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The War in Afghanistan ... and Haggling
Robert Kagan dismisses this "war of necessity"/"war of choice" nonsense and then nails it:
But there is a deeper reason, as well, for Obama to claim necessity in Afghanistan. It is part of what increasingly seems to be a striving for moral purity in international affairs by this administration. Obama and his top advisers apologize for America's past sins, implicitly suggesting they will commit no new ones. And that goes for fighting wars. No one can blame you for fighting a war if it is a war of necessity, or so they may believe. All the inevitable ancillary casualties of war -- from civilian deaths to the occasional misbehavior of the troops to the errors of commanders -- are more easily forgiven if one has no choice. The claim of necessity wipes away the moral ambiguities inherent in the exercise of power. And it prevents scrutiny of one's own motives, which in nations, as in individuals, are rarely pure.
This hoped-for escape from moral burdens is, however, an illusion. Just because America declares something necessary doesn't mean that the rest of the world, and especially its victims, will believe it is just. The claim of necessity will not absolve the United States, and Obama, from responsibility for its actions.
As Reinhold Niebuhr pointed out long ago, Americans find it hard to acknowledge this moral ambiguity of power. They are reluctant to face the fact that it is only through the morally ambiguous exercise of their power that any good can be accomplished. Obama is right to be prosecuting the war in Afghanistan, and he should do so even more vigorously. But he will not avoid the moral and practical burdens of fighting this war by claiming he has no choice. An action can be right or just without being necessary. Like great presidents in the past, Barack Obama will have to explain why his choice, while difficult and fraught with complexity, is right and better than the alternatives.
Even if you do not like Kagan -- as I recall, ahem, he used to support another administration that explained its foreign policy in black-and-white moral choices -- you should read this very good column. Last week, I flew to Boston to give a talk on Afghanistan to a collection of senior-level government officials from the United States and abroad as part of the Kennedy School's Executive Education Program. All credit goes to the excellent audience -- which happily agreed to listen to a talk on strategy and operations from a 31-year old and peppered me with some great, thought-provoking questions. But without a doubt the most persistent questions I received were along the lines of "What are we doing in Afghanistan and why are we there in the first place?"
The fact that these are the questions that I am now receiving from career public servants in our nation's departments and agencies should be a huge warning bell for the administration. And it means that Kagan is exactly right -- this is now Obama's war, and he and Stan McChrystal need to explain to the American people in non-IR-speak why we are in Afghanistan and what we are doing there. (Hint: if you cannot explain your policy to folks in the 3rd Congressional District of Tennessee in a way they can understand it, you might need to change your policy.) As one career public servant explained to me afterwards, "It's not like we do not support the war in Afghanistan -- it's just that no one has explained what we're doing there."
Over to you, Mr. President, though Gen. McChrystal and the rest of your commanders should be able to help you here. I know some people fret about generals "selling" the war to the American people -- and there was certainly some of that going on in 2007 -- but I thought Gen. Petraeus's efforts to explain our strategy and operations before the U.S. Senate were helpful and not a threat to civil-military relations. So the president should ask Gen. McChrystal to do the same when he visits Washington this fall. But again, the primary burden on all this falls to POTUS.
Elsewhere in today's Post, Ignatius and Diehl wring their hands over the Middle East and lament the capacity of the Israelis and Palestinians to get the Americans focusing on the trees at the expense of the forest. "As so often happens in Middle East negotiations," Diehl writes, "what were intended as simple first steps have become an end in themselves, subject to months of posturing, hair-splitting and horse-trading."
As Monty Python understood, though, this is just the way it is.
"The fact that these are the
"The fact that these are the questions that I am now receiving from career public servants in our nation's departments and agencies should be a huge warning bell for the administration."
Its not just career public servants who are asking this question, or have been for some time......I suppose, too, when a 'new' team takes over, and gets a lot of publicity for taking over, the questions naturally arise. New president, new general, new strategic review, new posts on follow-up to review leads to questions from readership. The dynamic was set by the events!
What is surprising to me is that I see similar perplexed questioning across the political spectrum, if you take right and left ideological magazines and blogs as any kind of indication of anything - which I am not sure they are, instead, they may represent an online intellectual bubble, which is why it is good to hear follow-on questions from your talk.
'Selling' and 'explaining' may have some gray areas between the two, but explanations are one of the minimum, very minimum, duties of POTUS in our ole republic (I'm in the mood to state the obvious and reiterate points and maybe explanation isn't *quite* the right word).
What is interesting to me is how much trouble this administration is having articulating its goals on a variety of issues, when I had thought, or was assured, that eloquence was a part and parcel of the deal? So did the last one, but, for, uh, very different reasons. What does your COIN theory tell you about these messy little wars (aren't all wars messy? Oh, that's the point of the post.) and how you interact with and educate the population of your own country? That I even ask that question makes me kind of queasy...something's not right about that, is there?
Good discussion in the comments to the war of choice/necessity post.
"As Reinhold Niebuhr pointed out long ago, Americans find it hard to acknowledge this moral ambiguity of power." What does Kagan mean by this? In terms of projection of power abroad? That can't be true, domestically.
Our war in Afghanistan, one
Our war in Afghanistan, one can easily understand, began as a way of retaliating for 9/11.
If we continue to stay in Afghanistan, however, one might perceive that this has more to do with bringing about fundamental change to the country and to the region. Such fundamental change being in the nature of market-based state-building and market-based societal transformation.
Some may believe that such fundamental changes, for Afghanistan and for the region, are what is required to preclude another 9/11.
However, this (the determination to make fundamental change) would seem to be a much larger, much more long-term, much more expensive (in blood, treasure and political capital), much more entailed and much more precarious mission than was originally envisioned.
Such a new and much broader mission would seem to dictate the need for much greater and more careful consideration.
I don't worry about
I don't worry about President Obama & the commanders explaining the war but I do worry about the President standing up to what will surely be a hostile progressive wing in congress if Af-Pak isn't completely solved in less than a year.
[wanna be "The
[wanna be "The Comedian"]
@Bill - thank Allah you acknowledge how it began.
Now if your market based state building is correct - if anyone in power believes that, God help us. I respectfully disagree.
I think it's back to nation building again {can you say 90's? Who was that again) - and nation building could accurately be described as war as a social program. Cuz they can't embrace their inner Sherman/Fonseka.
What are we actually accomplishing? We're delaying the renewed onslaught of terror against our civilian populations that will resume once the pressure is off the enemy. We can point to that.
So now, the next 12-18 mos while the Paks squeeze North, we surge (and another 20-40K troops coming in the fall kids, per Ink Spots) and we squeeze south, maybe break their backs. At least do some major damage. Meanwhile while we're hopefully going kinetic belts away in Astan, on the home front we'll be selling COIN as beneficial social work, full of unicorns and pink bunnies who play in the magic forest with lovable harmless lions, tigers and bears. Pay no attention to the loud noises, that's just McChrystals marching glee club band.
If I sound bitter, it's because I actually bought this "High School Musical" horseshite. For a minute.
Middle East Peace: does anyone outside the USA really want that, or think it possible? AM if you do, it's time to head to the VA to have your head examined. Nothing personal.
تا أخي Be careful about
تا أخي
Be careful about inserting your progressive domestic political leanings into your analysis. I've noticed it creep up without rhyme nor reason in maybe half of the last 15-20 posts. No disrespect intended, but don't let the Rachel Maddow facetime and subsequent pronouncements spoil your message.
I remember hearing once upon
I remember hearing once upon a time: 'Nothing sells like success'. Unfortunately too much of the time of American generals seems to be taken up by public relations, trying to make bad things look good, etc. Indeed, so much time is dedicated to this purpose that it seems to have become an end in itself, rather than a means to an end. A good strategy should be able to stand on its merits. When 'real' progress is achieved it is recognized and the masses jump on the bandwagon. Otherwise, folks smell a rat and begin to leave the sinking ship.
These moral arguments are
These moral arguments are really the last refugee of a scoundrel. They are, simply put, incoherent and no one I have ever heard make this sort of argument can answer even very basic questions about it, such as,
"Is it ever possible to discharge our moral obligations?"
"Why does the use of force commit us morally, but other forms of interaction from the quasi-positive -- aid and support to a 'bad' regime -- to the negative such as extensive sanctions don't?"
"What are the strategic implications of the claim that in order to use force in defense of our national interests we have to essentially commit to leaving the target of our violence BETTER off than when we went in?" We're getting into Mouse That Roared territory.
Anyway, I have a longer piece coming out on this that gets into all of this in more detail.
I will, however, reiterate my genuine frustration at this post. I've written about this before (http://www.bernardfinel.com/?p=518). This is not about our moral obligations. This is about shutting down debate by trying to cast skeptics of Afghan policy as lacking in decency and humanity. Well, sorry Ex, I'm not going to be lectured on this by people of Kagan's ilk.
I have a pretty strong moral compass. I am not a "realist" who denies the importance of morality in international politics. We went into Afghanistan for national security reasons. AND We have ALREADY done more to improve the condition of the country than 99% of cases of past wars. Traditionally, the only binding moral commitment were to mitigate civilian suffering (often ignored), not rebuilding societies to permanently enhance the lives in the people.
At this point, if you are intellectually honest and you want to invoke claims of moral obligation, you need to do so on universal principles, not Afghan-war specific principles. Kagan isn't willing to do that... and I doubt you are either.
@Mattm, It's not very mature
@Mattm,
It's not very mature of me, but I would love to see the rabid monkeys the Dems fed turn on and eat them...
I don't think it's a sure thing, though.
Everyone heard the story of the Jackalbins? That's a Mr Roche in 1965 describing the Peace Radicals as "Upper West Side Jacobins" to reporter Jimmy Breslin. Breslin miscribed it as "Jackalbins".
Sometimes God gives ya some yuks.
Explanations are not the
Explanations are not the same thing as public relations - an explanation is answering a question. Lotta people have a lotta questions. Like, we are 'fixing' Pakistan, now, too, because if we don't fix Pakistan we can't fix Afghanistan and if we can't fix Afghanistan it will mess up Pakistan. Hey, I said I was confused.
"A good strategy should be able to stand on its merits."
Yeah, well, maybe that's why people are confused? Support from the middle has to come from somewhere and I am so in the middle, you know?
@Bernard
@Bernard Finel,
"...Traditionally, the only binding moral commitment were to mitigate civilian suffering (often ignored)"
Very. Good. Point.
Checked your link. You'd shut out 3 of my arguments (I don't care about moral obligations in war except to my own). It's good PR. So's "High School Musical". I don't remember High School or War that way.
However if you are going to claim Exum in particular shuts out arguments - I am sure it could happen in debate, but this blog is the open source code crack me to pieces COIN blog from Hell. If he throws himself and his arguments anymore at the world he'd have to change his trade name to "Linux" or maybe "Apache".
That link seems to show me you seem pretty interested in 1) shutting down your opponents, and 2) accusing your opponents of doing what you are attempting. Good grief, what would you leave them to argue with?
on Point # 2 - lets give them a chance.... many nations and tens of thousands, hundreds of thousand with the Afghans and Paks are in motion on this, committed to a certain course. They can't just stop and debate it every Sunday. They're on the march.
Hell, I don't even believe it myself, and I say give them their 18 mos.
No choice worked great for the Israeli's BTW.
Peace Out
"Our war in Afghanistan, one
"Our war in Afghanistan, one can easily understand, began as a way of retaliating for 9/11."
Bill, one could perhaps be easily persuaded now that such was the case (if it were we could declare victory and go home), but one's understanding would fall far short of reality. Our war in Afghanistan certainly was a response to 9/11 (which was an escalation of previous attacks, btw - and more were promised) but given the range of options available in response, simple retaliation is a poor choice of a one-word description for what followed.
"However, this (the determination to make fundamental change) would seem to be a much larger, much more long-term, much more expensive (in blood, treasure and political capital), much more entailed and much more precarious mission than was originally envisioned."
That was exactly the mission originally envisioned.
As for how long it might take, "Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen."
And while "America and Afghanistan are now allies against terror. We'll be partners in rebuilding that country" could be called over-simplified, over-optimistic, mistaken, or a bad idea we can't pretend now that once upon a time America thought it could just throw some retaliatory punches and forever after be left alone. I was sixteen years into my military career on 9/11. I'd been paying attention to threats for years, and payed close attention to exactly what the CinC was saying my future would be.
Plenty of things didn't go according to plan, I'm not aware of anyone satisfied with the level of "progress" in Afghanistan over the past eight years, and the future is always open to debate - but the past is what it is.
However if you are going to
However if you are going to claim Exum in particular shuts out arguments - I am sure it could happen in debate, but this blog is the open source code crack me to pieces COIN blog from Hell. If he throws himself and his arguments anymore at the world he'd have to change his trade name to "Linux" or maybe "Apache". - ELF
LOL. It's true, there couldn't be a more open place on the internets, give CNAS its due, this is free speech straight up.
@Madhu, If we have a Grand
@Madhu,
If we have a Grand Strategy (I am skeptical of such things BTW) we need to keep it a f*cking secret, hidden away and masked behind clouds of sweet smelling incense as the outer cordon, with the inner cordon being not so sweet smelling bullsh*t (the inner cordon's earthy tones will give it a convincing, faux credibility and convince rubes and reporters they're hearing the inner circle).
What we don't need to do is advertise grand schemes to remake the world with us as Hegemon to a cruel and shrewd audience. Like the 90s (again). Possibly (we don't yet know) like 01-05/6ish....before shrub woke up and smelt the coffee.
Meet'cha on Park Street for Health Care...more firepower in that theater, anyway.... ;-)
No, no, no... I am not
No, no, no... I am not trying to shut down debate. It is perfectly reasonable to argue that there is a counter-terrorism mission, but not reasonable to argue that your approach will ensure that "never again" will an attack on occur. That is a flat impossibility. It isn't a strategic argument, it is a rhetorical cudgel. "I am committed to NEVER AGAIN allowing an attack to occur, while YOUR strategy puts us AT RISK." There is always risk.
Same with the others. You can make moral arguments, but ground them in some sort of consistent framework (good luck). And you can recommend strategies that require Afghan assistance, but at least acknowledge that the ability of the Afghans to meet their end of it is an endogenous part of your strategy.
I appreciate Ex's willingness to debate. But he -- and the other COINdinistas -- have so internalized a series of incoherent arguments about the mission that they don't even recognize it. And as a consequence, when pushed they fall back on "Cheneyesque" tactics to delegitimize dissent. Cheney wasn't doing it in bad faith either, probably. He was just in such a closed box that his arguments evolved in tremendously pernicious ways.
@Bernard Finel "When they
@Bernard Finel
"When they say [this], I hear [something else]."
That's quite convenient - rather than countering what they said, you can argue against what you heard.
"This is not about our moral obligations. This is about shutting down debate by trying to cast skeptics of Afghan policy as lacking in decency and humanity."
And here you appear to be countering some future personal attack launched by some unnamed opponent in response to your refutation of the various things you heard them say.
You certainly are well out in front of the debate - so much so that others might not even choose to engage.
Bernard, I've read and
Bernard, I've read and re-read and re-read this post searching for the delegitimization of dissent. All I've come up with was a post arguing that the Obama administration needs to argue for the merits of the Afghanistan war if it expects support for it. Kagan isn't making a morally-derived argument for the Afghanistan war, either; he's arguing against a certain strand of moral argument for the war.
@Bernard, OK thanks for
@Bernard,
OK thanks for reply. I guess (only a guess) you may have run into said tactics, so fair nuff....
Look, I think the prior strategies and the current "Triage" (Triage Plus? Triage Lite?) all have major elements of this sucks from every angle ** but to paraphrase Ibn Apache Abu Mookiewammy at the CNAS conference --what choices do we have? If we cede the country or even the south of Astan (with Kandahar as again the de facto capital?) we'll have the Emirate of AFPAKISTAN faster than you can say gimme 3 cups of tea three times fast in Pashto.*** One way or another we have to keep the enemy off balance and engaged on his own real estate, obsessed with getting a state again. As opposed to sending nutters to NY, DC, LA, London and other points of the compass to blow themselves up.
There's also an opportunity here to do some real damage. The Paks have at least partly turned on these idiots, the Afghans are having ...er...elections, we have new Commanders, more troops, a new strategy and even the rest of NATO is finally accepting that war is sometimes necessary and that does indeed mean killing. So we have "surged" in both troops and getting a First Team all around (I was impressed with Holbrooke team presentation last week) so lets take this opportunity and kick some Talibass.
**I so wanna work a Jenna Haze joke in here :D
***[that's someones homework assignment BTW]
On Cheney - let's recall what changed him from a modest public servant into Darth Vader. It does fit into context...
@Scotland, Oh thanks for
@Scotland,
Oh thanks for letting the Lockerbie bomber go...it's no longer a kilt. Now, it's a skirt.
Downfall
Yer kicked outta the Celts club. No girls allowed.
COIN and Jenna Haze. Does it
COIN and Jenna Haze. Does it get any better than that? I'd like to be population centric with her.
@elf: Why do we need to keep
@elf:
Why do we need to keep a "grand strategy" secret? I may agree with you, and may be very skeptical of such a thing. I'm curious, though, why there would be no merit in announcing what basically amounts to a mission statement. At least other parties would know where we stand.
Elf, you're the guy who came
Elf, you're the guy who came up with the 12-18 month timeline. A lot of us don't think there should be a timeline at all.
And, WRT the "moral arguments," some of us who bought that in Vietnam think such arguments are the last refuge of a scoundrel, or, if you don't like that, a war lover, one who usually doesn't participate in said war. Let's see a valid national interest and a coherent geopolitical strategy; then we can talk about "moral arguments" and "staying the course." Otherwise, it's all BS, and one sees only wasted lives, wasted money, and, critically, inattention to true threats.
Petraeus: "Tell me how this movie ends." Probably the most truthful utterance ever by the perfumed prince. Nobody really listened. Nobody seems to realize that the savior is just fumbling around in the dark like everyone else. Hell of a thing to bet a nation, an economy and a presidency on a whiz-kid trying to get it right. Nobody cares about the presidency, but some of us care about the rest of it. The generals? What do they care about? Not much, it appears. It's not as if their screwing around and game playing doesn't just cost lives and treasure; it's also unfortunately the case that in today's zero-sum world, every dollar wasted there equates to a dollar not available to actually secure the nation. This is what the Coindinistas ignore: fixation on one "threat" or a "moral argument" costs all of us dearly.
On keeping a Grand Strategy
On keeping a Grand Strategy a secret – why?
Tactical methodology of course, no sense in telling people how you plan top hit them, but a grand strategy is a bit more open source than that, it’s about the direction that you point your domestic and foreign policy in and what aims it hopes to achieve, and trust me there are plenty of people outside of the US that would like to know that you’ve moved on form the get them at all costs strategy of previous administrations.
I agree with the post that we need to know exactly why the US is in Afghanistan, even if there are people who will not agree with the reasons they need to be articulated.
And is there no way that the Leviathan might of the US military cannot handle both the Taliban and the stability. Why can’t we kick Talibass and build schools, connect highways, both physical and ether based, build good governance and leave the country better than it was found?
Hmm, normally writing IT essays over the weekend leaves me less that idealistic, not sure what happened here.
Bernard: Dissent has never
Bernard:
Dissent has never really been tolerated by the Coindinistas. I know, I have been at it for over two years now. This whole coin thing has the elements of religion; it has its doctrine, it has its priests, and it has its necessary faith.
The Coin crowd has really only been interested in polishing their doctrine and practices around the fringes. They are not interested in real debate and serious consideration of alternatives. For many of them there is much persoccnal baggage and capital involved.
And they won’t let go which is why you get these silly incoherent positions that make no sense. Interestingly, if you look at the airpower zealots of the 1930s and even after world war II you see many of the same things.
I have personal examples of how dissent is not tolerated. It doesn’t really matter who was a part of it all but last year I was asked to write a chapter in a book on Coin history, theory, and practice and when some of the other contributors heard I was writing an essay in it they basically threatened the editors with pulling their essays out if mine stayed in. Some of them were of rock star status which is why I think the editors buckled to their desires. The response that I got from the editor was that they thought my pen was too sharp. Here is another example, the author of an acclaimed set of Iraq War memoirs at last year’s annual SMH (Society for Military History) conference sitting right next to me on a panel on current histories of the Iraq War basically spoke and made small talk with another panel member sitting next to him when I was delivering my talk; very rude I thought it was. I concluded that he thought it well beneath him the implicit criticism I made of his book, and many others that are part of the Iraq version of the Coin religion.
Spencer Ackerman saw some of this I think a couple of years ago when he penned a piece about the rise of the counterinsurgents and refered to them and what they were producing as the "matrix."
Ironically it is this blog now that is displaying dissent since the millions of lines of matrix code have been running through it.
gian
@Elf: "If we cede the
@Elf: "If we cede the country or even the south of Astan"
See, that is part of my argument. NO ONE is saying, "cede Afghanistan to the Taliban." What some people, including me, are saying is that there are (a) more cost effective responses, and (b) IN THE WORST CASE, it is possible to mitigate the worst consequences through active diplomacy and military responses. I AM making a tremendously controversial point -- namely that re-intervention is better than deep involvement both because it is possible and unlikely to be necessary. So feel free to attack my argument. Use facts. Make me look naive if you can. But don't just assert I am wrong and then caricature my position as abandonment.
@Greyhawk.... look, I am trying to be generous here. I don't know that the COINdinistas want to shut down debate. They tell me they don't. So I am trying to be kind and take make an indirect argument. My guess is that many -- Kagan certainly -- know exactly what they are up to. But regardless, this isn't an abstract argument. Bush and Cheney explicitly used precisely these arguments to silence dissent. The COINdinistas ought to be aware of this history and carefully avoid paralleling those argument. It is like 1960s Southerner talking about "states' rights" instead of "segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever." Same goal, slightly different, slightly more respectable language.
@Spencer... dude... I can only fall back on the plain language of the post. Exum citing approving Kagan is arguing that it is mistake to try to claim that we have a lower set of moral obligations in Afghanistan because it is a war of necessity. It is a direct attack on the notion that we have already or could easily discharge our moral obligations there, and that instead we have some sort of affirmative duty to "fix it." He's calling for Obama to explain the involvement, but explicitly ruling out a narrow national narrative in favor of what Obi Wan termed a "damn fool idealistic crusade." (well, actually Obi Wan was paraphrasing Uncle Owen).
@ Mattm: What I think you meant to say about Jenna Haze is, "I'd populate her centric." Not that I would because (a) I have no idea who she is, and (b) I am happily married... yeah... that's it.
Gian: As you well know,
Gian:
As you well know, EVERY COIN critic has a ton of examples of debate being suppressed. Lost job opportunities -- and in some cases actual jobs lost. Various personal slanders... which are not worth repeating because it would just give new life to them.
I don't have the resources to do it... but it would be interesting to make of list of prominent scholars and officers circa 2004. Divide them into pro-COIN and COIN-skeptics and see what has happened to each group. If my admittedly impressionistic assessment is accurate, the answer is obvious... all the way down to the 0-4 level, you'll see a systemic bias in favor of the pro-COIN guys. Faster promotions. Better positions. Did the pro-COIN guys suddenly get smarter? Harder working?
Exum is a smart guy -- he's young though, 31 as he recently pointed out -- would he be where he is had he been a COIN skeptic? Nagl was recognized as a brilliant guy for over a decade... but would he be on Defense Policy Board today if not part of the "matrix"? But forget about them... they're just pundits now. What bothers me is that battalion and brigade commands are being determined by fealty to COIN doctrine. If you "don't get it" you might as well get out.
It just isn't healthy.
--BF
I enjoyed re-reading the
I enjoyed re-reading the underlined site references provided by Greyhawk. It did me good to return to these important documents.
At the time of these speeches, the then-President of the United States did indicate that this new "war against global terrorism" might take a very long time and "be unlike any war we had ever seen." And he did indicate, at the time, that Afghanistan and the United States were to be "allies against terrorism" and "partners in rebuilding Afghanistan."
However, as we know, concluding the war in Afghanistan, because of Iraq, was deferred to our new President, who has been seen to distance himself from such terms as "the long war" and "the war on terrorism."
This being the case and before proceeding further, I think we must determine whether President Obama's initiatives, in Afghanistan, the region and elsewhere in the Third World -- by whatever name one wishes to call them -- are to be underpined by the requirement (or the attempt) to achieve fundamental state and societal change (such as that I have identified in my earlier comments).
Only then will we have an idea of what we are really getting into, an idea of how long this / these "wars of state and societal change" really might take, and an idea of what victory or defeat will look like.
Damned if you do. Damned if
Damned if you do. Damned if you don't.
This to me sums up much of what we face. We are not fighting the right war yet. The Afghan situation is a symptom not the cause. As some may agree we are fighting Jihad, a philosophy based loosely around a religion. No one at the political level wants to give this speech. There are no boarders, there is no single enemy. COIN may be useful strategy in the Afghan battlefield, but does it address the real battle? We know our Military can hold the Afghan battlefield. The question to me is how long if ever will it take world politicians to win/address the Jihad battlefield?
@Bernard, I really wasn't
@Bernard,
I really wasn't attacking your position...really with the cede the country/south. I think I was trying to point out likely bad consequences of walking away. Don't take it personal. Lotsa people are asking "why are we (still) there...
If you look at my personal preferences for a solution (I still reserve the right to support Triage until end of 2010 for reasons discussed) I'm not a COINster. I'm a fucking Nazi. But I'm a Nazi of one.
@Publius - 12-18 mos ain't my number. It's the policy makers number, also one AM (who had a hand in policy) came up with...and you may notice it's moved from Aug 2010 to Dec 2010. Not to win, but to achieve Triage.
@Sanmon - well that's been bought up. The conclusion I've come to embrace is the Takfiri narrative (as opposed to jihad which might start you off on the wrong foot). I have a good book to recommend - "The Islamist" by Ed Husein. Not that he uses the word Takfiri in the book.
I picked up Takfiri from the Sawah folks, before someone challenges my non-existent scholarly credentials and shaky theology. I'm a practical person, BION.
Then don't follow through.
Then don't follow through. Nope on public Grand Strategy. Go with Incense and Bullshit - and the "High School Musical" COIN narrative. It's all good for you kids!
Abu Muqawama and the Chocolate COIN factory!! Much nicer than those smelly Frenchmen from the 50's.
Hell Reagan had a Grand Strategy. But he really didn't tell hardly anyone, certainly not the world!!
Sneak. Sneak. Sneak I say.
The argument by Kagen then
The argument by Kagen then is that the "war of necessity/war of choice" dictum is too inconsistent and causes us to lower our moral standards. So now we are supposed to trash this dictum of necessity/choice and replace it with morality.
Like waging wars based on morality is a good idea. It's like the good/evil argument of fighting against tyranny (read Saddam Hussein). What are we trying to judge here? We're going to make a lot of mistakes if we consider fighting wars for a higher morality.
@Bernard Finel Well you
@Bernard Finel
Well you aren't paranoid if people are out to get you. Seems to me your options are to accept inherent risk or withdraw. Something is or isn't worth fighting for - that applies to Afghanistan and debates about Afghanistan. Likewise in neither case can we demand our opponents acquiesce to rules or restrictions, whether we impose those same rules on ourselves or not.
@Bill
"...our new President, who has been seen to distance himself from such terms as "the long war" and "the war on terrorism.""
The terms, but not the war. The Obama admin doesn't like to name things, do they? Hard to be anti-"???". (Come to think of it, I'm not even sure if "war" is still in official use.)
Somehow I'm reminded of this quote: "It is like 1960s Southerner talking about "states' rights" instead of "segregation now, segregation tomorrow, segregation forever." Same goal, slightly different, slightly more respectable language."
Except that the new, officially approved terms don't currently exist. (Though now I'm beginning to wonder if COINdinista, pro-COIN and COIN-skeptic have lost - or will lose - some of their literal meaning...)
Hey, Along those lines, Ex - how about "premature COINdinista" for guys like Kagan? Could save some of the agony involved in crafting phrases like "he used to support another administration that explained its foreign policy in black-and-white moral choices."
Elf, Thanks for the
Elf,
Thanks for the recommendation on the book. The name Jihadist or Jihad is the name the world recognizes if you get in the down in the weeds to deep on terms most Coalition countrymen will just get lost. I know this blog gets deep. We need help in getting the Coalition country population to understand this war so there is a possibility your children will see some peace. Just a thought when you get out and address the greater population which is desperately needed.
COINster Sir. It allows you
COINster Sir. It allows you to be COIN advocate (respectable businessman) while still having a hard stilleto edge in a velvet sheath, wear nice suits, and sell the High School Musical version of Counter Insurgency.
@Sanmon - you have a point. But the problem is that kind of undermines an approach towards the moderates we are trying to woo (as well as get them to turn on the Takfir F-Tards). The last 30 years we've learned the words muhjahadeen, Jihad, Shahid, and Sharia. Let's push Takfiri into the lexicon. Also does a good job of displacing any conjugation of the word "Islam" which can hurt the message.
BTW that book - The Islamist - by Ed Husein really needs some play - it speaks to this same issue much more eloquently than any pol or pundit I've heard.
Pols - look our Democracie's pols usually would have been much happier staying at the State Capitol or City Council level. With today's Press we'd never get a statesman like Churchill, Nixon (yes) Reagan, LBJ, even FDR past the gauntlet of childish paparazzi. We used to have heads of state that told their subordinates what to do...now we have salesmen who are told what to say.
OK, needed to get my O/T hating on the pols in....whew....
When you say 3rd
When you say 3rd Congressional District, do you mean the district or its congressman? Having met Zack Wamp, I tend to think the latter would require a lot more "simplification."
Bernard, I am struck by how sympathetically your arguments would have been heard at the Limonges garrison in 1914-1915. When, if ever, is change necessary? And how can change be brought about institutionally without using personnel decisions? Was Marshall wrong in 1940-1 to purge scores of generals from active command? Is it really that wrong, or so contrary to army culture, that a failure to generate new ideas, and poor tactical and strategic performance, have an influence on someone's career, even if they are a "great guy?" I would have a lot more appreciation for your position if I could see clear innovative proposals for addressing current circumstances at the strategic and tactical level from the COIN skeptics. Perhaps I'm missing them (being a civilian academic, I have my hands in many different pies, including teaching undergraduates, so that's not impossible), but what I hear are efforts to whitewash commanders' poor outcomes (that they were "trying hard" is immaterial),often unpersuasive arguments that "COIN" 2005-7 was really more continuity than change, whining that the wars currently engaged in are not of the sort that they would like to be engaged in, and a conviction with relatively little relationship to current trends in international relations (and on this question, I am an expert) that future "serious" wars will look more conventional great-power enterprises. If the coin skeptics were actually constructive and took innovation more seriously, then perhaps I could appreciate your position. But frankly, I just don't see a lot of what passes for 'coin skepticism' being all that constructive.
Tom
Hair-splitting? Honestly,
Hair-splitting? Honestly, that makes little to no sense. Normalization of ties to Israel as well as settlement freezes lie at the crux of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Rabin was assassinated for perceived beliefs that he was going to consolidate the settlements! It is no surprise that Netanyahu, coming from the Likud and supported by a conservative government is hesitant to alienate the settler movement. As well, considering many Arab governments like Saudi Arabia don't want to capitulate first (normalizing ties with Israel before a halt to settlements) has been the general rule of thumb for the past, I don't know, sixty years, I think Diehl, using some blunt language, misses so many of the intricacies of the conflict. I don't think anything will actually chance, but let's not dismiss negotiations before they finish.
Here in Afghanistan, the
Here in Afghanistan, the Taliban like to call themselves "Mujaheddin." We call them Taliban, but the word that is universally understood on the dusty ground is, "Dushman," pronounced, "Doosh-man." It is the Dari word for, "Enemy." It is what will get you the most consistent understanding. If you ask a question about, "Taliban," you may or may not actually get an answer that relates to the enemy. In that area, they may be mostly HiG, not Taliban. It could be that the ones who call themselves Taliban are actually just organized criminals who use the Taliban brand for their own purposes. Dushman will instantly bring the desired recognition. We fiddle with terms like, "ACM" (Anti-Coalition Militia), and the newest versions, "AGM" (Anti-Government Militia) and "AAF" (Anti-Afghan Forces). But to the people, "Dushman" says it all.
As far as strategy, if there is to be a change in our foreign policy behaviors, it starts here; not with furthering warfare as the primary tool of foreign policy, but the capacity building practices and competency that we will either develop to succeed or fail to develop and fail. There is a new crop coming up in the State Department that is finding its legs in the capacity building competency and who will have the ability to carry capacity building to other areas of foreign policy, rather than just throwing money at everyone and trying to buy their friendships. If we concentrate on assisting (acceptance of mentoring being a condition of accepting money from us) building governmental capacity to deliver services to people and allow them to actually self-determine their own governments, then we will avoid such failing or failed state scenarios where insurgencies develop, and the overflow does such strange things as topple buildings in our major cities. Just a thought. This is where Cohen is so misled in his fear of COIN success that he avoids making a coherent contribution on the capacity building side that is so vitally important. In this role, he is less than useful.
As for COL Gentile, you need to come over here and attend a class full of field grade officers, 6% of whom will have read the FM prior to the class. Religion. Feh. The capacity to grasp the doctrine by having at least read it, in a field grade officer; 6%. These are people who knew they were coming to fight a counterinsurgency. No, Sir, this is not a religion. Dogma is to be found in the field grades and above who cannot break their molds and actually learn the doctrine so that if they choose not to apply it, that decision is based on a balanced knowledge and not an ignorant fear or unreasoning prejudice. Where I find your counter-advocacy particularly unhelpful is in providing the lightning rod for those folks who, out of laziness, fear or disregard, choose not to read the doctrine prior to being assigned to senior level positions in the middle of a counterinsurgency fight. It is those who lead the charge against the doctrine who provide the ready excuses, as if it were particularly patriotic not to learn the doctrine, rather than a duty as a professional to actually have a grip on the doctrine which the Combatant Commander has determined is the doctrine that we will use to prosecute the fight.
I have had the opportunity to read your work, and the pleasure to discuss with your personally, via comments on various fora, your viewpoint, and have found that while you argue eloquently, a plausible alternative is not presented. We have pursued a largely kinetic focus, regardless of the jargon used, for nearly 8 years in Afghanistan and we are faced by an insurgency that has gained strength like a tropical storm in the late summer Atlantic. Hunting insurgents without any integrated approach to governmental capacity building, addressing corruption, and economic development will simply not work. Any questions on that should be answered by the Cosby Observation; "the proof is in the pudding." We have tried eating our soup with a spoon and found it to be a sieve.
Instead of using trite references, such as "religion," "dogma," and the rest to belittle, offer a coherent alternative or doctrinal adjustment that truly shows some sign of working in a counterinsurgency environment. If the alternative is to quit the battlefield, that is unacceptable as a military choice. The caveat that it has to involve success or, if you prefer, winning. Otherwise the criticism is less than helpful. As a commander, you would not tolerate someone bringing you problems with no solutions, or telling you that your chosen COA will not work and failing to provide a workable solution. I find it quite rare in history, although being a professor of that field you would certainly have the upper hand here, for a military commander to be given the option of failure, at his discretion, to fulfill his charge to the best of his ability.
Have you submitted any recommendations on alterations to the doctrine as written? Have you offered one of your own in its stead, tailored for use specifically against an insurgent threat? If you have, I am unaware... although I have admittedly been busy working to further this one. I do this because my observations and experience have led me to strongly believe that it is pertinent to this Area of Operations and that it has not actually been tried here to any great extent. Great doctrine can be discredited by poor implementation. I hear the criticism, but the solution I see offered does not involve succeeding in this environment, and any suggestion that does not carry with it a method for surmounting an insurgency in the current conflict, choosing retreat instead, is completely unhelpful and is not what I am asking about whatsoever.
Suggesting that our only purpose as an Army is versus the existential peer-to-peer threat disregards both reality and history. The Weinberger/Powell "Doctrine" was a fantasy that never really held any water other than in the minds of officers who wished it to be so. This theater is proof of it. Clinging to it wistfully is unproductive. We are challenged by the mission we have been assigned to find a way to succeed. AirLand is not the solution to the COIN fight, and any suggestion that it is would be unworthy.
President Obama, who is acknowledged to be a great orator, is now challenged to actually communicate the importance of resolving the issue of a failed state in Afghanistan, having once provided sanctuary for what we once again believe was just a bogeyman in the closet, as if the WTC fell on its own. His administration is challenged with explaining the concept that failed states, Takfiri ideology and globalization make failed states a threat to the security of potentially any nation and the United States in particular. The Obama administration has already seen fit to continue prosecution of the conflict, and now is challenged not with charming oration but with serious explanation of why this is in our nation's interest; why Bacevich's vaunted and emotionally charged "blood and treasure" should be weighed against it.
War afghanistan and
War afghanistan and haggling.. Retweeted it :)
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