Center for a New American Security

" Although, to be fair to

" Although, to be fair to all parties involved, this debate indeed should have happened a long time ago."

Good to see you say this now, but it seems disingenous since for over two years your blog avoided any such debate of the kind the NY TIMES talks about. Two plus years of debating nothing but the tactical aspect of Afghanistan; 3 days of posting posts by others on the strategic dimensions....

How about this one

How about this one then

Being invaded and occupied by, and then bleeding out the dominant imperial states of the day is what Afghanistan is for, and it wouldn't know what to do with itself if just left alone?

so maybe the US should thus pull out, and let China have a go.

Enough with the whining

Enough with the whining about not discussing strategy up to this point! Srsly, what is up with that? It didn't need to happen before because this blog and its readership agreed about Iraq and it started out as a subject matter kind of place, anyway.

Anyway, the internet is a huge place and it's not like Abu M is the top person on the political decision-making food chain. Like, he's not personally sending more troops to Afghanistan, right? He is ONE guy who is how old, 30, tops?

I NEVER agree with anything political on this blog, and I made plenty of fun of Abu M last fall during the election, but even I can't take it any more. Normally I love how grumpy the internets is. I actually sometimes like the mean. Sad, but true. The internet is a gigantic place. Start your own blog and do your own thing. Nothing is stopping any of you from speaking your mind about anything on this forum, the dude don't delete anything even if sometimes he should, (don't delete my comments, though, especially when I make fun of the political class, certain administrations that rhyme with Bobama or snark about the Red Sox. Look, I worked down the street from Fenway for years and it was a nightmare, don't ask, but I'm still holding a grudge.)

Debate is the important word

Debate is the important word here, it implies an open discussion where people have the ability to change other people minds and perceptions well as admit to the possibility of having theirs changed.

Now I’m just a student of CT not COIN, and new to AM’s blog (although a long time reader first time caller so to speak). But it strikes me that people seem a little entrenched in their views in these here parts.

There are aspects of the debate that will appeal or horrify people. But yes the web is a large place and you can always find a site streamlined to your particular bias.

Me, I like Cordesman’s take on armed nation building. The US can, and therefore should China could but it doesn’t, and for the love of god small girls have the right to go to school. The Afghans have a right to a decent road that links major cities and therefore links to a hope of grater travel and trade amongst them. If that links to greater connectivity with the outside world then great, because people in off grid locations should have the same opportunities as we do. If they choose to use those opportunities to elect government we don’t like, so be it.

Cost is everything. The real

Cost is everything. The real cost. Not just current incremental costs but the long term health care and pension costs for the troops, replacing people and repairing or replacing vehicles and equipment and interest on the borrowed money this campaign is being fought with. My hunch is that a true estimate of the costs of the campaign going forward would lead to more folks abandoning the "nope" side.

Current expenditures will lead to the US being on the hook for a trillion dollars fairly shortly. If the latest Cordesman proposal to add another 45,000 troops is acted on it will probably be in the multi-trillion dollar range within 5 years.

Doesn't this sound like something bin Laden would want to happen? If you were to concoct a plan to reduce US power using the least resources possible wouldn't this be it?

"Again, I never saw it as

"Again, I never saw it as this blog's duty to discuss the policy. I am not an elected official, nor is this blog for-profit, so the way I figure it, I can pretty much blog about whatever I want. Don't whine to me that you're not getting your policy debates on a blog honest about the fact that it's dedicated to discussing COIN tactics and operations. That makes as much sense as whining that Deadspin or KissingSuzyKolber don't cover European politics with as much depth as you would like. In the end, though, I decided that we should spend a few weeks talking about the larger policy issues. Don't throw a tantrum, though, when we go back to tactics and operations."

Without question, you and you're blog have received far more publicity than you would have gotten otherwise because the US has chosen a strategy of a more intensive campaign in Afghanistan. But when you do nothing but enable this operation for two years on your blog, without raising the slightest question as to whether that is a good strategy, it's fair for readers to push back. After all, you clearly make strong statements about the strategic need to escalate in Afghanistan, like during the panel with Bacevich at the CNAS conference, so you can't just hide behind the claim that Abu Muqawama only does tactics.

The challenge is that the

The challenge is that the "debate" remains structurally biased. The consensus view is now entrenched among senior military officers, influential advisory boards like Defense Policy Board, and so on. But that did not happen organically. Instead, the COIN advocates have systematically purged and marginalized dissent.

I appreciate any willingness to open a debate... and I commend Ex on it... but let's not pretend that this is anything like an real debate that has the potential to affect policy.

Things may change... but right now, the COINers needs to accept that they own Afghanistan policy... for good or ill.

I don't think it is fair to

I don't think it is fair to say AM "enables" the War in Afghanistan, unless you think this blog has literally driven on the ground changes in policy. In that case, it seems like we should all be a bit more careful in what we say!

Fnord: I do not see this as

Fnord:

I do not see this as being about such trivial things as "redeeming failure" or "grabbing land."

I see it as being viewed through the lense of whether a further commitment to Afghanistan helps or hurts our central goal of transforming the Third World so that it better serves the global economy.

We don't want to "own" Afghanistan. And we may -- or may not -- want to attempt to "transform" it.

We originally went into Afghanistan because of 9/11.

But we will stay on longer only if a cost / benefit analysis re: Afghanistan indicates that this is prudent and necessary.

With this analysis, it may be determined that Afghanistan is unworthy of further effort. Or it might be determined that further effort would do more harm than good.

But this determination will be made within the context of whether our actions would tend help or harm the global economy.

And it within this context (whether it will help or harm the global economy) that the United States must decide specific cases re: armed state-building in the future.

In some cases, the United States will determine (rightly or wrongly) that the effort is worth the cost.

@ Bill the US as the sole

@ Bill

the US as the sole remaining superpower

Are you still stuck in the 20th century? We're no longer the world's superpower, and we do not have the capabilities to project our will across the globe. The more sensible thing for us to do is pick and choose our battles in a way that best promotes our national interests while not putting us out on the "imperial" limb.

@ Bill
In fact, the success of the capitalist experiment in China, Russia and India -- and by extension the continued success of the United States

You say this while we are in the midst of the worst recession since the 1930s.

I hate that my new role on

I hate that my new role on this blog is to defend Exum. That really sucks.

But, again, can we cut him some slack? I actually think that his wide-ranging debate on policy options in AfPak is refreshing. Where is this intellectual courage in other fora? How many bloggers have been willing to shrug and say, "OK, I might be wrong. Tell me why."

Sun Tzu famously warns the commander: Know the enemy. Know yourself.

He just came back from a tour of Afghanistan to gain the former. Let him slowly relearn the latter.

If he doesn't hear it from you, he most certainly won't in the fishbowl of CNAS, where apparently Ricks and Nagl compete to propose the most saccharine praise for McChrystal and Petraeus possible without violating some sodomy statute.

While I share your concerns about the structure of this, Dr Finel, I think it's slowly approximating more of a round table than a Q&A. I think that's an excellent choice, because -- and I'm sure you agree -- neither the COINdinista nor the Bacevich wing of the Realists have a monopoly on good ideas. The COINdinistas might own OEF policy now, but they don't own all the possible utilities of force that might be applied there to reach whatever our strategic goals remain.

I also trust the Exum will round out that table of voices without then defaulting to Q&A. We need a diversity of views on these issues, and I'm intrigued that Exum isn't trying to find (or force) consensus in these viewpoints. In other words, he's not trying to manufacture consent for CNAS theories or the practices of McChrystal's command, but rather to second guess his own perspectives.

At the end of this, I would like for him to honestly say what might have changed his mind, or perhaps acknowledge perspectives he formerly didn't realize might have merit.

I do this all the time. Over the years, I've internalized much of your wisdom.

... the Department of

... the Department of Defense has a major ongoing ininitiave to adopt enhanced irregular warfare capabilities [hard power] tailored for use in the Third World; and the Department of State has a major ongoing initiative to adopt enhanced diplomatic and aid tools [soft power] also tailored for use in the Third World.
These two new "carrot and stick" initiatives do seem to be designed to be used -- in tandem -- to accomplish a broad and seemingly important strategic goal of "opening up" "backward," "recalcitrant" or "poorly designed" nations and transforming them such that they might better service the old and new market nations and better service the expanding global economy.
This, I believe, is the reason why we should not expect that nations such as Iraq and Afghanistan will be left to their own devices once their militaries have been brought up to par. This (security) will be seen as having only accomplished half the job. The other half of the job is to make these nations better servants (or partners, if you wish to look it that way) to the world-market.
As the United States moves to transform the Third World -- (through smart power initiatives) -- such that it might better service the global economy, the types of conflicts we see today in Afghanistan and Iraq regime change, ethnic conflict, tribal conflict and religious conflict) become more likely. The United States will us "carrots and sticks" to install market-friendly governments in appropriate Third World nations. After the United States has its market-friendly government in place, it will defend its interests.
Anyone who would seek to overthrow a market-friendly government -- or who tend to disrupt, delay or deny a market-friendly transformation --these individuals and/or groups will be put down. This includes any Third World government installed by the United States that fails to honor its obligations to quickly and efficiently transform its nation to meet world market needs generally and to meet United States needs specifically. Thus, ineffective transformation regimes, and ethnic, tribal and religious obstacles -- any or all of which might get in the way of an efficient market-friendly transformation -- all of these must be overcome. Herein, irregular warfare and COIN fighters find their calling. This is why IR and COIN are, and will be, the coin-of-the-realm in the 21st Century. And this (the critical need to transform the Third World) is the reason why the United States is, and will be, committing to armed state-building projects now and in the future.

Thank you for the detailed explanation regarding what you note could easily be the current plan for US foreign policy. As you explain it, the armed services and the treasuries of the US and its allies to achieve control over global profit making enterpise. To do so will require killing the citizens of all nations involved: the citizens of the US, of its NATO allies and of the subject countries. It will entail the destruction of property and resources, and will result in the creation of new homeless, migratory populations.

"After the United States has its market-friendly government in place, it will defend its interests." What, or more properly, whose interests are you discussing?

MA: The interests that the

MA:

The interests that the United States will defend will be (1) the market-friendly governments that the United States installs and (2) the market-friendly governments the United States already has in place.

In both instances, insurgencies are what is to be expected (at least at the beginning) and what must be guarded against.

The United States must also be prepared to overthrow and replace Third World governments -- ones that it has installed -- and / or ones that it already has in place -- that prove to be ineffective at making market-friendly reforms.

This is how counter-insurgency (COIN) and irregular warfare (IW) become the coin-of-the-realm in the 21st Century.

COIN deals with insurgencies and IW deals with the ineffective or uncooperative leaders and governments.

Indeed, as we have learned with Afghanistan and Iraq, it can get rather messy having to do all this regime change, and deal with all these ethnic, tribal and religious difficulties, both of which are common to these transformational endeavors.

But that is why, I believe, that the DoD and DoS has been so dramatically transformed -- so as to better meet these challenges in the future and so as to do these transformations attempts more smoothly and with less loss of life.

I also think greater discretion will be used in detemiming which nations will be targeted for transformation.

comment at 9:36pm is mine.

comment at 9:36pm is mine.

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