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The "Is Counterinsurgency Stifling the Debate?" Debate: Day Two
August 26, 2009 | Posted by Abu Muqawama - 1:03pm | 23 Comments
From a reader:
Given the sheer mass of articles in my google reader, both sides of the debate are certainly talking at each other enough to make any accusation of "stifling" seem like hyperbole at best. However, much of the problem is that in the last six months or so there has been a steady calcification of positions in the debate. That's not to say that the people at the center of the debate are not making a genuine effort to hear out the other side, but when a debate has been going on for this long there just are not many new arguments to put forward that will be sweeping enough to change the mind of anyone who has spent serious time thinking about this already and formed a opinion.
That being said, I have noticed one trend in the debate that worries me going forward. I've heard it said several times (most recently by Kilcullen) that one of the difficulties of shaping COIN in two different simultaneous theaters is that tactical "Lessons Learned" are lessons learned in the blood of the friends. The physiological impact of breaking with not only what you believe to be best practice for your men's safety, but also what is in many ways a concrete representation of the sacrifice that others have made, makes incredibly difficult to adjust to the rules of a new environment . Given the strong role which practitioners have played not only within the defense community itself but also within the beltway more broadly (which I know has been discussed here in the past, particularly with regards to Nagl and Gentile and the role that their past command experience has played in their thinking) it seems logical to expect that that same pressure would come into play at the strategic level, and make it somewhat harder for people to change their opinions about what has worked and what has the potential to work going forward, even above and beyond typical beltway entrenchment.
Obviously, the massive benefits of having practitioners at the forefront of the debate alongside the older beltway hands like Kagan, Biddle, and Cordesman far outweigh this consideration, but I think talking openly about when field experience might be coloring strategic arguments is worthwhile. This seems particularly important given that the rapid rise of COIN to beltway prominence has pulled many of those who used to approach COIN from a more academic perspective into more of a practitioner/policy maker role. Again, I think having smart people advising those in power is a unequivocally good thing, but I think the absence of the strong academic component (excepting Bacevich), with all those dubious ivory-tower characteristic like abstraction and detachment, which used to be an strong element informing COIN is something that is missing in the community as a whole's preference for practical wisdom over cutting edge academic work.
For the sake of full disclosure, I'm an academic myself not a practitioner. Obviously this makes it more than a little presumptuous for me to tell the vast majority of this blogs readership what you have experienced and how it effects you. That being said, I genuinely feel that the decline of interest in academic writing and thinking within the broader COIN community, and the effect that may have produced not just in content but also in the tone of debates has been a missing component of the discussion for awhile now.
AM, Here's the way I see it.
AM,
Here's the way I see it. Until around one year ago, you and your blog could not be accused in any way of "stifling debate." But then several things happened:
1) Obama took office promising to fight the "Good War" in Afghanistan.
2) CNAS was founded as a pro-Obama think-tank that specializes in COIN.
3) You joined CNAS.
These three factors are probably what led to the "stifling of debate" that some people are complaining about. Perhaps a better description is that the debate has become more "political." Abu Muqawama has become more political and CNAS clearly has its political agenda. So the debate has become more about analyzing facts on the ground and then proceeding accordingly, to the kind of debate that occurs amongst people with partisan political agendas. Facts that tend to undermine certain doctrines, narratives, tend to get intentionally overlooked.....
(1) and (3) is correct --
(1) and (3) is correct -- (2) is not. CNAS actually specializes in Asia and "Natural Security" more than it does in counterinsurgency theory and doctrine. We're just known for COIN because John is the president and I work here. And we try hard to be bipartisan -- keep your eye peeled for our next hires, and check out our boards of advisers and directors.You can say that 2 is half
You can say that 2 is half correct. Yes, it doesn't specialize in COIN and just happens to get alot of press re COIN because of some of the individuals that work there.
But its hard to deny that CNAS is a partisan think tank. How many people have gone into the Obama administration? Isn't your latest hire Abu Aardvark?
Speaking of CNAS pipples and
Speaking of CNAS pipples and David Kilcullen, I understand that the good Doctor is likely to make an appearance at a theater near me soon. My understanding is that I will be present during at least a part of his visit, and will get a chance to meet him and briefly work with/around him.
Then I'm off on a walkabout for a bit.
But, brushes with greatness continue to happen. It is a small war.
You should hire Orly Taitz.
You should hire Orly Taitz. She seems to represent the honourable opposition.
What's with all the trolls
What's with all the trolls this week?
Look I love dissent and think it's essential to have a really constructive discussion. However baseless accusations like "CNAS was founded as a pro-Obama think-tank that specializes in COIN" are not helpful.
@ Abu M
By the way thanks to you or your publisher for making "This Man's Army" available for the kindle. I just got one as a gift and there is nothing like listening to Amazon's Hal 9000 talk about "Office Buffer Rodeo Challenge". Any chance this blog is available for the Kindle?
Hahahaha! That's really
Hahahaha! That's really funny. I can still ride a buffer like no one's business, so it kinda sucks that our offices are carpeted.That's a damn shame. As soon
That's a damn shame. As soon as I read about that I tried to think of a place with a floor buffer in DC and I was stumped. But very glad to hear it is kind of like riding a bicycle in that sense.
The Kindle is great for those who love their books and reports available in pdf format. Definitely no regrets receiving this over an iPhone. Unfortunate though that the Logic of Violence in Civil War isn't available for it and the pdf reader isn't totally perfected yet. Bonus points go to Amazon for designing a protective cover that can rip the kindle in half when opened incorrectly by the hapless customer. Great job guys.
I find this whole premise
I find this whole premise ridiculous. Here we are arguing vociferously over whether we are able to argue or not.
I wonder what Russian blogs were debating Russia's strategy and tactics in Chechnya at the time? How many serving and former military types were pitching in with their opinion?
>>CNAS actually specializes
>>CNAS actually specializes in Asia and "Natural Security" more than it does in counterinsurgency theory and doctrine.<<
Oh, come on man... let's not just BS completely.
If you believe that CNAS's contributions to the debate on Asia and Natural Security are anywhere near its role in the COIN debate, you're just stoned. I could name 10 more influential institutions on both those topics in a heartbeat, but there is literally no think tank that has more juice than CNAS on COIN. It is a great honor and great responsibility. Embrace both.
The views in the articles on
The views in the articles on the Washington Times News page referenced at "Widening the Aperture" are informative of the degree to which others disagree with Obama - or with what they present or understand of his positions and policies. The range of views presented here have been informative.
To provide context for my own comments, as a citizen of the US, I disagreed with President Bush's foreign policy, and was alarmed by the actions he took.
So I'm working on developing greater empathy for those who don't agree with President Obama. I remain easily alarmed by what I don't understand and, most particularly, by what appears to be salesmanship in the place of information.
The debate on the Afghan. strategy helped settle me down, so thanks much for that. I really want to see more debate, respectful statements that don't assume agreement, and therefore explain.
From my perspective, of
From my perspective, of course, "Natural Security" in Asia and elsewhere in the 21st Century, is significantly about transforming the Third World. A mission that has transcended recent political parties and presidential administrations.
Thus, ALL think tanks, I believe, if they wish to be relevant in the 21st Century, will need -- not only a robust COIN section -- but also a vibrant and complimentary DIPLOMACY, DEVELOPMENT and STATE-BUILDING department and crew as well.
Thus, COIN is just one of the new arrows in the "Natural Security," quiver which, along with what we see DoS and private enterprise now moving to provide, simply mirrors, reflects and accommodates the Third World-centric focus of US foreign policy in the 21st Century.
It is a bit silly to claim
It is a bit silly to claim that CNAS doesn't have a ton of authority on COIN. And to whatever extent the reduction in expertise is true, it's because many CNAS folks who did work on Iraq, COIN, or related areas (Flournoy, Miller, Singh, Kahl, Brimley - who am I missing who worked on those issues?) are now in the Obama Defense Department or a related area of the government. And that's not by the universe of CNAS -> Obama Administration people by a long shot (example: Campbell).
As someone above said, this is a great honor and testament to CNAS, but it also means CNAS is central in this whole debate.
I have noticed one trend in
I have noticed one trend in the debate that worries me going forward. I've heard it said several times (most recently by Kilcullen) that one of the difficulties of shaping COIN in two different simultaneous theaters is that tactical "Lessons Learned" are lessons learned in the blood of the friends.
This is an absolutely meaningless observation devoid of any relevance to a discussion on COIN proponents vs not.
Kilo: Interesting point you
Kilo:
Interesting point you make about the often used statement by the Coin Experts "lessons learned in the blood of friends." This in fact is a very common method by the Coin Experts of waving the bloody shirt combined with the moral bludgeon that implicitly says something like this as a general message:
“hey you big stupid conventionally minded army that in the past only wanted to fight big battle-like wars, it was your fault that Iraq turned out badly during the first three years and it was your fault that too many men died so if you don’t want this to happen again, you better come over to the Force and listen to us the experts so that we can help you get it right so that you don’t have to get men killed again because you didn’t get Coin.”
Does anybody not think that this is a correct caricature of the implicit message that the Coin experts send when they wave the bloody shirt in this way?
Unfortunately, the Coin experts have their history wrong. In fact Armies that are trained to fight are better equipped to handle insurgencies and have done reasonably well at them. It has been a pernicious construction of knowledge over the years that conventionally trained and minded armies fail at counterinsurgency, therefore our current American Army must be transformed primarily to fight irregular wars. History does not support this assertion, but it continues to drive our thinking on things. This skewed understanding of history though, combined with waving the moral bloody shirt, continues to push us down the road to a counterinsurgency only force. It is not uncommon at all in the halls of think tanks and Coin conferences, and new Coin books, to hear and read things about the necessity of expunging terms and concepts like “warfighting” because we can’t trust our generals and combat soldiers with such dangerous terms lest they revert back to the knuckle-dragging don’t-get-coin mindset.
A question, based on COL
A question, based on COL Gentile's comment above.
If the United States' conventional-heavy military forces had simply gone into Iraq with the appropriate number of troops (Gen. Shinseki style or more), would we even be having this COIN v. Conventional debate?
One could suggest that Conventional -- done right -- precludes the need for COIN.
Another question: In the
Another question: In the Lyall-Wilson IO article ("Rage Against the Machines"), it was suggested the 4th ID did poorly at COIN because it was mechanized. Could it be, simply, that Lyall and Wilson's case study portion of their article - the paired comparison between the 101st ABN and 4th ID - constitutes omitted variable bias, i.e., the leadership of the two divisions? And - perhaps equally important - does the leadership of the two divisions at the time (i.e., Petraeus and Odierno) advance or retard the criticisms that COL Gentile makes? If Petraeus had commanded the 4th ID and Odierno had commanded the 101st ABN, would outcomes have been different?
Cavguy/Niel Smith at SWJ: Please tell me you're reading this, because you had said you were going to submit a rebuttal to International Organization (NOT "Organizations").
Tom Ricks: Since L and W seem to rely largely on "Fiasco" in writing this case study, I'd be thrilled if you told me you're reading this, not that I expect you to.
ADTS
My question @ 8:46 above
My question @ 8:46 above stated another way:
If I had stepped on a portion of my anatomy (how we went into Iraq in 03) --
and had to go to the hospital to get the injured area stitched up (by COIN) --
should I determine that getting stitched up (by COIN) is the new way to go, and what I need to learn from this experience, and what I should invest in and alter my life for in the future?
Or should I, more reasonably, simply learn from this experience -- and invest for the future -- in a determination NOT to step on my anatomy again in the same fashion that I did in 03?
One could suggest that, very obviously, COIN is not the right lesson to be learned from our Iraq 03 experience and, thus, is not what we should invest in for the future.
A more reasonably determination would be that the lessons learned from Iraq 03 is to simply do Conventional right next time.
Perhaps the question should
Perhaps the question should be (in Bosnia or Iraq) whether mechanized-heavy SASO, done "decisively," either in a negotiated peace or immediately after a regime collapse, precludes the need for light-infantry-heavy COIN conducted in the midst of an insurgency?
ADTS
Good question, ADTS!
Good question, ADTS!
“hey you big stupid
“hey you big stupid conventionally minded army that in the past only wanted to fight big battle-like wars, it was your fault that Iraq turned out badly during the first three years and it was your fault that too many men died so if you don’t want this to happen again, you better come over to the Force and listen to us the experts so that we can help you get it right so that you don’t have to get men killed again because you didn’t get Coin.”
I actually think the opposite is the case. COIN is going to get a lot more coalition soldiers killed than the previous paradigm, but is predicated on less civilians being killed, and actually just might work..
the failure we are discussing is the failure to tell us why it is worth it. 'No choice' doesn't cut it.
SNLII was right. Jumped the
SNLII was right. Jumped the shark.
If we had simply done
If we had simply done something along the lines of what ADTS suggests above in Iraq, would there have been -- not only far fewer American/coalition military casualties -- but also significantly fewer civilian casualties as well?
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