Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS.
Pretty interesting panel discussion at the Heritage Foundation. I was wondering what Barno's thoughts on all this were...
In other news, Hamid Karzai is doing his best to exhaust the patience of the United States.
Case in point: a now widely reported exchange the day after the elections last week between Mr. Karzai and Richard C. Holbrooke, Mr. Obama’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, at Mr. Karzai’s presidential palace in Kabul.
American officials initially described the meeting, which also included Gen. Karl Eikenberry, the American ambassador to Afghanistan, and his deputy, Francis Ricciardone, as routine. The three men, the officials said, told Mr. Karzai that the United States was maintaining a neutral position on the elections and was leaving decisions about whether there needed to be a run-off to the Afghan elections commission and the electoral complaints commission.
But a few days later, reports surfaced in international and Afghan news outlets that Mr. Holbrooke had demanded a run-off election in the “explosive” meeting with Mr. Karzai, a charge which the Americans deny. Administration officials accused Mr. Karzai’s agents of leaking select portions of the meeting to make it look as though the Obama administration was trying to force Mr. Karzai into holding a run-off.
Mr. Karzai, a senior administration official said, “has a longstanding pattern of creating a straw man of America’s positions, and rallying people around that.”
“But contrary to those reports,” the official said, “no one shouted, no one walked out” of the meeting.
Mr. Holbrooke, administration officials said, did not demand a run-off during the meeting but did express concern about the complaints about fraud and ballot-stuffing. The Associated Press quoted Mr. Karzai’s spokesman, Humayun Hamidzada, as refusing publicly to discuss the meeting.
Whatever the case, the atmosphere may now have become so poisoned between the United States and Mr. Karzai that the Obama administration will be hampered no matter what course it takes. Administration officials said that initial characterizations of the success of the elections referred solely to the fact that they took place at all, despite threats by the Taliban and more than 200 rocket attacks that rained on southern Afghanistan on election day.
You know, Hamid Karzai is playing a dangerous game. There are plenty of senior-level folks in the Obama Administration questioning our continued involvement there, and the president himself seems to be worrying Afghanistan could be his Vietnam. I have made the case that both the United States and our allies have clear interests in Afghanistan, but I do not think this administration is nearly as enthusiastic about this war as I am. (And I'm not that enthusiastic.) I wonder if Karzai understands this. I wonder if he gets that while Bush was willing to bet his entire presidency on Iraq, Obama does not appear ready to bet his entire presidency on Afghanistan?
Come on, Ex, be serious. I know you have more access than a lot of the rest of us, but there seem to be plenty of signs that the President is willing to do exactly that. I'm not making a partisan statement here, either, but a pragmatic one; you yourself have noted that political realities mandate continued involvement, if only because candidate Obama sold this as the good and necessary war. Th administration is telling us that an existential threat emanates from a weak or ungoverned Afghanistan. However untrue that may be, how do you walk it back from there?
Gulliver, I think Ex has a point. Obama needs to be able to credibly threaten to cut off support to the GIRoA and ANSF to force them into difficult reforms. I would seriously hope that Obama threatens precisely that in private, in as respectful a way as possible. I would also hope that Obama makes it clear to Russia, India and China . . . that Haqqani and the Quetta Shura Taliban are a bigger problem for them than for America; and America may reconsider its support for Afghanistan unless they step up their tangible support for the GIRoA. I would also hope that Obama quietly makes sure that Khamenei understands that Haqqani and the Taliban are a bigger threat to him than America . . . and that Obama expects a far more substantial Iranian contribution to Afghanistan.
Gulliver, I think Ex has a point. Obama needs to be able to credibly threaten to cut off support to the GIRoA and ANSF to force them into difficult reforms. I would seriously hope that Obama threatens precisely that in private, in as respectful a way as possible.
All of which is fine and good, except that it's much easier said than done. At the end of the day, who's buying it?
I would also hope that Obama makes it clear to Russia, India and China . . . that Haqqani and the Quetta Shura Taliban are a bigger problem for them than for America; and America may reconsider its support for Afghanistan unless they step up their tangible support for the GIRoA. I would also hope that Obama quietly makes sure that Khamenei understands that Haqqani and the Taliban are a bigger threat to him than America . . . and that Obama expects a far more substantial Iranian contribution to Afghanistan.
Again, fine and good, except that you're expressing your assessment of the situation and not an objective reality. I can assure you that with 60,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan, Russia and China do not view Afghan or Pakistani insurgent groups as a bigger threat to their own security than to ours.
Speaking of objective realities, Gulliver: people in NATO countries see money being invested in other countries, with grand proclamations about democracy that tie it to development of commercial interests, while looking at the conditions around them and wonder WTF.
Democratic governments that don't respond to their popular base are replaced; if they harm the interests of too many of a nation's population base, they are replaced. I think the second situation is what occurred in the US during the last election. Obama will win reelection based on the degree to which his government succeeds in restoring some balance to the conditions that resulted from the actions of the previous administration.
The response of those whose ideology no longer prevails is to raise a ruckus at the lack of support for their views. Ideologically driven, overtly careless of harm that results to others, they preach to their choir. The views of the public thus are represented as polarized. Time will tell how much good that tactic does the extremists among us.
Im starting to wonder what will happen in the moment Karzai sees it as more profitable for him and his drugbuddies to let the US go to hell and get back to the old business of civil war. That tends to be a common trait among criminals: a certain lack of national fervour and a cynical tendency to look out for number 1. Right now, we are it seems training the biggest narco-economical fighting force outside of Mexico. How does 120000 US trained mafia soldiers rank on the national threat asessment scale.? While Im aware that most Afghan heroin goes to Iran and Europe, the drug economy is fiercly interdependnet, and so it could be siad that Karzai and his buddies are killing more americans (and NATO members) every year than bin Laden has done in a lifetime. Only difference, trhey dont kill rich folks.
Andrew, Karzai's game isn't that dangerous. He knows we are committed for at least a year and he can certainly afford to piss us off a bit if it means a stronger showing in the election. I mean, look at Pakistan - parts of their government are actively opposing us yet we haven't exactly kicked them to the curb.
One question I would have about understanding COIN is it seems necessary to have to start with a political model first and then build the security apparatus upon that political model? Why is it necessary though to focus on a national political stage when there seem to be so many problems? Why not instead focus on local democracy within each province and decentralization of the political power (for now)? If the national government is corrupt and incompetent, why not go around them to the local governments? It seems to me that one of the problems from the Iraq COIN stragegy was that is was originally based on political reconcillation from the top down, however the real on-the-ground success came from bottom up political progress. In moving into Afghanistan why not base our politcal strategy on building local government capability, and the involvment of the national gov as secondary to that? This would allow us to then go around the many problems of Karsai and the national government as well as put pressure on him because we would not need him to be politically successful. I am sure I have simplified the reality a little bit, but I think in principle democracy could be successful in the Afghan region if begun from a local process.
CN:
Reminds me of a country song
"If I could start all over again, I swear
I would make it better..."
Of course you are correct. The big big lesson of both Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as Hexb and Hamas is that local fidelity beats heavyhanded top-down management. Micro runs macro in COIN, as in peacekeeping. That makes big buerocracies enemy nr. 1. Wich means we are screwed, just like the soviets.
or pehaps you, Abu Muqawama, and those inside the COIN bubble you operate in just don't know as much about Afghanistan as you think you do. Maybe Karzai knows exactly what he's doing.
http://www.thenational.ae/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090828/REVIEW/708...
See the NYT on Astan elections? Not good....
7 Days that shook Afghanistan
@Visitor: That would be well and good, but what can Obama and Karzai offer the Taliban that they won't be able to take for themselves in a few years time? Yes, we should negotiate more, but negotiations should be from a position of strength. The real time to negotiate would have been in 2002, when the Taliban and AQ were still disorganized from the invasion. Now, they have come back, stronger than ever, and they have no need to negotiate. Why settle for a piece of the pie when you can take the whole thing?
Of course, it is possible that Karzai knows exactly what he's doing. I'm gonna go out on a limb, though, and say, "Doubt it."
re: "Karzai is playing a dangerous game."
What else can he do? The guy is between a rock and a hp. He'll do whatever it takes to wrangle domestic support.
FNORD Bonn established a fairly centralized Afghan government. Kharzi has great latitude in appointing regional leaders which makes it difficult to find that honest and comptent local power broker to support. One of the refrains is that the people in power are under qualified for the work and are not as invested as we'd like. It's the downside to goverment as a patronage game. I would agree though that Karzai is merely doing what it takes to survive.
FNORD Bonn established a fairly centralized Afghan government. Kharzi has great latitude in appointing regional leaders which makes it difficult to find that honest and comptent local power broker to support. One of the refrains is that the people in power are under qualified for the work and are not as invested as we'd like. It's the downside to goverment as a patronage game. I would agree though that Karzai is merely doing what it takes to survive.
Add your comment