Abu Muqawama retains its autonomy and the views and beliefs expressed within the blog do not reflect those of CNAS.
As Josh Foust pointed out in the comments of the below post, the New York Times has some of the very best coverage of the war in Afghanistan because it employs smart, experienced journalists who take risks to travel around the country to see the war and the peoples of Afghanistan through a lens unfiltered by a public affairs officer. It's of little surprise, then, that the best and most disturbing article I have read on Afghanistan in the past few weeks was written by Dexter Filkins and Carlotta Gall:
KABUL, Afghanistan — Afghans loyal to President Hamid Karzai set up hundreds of fictitious polling sites where no one voted but where hundreds of thousands of ballots were still recorded toward the president’s re-election, according to senior Western and Afghan officials here.
The fake sites, as many as 800, existed only on paper, said a senior Western diplomat in Afghanistan, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the political delicacy of the vote. Local workers reported that hundreds, and in some cases thousands, of votes for Mr. Karzai in the election last month came from each of those places. That pattern was confirmed by another Western official based in Afghanistan.
“We think that about 15 percent of the polling sites never opened on Election Day,” the senior Western diplomat said. “But they still managed to report thousands of ballots for Karzai.”
Besides creating the fake sites, Mr. Karzai’s supporters also took over approximately 800 legitimate polling centers and used them to fraudulently report tens of thousands of additional ballots for Mr. Karzai, the officials said.
The result, the officials said, is that in some provinces, the pro-Karzai ballots may exceed the people who actually voted by a factor of 10. “We are talking about orders of magnitude,” the senior Western diplomat said.
The widening accounts of fraud pose a stark problem for the Obama administration, which has 68,000 American troops deployed here to help reverse gains by Taliban insurgents. American officials hoped that the election would help turn Afghans away from the Taliban by giving them a greater voice in government. Instead, the Obama administration now faces the prospect of having to defend an Afghan administration for the next five years that is widely seen as illegitimate.
“This was fraud en masse,” the Western diplomat said.
I think I have been pretty honest about the difficulties of the war in Afghanistan while at the same time making an argument for why we should continue and even intensify our efforts there. And I would like to think that -- for a blogger on counterinsurgency strategy and operations -- I have been pretty honest about the difficulty and limits of prosecuting counterinsurgency campaigns as a third party: to a large degree, your success is dependent upon what the host nation government does and fails to do.
In the next few days, I will post some thoughts on how the United States and its allies might adjust their strategy for Afghanistan based on the outcome of the Afghan elections. But as I have written, this really is the worst-case scenario: a small margin of victory for Karzai amidst widespread allegations of fraud. Prior to the election, this was considered to be the worst outcome for Afghanistan, the legitimacy of the Afghan government, and the international community.
When people look back on the Afghanistan war, this might be the moment when historians will judge we should have cut the cord on the Afghan government. If we believe Generals McChrystal and Petraeus, and we believe a counterinsurgency campaign to represent our best chance of success in Afghanistan, then we have a big problem. Because if we believe what we ourselves have learned about counterinsurgency campaigns, we understand that we cannot be successful in one if the host nation government is seen as increasingly illegitimate -- and that's what the Karzai government is.
Legitimacy, as Lipset writes, is a relative. Its root is the belief that existing institutions are those most appropriate for society. The deeply unpopular Taliban's form of government is not seen as being a better alternative to what the Afghans currently have. But the Afghans are both losing faith and looking for something else. The United States and its allies are blamed not just for keeping Karzai in power but also for the excesses of his government, his relatives, and local officials. And for those who are calling for a withdrawal from Afghanistan, this election presents the best possible excuse to do so.
Missing from that excuse alone, of course, is a discussion of how the United States and its allies will protect their interests -- or the costs of withdrawal. And that's why I do not see withdrawal as an option and will sketch out some alternatives before I leave on Friday for a three-week research trip. But there can be no question: these elections hurt the United States and its allies, Afghan and Western. We must have a clear answer for how we will respond to the challenge, or else the chorus for withdrawal will grow louder.
What is the quote? The greatest threat to Afghanistan is Afghanistan itself? I think this article proves it. And for God's sake, let 'em just go back to feudalism. We are not going to convince them otherwise. We can't just march in and say "we have a better way of doing it."
What's wrong with going back to a "light footprint?" I think Rory Stewart once argued that JSOC and various other "hardcore mother fuckers" should keep transnationals on the run, while Afghans figure it out for themselves. Small projects. After all, it is the land of a 1,000 Sheikdoms.
15% weren't even open? My God.
What is the quote? The greatest threat to Afghanistan is Afghanistan itself? I think this article proves it. And for God's sake, let 'em just go back to feudalism. We are not going to convince them otherwise. We can't just march in and say "we have a better way of doing it."
What's wrong with going back to a "light footprint?" I think Rory Stewart once argued that JSOC and various other "hardcore mother fuckers" should keep transnationals on the run, while Afghans figure it out for themselves. Small projects. After all, it is the land of a 1,000 Sheikdoms.
15% weren't even open? My God.
The only solution I can see (though with its own clear downsides):
Get a security council resolution installing something akin to the Bosnian High Representative ( www.ohr.int ) witth sweeping powers, limited to 5-10 years. Have him organize a run off election supervised by "neutral" (Switzerland, Japan) and some Muslim countries. Will the Afghans buy it? A central point of the HR's job (besides the elections and coordinating "re-"constructuon) would need to be to fight corruption in ANA and ANP (maybe mixed commissions of 1 international + 1 ANA, 1 ANP, or + 1 regional official and 1 from Kabul), deciding on the firing of corrupt officials on the spot if cought redhanded. Maybe also an international court to look into war crimes commited during the civil war. Warlords would oppose it; but they could be offered deals: get out of politics, declare your wrongdoings [truth commissions like in South Africa], and you won't be prosecuted .
In the medium run its the only way I can see to get the elections back on track and to fix the basic problem of the country: reliable security forces. And I think if you put this argument out there, most of the population might buy into it. ANA soldiers hate it when corrupt ANP mess up theiri AO and vice versa.
And btw, installing a HR is what imO we should have done from the outset. But it's nation building, and Rumsfeld wouldn't have any of it ...
(P.S. As I have never been to Afghanistan, take it with a ton of salt ..)
Also Filkins and Gall are super mega stars of war reporting, especially in Afghanistan (though also, obvi, Iraq and Chechnya).
"we cannot be successful in one if the host nation government is seen as increasingly illegitimate"
That is a problem with FM 3-24, is it not - it assumes the host nation is as pure and white as...
"for those who are calling for a withdrawal from Afghanistan, this election presents the best possible excuse to do so."
Please don't turn this into a stabbed-in-the-back meme - you're too sophisticated and even-handed for that.
"Missing from that excuse alone, of course, is a discussion of how the United States and its allies will protect their interests -- or the costs of withdrawal."
YES! We finally get to learn what our interests in staying in Afghanistan are, and the costs of leaving, and presumably, options - beyond clear, build, hold (yes, AM, I know I'm oversimplifying you) - as to how we can attain our interests. We are entering the realm of strategy.
ADTS
"we understand that we cannot be successful in one if the host nation government is seen as increasingly illegitimate"
Multiple Choice:
1) Legitimate to a majority of the Afghans
2) Legitimate to a majority of the Pashtun
3) Legitimate to a majority of the Pakistanis
4) Legitimate to a majority of the Americans
5) Legitimate to a majority of the EU
6) Legimiate to a majority of the UN
7) All of the above
8) None of the above
Just not sure the American will can survive this week - to say nothing of whether it's worth it or not to hold onto that will. The Marine photo, the fuel tankers, drunk soldiers, massive fraud, severe casualties. . . That 12 month timeline before support ran out is starting to look a little optimistic, if anything. . .
>>And that's why I do not see withdrawal as an option<<
I presume this was just some rhetorical sloppiness. What I presume you mean is that you do not believe that withdrawal is the correct option, not that you don't believe it ought to be at least considered. Or do you mean the latter? That "all options are on the table... except withdrawal"?
The reason I ask is that recent statements from Gates and other explicitly make this argument... which, of course, turns the notion of a serious strategic assessment into a farce.
Abu M: May I draw your attention to the Graud article you linked to in an earlier post:
(The Commission said:) "The results will not be officially certified until late September, AFTER fraud allegations in Ghazni, Paktika and Kandahar provinces have been INVESTIGATED.
"The commission, which comprises three international members appointed by the UN and two Afghans, said RECOUNTS would be conducted at polling stations recording 100% turnout or votes for any presidential candidate of more than 95%.
"Earlier it announced that about 200,000 ballots had been REJECTED because of FRAUD, but the UN called for FURTHER measures to counter widespread vote-rigging in the poll.
"Daoud Ali Najafi, the commission's chief electoral officer, said: "The numbers were SUSPICIOUS and the results did not match with the reconciliation form [used to double-check results]".
"He added: "In some areas the turnout was higher than the number of ballots we sent to the polling station."
"As doubts grow about the legitimacy of the poll, the UN's chief representative in Afghanistan, Kai Eide, has called on Afghan election officials to EXCLUDE all ballots that have "evidence of irregularities" from the vote count.
....
"A senior western diplomat told Associated Press that most of the votes in Kandahar, Paktika and Khost were fraudulent. Partial returns from each of those provinces heavily favour Karzai. Others have said tallies came in from as many as 800 fake polling sites.
"Najafi said it was UNLIKELY that 800 polling stations were faked, and said the most recent number of fraud-annulled stations he had was the 447 announced at the weekend."
AM, all of this indicates that if the election results in a fraudulent win for Kazai, we will hear plenty about it from the UN electoral commission. I mean 200,000 ballots have been rejected already and 447 fraudulent poll stations have been annulled?
I would also point out that the days are long gone when the United States can "cut cords" Chile 1970s style on democratically elected governments unless those governments are abrogating international agreements signed by previous governments. The fact is, unlike Iran for instance, the UN is monitoring this election as it has done for countless third world countries trying to establish democracies in difficult circumstances. The UN is highly experienced in this field and has its own reputation and credibility to maintain.
What the United States should do, and I'm sure WILL do, is ensure that the due process is followed so that the UN commission can certify the election results with credibility. If this leads to a run off, or a new election, or a Kazai majority win, then so be it.
Instead of which we get these alarmist beatups from even excellent journos like Filkins. Who does not indicate whether his sources, named or unnamed, have their own axes to grind or their own agendas! At least the Graud produced a balanced account.
A slight nuance to the language here - I would argue that this is a good reason to pull out, not an excuse. It shouldn't necessary be the only reason, but it is one. Being a former Army man yourself, I'm sure you understand the difference between the reason and excuse.
I think the best option is to go forward by focusing on local and regional approaches to security capacity and governance. I mean look, this is ultimately what we did in Iraq. Yes the election outcome is a worst case scenario but to me suggests simply shifting our focus toward a bottom-up approach, something that both the history of Afghanistan and our own recent operational experience suggests is the best option in a world of bad ones.
It strikes me that we all know how this is going to turn out. We'll still keep propping up the never legitimate Karzai government, we'll pour more troops into the country, with corresponding increases in casualties, we'll continue to fiddle and meddle with COINcentric plans and operations to flood the country with a sea of our choosing, the fish all coming to our hands, of course, all at a cost of billions upon billions more. And in the end, we'll still be forced to pull out with no more understanding of what we did wrong than than we have with any of our military disasters of note. God, we're looking more and more like 19th century British every day.
EMN
It's a nice articulation of the strategic challenges we face in Afghanistan.
As I see it, we have three options. The first is to replace the current Afghan government with, as Positroll suggests, some sort of independent outside commissioner. The problem, from a COIN perspective, is that this is all but indistinguishable from classic imperialism. You can sometimes impose a third-party-arbiter to reconcile warring factions, but it's awfully fraught; the track record for externally-imposed custodial governments in insurgencies is dismal. The second option is simply to replace Karzai with someone we like better, and pronounce it an Afghan government. Again, our track record here couldn't be worse. When was the last time we ousted one leader in favor of another, and that actually turned out to advance our goals?
Which leads to the third option - a runoff election. It's clear that Karzai, even without the fraud, attracted significant support. And I don't think it's disputed that Abdullah^2 ran second in the polls. So announce that pervasive fraud rendered the election too close to call, and hold a two-candidate runoff. There are three problems with this solution. First, given that the Karzai government is declaring victory, is that many will see this as tantamount to ousting the guy we no longer like in favor of our new shining hope. It's not as bad as simply doing that, inasmuch as Abdullah^2 would actually have to win a majority at the polls, but it's tough to see Karzai or his backers accepting a second-round defeat as anything other than rigged. Which brings us to the second problem. We spent a lot of time, money, and effort preparing the polls this time around, and the result was pervasive and systemic fraud. What would make us think a runoff would be any more fair? And then, there's the third problem. What if, after forcing a runoff, Karzai wins? Wouldn't he and his increasingly-paranoid inner circle see that as evidence of Western betrayal and domestic vindication? Having an ineffectual leader in A-Stan is bad; having a president actively opposed to our agenda would be an insurmountable hurdle to COIN.
Those are lousy options. But of the three, it's the last which offers some slender hope. Let's have the UN-sanctioned monitors issue a report, and then press aggressively for a second-round runoff, on the grounds that no candidate legitimately attained more than 50% of the vote. That way, there'd still be a slender chance of the elections being accorded legitimacy.
And if that fails, it's time to go home.
Did the strategic reassessment consider any alternatives other than CT, COIN, or CT & COIN?
I write from lovely Silicon Valley, where we have a lovely phenomenon we call the reality distortion field. I sometimes get the feeling there is one of these in Washington as well. Although I wish I knew where the generators were.
I mean, how could anyone have ever considered the Karzai regime as a legitimate sovereign government? If you're willing to consult your ouija board, you can call up any historian from Thucydides to Lord Acton, establish psychic contact, and watch in non-shocked non-surprise as the planchette spells out "P-U-P-P-E-T-S-T-A-T-E." Duh.
Question: if the Karzai government is not an American puppet, what would it look like it if it *was* an American puppet? Perhaps you might say: if the Karzai government was an American puppet, it would say "how high" when America says "jump." Of course it does no such thing. But this does not make the regime a non-puppet - it makes the regime a defective puppet. A proper puppet state would be vast improvement, for American and Astan alike.
Instead, constantly if subconsciously aware of the tremendous and fundamental condition of mendacity under which the entire American presence must operate, the decent and capable Americans in Kabul are constantly deferring to the Karzai mafia's enormous delinquencies, on the grounds of preserving its nonexistent sovereignty.
Regardless of the level to which these delinquencies rise, true sovereignty cannot exist in a regime created by a foreign power, and remaining dependent on it both financially and militarily. A dependent regime is not a responsible regime, and only responsibility selects for strength, wisdom and efficiency in a governing elite. The US relationship with the Karzai regime is selecting for um, very different qualities.
The actual reasons for the Soviet failure in Afghanistan are extremely obscure to me. But surely one of them was the quite genuine Soviet desire to create an independent, yet both stable and loyal, client state, which landed them in a very similar position of becoming dependent on a permanently incompetent puppet. I suspect results would have been quite different if the Russians had just said, screw it, and incorporated Afghanistan as an SSR.
And, on a narrower subject, Josh Foust is spectacularly right to praise the reportage of the Times' war correspondents. It's not without its flaws, but it's at least as good as anything else out there.
But it's spectacularly expensive. These are seasoned correspondents, and they cost money. So does their equipment, their travel, their food, their interpreters and local fixers, and all the rest of what they need to do their jobs. And virtually every other major American paper - you can count the exceptions on one hand - has closed its foreign bureaus. The broadcast media doesn't come close to matching the depth or texture of that coverage.
When journalists get targeted repeatedly, it makes it awfully difficult for their editors to sign off on their returning to the field. This is the second kidnapping of a Times reporter in a short span of time. When does Keller decide to feter their movements, or to insist on embeds or private security guards? I wouldn't blame him for making such a decision, although it couldn't come at a worse moment in time. Reports like this one remind me how lucky we are to have such coverage, and how much we'll miss it should it suddenly be suspended.
@Cynic:
I'm afraid a western coalition forcing Abdullah to be considered for a run-off, and him somehow managing to win, would be just another brand of awful. The Pashtun south would sink even farther into sullenness and insurgency, and there's a risk you'd fracture the security forces. We are underestimating the degree that he (or any other non-Pashtun president) would be seen as wholly unacceptable to the vast majority of Pashtuns, including a couple of my friends. That'd really be the beginning of the end.
So your only hopeful branch scenario is a runoff is negotiated, Karzai wins anyway, and then, as you say, becomes even more obstructionist. At that point we'd be getting perilously analogous to the final days of Ngo Dinh Diem.
See the trouble is, somebody got greedy. There are not 10,000 people of any age at one time in Shorabak District. It's an empty wasteland. The idea of 24,000 ballots from there (from 45 polling stations!) is just completely ludicrous.
In the nearly eight months I was there, Arghestan District, which the story refers to, had no government or coalition presence at all, ever. Too hostile. Zangabad, in eastern Panjwaii, could only be entered with all the force the ANSF and coalition had put together, and at a risk of heavy casualties each time. The idea of 2,000 local residents lining up under ANP observation to peacefully vote there (at the school the Taliban use as an RV, and all for Karzai, no less!) will sound completely unbelievable to anyone who was on my roto (that includes ANA and terps). So yeah, good for the Times... they've said what had to be said. The question is, as you say, now what?
It is well known by everyone that the amount of election fraud was significant, and this fraud heavily benefited Karzai, and it may have provided him the margin of votes which pushed him over 50%.
That being said, there must be a runoff election. The new Afghan president must win a clear victory and a fair victory (which has not happened so far), and this mandates a runoff. If the US does not apply political pressure, and if Karzai avoids a runoff election, then from here forward his regime will be regarded as corrupt and untouchable (even more so than it is already). This would completely undermine all US efforts to develop the legitimacy of Afghan institutions. In my opinion, a Karzai regime which cheats to maintain its grip on power is no longer an ally of the United States.
If the corrupt Karzai regime steals the election (which it appears to be doing), then we will have lost all reason for remaining in Afghanistan. We might as well go home. What would we be fighting for? To defend the corrupt? To maintain an illegitimate power?
@BruceR:
I hear you, and it's an excellent point.
I suppose - and I know I'm grasping at straws here - that what I really had in mind was a coalition. The vast electoral fraud seems to have been designed not to ensure a Karzai victory, which may well have been inevitable anyway, but a first-round triumph. That, in turn, was supposed to demonstrate Karzai's mandate, and strengthen his post-election negotiating position. It's speculative, but I think it's a fair read.
The situation in Afghanistan is rapidly reverting to ethnic blocs and their leaders - if, indeed, it ever got remotely close to a national identity to begin with. So when we're discussing legitimacy, we've got to be careful. It's not as if Karzai winning a free and fair election with 55% of the vote in the first round was going to render him legitimate in the eyes of most non-Pashtun voters. Conversely, Abdullah^2 triumphing in a monitor-certified runoff wouldn't quiet the Pashtuns. At the end of the day, some sort of coalition is going to be necessary so that the various groups within the country feel like they're getting their share. The election determines who gets to lead that coalition, and exactly how much clout they have to negotiate. But the Karzai forces screwed this up by transparently rigging the vote. All of a sudden, even a negotiated coalition looks like a farce. So we've got to have another round of voting, if only so that the baseline for the negotiations is seen as fair.
Yes, that's fairly weak logic. But what happened, in some sense, is that Karzai stole what he probably would have won - mostly to bolster his position in the aftermath. It's tough to assemble a coalition on the basis of fraud. So if there's hope in this mess, it will require an honest round of voting, followed by some serious negotiations.
Is it really that people who are skeptical about the merits of a COIN campaign now have "the best excuse" for our view? Isn't it possible that we've been arguing in good faith and you're now seeing growing evidence that we're correct?
Legacy of Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi in Iraq
mark the day.
"Also Filkins and Gall are super mega stars of war reporting, especially in Afghanistan (though also, obvi, Iraq and Chechnya)."
Bias aside ( I work for Fairfax) I'm putting in a vote for Paul McGeough from the Sydney Morning Herald
To the topic...
The increasing illegitimacy of the Karzai government is chilling. I support the ideas of COIN in AFPAK but to the extent that we prop up a obvious fraud, my temperament begins to change and my enthusiasm wanes.
@ SMG -"all of this indicates that if the election results in a fraudulent win for Kazai, we will hear plenty about it from the UN electoral commission" - look I love the idea of the UN, have good friends who work there but beyond a strong letter what can they realistically do these days.
For those with a better grasp of the internal politics - is a coalition bipartisan government of both Karzai and Abullah a remote possibility - or just one fraught with as many issues as either of them standing alone.
matt yglesias - the problem has always been that anti-COIN commentary has not included serious plans for managing the consequences of whatever alternative policy it may advocate, if it even gets around to actually advocating one. light-footprint is skethcy: we know that occasional cruise missiles, drones, and SF raids aren't nearly enough to disrupt taliban/AQ/HQN/HiG/etc operations now (not to mention that those tools have other serious problems), so why would we hope for better luck we if focused our efforts on using those tools?
under the current circumstances, i'm wondering about the likely consequences of trying for karzai-as-najibullah. i'm considering it. the guy's certainly canny enough to play the bush admin like a fiddle... which is sorta like mugging preschoolers, but cmon, karzai's a survivor. he's not legit, but dear lord, creating legitimacy is a hell of an operation... is it worth it? i was quite sure it was till very recently, but i'm reconsidering. this is incredibly tricky. either way we will be blamed for everything bad that happens afterwards. this has to be one of the most interesting geopolitical questions to face the west since the end of the cold war. it'll take me a couple of days to sort out ;)
I suppose Karzai could drive over a land mine by accident, perhaps after it is deemed necessary to cut back on his security detail for financial reasons.
David Sutton: " look I love the idea of the UN, have good friends who work there but beyond a strong letter what can they realistically do these days."
All they have to do, and what they DO do, is certify the election result, whatever it is. When that happens all this hoo ha will die down as it did in Iraq 2005 and recently in Indonesia.
The hoooha, including the allegations of and reality of ballot stuffing, is typical of elections in countries making baby-steps to democracy. Why AM is adding to the general hysteria is beyond me. He needs to have a cup of tea, a Bex and a good lie down. (That's an OZ expression)
"Is it really that people who are skeptical about the merits of a COIN campaign now have "the best excuse" for our view? Isn't it possible that we've been arguing in good faith and you're now seeing growing evidence that we're correct?"
Agree with this comment. The choice of "best excuse" as a title suggests a sore loser....
Who would the Taliban like to win? I suggest Abdullah because it would put the entire feudal system of patronage Karzai's presided over in complete disarray to be replaced by a new bunch of gangsters. Ideally fighting would break out and if the Taliban are really lucky there would be violent riots in Kabul with western agencies targeted for looting and arson. (Although the cause wasn't the election a violent riot broke out today in Ghazni for a preview of Afghan street politics)
The voter turnout in the south and east was low and the Taliban didn't even kill many people or attack many polling stations. What will they do for a run off? If they step up attacks on polling stations and election officials they may be able to get turn out down to single digits throughout the majority Pashtun provinces. Then what? Without pro-Karzai ballot fraud Abdullah wins but is considered illegitimate by everyone because of the low turnout. Then what? Another election this winter?
Some have said we should in effect stage a coup d'etat and replace the president with a UN Pro Consul. What are the chances that will lead to a widening rebellion and possibly mutinies among the ANSF? 90%...100%.
The best outcome was for Karzai to lose a fair election. The least bad answer may be to allow Karzai to win without a run off and get on trying to reduce corruption in the government.
A bex and a good lie down indeed, first heard that the day my mother started work at a hospital in Adelaide. Sage advice.
Dying down of Hoo Haa, that's not a bad thing unto itself, if the UN monitors can achive that, then will have done a decent days work.
"As I see it, we have three options. The first is to replace the current Afghan government with, as Positroll suggests, some sort of independent outside commissioner. "
Um no. I am not advocating replacing the Afghan gov as such. I was advocating putting in a HR that CAN fire Afghan officials, if they are corrupt, involved in the drug trade or helping the Taliban.
Like the Bosnian HR did with the former Republica Srbska President Poplasen back in 1999.
http://www.ohr.int/decisions/removalssdec/default.asp?content_id=267
The Afghans would still get to name the successor. Cf.
"I hereby remove Nikola Poplasen from the Office of President of Republika Srpska. Effective immediately, I forbid him from exercising any of the rights, privileges, and authorities of that office. Succession should be assured by relevant provisions of the RS law, which designate the Vice President of the Republika Srpska, and, failing that, a replacement appointed in accordance with generally accepted practice."
But maybe it won't be necessary, at least w.r.t. the election:
The Afghan Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) has for the first time invalidated some ballots from the presidential election because of fraud.
... However, the complaints commission does have the authority to order a recount or even to remove a candidate from the election. If it throws out enough votes "cast" for Mr Karzai it could also effectively order a presidential run-off by reducing his share of the vote to under 50%.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8248543.stm
It's not time for panic yet. If you thought a legitimate government was about a man, Hamid Karzai, it's a crisis. If it' about having functioning institutions, maybe not.
What we are seeing -- which our peerless commentators, AbuM included, seem to have missed -- is a battle within the instiutions running the election. It's between the Karzai-appointed Independent Election Commission, which bent the rules to drag Karzai over 50% and out of a runoff, and the UN-appointed and foreigner-run Election Complaint Commission, which has challenged roughly 500,000 votes -- enough to push the incumbent back under 50% and into a runoff.
Let's see what the outcome is before starting to unroll all the worst-case scenarios.
David Sutton .
Heh, heh, what AM needs is a Night with Dame Edna.
Christ, what a mess, and people familiar with Karzai's backhand ealings will be totally unsurprised by his electoral conduct. Fraud aside, let's not forget the deals he has done with highly unatural allieslike Dostum, allies who are going to want something in return. How can Karzai think he's got the legitimacy to repay them with key ministries, etc? It's farcical.
The Americans should push and push and push and push Karzai towards a second vote before he gets so pissed off he resigns.
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