doing it here. Poll after poll after poll shows that a broad consensus in the United States that people, on the whole, don't trust our own government. Bush spent the last 3 years of his term under water in terms of public approval. Obama looks to be heading there after just eight months in office. Congress hasn't had a positive approval rating in -- I believe -- at least a decade. Conservatives seem to feel that liberals wants to create death panels to murder the elderly, liberals seem to feel that all of our elected representatives are bought and paid for.
Aside from the bigger question of whether it makes sense for the United States to undertake this mission, what bothers me about the guidance is that the implied theory of governmental legitimacy is pretty thin. Legitimacy comes from the provision of goods and services? Always? Often? Sometimes? I don't want to be a jerk about it... but people have been studying this issue for generations, and I don't think the consensus is anywhere near as cut and dried as COIN doctrine or this guidance suggests.
The flip-side is that this whole exercise is motivated by the assumption that an insurgency ipso facto demonstrates a dangerous gap in governmental legitimacy. The empirical evidence on that claim is sketchy as well.
That said, the recommendations seem well-conceived and reasonable. It is sort of like the claim that cleanliness is next to Godliness. Well, I think good grooming is a good thing, but I can still doubt the spiritual consequences. I just don't know that there is a credible "theory of victory" there.
"The counterinsurgency guidance issued by Gen. Stan McChrystal to his units in the field has been finalized and released -- and it's very good."
Should we expect anything less? This blog is full of plugs and pats on the back. Everything written is "very good" and every scholar/policymaker you "very much respect." If one were to go back through all such references, the contradictions would be startling. How many "bests" can there be at one thing? Apparently on this blog, there are infinite. Until you move up the chain to where you want to be, I expect the readership will continue to be bombarded with such nonsense. Blah blah blah.
It will be interesting to see how the partnering works as compared to embedding mentors whose sole focus was the development of the ANA or ANP instead of conducting their own operations as well. Past history suggests the potential that US units will use the ANA as their pissboys instead of truly partnering, but hey; things can change, right? We shall see. It is now up to young officers and NCO's who are beginning to get training in COIN doctrine and who see their senior leadership bickering incessantly over the appropriateness of that doctrine.
Don't think the youngsters don't see it, either. Do you think that it's important for the young Soldiers, and particularly the young leaders on the ground to have some sort of faith in their doctrine... expecially when we ask them to assume greater risk in the performance of duties designed to avoid harming the population? How do the young react when faced with a quandry; a doctrine their own leadership openly questions and a more dangerous job because of it?
Again, we shall see.
@ Mr. Finel; Do you offer another, more accurate description of what an insurgency is or what legitimacy is? Or do you just raise questions and then lay in wait to ask more questions until you feel that you've run someone in a circle?
The level of distrust that Americans have for their government is nowhere near the level of concern Afghans have for theirs. Imagine if you were a member of a political party and you knew that if you made your membership known, truly committing yourself to their particular agenda and investing your own "blood and treasure" in it, that if your side falls you and possibly your family will die.
Yeah, it's that extreme. Legitimacy means that much. To the truly committed in this country, either way, delegitimatization means potential death. For the government, it is an existential struggle. For many Afghans, the choice of becoming committed is a choice of life or death... and it is easiest not to choose, but to lean one way or the other. This is why I laugh when people say that the Afghans have never been conquered. What mirth! They have been repeatedly conquered. By bending like a reed in the wind, they have survived and remained intact as the tides of history have repeatedly washed over them. They are survivors, and the reason that they survive is that in extreme situations they remain non-commital as a larger whole while portions commit their lives.
Oddly enough, our own nation was created by such a committed minority. Most of the colonials stayed home and waited it out. For many, it was simply a matter of continuing to do business under whatever authority blew past them that day or month or year. Many continued their lives as best they could with no real commitment either way. Our nation was begun by a committed few who were willing to risk their personal blood and treasure for such a thing, and the rest just lived through it. Afghans, Bernard, are good at living through it and being prepared to go either way. Backwards or forewards, they just want to continue breathing.
Legitimacy is relevance, Bernard. Who is more relevant in your daily life? To a person who just wants to be left alone and seeks the path of least resistance to his next breath, legitimacy boils down to who is relevant in his life. Who holds the authority to tell him anything? Who makes decisions that are enforceable in his world? Who provides security from the depredations of others, be they criminal or a "competing form of government?" A speeding ticket in America is a symbol of governmental relevance. Go ahead, don't pay the ticket. See what happens. Your state or local government will assert itself and prove itself to be relevant. In Afghanistan, it is much more elemental than that.
Comparing American polling data about the level of satisfaction of American citizens to Afghans who don't trust their government is comparing someone who is trying to decide who they would trust to lend their bicycle to with someone who needs to decide who will likely not get them killed. It is not the same. The stakes are not the same, not nearly so; the parallel between American satisfaction and Afghan satisfaction is weak.
This may seem a silly question, but what is your level of education on the doctrine? Have you read FM 3-24? Have you read Galula? Have you read Mao? Do you understand insurgent theory as well as counterinsurgent theory? I don't mean to be an ass, but I can probably safely assume that COL Gentile has read all of the above. The Colonel is as likely to drop some obscure reference to an offhand remark made by von Moltke the Elder as he is to quote Galula or Mao. He comes to a conclusion that I absolutely cannot agree with, but it's not because he hasn't read the background. I have no reason to make the same assumption with you.
True partnering is absolutely what's needed to break out of the current logjam. But I share a little of Old Blue's skepticism. It's partly terminology: in the past, "partnering" was often the euphemism for "not worth the time to mentor" so its reuse here could be either fortunate or unfortunate.
The big issue is going to be comparative tempo. Right now we're getting into a summer Ramadan, so ANA operations are gradually shutting down for the next month due to troop exhaustion. After that comes Eid, which will be two-three weeks of nothing, as well. It cuts a big chunk out of a Western unit's tour to sit around and do framework all that time, which will be when they will be tempted to start looking for workarounds.
The other issue with partnering as a concept is it's like "landowner unit": terms of art with not a lot of grounding in doctrine. Soldiers understand "TACON" and "OPCOM", but who can tell who to do what in a partnered operation is still a little elusive to people. Still, the document seems a step in the right direction.
BruceR
Flit
>>Have you read FM 3-24? Have you read Galula? Have you read Mao? Do you understand insurgent theory as well as counterinsurgent theory?<<
Yes, yes, yes, and I think. I've also read Trinquier, Traber. I've read Bernard Fall and Alistair Horne. And Clausewitz and Sun-Tzu, and Liddell-Hart. And on and on. I mean, I was a professor at the National War College, and have taught use of force classes at Georgetown for over a decade.
I don't really think my "book learning" is the issue. I have zero operational experience, though. Have never donned a uniform. Never been to Iraq or Afghanistan. I don't speak Arabic, Pashtu, etc.
But, I've also read Weber, Charles Tilly, and Timothy Earle. I've read Bruce Porter and Hendrik Spruyt. Have you? While I would bet at least some folks on this board know more about insurgency and COIN doctrine than I do, I would be surprised if many had read as widely as I have on the topic of state formation and legitimacy.
The short answer is that there are multiple pathways to state legitimacy -- and while the provision of goods and services many play a role, an equally large role is played by shared historical myths, use of force, the existence of external threats, ritual and religion, the role of charismatic leaders, the institutionalization of mechanisms for allocation of resources, and on and on and on.
Maybe all of this is covered in the broad pronouncement about being sensitive to local culture. But I don't think so. I think there is sort of simplistic notion that if you provide security and build stuff legitimacy will follow. I don't think history supports that claim.
But I do look forward to a vigorous debate on the literature about state formation and legitimacy.
I, on the other hand, am currently in Afghanistan, wearing a uniform. I am not interested in vigorous literary debate about legitimacy is, quibbling over definition. I am interested in what legitimacy actually means on the ground to these people.
I'm glad that you are so well read in the theory. What I am directly concerned with is converting theory to action on the ground. There is much being written and done here, thousands of miles away and yet directly related to the actual reality of what is blithely discussed in theory on these threads. There is a tremendous amount of change going on here, such as the dissolution of the ETT's in favor of the two BCT concept, which totally changes the dynamic. The CIVMIL effort is just beginning to blossom. Just forming the buds, really.
A serious question for anyone involved; and by discussing here you are, is how to take the theory from airy to dusty. This is the project right here, right now. Else you are not contributing, only distracting, or in the case of some, merely lamenting.
The question becomes, are you being helpful?
BruceR and Blue can talk about the differences between advising and partnering better than I can, and the comments above are good. I think Boony is right on the money when he says that typically, partnering is something that happens with more capable forces than mentoring or advising. To be clear, advising and partnering are two different missions (both of which fall under the rubric of security force assistance or SFA), and they require two different organizations; typically an entire US formation engages in the partnering mission, while advising or mentoring is done by a smaller MTT or ETT (or OMLT).
What I think this rhetorical shift is really reflective of is an emphasis on the fact that ALL ISAF formations -- including combat brigades, units that are dedicated specifically to the combat/COIN mission and not to advising -- are going to be working by, with, and through host nation security forces. I don't think we're talking about an operational change so much as a change in mindset and in the way the orientation of all ISAF forces is discussed.
With Tintin's help, I wrote last week about the Fourth Brigade of the 82nd's recent deployment as a proof of concept for the "modular brigade augmented for security force assistance." We talk a little bit about the way that this differs from the Iraq Advise and Assist Brigade (AAB) concept, and how SFA/advising is going to be done into the (post-OIF/OEF) future. Check it out here.
Bernard, do you think it is possible for the current Afghan regime to acquire enough legitimacy or is it out of the question? After all, an Afghanistan in pretty much these borders has existed for over a hundred years. Thats longer than Pakistan or India. I think we can assume a certain minimum level of legitimacy for the idea of Afghanistan as a state by now. The question is, does the current regime have the wherewithal to acquire enough legitimacy as the govt of this state? What stops that from happening? Do they have less legitimacy than the PDPA regime? (I think they have less legitimacy because they are not even the continuation of some previously accepted state apparatus). Even if they have less legitimacy, can they possibly BUILD legitimacy and what would that cost? I think the answer is that they can, but its not easy. It would take time and money and support by foreign troops who also manage to pretend that they are NOT an occupying force but rather a force helping a weak afghan govt. That may involve a level of ingenuity that the US embassy has not yet shown. It look to me like the US is simultaneously more evil than they say (their motives are not always as pure as claimed) AND less evil than their own machiavellian theorists think they are (I am liable to be misunderstood, but anyway, lets try: I suspect US planners are naively innocent AND unaware of their own innocence, while being arrogant and having subconscious racist assumptions that further muck up their chances of success..and I am not using the word racist with any of its common multiculti bullshit connotations). I hope to clarify in future communications.
But I do look forward to a vigorous debate on the literature about state formation and legitimacy.
I'd be happy to oblige, having read plenty on the subject, plus the political and cognitive dynamics of social identity, the micro-foundations of rebellion, and more generally decision-making at the individual and group levels regarding politics and civil violence.
But all that rich literature seems rather stale in the face of what I've heard directly from people faced with those decisions in central and eastern Africa (also highly segmented societies with long histories of inter-group violence). Bottom line for most of them was that the retreat to a small primary solidarity group was motivated more by fear and insecurity than any primordial sense of identity.
All the factors that you cite - "shared historical myths, use of force, the existence of external threats, ritual and religion, the role of charismatic leaders, the institutionalization of mechanisms for allocation of resources" - certainly matter, but they interact in complex ways on a basic calculus about how to 1) stay alive, 2) subsist, 3) prosper. While definitions of those goals, and perceptions of the plausible routes to accomplish them are somewhat bounded by culture, history, etc., they are remarkably responsive to the pressures of brute fact.
So while it's not as simple as provision of security = legitimacy (and no COIN proponent worthy of the name would argue so - remember where IO is the frame for everything else?), neither is it as irresolvable as you (and most academics) make it (and if we're being honest, every social science problem) out to be.
MK
@Old Blue
I'm not the one who opened up the "who has read more books issue" Blue, you are. But now that it turns out that I have read the books, you fall back on the who is on the ground argument. Of course, if instead, I had answered that I was not at all familiar with COIN theory, but was instead, say, an expert in Afghan politics and had lived there for years (as many critics of the war have), your response would surely have been that I was not qualified to comment because I was not an expert on COIN theory.
Theory and history... in short... are important when they conform to your impressions, useless when the don't. And expertise is only relevant in whichever area you believe you happens to have a comparative advantage at a given time.
Well, I know my limitations. I wouldn't even try to involved in the "ETT's in favor of the two BCT " debate. Nor, you will note, have I gotten involved in the debate over lessons of Wanat or any number of other important issues that people on this board (and elsewhere) discuss with much more knowledge and insight than I could possibly provide. You'll also note, I don't particular get involved in debates over microfinance vs. large development projects.
But I know history. And I know a fair amount of the challenges of linking operational concepts to strategic outcomes in conflict. And I know a fair amount about the relationship between violence, legitimacy, and control. And I not interested in debates over semantics, but rather in concrete behavioral implications.
And while you may not believe it, the fact is that COIN literature is deeply flawed on these concepts. The assumptions about legitimacy in particular are razor thin.
@Omar... I don't know how to build legitimacy in Afghanistan... but at least I know that I don't know. The fact that I don't know and can't find anyone to explain how to me in terms which are not transparently flawed is one major reason why I am skeptical of the Afghan war and would prefer to focus on mitigation strategies. If we absolutely refuse to do that, I would say the next step is to spend a good long time trying to learn from our adversaries. In a period of 2 years, the Taliban went from a small regional militia to control of 90% of the territory of the country. How did they do it? How did they keep control? It wasn't all just ruthlessness -- which we wouldn't emulate even if we decided it was effective. I'd be asking good hard questions about centralization, about our anti-corruption agenda, about our willingness to tolerate such things as oppression of women. I have some thoughts on those issues, but they are really quite speculative.
Unfortunately, my expertise positions me better to ask questions than to provide answers at this juncture. Old Blue considers that less that useless. I understand where he is coming from and I respect the needs of men who lead others into combat. Having a jerk-off like me in his battalion command post (is that about right, Blue, O-5?) would hurt morale and potentially compromise his mission. Having me there virtually probably -- from his perspective -- isn't much better. I get it.
But even though Old Blue may think I am worthless, I am pretty well convinced that by pushing and asking questions and questioning assumptions and challenging the logic of COIN, at the very least I am helping the COIN folks hone their arguments and logic. We're all in this together. We all want to contribute to U.S. national security and keep the country safe.
So even though it will piss off Blue, I think I'll keep speaking and writing.
But all that rich literature seems rather stale in the face of what I've heard directly from people faced with those decisions in central and eastern Africa (also highly segmented societies with long histories of inter-group violence). Bottom line for most of them was that the retreat to a small primary solidarity group was motivated more by fear and insecurity than any primordial sense of identity.
All the factors that you cite - "shared historical myths, use of force, the existence of external threats, ritual and religion, the role of charismatic leaders, the institutionalization of mechanisms for allocation of resources" - certainly matter, but they interact in complex ways on a basic calculus about how to 1) stay alive, 2) subsist, 3) prosper. While definitions of those goals, and perceptions of the plausible routes to accomplish them are somewhat bounded by culture, history, etc., they are remarkably responsive to the pressures of brute fact.
On this I'm just going to chime in and drop Stathis Kalyvas, even though that's ridiculously simplistic and doesn't really add anything to the conversation except to say that (at some level below "identity" or governmental legitimacy) people tend to appreciate the institutions and groups that keep them from getting killed.
I don't intend to monopolize the board... so I'll drop out of this thread after this post unless someone decides to specifically call me out. But I needed to just say a few words about MK's excellent post.
>>Bottom line for most of them was that the retreat to a small primary solidarity group was motivated more by fear and insecurity than any primordial sense of identity.<<
Yes, and please don't confuse me with people who fall back on "ancient hatred" arguments. My only qualm with the implication of your statement that "insecurity" is primary about objective insecurity -- implied by your "brute fact" statement. Indeed, I think history is replete with examples -- including in Rwanda for instance -- where "insecurity" has been "constructed" by powerful elites in order to maintain control and in some cases initiate strategic dispossessive conflicts. So, in Afghanistan, we're tending -- I think -- to define "security" as stuff not going boom. But what are the "security" implications of a powerful Afghan National Army controlled by a non-Pashtun regime in Kabul? How does that goal play into the strategies of Taliban leaders who are clearly playing on fears of being power being institutionalized outside their control? Okay, I'll stop with the questions. My guess -- and I could be very, very wrong -- is that in Pashtun communities, insecurity is going to be more durably associated with potential domination from Kabul than fear of immediate violence.
>>provision of security = legitimacy (and no COIN proponent worthy of the name would argue so - remember where IO is the frame for everything else?),<<
Maybe. Here we have a very complex set of issues -- is the IO frame that GIRoA can better provide goods and services as McChystal's guidance explicitly says? Or is it something subtextual? But I admit, I could very well be misreading the argument on this point. I'll work on this more.
>>neither is it as irresolvable as you (and most academics) make it (and if we're being honest, every social science problem) out to be.<<
Look, I didn't make it out to be irresolvable. I've said that the existing doctrine -- as I understand it, and I have spent a fair amount of time trying to figure it out -- is problematic. Indeed, I would argue that my core argument has been that it isn't irresolvable, but rather that by trying to impose what are essentially western conceptions of statehood and legitimacy and combat effectiveness and good governance we may be going astray. My argument --- consistently -- has been that there is historical evidence that local modes have worked in the past that look quite different from what we propose to do.
The fact that I don't know and can't find anyone to explain how to me in terms which are not transparently flawed is one major reason why I am skeptical of the Afghan war and would prefer to focus on mitigation strategies.
Maybe because you're assuming it's one war, when in fact it's many small ones that the Quetta Shura and other groups seek to knit together into one larger struggle. The strategies have to be local - what works with the Noorzai of Kandahar is unlikely to be relevant (except in the broadest strokes) for the Hotaki of Wardak or the Pashai of Nuristan (which isn't to assume that the relevant qawm in all of those cases is at the tribe or sub-tribe level - could just as easily be the khel).
If we absolutely refuse to do that, I would say the next step is to spend a good long time trying to learn from our adversaries. In a period of 2 years, the Taliban went from a small regional militia to control of 90% of the territory of the country. How did they do it?
Based on what I've read, the Taliban's success was in large part their willingness to adapt to local conditions using a combination of service provision (esp security and adjudication of local disputes), co-optation, intimidation, coercion, and (especially in southern Pashtun areas) astute employment of symbolic logic in IO (such as appearing in the Cloak of the Prophet in Kandahar in '96). They were also an alternative to the other options then available to Afghans - the warlords. In this case it sounds like the devil they knew was so bad that they preferred to try a new one. Which sounds kinda similar to the situation Western forces encountered when we first arrived, doesn't it?
MK
Bernard - thanks for the reply. On a couple of points:
Indeed, I think history is replete with examples -- including in Rwanda for instance -- where "insecurity" has been "constructed" by powerful elites in order to maintain control and in some cases initiate strategic dispossessive conflicts.But what are the "security" implications of a powerful Afghan National Army controlled by a non-Pashtun regime in Kabul? How does that goal play into the strategies of Taliban leaders who are clearly playing on fears of being power being institutionalized outside their control?
Those are excellent points, and I'm sure they figure to some extent in the minds of some Pashtun leaders, but I doubt they dominate the calculus a the level of village-level leaders and below. I suspect they are more concerned with a government they experience primarily through corruption and violence than anything else. But either way, building governance from the bottom up at the same time as building from the top down (yes, this requires some complex synchronization of efforts) is probably the way forward. Are we doing it now? Not consistently if at all.
My argument --- consistently -- has been that there is historical evidence that local modes have worked in the past that look quite different from what we propose to do.
Sure, but is it realistic to think we can turn back the clock? It's been a heck of a long time since those local modes produced stability for more than a year or two at a time, and the society (societies?) hasn't remained static. I am deeply skeptical of arguments that returning to earlier models of governance are realistic or would prove effective int the long run. The challenge is to help the Afghans design and construct authentically Afghan institutions (e.g. not mindless recreations of our own) that are (and are perceived to be) a) effective b) reflect current and near future conditions, and c) compatible with our strategic objectives.
MK
Bernard - thanks for the reply. On a couple of points:
Indeed, I think history is replete with examples -- including in Rwanda for instance -- where "insecurity" has been "constructed" by powerful elites in order to maintain control and in some cases initiate strategic dispossessive conflicts.But what are the "security" implications of a powerful Afghan National Army controlled by a non-Pashtun regime in Kabul? How does that goal play into the strategies of Taliban leaders who are clearly playing on fears of being power being institutionalized outside their control?
Those are excellent points, and I'm sure they figure to some extent in the minds of some Pashtun leaders, but I doubt they dominate the calculus a the level of village-level leaders and below. I suspect they are more concerned with a government they experience primarily through corruption and violence than anything else. But either way, building governance from the bottom up at the same time as building from the top down (yes, this requires some complex synchronization of efforts) is probably the way forward. Are we doing it now? Not consistently if at all.
My argument --- consistently -- has been that there is historical evidence that local modes have worked in the past that look quite different from what we propose to do.
Sure, but is it realistic to think we can turn back the clock? It's been a heck of a long time since those local modes produced stability for more than a year or two at a time, and the society (societies?) hasn't remained static. I am deeply skeptical of arguments that returning to earlier models of governance are realistic or would prove effective int the long run. The challenge is to help the Afghans design and construct authentically Afghan institutions (e.g. not mindless recreations of our own) that are (and are perceived to be) a) effective b) reflect current and near future conditions, and c) compatible with our strategic objectives.
MK
First off, sorry for cluttering the comments with garbled replies. I'll try once more and then give up:
Bernard - thanks for the reply. On a couple of points:
Indeed, I think history is replete with examples -- including in Rwanda for instance -- where "insecurity" has been "constructed" by powerful elites in order to maintain control and in some cases initiate strategic dispossessive conflicts.
Absolutely, but there was real insecurity that people were experiencing that those elites then "explained" (I'd say re-framed) in terms of a zero-sum inter-ethnic struggle. The collapse of the global coffee market in '89 and the austerity measures imposed by the IFIs on social spending had a huge impact on the patronage networks that the Rwandan elite relied on for control, and more generally created a gap in popular expectations (that had been relatively static in this case) and reality - Davis' J-curve in action. Couple that with the RPF invasion in '90 and you had a level of generalized social anxiety and sense of insecurity that was ripe for mobilization. Point is there were real, individual-level experiences that made people and groups receptive. If Rwandans hadn't felt a more generalized sense of crisis, I doubt they could have been mobilized, even with the exceptionally centralized and extensive mechanisms of social control that existed in that society. That's what I mean by 'brute fact.'
Likewise, you can see the same basic dynamics underpinning the Hema/Lendu conflict in Ituri, the conflicts with Banyarwandans in North Kivu, and the Banyamulenge in South Kivu (all in the DRC).
But what's interesting in this particular case is the receptiveness of Rwandan FDLR combatants to repatriation once they're convinced that a) they won't be killed on return, and b) that they'll get reintegrated into Rwanda society with trade training, etc. The degree to which constructed security dilemmas can be resolved by the presence of a convincing and credible third party is remarkable, even if it gets significantly more complicated once that third party sets about trying to build institutions (note to Holbrooke - don't replicate the mistakes of Dayton!).
(BTW - this is not to gloss over the Kagame regime's reconstruction of the security dilemma on both sides of the border to maintain a monopoly on power, albeit not along quite the same lines)
But what are the "security" implications of a powerful Afghan National Army controlled by a non-Pashtun regime in Kabul? How does that goal play into the strategies of Taliban leaders who are clearly playing on fears of being power being institutionalized outside their control?
Those are excellent points, and I'm sure they figure to some extent in the minds of some Pashtun leaders, but I doubt they dominate the calculus among village-level leaders and below. I suspect they are more concerned with a government they experience primarily through corruption and violence than anything else. But either way, building governance from the bottom up at the same time as building from the top down (yes, this requires some complex synchronization of efforts) is probably the way forward. Are we doing it now? Not consistently if at all.
My argument --- consistently -- has been that there is historical evidence that local modes have worked in the past that look quite different from what we propose to do.
Sure, but is it realistic to think we can turn back the clock? It's been a heck of a long time since those local modes produced stability for more than a year or two at a time, and the society (societies?) hasn't remained static. I am deeply skeptical of arguments that returning to earlier models of governance are realistic or would prove effective int the long run. The challenge is to help the Afghans design and construct authentically Afghan institutions (e.g. not mindless recreations of our own) that are (and are perceived to be) a) effective b) reflect current and near future conditions, and c) compatible with our strategic objectives.
MK
MK -- the comment isn't supposed to show up instantly. If it doesn't show up when you post it, just check back later instead of trying again.
MK’s argument that we need to engineer an Afghan set of institutions that reflect their makeup not a mirror of our own strikes me as simple but excellent logic.
Any country made up of tribal institutions and a multi-ethnic population is going to need different sets of rule sets and skill sets to begin to knit them into a cohesive mass. Once that mass has been formalised then a rule set that reflects their own culture and history is going to be necessary.
That may take a form that the US finds foreign and therefore uncomfortable, but you can’t bring democracy to a country and then argue if they elect people you don’t like.
Tribal identify is not to be trifled with, I don’t think anyone here would disagree, but we (mainly the Brits and other colonialisers) screwed the pooch in Africa by failing to understand the long term devastation that straight line boarders cutting across tribal identities would cause.
That issue is not so prevalent in Afghanistan, but it’s worth remembering. Different strokes, different folks.
...and of course it will not be read any more than the much ballyhooed COIN manual was.
"I find it interesting that our goal is to create "responsive and credible governance" in Afghanistan, when we seem to have immense difficulty doing it here."
Ding, ding, ding.
Someone said it best when they commented that we had corrupt politicians telling corrupt politicians to turn over power to the technocrats (who, mind you, have their own issues - namely, technocrats are above and not attuned to the people, anymore than an artist is to clay). One of Karzai's failings is he's hiring out jobs in his future Administration for votes ... and does anyone here believe that our Secretary of State, for instance, acquired her office for international acumen?
We treat Afghanistan as if we're in the position and have the ability to reach down and hand them something new and different. But we're not even something new and different. Let alone able to transplant our own chaotic and organic development on them. Unfortunately, I think Karzai, in his patronage and 'old Afghanistan' politics, understands more about how Afghanistan runs than the bulk of our social (sausage-science, perhaps, for those of us who've seen it made first-hand, but not inhaled the fumes too deeply)-science indoctrinated generals, politicians, and policymakers who are trying to change him.
"Aside from the bigger question of whether it makes sense for the United States to undertake this mission, what bothers me about the guidance is that the implied theory of governmental legitimacy is pretty thin. Legitimacy comes from the provision of goods and services? Always? Often? Sometimes? I don't want to be a jerk about it... but people have been studying this issue for generations, and I don't think the consensus is anywhere near as cut and dried as COIN doctrine or this guidance suggests."
Call it the bastard child of military theory and economic determinism.
But, hey, it's easy to measure...and we're pretty sure we can control/provide it (cause we've got endless amounts of money and crap to give)!!!!!!! (We hope!)
"The question becomes, are you being helpful?"
Sign #1 of a fatally fragile game-plan - it requires others to shut up and let the true believers get to work uninterrupted.
BF: "But even though Old Blue may think I am worthless, "
quit the emoticons.
If "partnering" is done properly, "mentoring" occurs as a natural by-product...both ways US/NATO to ANSF and vice versa.
Just in case anyone else is interested, I tried to sum up the major structural issues with the mentoring approach in the Afghan context so far, which this proposes to redress and overhaul, here.
The ETT says, "You've never been here."
The professor at Georgetown says, "You haven't read enough."
The area experts say, "You don't speak the language[s] and don't know the history."
Why do these people not sit down at a table together and learn from one another, as opposed to just carping about the others' deficiencies. Disappointing. The lesson I take from this is that military/govt culture (all the above categories I quote above are military/govt) is about jealously guarding one's patch of territory rather than learning and benefiting from others. There's no one single person who knows how to "do" Afghanistan, and anyone who claims to is a charlatan (in or out of uniform).
@ visitor 10:25 - that is a very astute point. No offense to the others in the thread, who make many excellent points, but that is why I am so skeptical of a large, centralized, bureaucratized D.C. culture in general.....but, here's hoping I'm wrong w/r to Afghanistan and you all do an awesome job.
Oh, and Old Blue, it's always good to hear from you around here.
These guys and their friends get a vote too...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gZZoIRRZGDo&feature=related
Btw, I am a bit sad to see that they did not have clip-art elements in the frames of the pedagogic examples. (Love the one about the "lightpen"). Clip Art always makes life better, together w powerpoint.
Emoticons, indeed. I'm supposed to feel bad for asking you some hard questions and questioning your conclusions? As for Malak; nice mock, dude. Off point, simplistic, but authoritatively stated. My point is not that I want for him to shut up. My point is that he offers no alternative, only a narrative designed to call the current course of action into doubt. That is not helpful. It's okay to be a critic; but be a helpful critic, for Pete's sake.
Malak von Mock is only instigating; neither offering a criticism of current doctrine nor any proposed solution. Draw your own conclusions.
Bernard, thanks for projecting my behavior on what my response or counter argument would be to someone who lives here and doesn't know COIN doctrine. You don't piss me off by being, but your academic arrogance inspired me to respond to you. I wasn't starting a reading dick measuring contest, I asked you to put yourself in context so that I would know what I should be able to expect you to understand. However, the girly noises that you're starting up with are irritating.
I don't mind academics. I enjoy if they have some original ideas, even if they challenge my own. Most academics actually listen to stuff that they don't know. My first clue was your refusal to accept as significant any part of my telling you about what seems to matter to Afghans; a piece that you would not be reasonably expected to have at this point. Your reaction is to get butt-hurt.
There is a tremendous amount of stuff going on over here that you have no concept of. Simplifications are perhaps necessary to a certain extent in order to have discussions that do not take weeks via text, but I would expect an academic to grab information and perhaps use whatever academic context that they have to put it into a framework.
You didn't. You got all Sally on us. When you ask your questions, they aren't really questions, are they? They are merely to cast doubt on whatever you are asking about. If an answer is offered, an answer from someone in the country you are asking about (and no neophyte at that) you don't use that to modify your point at all. You cry. WTF?
Whoever touched on leveraging traditional tribal structures (which in many cases have been damaged, but are struggling to reassert themselves) was onto something that is gaining traction here.
Old Blue:
Blah... my argument throughout has been that our doctrine is too narrowly based on one example -- Iraq. I respect your experience, but your impressionistic assessment of what "seems to matter to Afghans" is only one piece of evidence.
At the risk of increasing the perception of my "academic arrogance," I'd suggest you spend a little time with Clausewitz, Book Two, Chapter Two, notably the sections starting with "A Positive Doctrine is Unattainable" and going through to "Theory Should be Study, Not Doctrine."
But keep going with girly, Sally, butt-hurt... Easy to go there when you can retreat behind a pseudonym.
"Why do these people not sit down at a table together and learn from one another..."
Well, there's certainly an opportunity to bridge the miles right here on the innernets - but here's the obvious hurdle.
Those who argue that now's the time to debate our Afghanistan strategy are going to run into folks like Blue - by that I mean folks in Afghanistan very busy implementing the strategy decided on a few months ago - after much debate.
I'm not speaking for Blue here - he's more than capable. But I have an appreciation for his position based in part on my own experiences looking at America from Iraq in '07. The current "debate" doesn't approach that level yet, but it's easy to imagine there are those who would have it so.
But unlike Iraq '07, there was a hellalot more debate on Afghanistan '09 before our course of action was determined. President Obama's campaign positions on the topic were (IMHO) clearer than on his others or his opponent's, and most of what's followed has been in line with those pledges (though significantly less belligerent). Our host - upon announcement of McChrystal's then-pending 60 day review - noted (bemoaned, even) the number of reviews that had already been accomplished.
So Blue - the guy in Afghanistan implementing the strategy - invites contributions: "A serious question for anyone involved; and by discussing here you are, is how to take the theory from airy to dusty. This is the project right here, right now. Else you are not contributing, only distracting, or in the case of some, merely lamenting.
"The question becomes, are you being helpful?"
And gets this response: "Sign #1 of a fatally fragile game-plan - it requires others to shut up and let the true believers get to work uninterrupted."
Which I'll interpret as "no". Fair enough, scrolling isn't hard.
Enough of all that. Accept location, experience, and education as (optional) establishment of bona fides and POV and a foundation of discussion rather than claim to ultimate authority and press on - or argue endlessly over who's stifling debate in this open forum where expertise abounds and trolls are easily ignored.
In other words, it would be a damn shame to see this be a place where academics and practitioners can gather to swap insults for the enjoyment of the peanut gallery, but perhaps there's a need for that too. (Contra many complaints during Ex's absence, the comment section is what the users make it.)
@Visitor @10:25: Again, what is happening over here... beginning to happen over here... is not what you are discussing on this site. I am working with academics, sharing information, ideas, mobility, networks, training, tools, and humor. I am working with NATO partners, all US services, NGO's, GO's, MRRD, IDLG, civilian contractors and so on. Civilians are getting trained in COIN doctrine. Shortly, military senior leaders who cannot play well with others will find their careers developmentally challenged.
Yes, "hear hear" to your statement; change she is a'coming. 'Less someone loses their nerve... and I don't think that's going to happen.
The difference is that the academics over here listen.
Bernard, you may visit my site, (the old link to which is found in the sidebar of this one, but you will easily find your way to my new site via my last post at the old site.) It's the one called "Afghan Adventure" in the sidebar. There, or at my blogger profile, you will find an email link. Feel free to use it.
COL Gian Gentile knows exactly who I am. He used the link to email me during a discussion on this venue. I like to think that he and I respectfully disagree. I am not pseudonymous so that I can speak my mind to you, or to him. It is also not to evade my chain of command, who are welcome to read my blog and know all about it. It is for other reasons.
If you care to have a reasonable discourse, or if there is anything I can do for you, feel free to email. I will tell you that the retreat to charges of cowardice does not endear you.
The thing about COIN doctrine is that it is not formulaic. In fact, it requires imaginative use of resources, information and synchronization of effects undreamt of in AirLand. It is difficult and it is complicated, but it is not an equation. It is dynamic, a battle of adaptation, evolution and counter-evolution. There is no document other than the commander's overall intent that is not a living document. The doctrine is clear; the implementation of it is infinitely less so; and there is no perfect implementation. It is a mindset more than anything else. It is a change in military thinking, and it provides a toolset with which to analyze and attempt to organize information and priorities. It recognizes the political nature of an insurgency and the basic struggle for legitimacy and relevance.
Looking forward to hearing from you.
"My point is that he offers no alternative, only a narrative designed to call the current course of action into doubt. That is not helpful. It's okay to be a critic; but be a helpful critic, for Pete's sake."
Correctly pointing out the flaws in a game plan is being a helpful critic. Solutions are an added bonus.
@Old Blue
I am an avid reader of yours, and I qualify in the third category of "area experts" that I criticized. I am right in the thick of the military's changing intellectual atmosphere over things cultural and I frequently butt heads with people who don't think I know how to "do" Afghanistan since I don't live on a FOB. And I myself am certainly guilty of occasionally dismissing ideas that are untrained and unacademic, something I'll happily apologize to you for right now.
Unfortunately, you haven't gone beyond the circle you've chalked around yourself. Do you listen to that horde of civilians, or are they only expected to listen to you? Also, not only do academics there have useful things to say, but even ones here do too. For a variety of reasons there's a bunch of people who can't just hop a plane NYC-Dubai-Kabul and "help." Bernard isn't someone you should just dismiss out of hand because he isn't there along side you--he just respectfully disagrees with you. As do I, especially on that whole "leverage the tribes" throwaway line you ended with. Am I being helpful?
The search for "solutions" to impossible situations is exactly what got us the brilliant move of escalating and investing even more into the strategic cul de sac that is Afghanistan. It's a large part of the attractiveness of conventional COIN theory.
No. I'll pass on the requests for alchemy.
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