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Is Kandahar Falling?
My friend Erica Gaston -- the pride of St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana -- is a lawyer and human rights researcher based in Kabul who has done some excellent work on civilian casualties. Here, in the Huffington Post, she gives me a nice shout-out before asking the kind of question that keeps me up at night:
Has Kandahar already fallen?
• Taliban intimidation has virtually curtailed any sense of normal life in Kandahar. Open support for the government, much less international forces, is an invitation for a night letter or worse. Government officials, teachers, and aid workers (those left) are regularly killed, assaulted, or otherwise harassed. Many of the pro-government clergy in Kandahar have already been assassinated or forced to go into hiding because of threats in the last few years. Girls cannot go to school without fear of attacks, the most notable being an acid attack on 15 girls going to school.• After years of extreme security threats, frequent incidents of air strikes and nighttime raids, high government corruption and graft, and a dearth of government protection or services, the majority of the population, if not ideologically pro-Taliban, are against the international military presence and the Afghan government (at least in its current iteration).
• The Afghan government and the international community have virtually ceased to operate in any meaningful capacity in Kandahar due to extreme security threats. Afghan government officials do not move at all, except under tight security and in a limited security corridor. Attacks on Afghan National Police are routine - a friend who had just returned from Kandahar recently showed me a picture of an ANP officer with an ax to the back of the head.
• Most humanitarian workers and journalists have simply pulled out of Kandahar because they cannot operate under the intense security restrictions. Those who remain are prisoners to their compounds. The incidents that have happened when they do leave their compounds are chilling. A brave researcher, Paula Loyd, was doused in cooking oil and set on fire when she ventured out of her compound last year.
Kandahar sounds a great deal
Kandahar sounds a great deal like my Orleans Parish.
It's just the words of an uppity North Shore potentate!
Hahaha. You know your NOLA
Hahaha. You know your NOLA geography. But Erica is the humble daughter of a retired schoolteacher ... who used to teach with my mom's cousin. Erica also makes the best dirty rice you're going to find in Kabul, so if you happen to meet her..."After years of extreme
"After years of extreme security threats, frequent incidents of air strikes and nighttime raids, high government corruption and graft, and a dearth of government protection or services, the majority of the population, if not ideologically pro-Taliban, are against the international military presence and the Afghan government (at least in its current iteration)."
I just have to quote this excellent piece. If anyone questions why population-centric COIN is dominant in the US Army (or why it should be) it is because of this. Attempting to kill/capture our way to victory leads to almost everyone of these situations. Either with airstrikes and nighttime raids directly angering the population or a wrong-focus leading to a lack of security and inaction allowing the government to become corrupt and inefficient. This quote is why the FM 3-24 covered so much non-military topics, because COIN is inherently about the government and not the killing/capturing.
Uhhhh, I would have to know
Uhhhh, I would have to know my geography, having lived Uptown.
She apparently couldn't get into Tulane and was forced to attend some yankee law school in Cambridge, Mass., where she probably really learned her dirty rice recipe from Julia Child. It's probably Hamburger Helper and something yankeeish, like chowder or Sam Adams.
Hrummph.
On a serious note, I would like someone to explore the Taliban's notions about schooling women. It's more complex than it's often conveyed here, and it depends a lot on the particular insurgency running that part of Afghanistan or Pakistan.
Suffice it to say that even in the 1980s the Soviet-backed regime that tried to install universal education faced great difficulties because of an important taboo: Men teaching women. In a nation lacking female teachers, many in the rural, traditionalist societies won't tolerate the stigma of leaving men alone to school even girls.
As sick as it sounds, if you ask some illiterate, traditionalist kinship leaders in Afghanistan why they would tolerate a physical attack on girls going to school, they would respond much like this: "We actually are protecting their virtue. We will do anything necessary to accomplish this. What is their skin compared to the honor of their souls and their family and their community?"
Again, this is a nation where men marry cousins and some areas require women to don shower curtains rather than form fitting clothing. The Karzai regime quite seriously backed a statute that would allow minority Shiite Afghans to get away, legally, with raping members of their own family, something the Brits in particular found so offensive that they have tried behind the scenes to outlaw the practice.
I don't disagree with the sentiment. It is offensive, just as the notion of refusing girls the chance to gain an education for whatever reason. But I also am not so arrogant that I believe we might change what history and culture have sired in Afghanistan, even if I find it backwards.
Why do we believe that we can stop the flow of these lifeways in Kandahar? Is not our very imposition of destabilizing policies helping to drive the insurgencies? Is not the Karzai regime itself hated across Afghanistan for all sorts of reasons that have nothing to do with these destabilizing policies anyway?
This is going to sound contrarian and perhaps a bit harsh, but perhaps if we really want to affect these traditional societies to achieve our strategic purposes, maybe we should ban these do-gooders.
I love them. I give them money. But if I'm a ground commander, and I see that in my AO these NGOs are helping to drive the insurgency, I need to get rid of them.
Keep our eyes on the prize: Fracture the insurgents' networks. In their confusion, re-establish our form of security. Return civility by producing a workable and legitimate rule of law (Sharia probably) under which they agree to live.
If there's no room for a western NGO in this deal, then so be it.
Question--how far is the
Question--how far is the city of Kandahar from the US airbase in Kandahar? It would truly be a COIN failure if this happened right outside the confines of the FOB.
Starbuck, I believe that
Starbuck, I believe that she's speaking about the Foco revolt throughout Kandahar province. Kandahar airport is in the province, but it's not wholly the province.
KAF is about 10 miles
KAF is about 10 miles outside the city, I think.
Very few U.S. forces operate
Very few U.S. forces operate in Kandahar province, though that may change with the troop increase. That we've entrusted one of the more important provinces in Afghanistan (and the second-largest city) to the Canadians is testament to a poor overall Afghan strategy. The Canadians focus all their troops and resources on a handful of districts while leaving most of the province completely open to Taliban control. If memory serves, they do almost nothing in the city itself.
"On a serious note, I would
"On a serious note, I would like someone to explore the Taliban's notions about schooling women. It's more complex than it's often conveyed here, and it depends a lot on the particular insurgency running that part of Afghanistan or Pakistan."
In early 2002 I sat in on a provincial Shura in Paktia. The meeting had been called to address the attempted overthrow of the elected governor by another being imposed by Kabul. There were only really two items that anyone really cared about: the first was that the Shura had elected a man with whom they were quite satisfied and the second was that his replacement (Padsha Khan Zadran) was illiterate. Each man took his turn to speak and I was particularly interested in the thoughts of one grizzled veteran of the Soviet war - looking like he'd just taken a break from filming "The Man Who Would Be King". He straightened his back and began to speak, quietly, thoughtfully and carefully. He complained about the imposition of Zadran, not because he disliked the man personally, but because he was a man without the benefits of education and wouldn't be of much value to the province. He then said, "We need a governor who understands these things because I would like my daughters to be educated in the use of computers and information technology." These were people who, at the time, were being accused of being Taliban.
He was, of course, looking to a potential future in which the obstacles to such ideas would be overcome and the advanced schooling of his daughters would be a possibility for him and men like him. In my time in Afghanistan from North to South, I would often see Afghan men with their pre-pubescent daughters and it was not difficult to see how they cherished these children - especially in these few precious years before they grew into young women and became fertile.
Afghanistan, as you all know, is an agrarian economy in some of the most inhospitable terrain on earth. Afghanistan also has the second highest (first is Liberia, last time I looked) infant mortality rate in the world where, in 2007, more than 300,000 children died before they reached the age of 5. That was not a typo. That is the shocking reality for the families of Afghanistan. We don't need a degree in sociology to fathom where this is leading. Underlying the cultural opposition to the education of girls is a real, deep-rooted fear for the survival of a people.
As a bit of evidence for this approach to thinking about the problem, let me put forward the fact that a woman who passes through her fertile period and into menopause and, in the process, becomes a grandmother, will usually occupy a socially elevated position. I have many first hand experiences from my time in Afghanistan that supported changing the way I was viewing the problems of the advancement of women in the country. Some may bridle at this approach - thinking of the women of Afghanistan as not much more than breeding stock - but hating Afghan men will not solve the problems. No matter how much they care about their daughters or their wives, the men are locked in a cultural and economic trap.
So what is there to be done? Investment in reproductive healthcare. The Soviets had a go at this and it was probably the best thing they tried to do. I once met a man in Uzbekistan who had been a translator for one of the many teams of female doctors sent there. I always wondered though, why the translator was a man......
Right now, Marie Stopes International is, I believe the only organization on the ground in Afghanistan that is dealing with reproductive healthcare, post-natal hygiene and - of the utmost importance - the education of Afghan husbands who are being taught how to keep their wives and children healthy. The project is an enormous success and is funded by the Finnish government. But not a red cent from USAID would you believe? Why? My understanding is that their abortion policy (even though they don't actually do them, anywhere in the world, they will recommend abortion if appropriate to the laws of the host country) prevents them from receiving US funding.
Sorry, long post but on what I believe to be one of the most important challenges facing Afghanistan and those trying to help the country.
SC
Afghanistan's infant
Afghanistan's infant mortality rate ranks third in the world, behind Sierra Leone and Angola.
What a competition!
Let's look at a case study in how not to conduct counter-insurgency. In 1978, the Khalq regime in Kabul put forward a series of ill-conceived reforms. The most asinine was probably the land redistribution scheme that led to peasants owning 15 acres of land but without the ability to water or seed it.
The highly unpopular law banning doweries designed to discourage men from abandoning or mistreating their wives also fizzled.
So also did the plan to extend universal education to girls. Hiring only men as teachers, many fathers refused to allow their children to attend classes. In some villages, mobs slayed the educators sent out from Kabul. To punish them, Afghan and Soviet forces retaliated, setting off even more bloodshed.
I fail to understand why we should be trying to dam the powerful forces of history and culture. I don't much like the gender segregation of rural Afghanistan. I don't like that girls are afforded, at best, a simple mosque education of the Quran in the rural areas, and not even that if the community can't afford a mullah to do the job, such as it goes with an inability to operate the zakat system necessary to find, train and retain a literate, competent part-time teacher.
In no way am I an expert on development issues. But I'm concerned that we're putting the cart before the horse. If I'm a local commander, and I see that these education policies arriving from Kabul or from well-meaning NGOs are driving, in part, a larger revolt, then I must stop them and ask that these sincere people consider other means of reaching their ends without causing more problems.
For example, perhaps the best way to achieve results would be one that both supports the traditional gender roles while helping girls: Teach their fathers to read so that the fathers can teach their families in the privacy of their own homes. This both affirms the father's role in the gender hierarchy AND allows children to get something more than the basic mosque school immersion.
It would be very difficult for the Taliban to challenge this, it seems to me. And one would need to make the argument for such a program by borrowing the language of Islam: Is it not farz for both men and women to seek the knowledge of the Prophet?
In the modern history of Afghanistan, there never has been much education of girls, even in the cities. During the Soviet years, I believe that no more than a mere tenth of the nation's school children were girls, and in the countryside they simply didn't go to class.
When the Taliban banned the teaching of girls in the rural areas, one must understand that there weren't many girls there being taught anyway.
SNLII, I agree with much of
SNLII, I agree with much of what you're saying and would add to my first post that when almost a third of your children die before they're 5, the idea of educating girls (and probably losing their reproduction abilities to a workforce that lacks the capacity to absorb all the men) must seem somewhat decadent.
That the cart is being put before the horse is arguable. I would say that the cart (ongoing military action) was running downhill all on its own from the summer of 2002 onward. It was largely unnecessary and counter-productive in that it maintained an insecure environment across some of the most needy area's of the country. By the end of that summer the development effort had, in the eyes of Afghan's in those southern and eastern provinces, completely failed to materialize and all they saw of western efforts was a military campaign of retribution.
The big question now must be whether there's a way to rescue the situation. Unfortunately, where we are right now is not a good starting place.
BTW, my understanding of Afghanistan's dowry system is that it has always been that the family of the groom pays the brides family - reverse of that in India. or is that what you're saying?
SC
I'm not sure more security
I'm not sure more security for Kandahar would change the tide, SC. If the BBC poll is accurate, than the Taliban had something like a 64 percent approval rating in the province in February.
In other words, when people have voted with their hearts and minds against government policies -- including universal education -- it probably doesn't bode well for the feckless, corrupt and incompetent government itself, at least compared to the Taliban.
And, yes, the "reverse dowry" system is in effect in much of Afghanistan, but NOT all of it. Many tribes use the traditional mahr deposit, which must be returned to the woman's family if the man seeks a divorce or harms her.
If I had the right textbook here, I probably could point out which tribes pay the groom price, bridge price or whatnot.
Olivier Roy's book on resistance and Islam handles this better than I can.
THEN, not than...
THEN, not than...
SNLII, you bring up an
SNLII, you bring up an interesting scenario in which a local commander has to balance his need to tame the insurgency and the implications of an NGO's activities which may be turning locals toward the insurgency.
First thought: Is this happening? Let's take a tangential example which relates more directly to COIN operations, that of school building. When US/NATO forces build schools, we often build both boys and girls schools, sometimes over the protests of the local shura. Is this an example of the imposition of Western values that drives locals to support the insurgency? And aren't the attacks on schools proof (on top of the shura's stated opposition) that the locals reject our "westernization?"
Certainly there is evidence to support that view. Also though, we should consider that despite attacks on girls schools, despite attacks on girls who are walking to school, despite there being no history or precedent of girls attending schools in rural communities... despite all these things, those girls schools get used. Girls aren't deviantly attending, their families are sending them, condoning them to do it, encouraging, perhaps making them do it even on top of the attendant risk.
I don't mean to say there's not opposition, but I am looking at evidence of people voting for change -by struggling to become educated.
Second thought about your local commander's dilemma:
I'm sure no commander would let worries of domestic support for the mission influence his ground operations, but the situation you've constructed highlights an interesting paradox. If he wants stability and to sap support for insurgency among the locals, he might decide to obstruct or "deny sanctuary" to the NGO promoting women's health or women's empowerment. Might this not affect how US/NATO operations are viewed back in the homeland? If we're seen as legitimizing local practices, many of which seem barbaric to Western eyes, wouldn't this further drain support for the "costly," "hopeless" war? Not that many from that camp would argue that it's less costly or less hopeless were we to promote women's health/empowerment, of course...
It has always been difficult
It has always been difficult to make the argument that the Taliban has also brought benefits as well as misery to the society. People usually look at you as if you just finished your third joint.
Good to know they can't agree on what dowry system they're going to use:)
Well, Timoteo, I wasn't
Well, Timoteo, I wasn't exactly thinking of the battalion or even larger BCT AO, but rather something a bit larger because, as we know, C/BCT ain't making policies on NGO employment. That's most likely coming from higher up.
But I do think it's worth considering. If we agree that all COIN is local, and we realize from our local observations that certain practices of outside agents (be they NGOs or whatever) are NOT helping you in your primary missions of "securing" the population (by which I mean cleaving the insurgent from the larger population) and fracturing the enemy's infrastructure to degrade his capabilities, then why shouldn't we strongly consider evicting the NGO or whatever?
That's not where Exum was heading. But if I'm looking at Kandahar, I see a province wherein about 70 percent of the people support the Taliban. This number, according to polls (full disclaimer on those), seems to be rising in favor of the Taliban, with more people suggesting that the Taliban are becoming more "moderate."
Something is driving this. Perhaps it's more love for the Taliban (which I doubt), or it's hatred for the government, the occupation, the lack of security and policies delivered to a traditional people, for the best of intentions, that seem to be pissing them off.
There's probably some of all of that.
"If we're seen as
"If we're seen as legitimizing local practices, many of which seem barbaric to Western eyes..."
Timoteo, just to correct what I'm sure is a mis-statement here: I know of nowhere in Afghanistan where it's a local practice to deny or obstruct healthcare for women. Quite the opposite.
SC
Reproductive medicine
Reproductive medicine knowledge, to include lowering infant mortality, follows both increased literacy rates and a period of chaos. Until all of Afghanistan has modern, or close to modern, literacy rates, the period of chaos will continue whether we increase or decrease the number of troops in country. As Steve Connors points out there are not, in general, local practices to deny or obstruct healthcare for women. However, if people can't read and write or sufficiently have material for the next few meals available, healthcare for women will remain a low priority.
Afghans want to learn to read; everything else will follow. The question for us then is "What course of action on behalf of the United States will best develop literacy in Afghanistan?" The answer to this question, although debatable, is almost certainly not to increase the number of combat forces in country.
Emmaneul Todd outlines all of this in "After the Empire" for those of you not familiar with it.
Well, if Emmanuel Todd says
Well, if Emmanuel Todd says it...
Thank you both SNLII and SC
Thank you both SNLII and SC for the corrections to my previous post.
To twist my argument a bit in order to address what SNLII posits (support for the Taliban is growing), and to build upon SC's correction (provision of health care is not prohibited), I think we are blamed for not making things better. SNLII points out that they might turn to support the local insurgency because we have failed to provide security; I believe this is a perrenial complaint and holds some water. But it's not just security they want. I'm reminded of a quote in which the Afghan blames the US for his misery and for the corruption of the local police and government and lack of development, saying "They put a man on the moon and they fly here in jets, but they tell us they have no money for a road." They want roads, electricity, jobs, schools, a new car...
They don't generally know much about Amrika, especially not back in the hinterlands, but they do know it's a rich place. We almost never bring about the scale of change they assume we have the power to command. Whether this erodes their support for us or, more problematically, creates animosity, is probably highly variable.
What should we do about it? I believe Rory Stewart was pushing for the completion of the Kojacki Dam -and other simularly grand projects- as demonstrations of largesse, things we could point to and as demonstative of our will to assist.
I understand the project is plodding along, slowly. Maybe it will help. But probably only to the extent it has local impact , eg reliable electricity and the benefits that accompany it.
www.usip.org/files/resources/
www.usip.org/files/resources/guidelines_pamphlet.pdf
http://origin.usip.org/theguide/index.html
Ideally an NGO should be independent and neutral since they rely on the community's acceptance for their security. However to play devil's advocate: say there is a direct conflict with an NGO that is pushing an issue that is at odds with the communities wishes. I'd say the USAID rep. would have a better idea of how to settle the issue. I'm also not an expert when it comes to development but that is just my 2 cents. If it is an NGO from another country... no idea what should be done. It would be easier if the UN took the leading role but sadly that is not the case in Afghanistan.
It will be interesting to
It will be interesting to see what effect the introduction of 5/2 SBCT to Kandahar has in the next few months. According to newspaper articles over the past couple days, a Stryker battalion is taking over in Arghandab and a RSTA squadron in Spin Boldak. Supposedly this will allow the Canadian battle group to focus more on Kandahar city....but it seems to me they still have a massive rural AO to cover and this probably won't allow for much extra attention on the city, since they barely had any resources devoted to those other areas anyway.
SNLII - isn't there a danger
SNLII - isn't there a danger of Afghani rural resistance to girls education being skewed out of perspective? After all the same BBC/ABC poll had 92% of all respondants supporting girls education and 91% favoring women's voting? And these %s have held up since 2005?
The "64%" approval ratingfor the Taleban" in Kandahar. you quote was actually 64% saying that the Taleban "has some support in the area." In other words it was a question related to perception, not personal opinion, as you suggest.
Significantly, when asked for their personal approval of the Taleban, overall only 7% were favorable. The Kandahar breakdown was not given, but clearly it would be far, far less than the 64% you quote, probably less than 20% since the overall disapproval was so high.
Isn't the situation being reported in Kandahar somewhat analogous to Ramadi - that is, power vaccuum filled by insurgents. And the remedies the same?
I think we need to be
I think we need to be careful here, Timoteo.
If I might mention Roland Paris (notice RB that I'm all about Canadian profs): Sometimes the development projects themselves, especially when they seek to turn a traditionalist society into a market-based, liberal democracy, tend to make peacekeeping (security) even more difficult for the counter-insurgent.
In Afghanistan, we have the worst of all possible problems in provinces such as Kandahar: No cease fire between warring parties; no consensus on the government; no legitimacy for the government; development projects that actually create more hatred for the occupation and the Mayor of Kabul; a lack of key institutions, especially the means for resolving disputes non-violently; a lack of consensus on statebuilding; a weak, rentier addiction to western aid; an inability to regulate blackmarket economies; an adhoc statebuilding approach by the counter-insurgent; the ongoing perception that the occupation runs the Afghan government; the fact that Afghanistan is in a bad neighborhood, and the bad neighbors keep stirring up trouble, a lack of delivering on the aid we promise, nouveau riche embellishments paid for by skimming off aid or engaging in the government-sanctioned narco-mafia operations that drive the have nots crazy, etc, etc, etc.
I'm not sure that simply bringing in more troops will solve these problems. Why? Because if we agree that the twin drivers of the Taliban insurgencies in Kandahar are the Karzai regime and the occupation, I fail to understand how more of the Mayor of Kabul's regime and more occupation will solve that. If the policies designed to turn Kandahar into part of a liberal democracy with free markets, and those very policies are driving the revolt, then how will more of that help? If the traditionalist rural peoples are inherently distrustful of state governments operating from distant Kabul ( a "government" currently without the legitimacy in the province that the Taliban seem to hold), then how is more of that going to help?
I could go on, but those are the paradoxes as I see them. Karzai is our Babrak Kamal, our Shah Shujah, so I'm not sure how we're going to sell him to the people of Kandahar. They had a chance to buy the product, and they won't even clip a coupon for it today.
Populist anger actually is directed against NGOs in many communities, and the very arrival of the NGOs becomes propaganda fodder for the Taliban.
No, SMG. They're not even
No, SMG. They're not even remotely the same.
Although we might arrive at the same method for treating the disease: Pick the kinship groups we like, protect their ringleaders, turn a blind eye to their corruption and bribe them to stay on the sidelines or fight our enemies. The "Awakening" leaders weren't completely legitimate, but they had enough legitimacy that we could build on it to pacify the area and receive valuable HUMINT from them.
But there are all sorts of differences between western Iraq and southern Afghanistan, including the fact that Iraq's agricultural and industrial infrastructure could absorb the large aid we brought in, whereas in Afghanistan there just isn't the capacity for it. The kinship networks aren't even all that similar.
More to the point, if I asked even the most illiterate, hidebound traditionalist in Afghanistan whether he favored schooling for his daughter, he would say, "yes." By which he likely would mean the traditional, hidebound and barely literate rote instruction of the Quran taught in the mosque school down the road. Because it is sanctioned by the people in his community and fails to distort his gender role, it's accepted.
What we know from Afghans in Kandahar is that they don't want more government or more occupation. How shall giving them more of what they don't want help the situation?
I sat one evening and
I sat one evening and listened to a UN worker who had spent months setting up a project just outside Gardez and had been pleading for quite some time with the commander of a US special forces unit to please stop distributing aid in the area because things were becoming confusing for many of the Afghans. The aid distribution continued and, for some reason or other (and it doesn't really matter) the SF unit attacked a nearby compound, called in an airstrike and people were killed. The UN compound was attacked in retaliation and some of the workers were killed and injured. The development project was closed down for lack of security. As far as the Afghan's were concerned (cutting through all the self deceiving BS we first-worlders have) there was no difference between the people on the project and those dropping the bombs.
I met a man at Tora Bora in August of 2002. He was a fairly typical 30+ Pashtun tribesman who gave me chapter and verse of Tony Blair's "Brighton Speech" of October 2001. The man was clearly by this time highly skeptical of western intentions or capabilities to deliver on the fine promises made in Tony's manifesto for a brave new world. He said to me, "if we're betrayed in this we will fight and we'll drive you people from Afghanistan."
At the time of this meeting the paltry $5bn pledged by donor countries had already been turned into a "soft loan" and of the $800 m spent, the bulk of it went on organizations of various sorts building their nests in Kabul. When asked why more hadn't been spent on development the usual reply was that "capacity" needed to be built. This at a time when hundreds of thousands of refugees had returned from Pakistan - many swelling Kabul's already overstretched infrastructure - and were facing the first winter without shelter.
I wonder, how would the Afghans have responded to an imaginary Soviet entreaty, say in 1987, to give them another chance because they promise to do better in the future?
Another key component to a
Another key component to a more lasting (but perhaps not eternal) pacification in Anbar was the breaking of the will of the Sunni Arab when it came to fighting the "Persians" in Baghdad. Let's just say that streams of refugees needing to be housed in ANbar sent a less-than-subtle message to the insurgents there that they couldn't protect their own "people," something the "people" arriving from Baghdad could discuss openly.
Thus far, the Taliban haven't been discredited in this regard. The people in provinces such as Kandahar are NOT convinced that the US and the Karzai government will win out, nor even stay for longer than a year or so. They know that the Taliban hold the night while the US-led coalition runs the day (if lucky).
They also know that the US isn't exactly rushing into Balochistan or NW Pakistan to eradicate the Taliban.
By the way, I don't want to
By the way, I don't want to sound all depressing about OEF. I once kind of suspected some of the strategic assumptions and resource allocations, but then I found a new mantra.
Whenever I'm kind of glum about the sitrep, I just channel some wisdom I read in Le Figaro: La bataille est loin d'être gagnée.
Oui. La bataille est loin d'être gagnée.
SNLII-throw -the-NGOs-out
SNLII-throw -the-NGOs-out .... well, given your authority here, I would ask you to acknowledge that your "64% approval" rating for the Taleban in Kandahar appears nowhere in the BBC/ABC poll? And also acknowledge that the the poll finding that overall only 7% of Afghans said they supported the Taleban and 91% did not, does not suggest that the Afghans in Kandahar support the Taleban in overwhelming numbers? Otherwise impressionable commenters might start quoting these figures as gospel in later threads.
Re girls: Well, I suppose that illiterate, hidebound traditionalists in Afghanistan might misunderstand the question. But how many mosque schools dot the rural villages in the mountains,I wonder? Do they ride camels or goats to get there?
Re- snlii - more-security-no-help:
The poll had this to say: "Crucially the Kabul government and its western allies do better where they are seen as having a strong presence and being effective in providing security.
"For example, among people who say the central, the provinical government or western forces have strong local presence, 58%, 57% and 46% respectively approve of their performance. Where the presence of these entities is weak, however, their respective approval ratings drop to just 31, 22 and 25%"
and
"In the country's beleaguered south west (Kandahar etc) ...only 26% feel secure from crime amd violence; in Helmand alone just 14% feel secure."
As we would say in Australia, increasing security might at least be worth a throw in Kandahar before the towel is chucked in? You know, a bit of the old clear,hold and build? After all, when asked in that poll "Who would you rather have ruling Afghanistan today?" only 4% said the Taleban. This would further suggest that approval for the Taleban in Kandahar is not exactly at premium rates even in the south west?
You're right, SMG. Let's
You're right, SMG. Let's just give it another eight years, ok?
Let's fill Kandahar to the brim with NGOs, seeing as they're only occassionally doused in cooking oil and set on fire by the recalcitrant natives.
As the dimmest of the Australians like to say, OEF is "winnable, but only just." And he gets to cash a US taxpayer check for the privilege!
Fair enough, 64 percent of the people in the province think the Taliban are going to win. Or, as CSIS puts it:
"The Taliban are far from achieving popular support -- across a range of measures the group still is shunned by
large majorities of Afghans. But 22 percent say it has at least some support in their area, and this soars to 57
percent in the Southwest overall, including 64 percent in its home base, Kandahar. That’s up sharply from 44
percent in the Southwest last year, and up from 41 percent in Kandahar. There’s also evidence the Taliban have
made some progress rebranding themselves. Twenty-four percent of Afghans say it’s their impression the
Taliban 'have changed and become more moderate' -- far from a majority, but one in four. And that view spikes
in some provinces -- most notably, to 58 percent in Wardak and 53 percent in Nangarhar, bordering Kabul to the
west and east, respectively. People who see the Taliban as more moderate are 20 points more likely to favor
negotiating with the movement, and less supportive of the U.S. and NATO/ISAF presence in Afghanistan."
Sure, let's give it eight more years, by which time the Taliban will be considered a moderate force with 100 percent approval.
IEDs, murder of academics,
IEDs, murder of academics, intimidation of locals, very effect means to eliminate our human sensor abilities. How do we get out of this isolation trap?
I speak on behalf of a
I speak on behalf of a people who begged on their hands and knees to be occupied by the US in 1942. T'was the first known instance of which I am aware of the US officially assuming the White Man's Burden from the poms. Three years later my father landed in Borneo with you yanks as an advisor. Ah, looking back from today how you all must deeply regret the US bleeding the pommy imperialists dry with the lend lease scam!
CSIS quoted the poll correctly. What it demonstrates is that the people of Kandahar have powers of observation and deduction, not that they personally support Taleban.
btw you must ask Kilcullen about the Australian saying "when you're feeling glum, stick your finger up your bum" Am not sure of the French translation.
For the record, Paula (who I
For the record, Paula (who I had coffee with in KAF shortly before she was attacked) was killed in Maiwand District, far from the city proper: an area that had not seen any significant Western or ANSF presence at any time for the 8 years prior to her death, which came just as the first significant numbers of Western troops and ANSF were finally being deployed there.
To lose something, you must first be said to have possessed it, surely.
The Canadian experience in
The Canadian experience in Kandahar is a word to the wise. The decision to go was based on the hope that support for the war would lead to trade and border issues being resolved in Canada's favor and the Canadian Forces desire to be part of a small war mainly to justify expansion and equipment purchases and to distance itself from "peacekeeping". Staying out of Iraq was also key to the decision to look for another task in Afghanistan when the battalion slot in the ISAF Kabul Brigade expired in 2005. PRTs in Ghor and Herat were dismissed by the army as not being high profile enough (or needing billions of new kit) so Kandahar was taken. A battle group followed the PRT. The total of troops now is about 2800 although many never leave KAF.
Whether the CDS didn't realize the difficulty of signing on to pacify Kandahar Province with a battalion + or simply didn't care is open to question. His briefing to the Prime Minister lacked terms such as guerrilla or war and painted the mission as robust stabilization. His plan to leverage the war into more gear worked well as new Chinooks, main battle tanks, MRAPs, artillery and heavy ICVs have all been funded. The Canadian people were also the target of an effective defense department information ops campaign although the effects of this have worn off. Most Canadians will still say they "support the troops" but are also all for leaving Afghanistan. Few believe the "we're fighting them here so we don't fight them here" line which was a common defense talking point in 2006-07.
Canada has had no strategic goals beyond being a good NATO member and friend of the US. It's AO has been steadily reduced as the casualties (120 dead in Kandahar on this mission) have risen. The major reason for the withdrawal into the city is an attempt at reducing casualties. The current tactic d'jour is a model village whose infrastructure and governance is to be "fixed" before the next village is selected. They are now well into the saving face before quietly leaving stage of the mission.
@ SNLII If there's no room
@ SNLII
If there's no room for a western NGO in this deal, then so be it.
Maybe it’s an Australian thing but I’m all for giving the NGO’s a go before we arbitrarily decide that a military solution is the only option.
That’s not to say that kinetic operation will play no part – for the foreseeable future they will play a large part – if only we had started sooner and not had the distraction of that other fracas.
That certain staffers for NGO suffer the god awful fate of hot oil only shows their determination to get things rolling, schools being one of them.
And certainly, let’s acknowledge that the Afghans have a different mentality about women, but let’s also acknowledge that it’s outdated and offensive, damn near medieval. PC rhetoric aside, I don’t see acid attacks on schools girls as a justified method of protest nor of ensuring cultural purity in the face on oncoming cultural change.
For me education and emancipation of women in AFPAK is a solid reason for expending blood and treasure – it will have significant benefits down the track and it’s just a damn good moral reason to be there.
SNLII, your sarcasm and
SNLII, your sarcasm and animosity are quite silly. I've been coming to this blog almost daily for the past 8 months, in large part because I love reading your comments -- they are unrelentingly sharp, pithy, and insightful.
So it's disappointing to see the crying lack of rigour and dismissiveness you're displaying in this thread.
Your point about the difficulty/impossibility of winning is based on an assumption that is completely wrong : "the Taliban had something like a 64 percent approval rating in the province in February." As SMG pointed out, the Taliban enjoy no such support.
Now that you know your original assumption was wrong, does this change your opinion on the war's winnability, and the potential for enduring, credible population security to help turn the tide, by freeing ordinary Afghans from the threat of Taliban coercion and converting latent support for the government into actionable intelligence and tangible support?
Just a thought regarding
Just a thought regarding girls being educated. If you take the trash that no one cares about then no one will notice. Take the street children and educate the girls in an orphanage. Keeps NGO busy behind walls, educates a population of discarded, and who knows, they maybe welcomed at some point to teach other children.
Sanmon: Actually a very good
Sanmon: Actually a very good idea. Give the street-kids computer-skills and a couple of centers to gather at. Its doable.
There's a lot of numbers
There's a lot of numbers flying about here. Perhaps the most telling is that this very contentious article attracted 1 whole comment at the Huffington Post. The latest post about a town hall meeting has over 6500.
Is this level of interest indicative of the level required in order to sustain the kind financial and political commitment to this campaign over the years required ?
"Canadians ... Few believe
"Canadians ... Few believe the "we're fighting them here so we don't fight them here" line which was a common defense talking point in 2006-07."
Surely the same could be achieved by broadcasting your weather channel internationally.
BruceR, what an
BruceR, what an extraordinary individual Paula Loyd was. I had no idea three researchers involved in that particular program have been killed (according to the linked Boston.com article).
Kilo has a point. Good intentions are not the same thing as good results, and if good results are going to take a level of effort that our countries are not currently willing to expend, then just what is everybody doing? What worries me, a bit, about this thread is that it reminds me of the conversations many of us on the right were having about the Iraq War early on - that the nature of Saddam's regime justified the spending of blood and treasure. The interventionist left made the same arguments. The counterarguments, of course, were "well, yes, the regime is horrible, but the reality will be difficult, bloody and the outcome uncertain. It could even make things worse. Do you really want to do this?" Same arguments, same uncertainty. Restating the obvious, I know, but it struck me on reading the thread. I can't speak for SNLII, but I see a plea for recognizing that just because something is theoretically possible, it may not be doable given a certain physical and political reality. This administration is losing political capital, rapidly, and I don't see the arguments being made to the American people in a confident way - that what we are doing in Afghanistan will be worth the effort. I am talking about domestic political impressions. I know the politics stuff is icky to some on this forum, but it IS reality. You can't do any of the things you want without the greater debate working in your favor.
The other thing that struck me was this post in contrast to the article on the front page of the CNAS website: (excerpted from the article) 'However, even if the surge occurs, "it might not arrive until early 2010," said Andrew Exum, who's at the Washington-based Center for a New American Security, a national-security policy research center, and who serves as an adviser to McChrystal. "For the near term, the military needs to be prepared to take on responsibilities better executed by civilians. . . . We're on a very short timeline in Afghanistan with respect to shifting momentum, and by the time the civilians arrive in any significant numbers or capabilities, it might be quite late in the game." '
I see a lot of discussion of the trees, but the forest is still hazy. I am thankful, though, to hear all the arguments pro and con. It is an uncomfortably educational thread.
Here's an old 1963 memo on
Here's an old 1963 memo on the need for USAID to repave the highway between Kabul and Kandahar... makes for interesting reading:
http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/pakistan/freshman30june1963.jpg
"RGA May Press for Asphalting of Entire Kabul-Kandahar Highway"
Fast forward to this 2008 article in the NYT:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/world/asia/13iht-highway.4.15256825.html
Afghanistan's Kabul-Kandahar highway: A lifeline plagued with insurgents
By Carlotta Gall
"...When it was built several years ago, the Kabul-Kandahar highway was a demonstration of the U.S. commitment to building a democratic Afghanistan. A critical artery, the highway quite literally holds the country together. For the shaky Afghan state, it binds the center to the south, and provides a tenuous thread to unite Afghanistan's increasingly divided ethnic halves: the insurgent-ridden, Pashtun-dominated south with the more stable, mainly Tajik, Hazara and Turkic north. For the United States and the NATO-led force in Afghanistan, it is an important supply route for the war effort, linking the two largest foreign military bases in the country, at Bagram and Kandahar, and a number of smaller bases along the way."
"But today the highway is a dangerous gantlet of mines and attacks from insurgents and criminals, pockmarked with bomb craters and blown-up bridges. The governor of Ghazni Province came under fire driving through Salar on Tuesday and two of his guards were wounded, officials said. The insurgents have made the route a main target, apparently with the aim of undercutting Afghanistan's economy and infrastructure, said the Afghan military spokesman, General Zaher Azimi."
For the most recent on the Kabul-Wardak-Kandhar highway:
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-deaths3-2009aug03,0,3594308.story
"...The American presence in Wardak was beefed up early this year after a series of attacks by militants helped create the impression that Taliban fighters were tightening a noose around the capital. Western military officials said that was largely an illusion and that Kabul was in no danger of being overrun, but they acknowledged that travel on the main highway through Wardak, at the capital's doorstep, had become extremely unsafe."
The most obvious reason that the Taliban were able to retake Afghanistan after 2002-2003 was that Rumsfeld got in bed with the drug traffikers because he wanted "tribal warlord allies" - but those same drug networks were tapped into by the Taliban for finances, according to several reports. The UN claims $400 million per year, the CIA and DIA claim $70 million - but the fact is that the U.S. policies in Afghanistan from 2002-2008 were idiotic and essentially created the situation you see today. Despite warnings from Afghan politicians in 2004, Rumsfeld deliberately ignored the problem, and then used a wrong-headed strategy that, along with broken promises about agricultural support by NATO etc., alienated farmers and drove them to support the Taliban.
Reversing this will take a lot of work - which is why the general called for a 'civilian surge' to make sure that this time, the promises aren't all empty - and the funds don't all go to McMansions in Kabul, but rather for agricultural and building supplies for villages in the region.
"The counterarguments, of
"The counterarguments, of course, were "well, yes, the regime is horrible, but the reality will be difficult, bloody and the outcome uncertain. It could even make things worse. Do you really want to do this?" Same arguments, same uncertainty. Restating the obvious, I know, but it struck me on reading the thread. I can't speak for SNLII, but I see a plea for recognizing that just because something is theoretically possible, it may not be doable given a certain physical and political reality."
The most prevalent manifestation of that political reality being apathy, which puts to lie such counterarguments. The world's longest running insurgency earned that title for a reason. Say what you like about the Taliban or Saddam, but you really can't argue with the script writers for Rambo. Instead this amounts to nothing more than window dressing for what was/is already sold.
Pulp Fiction on the other hand tells us a different story....
http://kingsofwar.wordpress.com/2009/08/07/afghanistan-two-years-from-no...
@ SNLII Just to throw out
@ SNLII
Just to throw out some numbers and pretty charts on the matter
http://www.afgnso.org/2009/ANSO%20Q.2%202009.pdf
BTW, while you're getting
BTW, while you're getting down with those Afghan polling numbers, recall that most get their news from radio and 90pc of households own one...
http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/08/09/radio-shariat-returns-why/
And some context on your oil-death incident, article and comments...
http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/08/11/again-with-the-context/
"Now that you know your
"Now that you know your original assumption was wrong, does this change your opinion on the war's winnability, and the potential for enduring, credible population security to help turn the tide, by freeing ordinary Afghans from the threat of Taliban coercion and converting latent support for the government into actionable intelligence and tangible support?"
Meet:
""The Taliban are far from achieving popular support -- across a range of measures the group still is shunned by
large majorities of Afghans. But 22 percent say it has at least some support in their area, and this soars to 57
percent in the Southwest overall, including 64 percent in its home base, Kandahar. That’s up sharply from 44
percent in the Southwest last year, and up from 41 percent in Kandahar. There’s also evidence the Taliban have
made some progress rebranding themselves. Twenty-four percent of Afghans say it’s their impression the
Taliban 'have changed and become more moderate' -- far from a majority, but one in four. And that view spikes
in some provinces -- most notably, to 58 percent in Wardak and 53 percent in Nangarhar, bordering Kabul to the
west and east, respectively. People who see the Taliban as more moderate are 20 points more likely to favor
negotiating with the movement, and less supportive of the U.S. and NATO/ISAF presence in Afghanistan."
As I CORRECTLY stated, the Taliban enjoy 64 percent approval in Kandahar. An observation that, finally, brought this from SMG: "CSIS quoted the poll correctly. What it demonstrates is that the people of Kandahar have powers of observation and deduction, not that they personally support Taleban."
So, again, the people of Kandahar say the Taliban have 64 percent approval (I believe that the government is less than half of that). Perceptions are important. Why do the Taliban have such high approval in their home province?
Well it ain't because of the NGOs hanging around the Taliban, is it?
Or, as one in the STates would now
"Maybe it’s an Australian
"Maybe it’s an Australian thing but I’m all for giving the NGO’s a go before we arbitrarily decide that a military solution is the only option."
We've given them eight years. Perhaps a key metric in Kandahar should be: How many are being deep fried by the villagers?
I am in NO WAY doctrinally opposed to having NGOs share battlespace. The problem is when their role in the battlefield seems to increase the problems faced by the counter-insurgent. This is a well recorded issue (I cited Paris but I could've named a dozen other experts in his field who would echo his perspective) -- sometimes attempting to turn a feudal "nation" quickly into a market-based, liberal democracy is itself destabilizing and unsustainable, a problem complicated by ongoing fighting.
All COIN is local. If one were to show me (and I'm sure this data exist) that in other communities the NGOs were having a pacifying effect on the population and helping to cleave the insurgent from the fish in which he hopes to swim, then I would do everything in my power to keep them doing the good.
But if the indication is quite the opposite, what should the battlefield commander do? He exists to protect NGOs? I'm sorry, but he does not.
His mission is to hack the insurgent away from the population while destroying the insurgency's infrastructure. If NGOs help him to do that, great. If they don't -- and Kandahar might be an example, and I gave you other case studies from Afghanistan 25 years ago that showed eerily similar results -- then maybe we need to rethink what we're proposing to the population.
Fumbles, those were some of
Fumbles, those were some of the most depressing stats I've ever seen. On the bright side, most are just getting kidnapped or robbed and not executed or fried like a human falafel.
@SNLIII That poll doesn't
@SNLIII
That poll doesn't say the Taliban has 64% approval. It says 64% of people in Kandahar "say it has at least some support in their area".
That doesn't mean 64% of people in Kandahar approve of the Taliban. Those are two totally different things.
Can you explain how 64% "say it has at least some support in their area" (which is the referred phrasing in the preceding sentence with regards to the polling question" is the same thing as a 64% approval rating?
BTW -- This means, according
BTW -- This means, according to the text of what you wrote, you were factually incorrect when you said: "the people of Kandahar say the Taliban have 64 percent approval ".
That is *not* what the poll says. The poll says that 64% of people in Kandahar "say it has at least some support in their area".
That seems like an important distinction.
Alternatively, can you produce the original polling data?
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