Abu Muqawama: Post
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Working with, around, through and against GIRoA
I've been going on and on about the Afghan government of late, and though you folks know I care little for our counter-narcotics efforts, drugs do matter when they have an effect on the legitimacy of the government. This is from a great article on Marshal Fahim in the New York Times:
In hindsight, several current and former administration officials say they have come to believe the decision to turn a blind eye to the warlords and drug traffickers who took advantage of the power vacuum in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 attacks was one of the fundamental strategic mistakes of the Afghan war. It sent a signal to the Afghan people that the most corrupt warlords had the backing of the United States, that the Karzai government had no real power or credibility and that the drug economy was the path to power in the country.
This is certainly along the lines of what Sarah Chayes would say. And she knows a lot more about Afghanistan than I do. For more on how the government's weakness and/or corruption affects NATO/ISAF counterinsurgency efforts, check out Ghaith Abdul-Ahad's reports from the Guardian. Keep in mind that Ghaith is reporting from a pocket of Taliban-controlled territory in northern Afghanistan. You can only imagine, then, what southern and eastern Afghanistan are like. And there's bad news enough for everyone. For those who think these guys are just going to go back to farming pomegranates if ISAF withdraws, here is what one Talib says:
After liberating Afghanistan inshallah, our forces will be ready to conquer the land beyond the river [the old name given by the Muslims to central Asia]. The jihad in central Asia, India and Pakistan should not just have a tight nationalist agenda.
Joy.
It was a mistake if our goal
It was a mistake if our goal was and is to nation build. If we had set a limited aim of pursuing Al Queda rather than reconstructing Afghanistan, I think this arrangement might have worked quite nicely.
ADTS
And how, exactly, do you do
And how, exactly, do you do that? March over the Durand Line into Pakistan? Because we pretty much drove them from Afghanistan by March 2002, but I'm curious as to what you would have had us do after that. And if the Taliban came back to power, just so I am clear, we would not expect them to give a safe haven to al-Qaeda again?AM: I perceive your question
AM:
I perceive your question to me to be, "How do you set a limited aim of pursuing Al Queda rather than reconstructing Afghanistan?"
This seems to me a question that is less difficult to answer than you make it appear to be.
The goal is not to pursue, necessarily, in the physical sense. This is, or would be, as you know, not a conventional military operation, nor necessarily a counterinsurgency operation (dare I say strategy), but rather a counterterrorism endeavor.
Partnering with local partners was part and parcel of colonialism (divide and rule). I fail to see how it did us harm in our goals in the early days of OEF, with our vaunted ("First In," "Jawbreaker") light footprint.
Cooperation with the Pakistani government would seem one way to eliminate members of Al Queda. They did assist us with the capture of KSM, did they not? Are the Pakistanis more or less willing and able to assist with our heavy footprint in Afghanistan than they would have been were we to possess a light one?
If the Taliban comes back to power is a canard that, quite frankly, with all due respect, I'm tired of hearing. I think Steve Walt had it right: would there be a worse place than isolated Afghanistan from which Al Queda could conduct operations?
ADTS
AM: Finally, what is your
AM:
Finally, what is your counter to the argument that - assuming the US and its allies create a Jeffersonian democracy in Afghanistan in, say, the next 10 years (just to err on the safe side - there are other failed states from which transnational terrorists (to say nothing of non-failed state supporters of terror) could conduct operations? Why is Afghanistan sui generis from other failed states besides the fact that OBL was operating from there on 9/11?
ADTS
That quote at the end
That quote at the end reminds me way too much of the Domino Theory and how the world would turn communist if we left South Vietnam.
It was a mistake if our goal
It was a mistake if our goal was and is to nation build. If we had set a limited aim of pursuing Al Queda rather than reconstructing Afghanistan, I think this arrangement might have worked quite nicely.
We pursue AQ...and then what? Continue to pursue whatever other jihadist/terrorist network pops it's little head up every few years?
That's treating the symptom, not the disease. It's bad medicine and a horrible strategy.
Ex: I would expect the
Ex:
I would expect the Taliban to give AQ a safe haven... but I am not 100% sure of that. My understanding is that there was some tension over this issue in the pre-9/11 days, and it isn't clear to me that the experience of the past 8 years would necessarily have pushed the two closer. There has also been increased debate of late in "jihadist" circles about the whole far-enemy/near-enemy issue as well as the utility of mass casualty attacks. That said, I suspect you're right, I think you have to act on the presumption that if the Taliban came back into power, they would indeed give AQ a safe haven.
But then again, AQ has a safe haven now in Pakistan... and anyway, other than a the initial conceptualization of the plot, 9/11 was implemented almost wholly outside of Afghanistan... so I am not sure what the operational consequence of a "safe haven" is in the context of terror plots.
--BF
That last sentence screams
That last sentence screams for some ridicule:
For those who think these Irish Republican boyos are just going to go back to farming cabbage if the British Army withdraws, here is what one IRA man says:
"After liberating the north of Ireland, our forces will be ready to conquer the land beyond the Irish Sea. The wars for the independence of other Celtic lands in Wales, Brittany, and Galician Spain should not just have a tight nationalist agenda."
This half-ass domino theory is the "forever war."
For those who think these
For those who think these guys are just going to go back to farming pomegranates if ISAF withdraws, here is what one Talib says: "After liberating Afghanistan inshallah, our forces will be ready to conquer the land beyond the river [the old name given by the Muslims to central Asia]. The jihad in central Asia, India and Pakistan should not just have a tight nationalist agenda."
Meh. Travis Patriquin said he was learning Farsi because he wanted to speak it when we fought the Iranians next. Good thing no bad-guy blogs were quoting him as representative of the "movement."
Get back to me when Mullah Omar promises regional conquest.
@RWL and: what exactly is
@RWL and: what exactly is the "disease" in this rather tortured metaphor?
Doh. I think it safer to
Doh.
I think it safer to say that the greatest strategic mistake made in Afghanistan 2001-2007 was the absence of a strategy. All else stems from that, doesnt it? Anyone remember what the missionstatement all these years has been? I think it went something like "A stable and democratic Afghanistan". Nobody ever seemed to bother about the how, it was just another example of a holistic approach to history, "Build it and they will come".
Andrew, you might do the debate good by playing the time-warp and going back and providing a history of the mission: What about interviewing someone from the decisionmaking tiers from our own time in-country?
ADTS, Afghanistan matters
ADTS, Afghanistan matters because
-it borders Pakistan
-in a worst case scenario it is valuable to have a capable orthodox Sunni Pashtu army (the ANA) itching to cross the Durand line. Hopefully this doomsday scenario never comes to pass
-In the probable event that the ANA doesn't cross the Durand line it still helps relieve the pressure on Pakistanis by killing off many Pakistani Pashtu extremists west of the Durand line, and by denying the Pakistani Taliban safe havens in Afghanistan
-Psychologically, losing in Afghanistan to an elected GIRoA and ANSF would be devastating to the global extremist movement. The Ummah (global muslim community) is likely to view the extremists much more negatively if they lose to Afghans than if they don't; much as losing to Iraqis on Iraqi soil substantially damaged the legitimacy and popularity of the global extremist movement. ADTS, the United States and the global community are struggling with a movement rather than specific terrorists.
-AQ linked networks would be less dangerous in Africa than in Afghanistan. They would be farther from the Pakistani WMD arsenal and the former Soviet WMD arsenal
Abu Muqawama, may I clarify your statement. You are right that there are many fighters in Afghanistan who have global ambitions. However, this specific statement might reflect a form of Afghan nationalism rather than global extremism (or Takfiri related extremism.) Afghanistan was founded in 1747 following the death of the famous Persian emperor Nadir Shah in June, 1747. One of his best generals, Baba (Father) Durrani, took control of the Eastern part of the Persian empire and created modern Afghanistan. See the map:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Durrani_Empire
Afghanistan, use to include much of Eastern Iran, Pakistan, India, central Asia, and modern Afghanistan. The core of Afghanistan if you exclude the extremities of Nadir Shah's empire was modern Afghanistan, Pashtu parts of Pakistan, Punjab and Kashmir; at least until the Brits split Afghanistan up into many parts.
Therefore the specific quote you cited "After liberating Afghanistan inshallah, our forces will be ready to conquer the land beyond the river [the old name given by the Muslims to central Asia]. The jihad in central Asia, India and Pakistan should not just have a tight nationalist agenda" could be interpreted by many as a form of Afghan nationalism.
ADTS, Afghanistan matters
ADTS, Afghanistan matters because
-it borders Pakistan
-in a worst case scenario it is valuable to have a capable orthodox Sunni Pashtu army (the ANA) itching to cross the Durand line. Hopefully this doomsday scenario never comes to pass
-In the probable event that the ANA doesn't cross the Durand line it still helps relieve the pressure on Pakistanis by killing off many Pakistani Pashtu extremists west of the Durand line, and by denying the Pakistani Taliban safe havens in Afghanistan
-Psychologically, losing in Afghanistan to an elected GIRoA and ANSF would be devastating to the global extremist movement. The Ummah (global muslim community) is likely to view the extremists much more negatively if they lose to Afghans than if they don't; much as losing to Iraqis on Iraqi soil substantially damaged the legitimacy and popularity of the global extremist movement. ADTS, the United States and the global community are struggling with a movement rather than specific terrorists.
-AQ linked networks would be less dangerous in Africa than in Afghanistan. They would be farther from the Pakistani WMD arsenal and the former Soviet WMD arsenal
Abu Muqawama, may I clarify your statement. You are right that there are many fighters in Afghanistan who have global ambitions. However, this specific statement might reflect a form of Afghan nationalism rather than global extremism (or Takfiri related extremism.) Afghanistan was founded in 1747 following the death of the famous Persian emperor Nadir Shah in June, 1747. One of his best generals, Baba (Father) Durrani, took control of the Eastern part of the Persian empire and created modern Afghanistan. See the map:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Durrani_Empire
Afghanistan, use to include much of Eastern Iran, Pakistan, India, central Asia, and modern Afghanistan. The core of Afghanistan if you exclude the extremities of Nadir Shah's empire was modern Afghanistan, Pashtu parts of Pakistan, Punjab and Kashmir; at least until the Brits split Afghanistan up into many parts.
Therefore the specific quote you cited "After liberating Afghanistan inshallah, our forces will be ready to conquer the land beyond the river [the old name given by the Muslims to central Asia]. The jihad in central Asia, India and Pakistan should not just have a tight nationalist agenda" could be interpreted by many as a form of Afghan nationalism.
ADTS, Afghanistan matters
ADTS, Afghanistan matters because
-it borders Pakistan
-in a worst case scenario it is valuable to have a capable orthodox Sunni Pashtu army (the ANA) itching to cross the Durand line. Hopefully this doomsday scenario never comes to pass
-In the probable event that the ANA doesn't cross the Durand line it still helps relieve the pressure on Pakistanis by killing off many Pakistani Pashtu extremists west of the Durand line, and by denying the Pakistani Taliban safe havens in Afghanistan
-Psychologically, losing in Afghanistan to an elected GIRoA and ANSF would be devastating to the global extremist movement. The Ummah (global muslim community) is likely to view the extremists much more negatively if they lose to Afghans than if they don't; much as losing to Iraqis on Iraqi soil substantially damaged the legitimacy and popularity of the global extremist movement. ADTS, the United States and the global community are struggling with a movement rather than specific terrorists.
-AQ linked networks would be less dangerous in Africa than in Afghanistan. They would be farther from the Pakistani WMD arsenal and the former Soviet WMD arsenal
Abu Muqawama, may I clarify your statement. You are right that there are many fighters in Afghanistan who have global ambitions. However, this specific statement might reflect a form of Afghan nationalism rather than global extremism (or Takfiri related extremism.) Afghanistan was founded in 1747 following the death of the famous Persian emperor Nadir Shah in June, 1747. One of his best generals, Baba (Father) Durrani, took control of the Eastern part of the Persian empire and created modern Afghanistan. See the map:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Durrani_Empire
Afghanistan, use to include much of Eastern Iran, Pakistan, India, central Asia, and modern Afghanistan. The core of Afghanistan if you exclude the extremities of Nadir Shah's empire was modern Afghanistan, Pashtu parts of Pakistan, Punjab and Kashmir; at least until the Brits split Afghanistan up into many parts.
Therefore the specific quote you cited "After liberating Afghanistan inshallah, our forces will be ready to conquer the land beyond the river [the old name given by the Muslims to central Asia]. The jihad in central Asia, India and Pakistan should not just have a tight nationalist agenda" could be interpreted by many as a form of Afghan nationalism.
anand: U got to get used to
anand: U got to get used to the delay time ;-)
Note to the cnas-techgnomes: A small message on top stating that messages may take a few minutes to deliver would save a lot of multiples. And Afghan Adventure is still not properly linked.
Typo alert: I seem to have
Typo alert: I seem to have claimed afghanistan service in my above text, due to a letter missing. That was not:
What about interviewing someone from the decisionmaking tiers from our own time in-country?
it was
What about interviewing someone from the decisionmaking tiers from ***Y****our own time in-country?
my apologies.
F Nord, There are a few
F Nord,
There are a few replies here that indicate that some of us do not mindlessly accept the faulty assumptions upon which the Phony WOT is based.
The most important question is not HOW but WHY.
jim
F Nord, There are a few
F Nord,
There are a few replies here that indicate that some of us do not mindlessly accept the faulty assumptions upon which the Phony WOT is based.
The most important question is not HOW but WHY.
jim
Anan: 1) it borders
Anan:
1) it borders Pakistan
Are we more or less capable of influencing events in Pakistan - for the better - by maintaining a heavy footprint in Afghanistan? Why do we assume that we are making things better in Pakistan by maintaining a presence in its neighbor?
###
2)
-in a worst case scenario it is valuable to have a capable orthodox Sunni Pashtu army (the ANA) itching to cross the Durand line. Hopefully this doomsday scenario never comes to pass
Does one really expect a capable orthodox Sunni Pashtu army in the next decade? How capable is the Iraqi Army? And if this doomsday scenario came to pass, wouldn't it be indicative of a policy failure - **perhaps caused by our presence in Afghanistan?** - of epic proportions?
###
3)
-In the probable event that the ANA doesn't cross the Durand line it still helps relieve the pressure on Pakistanis by killing off many Pakistani Pashtu extremists west of the Durand line, and by denying the Pakistani Taliban safe havens in Afghanistan
Perhaps. But isn't killing the enemy in COIN less important than winning the hearts and minds (yes, I know, it's trite) of neutrals - Galula's 60% of undecideds? Do our kinetic efforts to kill off extremists and deny safe havens create more foes than friends? If we have a strategy, rather than a war of tactics (to borrow from Krepinevich, and to echo COL Gentile's criticisms), certainly effective Information Operations is a part of it.
###
4)
-Psychologically, losing in Afghanistan to an elected GIRoA and ANSF would be devastating to the global extremist movement. The Ummah (global muslim community) is likely to view the extremists much more negatively if they lose to Afghans than if they don't; much as losing to Iraqis on Iraqi soil substantially damaged the legitimacy and popularity of the global extremist movement. ADTS, the United States and the global community are struggling with a movement rather than specific terrorists.
Was losing in Vietnam devastating to the global anticommunist movement? How do movements perceive specific events? Can these perceptions be predicted? I recommend Jonathan Mercer's "Reputation and International Politics," James W. Davis's "Threats and Promises," or (which I have not read, but understand echoes the themes of the works cited) Daryl Press's "Calculating Credibility."
###
5)
-AQ linked networks would be less dangerous in Africa than in Afghanistan. They would be farther from the Pakistani WMD arsenal and the former Soviet WMD arsenal
Fair enough. But is geographic distance that large a hindrance for transnational networks? They seem fairly versatile and adaptable. I'd read Sheena Chestnut's article in "International Security" on illicit trafficking networks. And Afghanistan *is* landlocked.
###
Your points are well-taken. I think my points have merit, but I also concede yours do too, and to acknowledge your thoughtful response..
Respectfully,
ADTS
ADTS, be glad to continue
ADTS, be glad to continue this discussion on future posts by McChyrstal's new savior, the father of resistance :LOL:
"How capable is the Iraqi Army?" Large parts of it can fight pretty darn well. Its the logistics, ITDC NCO training, and promotion system that it has a problem with. And those aren't really IA problems (except for NCO utilization) but CoR (council of respresentatives) running interference in the IA. Several divisions in the IA are as good as any division in any Arab army. In fact the IA is a victim of its own success. If the IA hadn't won so decisively, the CoR wouldn't be slashing its financing and mucking around with it (trying to force it to hire and promote losers, and share graft on procurement and logistics with them.) The ISOF is as good or better than any special forces in any middle east country including Israel and Turkey. Col. Stephen Twitty, commander, 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, said in the fall of 2007 that 2nd and 3rd IADs were as good as any he had worked with (implicitly from any non US military.)
If the ANA reaches the level of the IA and the Iraqi Air Force . . . then its game over for the Taliban . . . even if they manage to fix their bridges with the Pakistani Army and again start receiving Pakistani Army support (which I think is unlikely); provided that the international community funds the ANA and ANP.
Anan: Perhaps I
Anan:
Perhaps I underestimate the strength of the Iraqi Army. Thanks (seriously) for updating me on its status. But to me the Vietnam analogy looms over Afghanistan darkly once more. The ARVN had elite units, at least large-scale ones (e.g., its airborne and marine divisions, and perhaps smaller ones more analogous with ISOF). South Vietnam fell, and Lam Son 719 failed prior to the fall. And these are not wars in which B-52s can be brought in (although I suppose Predators might) were outside assistance needed (a la the Spring Offensive of 1972) should assistance be needed that does not constitute a ground presence. Once more, if the ANA is brought up to the standard of the IA, is that sufficient to achieve our objectives, whatever they might be?
To be snarky, whether portions of the IA are as good as any division in any Arab army seems a bit - and I think SNLII may have written this already - like declaring it the tallest midget in the circus.
Whether the Iraqi army is a victim of its own success with respect to politics is, somewhat, irrelevant (to playfully borrow from the wonderful opening quote of Summer's "On Strategy"). As Robert Farley posted on Lawyers, Guns, and Money (blog), no military stands apart from its own society. I'd amend that to, no military stands apart from its own state, either. If the Iraqi army can't fight because its politicians hinder it, then this is a detriment. One could make the argument that this will oscillate - ie, as the Iraqi army's capabilities go down, they will be restored, just as they'd be diminished again if they rose - but this is a slightly more complex argument.
Similarly, that logistics, NCO training, and promotion are the problems with the IA still acknowledges that the IA might have a long way to go before...well, before. You know the magnitude of the effects of those problems, and I don't. But each would seem a serious impediment to performance. Simply saying, "They're great, except for [politics, logistics...]" doesn't negate the "except for" element of the sentence.
As for COL Twitty's comment, I take with a degree of (hopefully healthy) skepticism official praise by USG and US military personnel for the Iraqis. Once more, I consider it a form of Information Operations, and while I don't wish to assault COL Twitty's integrity, there are strong pressures for someone in his position to make statements like that, irrespective of actual facts on the ground. And there is the issue of cherry-picking - are the 2nd and 3rd IADs the best Twitty could point to, while other divisions are worthy of contempt? - and the overall context in which the comment was made - would the 2nd and 3rd IADs be as good **were American forces not present** as a metaphorical means to provide a credible commitment toward Iraq's security?
To return to the key point that you raise - if the ANA were as capable as the IA, the war would be over - crossing the Durand Line would be a conventional operation. Whether armies can perform COIN/LIC *and* HIC/conventional/kinetic operations seems a matter of dispute, to put the matter lightly. Could the IA defeat the Iranians in a symmetric war? Or to ask a slightly different question, using perhaps the Turks or Israelis as examples, do incursions over borders quell (what are perceived as) insurgencies?
But to return to COIN, **how realistic is it to expect the ANA to reach the standards apparently attained by the IA?** The presence in Afghanistan will be smaller than it was in Iraq; it has been smaller; and ostensibly (although I do not agree with the statement) the US has only 18 months to turn the situation around, before the US public center of gravity determines the war is over. Perhaps the difference in mentoring and partnering with the ANA will yield dividends more quickly than equivalent (but not identical) efforts with the IA. Starting a (say) 400,000 man security force in a country with a history of 30 years of civil war seems difficult to achieve, to me, though. Doing it quickly seems even more difficult.
Again, I worry we are inserting ourselves into a Vietnam-like quandary, without the moral courage to acknowledge we are making a mistake and that we ought to take the costly steps to remedy it now, rather than the costlier steps to remedy it later. I think Uncle Jimbo at Blackfive was right: President Obama had to run in favor of the war in Afghanistan so as not to appear a pacifist. Had he not run for the war, I wonder if he would be more open toward ending it. To what extent are domestic political considerations rather than objective appraisals of the possibility of success determining decision-making?
ADTS
Take out "metaphorical" in
Take out "metaphorical" in the above.
Thanks
ADTS
ADTS, I so wanted to quote
ADTS, I so wanted to quote SNLII in my last comment but didn't get to it: "To be snarky, whether portions of the IA are as good as any division in any Arab army seems a bit - and I think SNLII may have written this already - like declaring it the tallest midget in the circus." I think the way the wise SNLII put it when describing how the IA might soon be better than any other Arab army "my midget is one inch taller than your midget." :LOL: I miss him. SNLII, where are you?
ADTS, Twitty wasn't an information op. He said what he said because he believed it. He also said on the record in the fall of 2007 that the ISF could handle Ninevah on its own if US troops withdrew.
The Marines also meant it when they praised 1st and 7th IAD. Hell, even SNLII praised them in his hilarious way.
I know that 5th IAD and some other IADs still have major problems.
"Could the IA defeat the Iranians in a symmetric war?" No, because the IA still hasn't taken delivery of artillery (that has been reported), or sufficient tanks and armored vehicles. They also still haven't taken delivery of F16s.
Many of your comments go to the question of what the US objective in Afghanistan is. I think the objective is a capable ANSF that aggressively takes the fight to the enemy. Even if the fight lasts for ten years, needs to be heavily subsidized with foreign money, and even if large parts of Afghanistan remain contested, that would still be "victory" in a sense. As long as the extremists are tied down fighting the ANSF, as long as their sanctuaries inside Afghanistan are attacked by the ANSF, they will not be able to focus nearly as much on international terrorism or causing instability in other countries. Victory does not require the ANSF to win decisively within a decade.
Anand: I, too, miss SNLII.
Anand:
I, too, miss SNLII. Why has thou forsaken us with your absence, dear sir?
I engage, really, only with your last paragraph. I think your opening sentence is spot-on. I do indeed question what our objective is, and should be, and can be. I can understand an ANSF that takes the fight to the enemy would be ideal. Perhaps one could get Afghanistan to the state of present-day Iraq were that the case (or conversely, perhaps the [political] status of present-day Iraq is what permits an effective IA, so maybe successful elections in Afghanistan will permit the ANSF to operate more effectively). Then, perhaps, we could chalk Afghanistan into the "win" column. We'd have waged a successful counterinsurgency campaign, with a host nation government capable of maintaining violence to an acceptably low and infrequent level. I concur, I suppose, that the decade benchmark is irrelevant - somewhat. But I do question - and perhaps I am overly fixated on the Vietnam analogy - how long US public opinion and electoral dynamics will continue to support the war in Afghanistan, and whether the ANSF can be stood up in and supported in an adequate time frame. Tom Ricks continues to predict doom and gloom for Iraq *still;* can a positive prognosis for standing up the ANSF be provided?
To me, though, the most disagreement we probably have resides in your use of the term "extremists." How many of those we're fighting in Afghanistan are, to use Kilcullen's term, "accidental guerillas" versus extremists who would gladly plot (if they're not doing so already) another 9/11? **What are the opportunity costs of pursuing a war in Afghanistan? Does the use of resources to prosecute said war add or subtract to our contribution to GWOT?** What other failed states is AQ operating in, and to which we're not devoting adequate attention because our resources are focused on Afghanistan? For that matter (see Hamburg), how many *non-failed* states (ha! I just invented a term) are we not devoting adequate attention to or in, because our focus is or has become COIN and counterterrorism in failed states?
Once more, respectfully,
ADTS
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Many of your comments go to the question of what the US objective in Afghanistan is. I think the objective is a capable ANSF that aggressively takes the fight to the enemy. Even if the fight lasts for ten years, needs to be heavily subsidized with foreign money, and even if large parts of Afghanistan remain contested, that would still be "victory" in a sense. As long as the extremists are tied down fighting the ANSF, as long as their sanctuaries inside Afghanistan are attacked by the ANSF, they will not be able to focus nearly as much on international terrorism or causing instability in other countries. Victory does not require the ANSF to win decisively within a decade.
Anand, Incidentally, what is
Anand,
Incidentally, what is the ethnic composition - heterogeneneous or homogeneneous, or both - of effective IA units?
Thanks
ADTS
No such current data is
No such current data is available. The MoD has shut down most information about the IA. They don't even publicly circulate their Iraqi Army newsletter since earlier this year. About two years ago the IA had around 33% Sunni Arabs (versus 18% of the population) and around 51% Shia (versus around 60% of the population.)
The Rumsfeld Iraqi Army was suppose to be 40,000 troops and three divisions, 1st IAD, 3rd IAD, 9th IAD. In June, 2004, Allawi realized that Rumsfeld's plan was insanity and expanded the end state of the IA to 10 divisions. He quickly added used the Northern national guards to create two divisions. These in turn were quickly formed out of two KRG divisions.
2nd and 4th IAD were the former KRG divisions rushed into the IA by PM Allawi. As a result, they are both still disproportionately Kurdish. At the beginning of 2008, 2nd IAD was 55% Kurdish. Now it might be one third to 40% Kurdish. 4th IAD is similar. Both of these divisions were among the first IA divisions to get good in 2006. {They have continued to improve since.} Kirshad's 3rd IAD was a diverse division formed in the North. It had a higher than normal Kurdish ratio, but was formed diverse from the beginning. In late 2006 (3rd, 2nd, 4th, 8th, 1st) were the 5 good quality IA.
Allawi ordered that the Baghad national guards be converted to 6th IAD. It was very diverse from the beginning. It had a highly capable commanding general who quickly made it one of the best two divisions in the IA in 2005. This general was assassinated in 2006 and his army was infiltrated by Iraqi politics (political appointees) . . . the division degraded.
8th and 10th IADs were converted Southern National Guards and were disproportionately Shia. LTG Oothman's 8th IAD initially had a lot of ISCI/Badr and Dawa in 2004 and 2005. LTG Uthman is a very impressive guy just to look at, and he was even better with the cameras off. Many US analysts who visited were impressed with him. 8th IAD was a surprising success story early on. It and 6th were the first two to get division HQs, to have their division HQs assume command of a brigade, and to have their division report to the IRGC instead of MNC-I. 8th has proven amazingly resilient to political infiltration and remarkably nonpartisan . . . probably because of Uthman. This proves that disproportionately Shia forces can be nationalistic, nonsectarian and nonpartison. 8th IAD quickly was able to manage Iran, Sadr's guys, organized crime and violence in Najaf, Babil, Wasit, Karbala and Qadisiyah, allowing MNF-I to focus elsewhere.
10th IAD was a disaster. A complete disaster initially. The Brits (and other assorted coalition) supposedly converted Shia national guards into them. I don't know what the Brits did, but they messed up so bad that many Iraqis thought that they were "trying" to destroy Iraq. The piece of crap 10th IAD was great fodder for the global peace movement that loved to insult the IA. It was an organized crime coalition, thoroughly politicized, that couldn't shoot to save their own lives. Consequently, Basrah and Maysan fell apart in 2006, 2007 and early 2008. The Brits made a royal mess as only they could in clearly the worst IAD before Maliki had Americans and Georgians retrain it. The mess up with 10th IAD was one reason Maliki suddenly and so many in the CoR wanted the Brits out of their country. It is also why Maliki suddenly launched charge of the knights.
5th IAD was rapidly composed out of Diyala National Guards. It was one of the best IADs in 2005, just as Diyala was one of the safe provinces in Iraq. Rumsfeld withdrew US troops and transitioned Diyala to the ISF too soon. Diyala fell apart. 5th IAD became one of the two worst quality IA divisions. Its former commanding general Shakar was a personification of incompetence before Gaidhan fired him. 5th under Shakar was a bunch of JAM wackos and Badr guys who loved to kick around Sunni Arabs; and weren't all that good at it. 5th has been retrained by the US since.
9th IAD was the mechanized division. It was diverse early on. It stood up at a decent pace and became pretty good in 2007 under Riyadh.
17th IAD is a good quality division. It was formed out of the 250% strength old 4th Brigade, 6th IAD (24th Brigade.) It is nonpartisan and ethnically diverse. The old 24th brigade was one of the best in the IA, and so was its commanding officer. As best as I know, he is still in charge.
I thought 11th IAD (formed out of 23-6) was pretty weak . . . but what do I know . . . they stunned everyone including themselves by winning the war for Sadr City (Thawra) in March-May 2008. In fact, that was the battle that ended the Iraq war. They are pretty diverse . . . and had many Sadr supporters (who were more loyal to the IA than Sadr.)
7th IAD was the tenth Iraqi Army division to form, was immature, and severely understrength. It had a bunch of Shia, some Kurds, and some Sunni Arab close nit tribal types from Mosul (that seemed to arrive as a cohesive unit.) However Sawha happened, they got a good commanding general, and they got some awesome Marine trainers and some Army brats like SNLII (was he 7th or 1st IAD?) They were flooded with many Al Anbari volunteers who were eager to fight. Michael O'Hanlin reported that 60% of the grunts were Al Anbaris when they went to Basrah in charge of the knights. The Marines were openly boastful about how good 7th and 1st IAD were. {It was a pattern with many Marines.} The Marines even made many non PC remarks . . . such as about how 7th and 1st IADs were clearly the two best IADs in the IA in several public briefings! Many Army types were none too pleased since they declared that their IADs were the best.
1st IAD was the first IAD to see heavy combat. It fought in Falluja in November, 2004, taking heavy losses. It continued to take losses in Al Anbar right until it won in 2007. GoI used 1st IAD as their crack troops in many operations. Including in Basrah in charge of the knights in 2008, in Diyala (to fix 5th IAD and reduce violence in Diyala), in Baghdad during Petreaus' surge in Baghdad, and in Mosul in 2008.
12th IAD was formed out of a bunch of tribal corrupt FPS protecting oil pipelines and facilities. It's components use to be disasters. But a decent division formed out of them in 2008.
14th IAD had a weak British start. One British trained brigade broke in March 2008. {Training just ain't the British thing.} But they seem to be doing much better now. They are mostly Shia since they operate in Basrah.
Two more KRG divisions will transfer into the IA as 15th and 16th IADs. They are pretty good forces, and mostly Kurdish.
That is all 16 Iraqi Army Divisions (of which there are currently only 14.)
Anand: My gratitude for the
Anand:
My gratitude for the detailed Order of Battle information regarding the IA.
Your point(s) about the British is(are) especially interesting - after all, wasn't it they who were accusing us in Military Review of "institutional racism" or something like that? :-)
Let me try to get at my primary question another way. If a division is heterogeneous and mostly Shia does that mean it has more sub-division homogenous Shia componenents, or that the division is integrated "across the board" and there are just more Shia members of the division? The impression I get from your response is that the divisions are integrated across the board, but I'm not sure, and even if I'm right, bear with me for a second so I can ask what is hopefully a more penetrating question (or two). Could one see all-Kurdish companies, say, or ethnically homogeneous units at any echelon, for that matter within an overall heterogeneous division? If the answer is no, (the) two (hopefully penetrating) questions: Would that be a superior way to organize the IA (probably not, I'm guessing your response will be), or perhaps more importantly, would that be a better way to stand up the ANSF (here I won't wager what your response will be)?
ADTS
Respectfully,
ADTS
The biggest expert I know on
The biggest expert I know on the IA is here . . . http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/
Please paste your comment on one of the articles like this one:
http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/27/
Many other IA experts also comment there. I would be curious to hear their responses to your questions.
"If a division is heterogeneous and mostly Shia does that mean it has more sub-division homogenous Shia componenents, or that the division is integrated "across the board" and there are just more Shia members of the division?" 8th behaves like a professional IA which happens to be mostly Shia and is nonsectarian and nonpartisan.
10th use to have sub-division homogenous Shia componenents before it was rebuilt from the ground up.
All the IA are becoming integrated across the board. {One brigade is taken offline at a time and put through intensive training and ethnic rebalancing.} I am unaware of any brigades that have not completed this process among the sectarian or partisan IA units that use to exist.
Maybe 5th IAD still needs more work, although it has come a long way?
"Could one see all-Kurdish companies, say, or ethnically homogeneous units at any echelon, for that matter within an overall heterogeneous division?" Generally no longer. 4th IAD (16th Bde) and 2nd IAD (5th and 8th Bde) use to be like this but they have become integrated.
15th and 16th IADs when the transfer will be literally KRG. I heard that some of their brigades were 2/3rds Kurd. So they will match your description when they transfer to the IA.
But there is a proviso to your question. Many Kurds don't speak Arabic. As a result, Kurdish soldiers need to be bunched with translators.
The ANA also has the challenge of being multilingual. But they seem to handle it quite well. So do the Canadians for that matter (although all of them know both French and English.)
" If the answer is no, (the) two (hopefully penetrating) questions: Would that be a superior way to organize the IA (probably not, I'm guessing your response will be), or perhaps more importantly, would that be a better way to stand up the ANSF (here I won't wager what your response will be)?"
It use to be that many Iraqis who join the IA are allowed to join their preferred IAD for two years but were nationally deplorable after that. That seems a good model. This use to be the case anyway, but may no longer be true. The IA imposed a hiring freeze in the summer of 2008.
Right now it seems a roll of the dice (or a bribe or political connections) as to which ANA Corps a new ANA soldier joins. This means that those who join ANA in the North hit the jackpot; while the ones who join 205th ANA can look forward to a fighting until they die in the south. Because the ANA only hires a fraction of all applicants, they have this luxury. I think that is a good model. What are your thoughts?
Anan: My thoughts are,
Anan:
My thoughts are, first, that you have a lot more boots-on-the-ground knowledge of the pertinent facts than I do. :-)
Second, the role of the military as an institution by which to form a nation-state is one that should not be overlooked. Israel might be a good example (or it might not) of a diverse nation-state (yes, Israel is a diverse nation-state even though most of its citizens are Jewish) that created a cohesive national identity through its military. It's intriguing to wonder whether the same could occur in Iraq, or Afghanistan.
Third, I found this paragraph to be the crux of the answer to my question:
"All the IA are becoming integrated across the board. {One brigade is taken offline at a time and put through intensive training and ethnic rebalancing.} I am unaware of any brigades that have not completed this process among the sectarian or partisan IA units that use to exist."
My understanding, thus, is that segregated units are not permitted to exist, and that active efforts are, or have been, made to prevent or eliminate them.
Fourth, I'd be curious to learn the relationship between unit heterogeneity and combat effectiveness, and more importantly than the correlation, the causality. Do heterogeneous units fight better than homogeneous units, or the reverse, and why?
Furthermore, what is the recruiting mechanism for the IA? Is there conscription? When one chooses to join or is drafted, what occurs subsequently? Are the Iraqis capable of training their own troops, or are American advisors essential (you do recall that hilarious Youtube clip of Iraqi soldiers doing "jazzercise" jumping jacks, yes?)?
Finally, to aside from linguistic fractionalization, what are the similarities - and differences, of course - between standing up the IA versus the ANSF? One, I would assume, would be literacy; another would be the existence of a professional (relatively speaking) army prior to 2003.
Thanks
ADTS
Anan I tried to post to the
Anan
I tried to post to the website you referenced, but exceeded the character count. :-) I also apparently got the security code wrong, at least on my first try. [ Hey, I do my best. :-) ] Perhaps it might be better to link there to this thread?
Thanks
ADTS
Could we touch base via
Could we touch base via e-mail?
ADTS, many of my comments
ADTS, many of my comments disappear at (http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/27/) as well. Please consider copying your questions above and re posting them at Montrose Toast. You might need a couple tries with the passcode. It is case sensitive.
I passed on your questions to some of them. You would get much better answers there than you will get from me.
"Furthermore, what is the recruiting mechanism for the IA? Is there conscription? When one chooses to join or is drafted, what occurs subsequently? Are the Iraqis capable of training their own troops, or are American advisors essential (you do recall that hilarious Youtube clip of Iraqi soldiers doing "jazzercise" jumping jacks, yes?)?" Iraqis are a patriotic people and many are eager to join the IA. Recruitment has never been a challenge. In fact the new IA only accepts a fifth of the officer applicants from the old army that apply (in 2003 and 2004 the ratio was higher.) The new IA has stricter physical, literacy and competency requirements than the old IA.
Remember that the IA imposed a hiring freeze more than a year ago.
The ITDC (Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command) is responsible for training. They can do it on their own, but NATO and the US contribute officers to their officer training; and NCOs to the Iraqi NCO academies.
"Finally, to aside from linguistic fractionalization, what are the similarities - and differences, of course - between standing up the IA versus the ANSF? One, I would assume, would be literacy; another would be the existence of a professional (relatively speaking) army prior to 2003." Do you have all day :LOL: As you said Iraqis had a lot more literate people and experienced army officers to work with. Only half of ANA officers can read.
Might respond to you later regarding your other questions.
Anand: As always, I
Anand:
As always, I appreciate your detailed, considerate responses to my posts. At the same time, regarding going offline and using private messages, at the risk of sounding unduly paranoid or reticent, for the moment, I'd prefer not to.
As for reposting questions, heard, understood, acknowledged.
I did not know that the IA had relatively stringent entrance requirements. I remember reading an article in, I think, Infantry or Military Review magazine about how an advisor's unit made the "run" requirement for entrance into the IA, a 100 meter dash, because the average Iraqi lacked the stamina for anything of much greater distance. I also didn't know that the IA had its own TRADOC, presumably with (at a minimum) its own CGSC. The challenge of the IA has been said to be less the training of its soldiers in tactics than the formation of an NCO corps and functioning logistics; I've also either read, or at least thought, part of it was the absence of a (staff system), or at least a staff system that did not function on the model of a dictatorial army, and could conduct the basic work of planning operations.
How many, and what proportion, of Iraqis are trained by Iraqis, and how many are trained by NATO and US officers and NCOs? Are there instructor-qualified Iraqis? How long is Iraqi basic recruit training, and does it follow the US model, or (say) the Singaporean model, in which I've read parents are invited into the barracks on the first day of training to see where their sons will be living? Does Iraq emulate the US and bifurcate entrance with college-education being the primary dividing line between officers and enlisted, or does it follow the Israeli model of everyone starting off as an E-1, and relatively seamless transition from enlisted to officer?
Take your time responding questions and/or - and I mean this politely and respectfully - please feel free not to answer them. I recognize they're lengthy and, potentially, complicated.
Once more, thank you for your time and willingness to give me information I doubt I would find (or, at least, have found, given the existence of the website to which you directed me) on my own.
Sincerely,
ADTS
Anand: I know I "gave you"
Anand:
I know I "gave you" permission not to respond to my posts, and also declined to exchange emails privately, but I would be curious to get your take on the following post: http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/27/. The question that leaps out at me is, Are the Iraqi Security Forces insufficiently streamlined? Does the partioning of security forces lead to disproportionate (or, perhaps, proportionate) inefficiency?
Thanks
ADTS
Anand: In re: our earlier
Anand:
In re: our earlier discussions about whether we should be fighting in Afghanistan, and also time horizons and (US) political dynamics, I just saw this article on SWJ:
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-us-afghan30-2009aug3...
I thought especially interesting the portion about Iraqi police. I could ask you about the differences between IA and IP performance...but I don't want to add to your queue. :-)
Regards,
ADTS
PS - Needless to say, I was disappointed to see McChrystal's savior not quoted in the article.
ADTS, I have e-mailed your
ADTS, I have e-mailed your questions to many people associated with Montrose Toast. Some e-mailed me answers, some of which I will paste below. If you have further questions, please leave comments on http://home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/blog/view/27/ or some other Montrose Toast article. Again, you might have to post your questions a couple time for it to post: I have gotten permission to post this e-mail address for you to ask questions: MontroseToast@comcast.net. Omar from ITM has some responses for you. I am with his permission posting some of the responses from DJ to you:
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ADTS
08/30/2009 11:22:39
In re: Total Force Mobilization, The question that leaps out at me is, Are the Iraqi Security Forces insufficiently streamlined? Does the partioning of security forces lead to disproportionate (or, perhaps, proportionate) inefficiency?
Bingo.
The expansion of the Federal Police is not an expansion of the ISF. It is a consolodation of the INP, KRG's Special Police, and the provincial Emergency Police into one command. Likewise the increasing strength of the ERB is from the consolidation of the provincial SWAT Bns into the ERBs. The emergency police range from SWAT quallified to tribal levees. This allows the MoI to train, equip, standardize, and deploy these forces while it removes the provincial government from controling and corrupting these paramilitary forces. The provinces are not getting to keep their militia armies.
Likewise, the expansion of the IA is based on the number of Peshmerga being absorbed (100,000). Two divisions is only 30 percent. The KRG SP is another 12 percent going to the FP. Even with 25-30,000 going to the IP, that leaves two more divisions worth of peshmerga to be absorbed by the IA. Probably split up among the forces.
The MoI takeover of the FPS/OPD is the same thing. That monster was 24 seperate ministries and 4 autonomous departments running their own seperate forces. Before the MoI started taking over in Jan 2008, they were listed as 150,000 by payroll. Within 6 months that was down to 98,000 as they cleared the ghosts, purged militia, etc. The current plan for three OPD and three FPS Security Divisions totaling 108,000 personnel is nothing more than standardizing, organizing, training, and improving the force.
The personnel for all the formations projected/planned are already on the payroll. They are MoI, MoD, Provincial Paramilitary, FPS, KRG, etc. All being payed from the same pot. Now they are being consolidated into the MoI/MoD/CTB budgets, receiving standardized training, equipment, and organization. While losing the redundant buracracies...
ADTS
08/30/2009 11:19:42
Please see the related discussion between Anand and me at http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama/2009/08/working-around-through-and-against-giroa.html#comment-35897.
Later, I do have other work to do and you are seriously deficeint in knowledge of this subject if you are unaware that the draft ended in Iraq in May 2003. (End Phase III operations.) Catching you up on six years of developments would take time...
ADTS
08/30/2009 11:16:51
How many, and what proportion, of Iraqis are trained by Iraqis, and how many are trained by NATO and US officers and NCOs? Are there instructor-qualified Iraqis? How long is Iraqi basic recruit training, and does it follow the US model, or (say) the Singaporean model, in which I've read parents are invited into the barracks on the first day of training to see where their sons will be living? Does Iraq emulate the US and bifurcate entrance with college-education being the primary dividing line between officers and enlisted, or does it follow the Israeli model of everyone starting off as an E-1, and relatively seamless transition from enlisted to officer?
The policy since 2005 is train-the-trainer. We teach the instructors when they get new gear, the Iraqi instructors train their own. While NTM-I personnel train some of the senior officer courses at the Iraqi Defense College, it is not unlike having a visiting instructor at West Point.
No family in the bootcamps except at graduation. US/UK model with modifications. Four seperate 9 month officer academies based on Sandhurst that draw from college level Iraqis. Enlisted bootcamp is seperate. However, one of the reasons for the persistant shortage in NCOs is the competing need for officers. Really good NCOs can get an Academy slot and become an officer.
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ADTS, I commend you for your interest in the ISF. Give us all a bit of time to bring you up to speed.
"My understanding, thus, is
"My understanding, thus, is that segregated units are not permitted to exist, and that active efforts are, or have been, made to prevent or eliminate them." Yes.
"that created a cohesive national identity through its military. It's intriguing to wonder whether the same could occur in Iraq, or Afghanistan." Great point. The IA is aimed in large part at doing just that. And it has successfully caused a wave of patriotic pride and nationalism. The Pakistani and Indian Armies also significantly boost national pride and patriotism.
The ANA does the same in Afghanistan. However, Afghans already have a lot of nationalism (except for the 10% of Afghans that see themselves as Pashtu first and Afghan second.)
Give me more time to respond to your other questions, probably at Montrose Toast.
Anand: Thank you, and your
Anand:
Thank you, and your compatriots at Montrose Toast; I will check it eagerly and with enthusiasm.
Sincerely,
ADTS
what does that have to do
what does that have to do with the war and the causilties that are happening in afghanistan
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