Center for a New American Security

I for one am sick of this argument that just because some of us are now working on operational concerns, we have somehow failed to ask the questions of policy Bacevich is asking

Well you and Biddle have come to an agreement, but I poked around the state department website for an hour yesterday looking for a clear statement of our strategic goals in Afghanistan and couldnt find it. So what are the US government's goals? The same as Biddle's? I am open to being corrected if anyone has any insight

Re: USG goals

From the White house website:

The President put forth the central question:

Many people in the United States -- and many in partner countries that have sacrificed so much -- have a simple question: What is our purpose in Afghanistan? After so many years, they ask, why do our men and women still fight and die there? And they deserve a straightforward answer.

And gave his answer:

So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That's the goal that must be achieved. That is a cause that could not be more just.

" Plenty of us in Washington have in fact been having a very sober-minded discussion about U.S. interests in Afghanistan and the limits of our new counterinsurgency doctrine."

That's certainly not how I would describe the contents of your blog over the last year or so. I haven't ever, once, read you question whether the US should be fighting the war in Afghanistan. Any debate is over how to fight it, and that closely reflects the debate in Washington so I don't see how you can call Bacevich's claim "patently false."

"I think one of the things that annoys Bacevich is that some of us have moved on to strategic and operational concerns after reaching different political conclusions than his own. It's not that we have not asked or have failed to consider the questions Bacevich asks. We've just asked them and then arrived at different answers."

When? Where on your blog have you ever raised any real debate? Posted anything that would undermine the COIN narrative on Iraq/ Afghanistan? Anything that would undermine the arguements the people at CNAS are making about Afghanistan that states that the US needs to fight the war in Afghanistan.

The COIN strategy in Afghanistan is not a US national security strategy.

The idea that using 60,000+ troops (for 5-15 years) to prevent Afghanistan from becoming an AQ safehaven for operations to destabilize Pakistan is the most efficient use of our national security resources becomes very thin for each of the 7,000 miles that separates Afghanistan and the US.

I agree with the visitor at 1:20pm. I have not read anything about if/why Afghanistan is important to the national security of the United States from you on this blog. It seems like it is a given here and there has not really been a debate about the merits of the conflict 8+ years after the start. During the CNAS conference panel with Dr. Bacevich, he brought up the same concerns that he has brought up in this article, and it seemed like you decided to use humor/sarcasm to bypass his "big picture" questions and focus on operational plans/goals.

"I think one of the things that annoys Bacevich is that some of us have moved on to strategic and operational concerns after reaching different political conclusions than his own. It's not that we have not asked or have failed to consider the questions Bacevich asks. We've just asked them and then arrived at different answers."

So, please tell us, what are your "different answers" or "different political conclusions"? Why is Afghanistan is important to the national security of the United States? How long do we need to stay there to keep us in the U.S. safe? When are we going to realize that we can not bring this 15 century country into the 21st century world order. This is a country with borders only drawn on a map, with no major natural resources, with no real functional government, where things work better locally through villages than through a central government. So please tell us the WHY before jumping to the HOW.

What still seems to remain unanswered is the question of what exactly al Qaeda is. It would help to understand the nature of the foe better. Given the history of false flag operations by the US and notable other nations, al Qaeda appears all too much like a chimera.

One's concern is not just that al Qaeda appears likely to be influenced by, even possibly directed by other nations, and/or elements within our own, but that, if wholly homegrown and directed solely in the pursuit of interests that exclude the good of the western nations, it is a group formed in reaction to the harm done by our "great and good nation", and its allies.

Eradicating one militant group may be a task well suited to warfare. Eradicating global insurgency that results from a constant quid pro quo where widespread benefits are experienced only for the victor, and the victor's dependents and allies, seems far less likely to succeed through warfare, while causing enduring harm to many millions, and requiring a "long war" indeed. Only if such a war is fought within global economic and political arenas, with sufficient benefit for every one involved, does there seem a likelihood of success.

Our own elite seem likely to be against any endeavor leading to outcomes that benefit those in other nations, if doing so results in less benefit to the power holders in place. How can we expect to succeed globally when within our own country, "you snooze, you lose" is the predominant motif of our business and political leaders?

You're not being fair to yourself, Andrew.

Lay out the strategic paradoxes. It's not as if the review group agreed on a likely endstate or even a suite of strategic goals that can be accomplished over the next year with the forces and doctrine we have.

But instead of using Bacevich as your foil or Biddle's underwhelmingly essay as your crutch use your own doubts both.

What do you second guess about your own assumptions? How are some of the strategic "goals" locked in opposition with themselves?

Without violating OPSEC, be fair to yourself and explain what, in your opinion, is wrong about our past, present and, likely, future uses of force in Afghanistan.

I have read Biddle and Bacevich and I have to say that I ultimately come down on Biddle's side. I think U.S./NATO failure/withdrawal from Afghanistan would provide AQ with greater operational space and perhaps the ability to renew attacks on U.S. and European targets. Additionally I can see a scenario under which the return of the Taliban to power in Kabul could be destabilizing to Pakistan. However, I don't think Biddle (or others) have provided a full accounting of US 'interests' and I think, once such an accounting is performed, Bacevich's concerns become more salient. However before we talk about those other "interests" (not articulated by Biddle) I want to push back a bit on his argument that a Taliban controlled Afghanistan would be destabilizing towards Pakistan and the contention that our continued involvement in Afghanistan helps prevent that outcome.

The fundamental problem with Biddle's argument about Pakistan is that we know both historically and currently Pakistan is the primary backer of the Taliban. Although the Pakistani military has launched its offensive in Swat and has Meshud in its cross-hairs, its still seems pretty obvious they are playing both sides (I would love to be proved wrong on this and am open to arguments/evidence to the contrary). This is why Pakistan seeks to make a distinction between "good Taliban" (i.e. anti-India groups and useful proxies in Afghanistan) vs. "bad Taliban" (i.e. against the Pakistani state). There is also something of a conflict between Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura and folks like Meshud. Omar's prime objective is expulsion of NATO from Afghanistan. Meshud seems more interested in coercing Pakistan into abandoning its pro-US policy. It isn't clear to me that Omar or the Afghan Taliban would, upon regaining control of Kabul immediately turn on Pakistan and seek to control Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. Its possible, but even leaving aside the question of capability I am skeptical they have that desire. Taliban control of Afghanistan might provide the space for other groups that do seek to destabilize Pakistan and seize its nukes. That is indeed a concern. But to the extent that Pakistan's current fight against such (anti-state) elements is complicated by the perception that Islamabad is doing the US's bidding, might a NATO/US withdrawal actually enable Pakistan to more aggressively go after its own enemies?

As to the other less commonly articulated US "interests" in 'winning in Afghanistan,' they flow primarily from the regional implications of a Taliban controlled Afghanistan. Not only would a Taliban controlled Afghanistan be destabilizing to Pakistan but also to Central Asia more generally. We would likely see a return to the civil war alignments of the 1990's with Iran, India and Russia (and perhaps Turkey) backing various Hazara, Uzbek and Tajik groups. Additionally, increasing Islamic militancy (often inspired as much or more by authoritarian repression and poverty as religious zealotry) in the Caucuses, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Xinjing could have huge implications for Russia and China (especially given Beijing's thirst for Central Asian energy). Whether the threat of a re-Talibanized Afghanistan to the CARs and their larger neighbors to the North and East would stimulate greater Sino-Russian cooperation and influence through the SCO and CSTO one an only guess. But neither Central Asian instability or greater Russian and Chinese involvement in the region can be good from the perspective of European energy security or NATO expansion (just ask Richard Morningstar).

In short, whether by default or design our presence in Afghanistan has implications for our involvement (and the neighboring great/minor powers as well) across the whole region from the Black Sea to the Pamirs. Why else would we need bases in Kyrgyzstan or transport agreements with Uzbekistan? When viewed in the larger context of geopolitical competition with Russia and China in post-Soviet Central Asia, I must admit that Bacevich's arguments assume greater relevance. From the perspective of moralpolitik, one cannot help but be a bit uneasy about the kinds of deals we may have to cut (and with whom) in order to secure basing or transport deals (let alone pipeline contracts)? What do we have to give up in Central and Eastern Europe (regions for more relevant to NATO and more vital to our "core" interests) in exchange for cooperation in Afghanistan? Even a strict realpolitik appraisal may lead one to conclude that the U.S. is probably much better off pursuing a traditional policy of "offshore balancing" than attempting to become a "land power" in the heart of Eurasia.

On some level this is, as AM points out about "reaching different political conclusions." And while there is certainly a need for the kind of operational and tactical planning that the COIN community is (admirably) involved in, I think we (and I am especially referring to those inside the beltway) should not stop asking these kinds of "theater level" strategic questions. Biddle's contribution to that debate is an important and useful one, but I also cannot help but think the discourse on whether the mission in Afghanistan meets the "folded flag" test remains an incomplete and one.

If there is one thing that Biddle is exactly right about, its the difficult domestic political battles over long term US engagement in Afghanistan that are yet to come.

Hey, Gulliver, Marx is so two centuries ago. Of course, our world today has been heavily influenced by his thought. But we live in an environment that is substantially different from his, and I think he would have moved on to new ideas, based on some fundamental precepts, if he were still alive today. None of the people who consider themselves Marxists seem to agree with me, but since I don't agree with many of their conclusions (and know little about Marxist theory, and that almost all second hand), IMHO seems to suit the situation to perfection.

If I might Biddle while Kabul burns:

"On balance, then, reinforcement is a better bet than withdrawal. But neither option is unassailable, and if presented with all costs and benefits appended, neither looks very appealing—and that will make for very contentious politics in the United States. "

After reading this almost amoral paragraph, I almost rose from my chair and screamed, "Ils ne passeront pas!" Oh, yes, Professor Biddle, I just compared you, and not at all favorably, with Robert Nivelle.

Let's articulate what Biddle means here. "Reinforcement" is a noun that is constructed from the syllables of human flesh. It's a weasel word because in its dry pronounciation as a noun it fails to connote what is really going to happen. It's much like the term "combat replacement." Who is being replaced by whom? Oh, well, the dead or maimed, that's who.

The "cost-benefit" analysis is one that's measured, also, on an abacus of human beings. These are my comrades and, for some of you, your brothers and mothers, fathers and sisters, neighbors and fellow denizens of this democracy.

The other phrase he employs, "political management," is the sophistry of selling a war he, himself, concedes is murky, risky and likely to fizzle. A younger sort might term is "spin," but let's here accept it as "explain," if only to be charitable to Biddle.

A key part of Biddle's "analysis" is that we must raise the stakes of our occupation, apparently clearing and holding and building up to the Durand Line, to help poor Pakistan. But I don't recall Pakistan as suffering the siege of Taliban irregulars on Sept 10, 2001. Whatever could have triggered such dire problems for Pakistan?

Might it be, indeed, the effing occupation? How shall pushing MORE Taliban cadres back into the redoubt we can't attack help Pakistan? How shall MORE refugees streaming for Pakistan aid the weak regime there? How will MORE of our development dollars, skimmed by the Taliban tax collectors to fund their twin revolts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, help Islamabad?

Do no harm? Good gravy, ask a Pakistani general and his candid advice to us would be to simply leave Afghanistan, if we really want to help. I can't believe that Biddle's "analysis" (it would be a craven sin to give it such a lofty description) that the ongoing bloodletting in Afghanistan is good for Pakistan is even seriously being considered.

Our "failure" in Afghanistan likely would allow Pakistan to go back to a more overt support for the very Pathan irregulars we fight now, with other regional actors filling in the vacuum on behalf of the Northern Alliance and other natural foes of the twin Taliban forces.

When Biddle discusses the "cost" of the war, his notions are barren of any morality. He discusses this in terms of Afghan security forces raised. What about the real cost, which is paid in the subtraction from our rolls of the men and women who volunteer to fight for our democracy? He speaks of casualties that might be "heavy."

Let's quit mincing words: Industrial warfare is going to tear flesh from bones, split skulls open, splash enough American blood to fill several rail cars and leave without parent or spouse thousands of American families. Shall they be relieved if Biddle's "analysis" is read as an oration, like some latter day Pericles, at their funerals?

No. They would rightly consider his "analysis" to be a sick joke.

I could go on, but why? This, Andrew, passes as your evidence of a serious debate? Crucial analysis?

It's a con job by a slick grifter, padded in the soft but arid diction of Beltway pundits and printed, apparently with some sense of dark humor, in a publication called "The American Interest."

Pray, what is this "interest" in Afghanistan beyond the fable concocted by Biddle here?

I'm an agnostic on the war in Afghanistan. I so want to be converted. Biddle is not the apostle struck by a divine spark.

Are you? Make that case, Andrew. It's amoral to use Biddle's "analysis" as a crutch.

My two cents follows:

Andrew, you say "...the risks of our counterinsurgency strategy." How can counterinsurgency be a strategy??

Counterinsurgency is a set of tactics, methods, techniques and procedures that makes up a military operation. It is not strategy. Your use so easily of the two words together betrays the real problem at hand: that we have no strategy in Astan except for a set of population centric coin tactics that we hope will pull things together. This hope--or this absence of strategy--is pulled along by the power of the Surge triumph narrative that beguiles folks into thinking that since it (ostensibly) worked in Iraq it will work in Astan if we just give coin a chance.

A strategy of tactics is what we have.

Remember what Sun Tzu said:

"Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory...Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat...Speed is the essence of war." Callwell would have agreed.

gian

Angry SNLII > Angry Exum > Angry Gentile?

Three quite simple reasons why Afghanistan shouldn't be compared to South Vietnam.
1 The 9/11 attacks. Even if we can assume that the majority of Al Qaeda responsible for planning such attacks is outside of Afghanistan at the moment that is still hardly a good reason for the United States to leave the nation and allow the eventual reconquest of the nation by the Taliban. Further I would like to ask Mr. Bacevich what he precisely would have done in 2001 if he had been president. The only difference I can find in Bush's actions and the hindsight of others is that they would have committed more troops and more heavily involved the U.N from the start.

2. Pakistan and its impact on the region. I don't know how things in Pakistan would have turned out if the United States hadn't launched its attack, but as they are now we cannot afford to ignore the fact that there is a serious crisis in the nation. I don't like it when people draw nicely made graphs of how losing a nation will cause the others around it to fall like dominoes, but only the most blind or gullible can state that the Taliban and affiliated groups and tribes are not a distinct threat to the long-term survival of the Pakistan one way or another.
The peace deals seem to have suggested weakness in the state to those groups, who stepped up their attacks prior to the large scale offensive made by the army. If Pakistan stops fighting them it effectively sacrifices all control over the border and could unnerve the United States enough to send soldiers across the border.
Finally if Afghanistan does fall to the Taliban we have a serious threat that their Pakistani counterparts could seize ever more areas of Pakistan than they already do. I admit that I don't have any idea where Pakistan's nuclear arsenal could be and I am fully aware that it is very unlikely that such groups would ever have the capability to actually use them. That said, I am not insane enough by any stretch to ignore the fact that those weapons could potentially fall into areas under the control of anti-American groups. With nuclear weapons you don't take that kind of chance.

3. To put it bluntly and harshly, a continued U.S presence in Central Asia. While the loss of South Vietnam didn't cost us Japan or South Korea, we don't have that large military presence or the threat of Communism to tie local leaders to the United States. Geographically speaking both China and Russia have much easier access to Central Asia, and while I find it unlikely that either would launch an invasion they might use economic pressure to convince those leaders to enter into stronger ties with them. Please understand, I don't consider myself to be especially Russo-phobic or Sino-phobic but I do put the interests of the United States before all others.

"So I want the American people to understand that we have a clear and focused goal: to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future. That's the goal that must be achieved. That is a cause that could not be more just."

And since we're identifying weasel words, deceptions and outright lies, it should be mentioned that even if this is the stated "goal," it's one that can't be done so long as AQ and the twin Taliban forces and their confederates are across the Durand Line, and we can't get to them. That's no longer a "goal," it's a fiction.

It might, indeed, be a "cause" that is "just," but that doesn't mean that Biddle's essay pays that answer any heed, because even he isn't swallowing it. THat's part of how the war is sold. It's not what you get if you buy admission to the theater.

For all its faults, "Triage" at least conceded that.

And, Andrew, while I might actually have once shared the consensus that Biddle was a serious analyst, that doesn't mean that we have to agree that this latest piece is an example of serious analysis. It seems actually quite different from his more considered pieces, most certainly his writings on the history of the American way of COIN.

Why is this so? Obviously, a key reason is that he's speaking to a different audience. But part of it is because he's not so much "analyzing" anything but rather selling something.

That's OK. Bacevich also is trying to sell something to his audience.

I'm not buying either of them. In fact, I'm asking you to close the deal.

Put me into the convertible Strategomobile 2002, a used Afghan vehicle with a lot of miles on it but until recently only one driver, George W. Bush. What sort of bumper-to-bumper warranty can you provide? Kilcullen says I should lease it for two years.

What do YOU say? I want the Exum Carfax on this, too.

@C: I won't argue over the first two points as your viewpoint and mine are too different on them. It would probably turn into a flamewar.
As for the last one...
In a happier world I'd love to allow nations to go their own routes as they please, but sadly we've seen that life is just a bit too dangerous for that. I of course admit that there have been several points in history where the United States and the rest of the world would have been better served if we hadn't chosen to intervene (Iran, Vietnam, others) but I don't consider that to be the case right now. The basic reasons why I see a strong influence in Central Asia and South Asia are as follows...
1. A possible war with China or Russia. I don't really want the United States to fight China (mostly because I'm not certain we would win) but based on history, geography, and my opinion of human nature I'm assuming that a war will result sometime in the next thirty years. Russia I'm not so concerned about, but Central Asia would apply for the same reasons. Obviously in such a war the Central Asian nations would want to remain as neutral as possible with good reason, but it might be possible to send weapons and money to pro-independence groups, and to keep supplies of gas and oil flowing readily.
2. The presence of anti-American, anti-current Central Asian leader, Taliban influenced groups throughout Central Asia. Given recent events I would say that there is widespread evidence of such groups throughout Central Asia and China and Russia aren't doing much to help the situation. Instead of insisting that leaders reform and not perform widespread massacres of their own civilians Russia and China instead support them with billions in aid that will almost definitely be misspent. This on its own wouldn't be enough to worry me beyond human rights concerns, but the problem is that this means that extremist groups that would otherwise remain on the fringes become very popular alternatives to the states. Although doubtful I hope that the presence of the U.S can convince some leaders to make enough reforms to stop such movements, or at least buy us time.
3. As I referenced above, oil and gas. I dislike the idea of Russia able to use its supplies of gas and oil as an economic weapon in disputes with Ukraine and Western Europe, and influencing the Central Asian nations involved to create alternate pipe routes to the Western markets could go a long way to damaging Russian influence. Obviously if the U.S wants Russian help more than European goodwill we could focus less on that and let Europe manage on its own, so that's more subjective than the rest.
4. 9/11. It isn't likely that any of the Central Asian groups would attempt a similar attack on the U.S, at least not until they have managed to establish themselves as the groups in power. However I prefer to ensure that these groups never get into a position of power to try it from the start, instead of replaying the entire Afghanistan problem. Here of course you would need good intelligence on which groups are really ethnic/tribal local groups and which ones are religious and global.

I love reading this blog, but -- when you fall into rhetorical traps (have been hanging out with Tom Ricks a lot or something??) like this one: "Now does that read like a man who has not carefully asked the questions Bacevich is asking?" -- it drives me nuts. Using a rhetorical question to make your big point (and a rhetorical question that actually uses someone else to make your argument, no less) is not a good tactic much less a good argument.

I know the people at Penn didn't teach you how to debate like that or write that. Must be something you've picked up in the Beltway?

I know careful writing is difficult and beside the point on a blog, but you're smarter and better than using rhetoric to prove your points.

By the way, Bacevich has clearly staked out the Vietnam analogy as his historical test case (and other failed counterinsurgencies/declining empires).

What are your test cases?