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Oracular Spectacular
This news hit yesterday, but it should be noted that yesterday's massive bombing in Kandahar is in line with the Quetta Shura Taliban's modus operandi in that -- like the prison break of 2008 -- it's a spectacular attack that is meant to send a message to the local population more than it is meant to kill people. These spectacular attacks are then combined with a below-the-radar campaign of fear and intimidation that we Westerners have been largely oblivious to over the past three years. Which is to say that we know it's going on but have no way of measuring the effect it is having on especially vulnerable populations in places like Kandahar City or Arghandab District.
(Modus operandi is Latin for "the way they roll, dawg")
With respect, to paraphrase
With respect, to paraphrase Tonto, what do you mean, "we Westerners," white man? The "effect" it's having is it's scaring the people to death: I'm not sure quantifying it any more precisely has the value you assign. But this is not news to anyone who's worked that part of the province, meaning Canadians (and some US PMT guys). Some of us have been saying it quite loudly for some time, in fact.
BruceR
Flit
No, I disagree. That is, I
No, I disagree. That is, I agree that the Canadians are *aware* of this. What they have thus far been unable to do -- in part because they have little constant contact with the population in either Kandahar or Arghandab -- is state definitively the effect it's having on the population. I have only seen intelligence *opinions* on Kandahar and no good intelligence assessments.Our mileage obviously varies
Our mileage obviously varies on this, as I'm pretty sure I have seen what you say you're looking for.
But hey, when I was one of the guys working that problem, I could quantify the number of police stations that had been overrun at night. I could quantify the delays it took to establish any new outpost, in part because the Arghandab locals were terrified it would risk insurgent wrath. I could and did quantify how long it took between someone getting a rep for being both competent and anti-Taliban, until they wound up dead, or how many death threats other ANSF officials or interpreters reported receiving in a given week. But I'm still not sure I could quantify *fear* any more precisely than that. Other than to say it was growing, and had been for some time. Chayes' "Punishment of Virtue" which came out in 2006, has proved entirely predictive in this regard.
Well that's actually useful
Well that's actually useful stuff. I wonder -- in an environment in which 70% of the PIRs were enemy-centric -- how much that made it up the chain.Man, I've wondered about
Man, I've wondered about that question for just about every assessment I've *ever* written.
Bruce, would the attack on
Bruce, would the attack on Saita be considered a terrorist attack on civilians? How do Kandaharis view Saita? Will many Kandahar residents support the attack, be indifferent or oppose it? Do Kandaharis understand that attacks like this mean less reconstruction and a worse economy, do they understand it and support the attacks anyway, or do they understand but react in some different way?
In general, do Kandaharis want more reconstruction (schools, roads, rails, electricity, sewage, water), or are they indifferent? What would Kandaharis offer to get reconstruction projects in their neighborhood?
Do attacks like this cause public anger against the GIRoA, ANA, ANP and ISAF for not protecting their city? {Iraqis often responded to attacks in Iraq with anger against the GoI, ISF and MNF for not protecting their city.}
@Anand: A couple things
@Anand: A couple things about Kandahar.
The city population is made up of three groups: long-time residents, people who've left the surrounding country due to security reasons, and a growing number of itinerants from other places like Uruzgan who've left the country for all the reasons anybody leaves the country for the city. The first 2 groups tend to blur into each other. The latter tends to congregate in the new developments (I wouldn't call them slums) north of the east-west canal that divides the city, what the locals call Loya Wiyala.
The city-dweller/country-dweller line is also a bit of a blur. The first 2 groups are intimately connected with the countryside, to Khakrez, Arghandab, Zhari, Panjwaii and Dand districts. You'll see a lot of people commuting from the city to tend fields in Zhari, for instance. An extended family having a city dwelling and a country dwelling is common. (The newbies not so much, obviously.) Security problems in the surrounding areas thus contribute greatly to their feelings of ill-ease. That's why saying you're going to focus on making the city feel secure is more difficult than it sounds.
The attack, from what I can read of it, reads very similar in its MO to a suicide attack that occurred while I was in the city last November. We were uncertain as to the target that time for a long time, as well: it could have been one of a couple government buildings. This could have been a strike at the one NGO, or it could have been suboptimal placement, for whatever reason. There was a mention of a provincial HQ being nearby as well, I noted. There's a lot of barriers of various kinds downtown, and the streets are busy, and it can be hard thankfully to get right up against your target all the time, at least in daylight. AM is probably right that the civilian casualties yesterday were an unintended consequence. The insurgents aren't generally interested in killing large numbers of non-aligned civilians, although they do accept some level of "wrong place at the wrong time" wastage. You pretty much have to for large bombs in urban settings. The real intimidation is in the targeted work against fixed locations and pro-government individuals. They're not out to kill regular people, if they can help it, but they won't flinch from it if they have to, either.
The things that bothered Kandaharis I talked to the most (admittedly a small number of relatively well-off and pro-government individuals) was the war, and the killing, and the limitations that put on their freedoms, of movement, etc. They tended to blame both sides at least somewhat. Second to that was the lack of reliable electrical power. A lot wanted to move to Kabul as soon as they could find the resources, because of its relative safety and better services. I didn't talk to any who decidedly wanted to leave Afghanistan altogether, though: right now wages in Kandahar, in part due to Western inputs, are considerably higher than they'd get in Pakistan, so most were willing to tough it out so long as they had work.
From the point of view of
From the point of view of one of the citizens-at-'home' (US), thank you for providing more details - the trust one might desire to have in one's leaders is gone, whether that was or was not obvious, and details matter.
(not saying one will agree, but... will refrain from criticizing from my v. personal point of view - no attacks - in order to gain greater understanding.)
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