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Contrary to popular belief...
Eli Lake and others are now reporting a resource request for Afghanistan will come on Friday, while Spencer Ackerman is at the Marine Corps University's COIN Leadership Conference blogging the procedings here, here, and here. Spencer reports predictable anxiety -- and even anger -- with the president in some quarters of the small wars community. (Even the New York Times, today, admits to being nervous.) I imagine most speakers, though -- and seriously, like half of CNAS spoke at this thing -- focused on operations or institutions as opposed to the politics, and the guy I would have wanted to hear speak would have been the pride of Rome, Georgia, Col. Dale Alford. Spencer reports:
Although some progressive critics have argued that the Obama administration has moved the Afghanistan war too deeply in the direction of counterinsurgency, Marine Corps Col. Dale Alford, a former adviser to McChrystal’s predecessor as U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. David McKiernan — whom he called “a great soldier” — said that U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan are insufficiently positioned to conduct so-called “population-centric” counterinsurgency. “We’re completely an enemy-centric force,” Alford said, noting that most U.S. bases in Afghanistan were constructed in 2003 and 2004 to support counterterrorism objectives like raiding discrete enemies. Alford, who also fought in Iraq, called for a “significant repositioning” of U.S. forward operating bases and combat outposts in Afghanistan to provide for population security and partner closer with Afghan security forces.
“If you’re not not sleeping with them, eating with them and crapping in same bucket as them, you’re not partnered with them,” Alford said.
I know this comes as a surprise to those who think U.S. ground forces are now a "COIN Army", but my own observations line up closer to those of Col. Alford. Without question, counterinsurgency is the ascendent "way of war" within the officer corps of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, meaning it is the prism through which officers observe and reflect upon the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the force is still a long way from being set up to wage this kind of war effectively. Again, this will strike you as incredible if you have been reading only this blog for the past two years, but there would not have been all that stuff in the McChrystal review about changing operational culture if the U.S. Army and Marine Corps were really and fully committed to population-centric counterinsurgency. In June, I had a senior -- and now departed -- officer in Afghanistan tell me, "But that's exactly how you protect the population! By going after the enemy!"
This leader, in other words, thought that he was doing population-centric counterinsurgency by essentially fighting in exactly the same way he had been taught to fight by the U.S. Army over the previous 2+ decades.
Targeting and killing the enemy is a key component to most forms of warfare, COIN included. But the question is where your central focus is. And I think Col. Alford is right that for the majority of U.S. and allied units fighting in Afghanistan, the focus remains the enemy. Which just goes to show that making promulgating one's ideas is relatively easy compared with effecting change to organizational culture.
Quite right. I think it is
Quite right. I think it is easy for those interestedin COIN, and reading mostly about COIN, to get a false impression of the wider mood, within DoD, within NATO and so on.
I had the pleasure of being on a panel with Col. Dale Alford and Col (ret.) Mansoor at the Naval War College's IW conference last week, him making some of the same, and very important points made at the MCU's COIN conference, Mansoor talking about the great learning of COIN in Iraq and me pointing to the lag in institutionalizing such learning within DoD (more on that here, if I may: http://tinyurl.com/ybuy3xz). It all provided for a rather contradictory snapshot of where the U.S. military is in terms of 'learning COIN' or becoming a 'COIN-only force', as some would have it.
Beyond the immediate imperative of getting the Afghanistan strategy right (or less wrong), an interesting debate will play out with the release of QDR 2010 as to where the Army and Marine Corps in particular should strike the balance between competing types of missions. There is a temptation to confuse the operational (or is that rhetorical) commitment to COIN with an institutional one, as discussed previously on this blog, and it would seem to me that continued proponency will be required to cut through some of the anti-COIN narratives that are already being spun ('COIN doesn't work', 'learning COIN is learning how to fight the last war'). In other words, keep up the good work...
The big questions are still
The big questions are still not answered. Before those are answered there can not be a decision on strategy.
1. COIN is based on the legitimacy of the host government within a majority of its population and in international real.
"FM 3-24 1-3. Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the
people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate."
Karzai does not have that legitimacy. What are you going do to to make the people accept an illegitimate government? Shot them?
2. COIN as "protecting the people". What are you do if those people DO NOT WANT to be protected? What are you going to do if the RESISTANCE IS THE PEOPLE?
The really stupid answer to the above two questions from the COINistas is: "Well, we will do COIN."
Somehow that answer does not fit the questions.
David: Alford's presentation
David: Alford's presentation was a very smart one and I enjoyed it (la tienne aussi d'ailleurs:) ). Btw, have not yet received the book for the time being..... Perfectly agree with your comment, except that, being not commited in the US military or the US national interest, perhaps I'm not the right guy to make this point. But; well, how about crafting a fair history of what happened in Iraq? (which is precisely the topic of my PhD)
Andrew: I share your assesment of the US military and COIN. It's not so surprising if you assume most of US COIN doctrine (if not strategy) comes from the French one in Algeria where enemy- and population-centric approaches could be deemed as "two sides of the same coin" (or, more precisely, enemy-centric being a direct approach and population-centric being an indirect one with the additional flaw of "tactical schyzophrenia" and ambivalent projects for the people) . One more reflections: maybe it is too indeterminate to speak of "population as the center of gravity".. Why not prefer: "adhesion of the population"?
Again, a very good blog.
Thanks for the insight.
Thanks for the insight. While not a member of this community the resurgence of interest in COIN and its applications has been of major concern to me as a foreign policy problem. NB: it was a shock for those of us with long enough memories to discover that the great debates and learning from 'Nam had disappeared in the institutional dustbins of organizational cultural opposition (where's WEB Griffin when you need him?). Beyond that there are several other critical factors to consider imho. Envision a hierarchy of planning and implementation (briefly): Policy, Strategy, Goals & Objectives, Doctrine, Operational Planning, Capabilities, Implementation & Execution, Resources, Operational Management (aligning resources including time to OpPlans and Strategies, re-climbing the hierarchy to revised policy and strategies when mis-alignment is clear).
While the question you're addressing is vitally important it exists within this larger context and it is there I see the greatest weaknesses.
Specifically our goal is/should be a stable Afghanistan that provides decent government, not necessary a democracy, and lays the groundwork for socionomic development. Our real reason for that is that a destabilized Afghanistan would not only be at risk as a haven, nor just that our credibility and influence would take such a hit, but, most importantly that an unstable Afghanistan is likely to lead to a devolving Pakistan with all that would entail.
Given all that as a strawman pop down several levels an ask what operational capabilities and resources would be required on a local and provincial level to improve government performance? Are they available in an a politically viable timeframe? If not what are our alternatives?
Dave Livingston
p.s. - as a test case you might want to consider this essay collection where the approach was applied to Iraq beginning in early 2007: Iraq Lessons: Looking Back to Look Forward (http://www.scribd.com/doc/19654730/Iraq-Lessons-Looking-Back-to-Look-For... ) and if you're interested in the framework this might be interesting:
http://www.scribd.com/doc/18762337/Good-Government-for-a-Stable-World
Exum et all- I share your
Exum et all-
I share your observations on the GPF and COIN; however, the opposite reaction of some is to refuse to fight and target the enemy out of fear of being perceived as too enemy-centric. That's just silly. As I continue to frame my own perspective, I don't like the differentiation between Pop-Centric and Enemy-Centric. Most of those choices are METT-TC driven. My tactical experience in COIN was mostly spent clearing and occupying enemy safehavens- shadow goverments and training camps. In those areas, initially entry and dismantling of the enemy's infrastructure is a highly kinetic task. Another distinction should be made from a UAV triggered airstrike and troops-in-contact airstrike. They are mutually exclusive. A dude watching the war behind a computer screen does not have the same situational awareness of a marine receiving enemy fire.
Simultaneously, a commander must use strict judgement in determining when to strike the enemy. If women and children are being used to emplace IEDs, resupply fighters with weapons and ammunition, directly fire at CF, or serve as suicide bombers, then they are enemy combatants. Does that mean that you always kill them? Nope.
Going back to my questions yesterday, I'll refine one thought based off yours and Gullivers comments. A third option may simply be redefining what our goal for governance is for A'stan. If we except a much smaller centralized gov't that mainly controls the urban areas with tribal authority in the periphery, then that answer may be suitable.
Thoughts?
v/r
Mike
But you see though that for
But you see though that for the entire matrix of Coin to stay in place, the observation has, in fact MUST, be that the unit before me didn’t get Coin, we now still don’t get Coin, but if you listen to us the experts and we use the precepts of FM 3-24 of learning and adapting to better population centric coin then at some point we might get there. But the way the matrix works is that you can never get there because if you do the matrix implodes.
And come on, be honest with your selves Coindinistas, if you ever acknowledged that the Army was pretty good and has institutionalized Coin then you lose one of the key pillars of your raison d’être. There are hundreds of examples too of how the American Army has become a Coin force from decisions made about force structure, to its intellectual climate which is almost nothing but Coin-speak, to the catechisms and continuously regurgitated maxims of population centric Coin which essentially provide the substance for General McChrystal’s recently leaked assessment.
David Ucko's newest book is a perfect exposition of the Coin matrix and the narrative of learning and adapting.
Problem is that NONE of it is supported by history (although a good deal of myth does support it) nor does Alford's observations necessarily jibe with those made by Kilcullen and Biddle who have both recently complimented the American Army for being quite nowadays proficient at population centric counterinsurgency.
COL Gentile -- I notice you
COL Gentile -- I notice you never responded to my several questions from another thread in which you asserted that we are now a "COIN Army." I've reposted below:
Face it Andrew, you have won, the Army is now a Coin Army.
I'm sorry, but -- with all due respect -- this is utter nonsense.
If this is a COIN Army, why are we short of trained helicopter pilots?
If this is a COIN Army, why do we lack personnel trained in languages and cultures? (And why are there so few FAO generals?)
If this is a COIN Army, why are intelligence operations still driven by kinetic targeting?
If this is a COIN Army, why are there no dedicated, purpose-trained advisory personnel?
If this is a COIN Army, why are so many field-grade officers still ignorant of the rudiments of COIN doctrine?
If this is a COIN Army, why is there still no institutionalized training, units, or operational/procedural mechanism for providing ministerial-level governance mentoring?
If this is a COIN Army, why does force protection still get pride of place in the operating mentality of combat arms unit leaders?
If this is a COIN Army, why is the default operational approach still FOB-centric?
If this is a COIN Army, why do heavy brigades make up 40% of active Army combat brigades?
"And come on, be honest with
"And come on, be honest with your selves Coindinistas, if you ever acknowledged that the Army was pretty good and has institutionalized Coin then you lose one of the key pillars of your raison d’être."
Thats way over the line, I think, because it indicates that folks set personal ambitions in front of the mission. WAD respect.
Gulliver - as an outsider
Gulliver - as an outsider to all of this, it looks as if Col. Gentile has answered your question, albeit in an oblique fashion.The answer:
"There are hundreds of examples too of how the American Army has become a Coin force from decisions made about force structure, to its intellectual climate which is almost nothing but Coin-speak, to the catechisms and continuously regurgitated maxims of population centric Coin which essentially provide the substance for General McChrystal’s recently leaked assessment."
Are you not talking past each other, a bit? From the David Ucko comment above:
"There is a temptation to confuse the operational (or is that rhetorical) commitment to COIN with an institutional one, as discussed previously on this blog, and it would seem to me that continued proponency will be required to cut through some of the anti-COIN narratives that are already being spun ('COIN doesn't work', 'learning COIN is learning how to fight the last war'). In other words, keep up the good work..."
So, in the end, it all depends on how you define a COIN army, I suppose, and you two seem to me to be using a different definition. Neither definition will meet - the lines are parallel into infinity! How can such a large institution change itself, but over time, and depending on the time point or the level of the organization that you 'measure' , you will get a different sense of how far down COIN reaches. Each member of the regular discussion 'panel' in the comments section here at Abu M seems to use a different definition of a COIN army, anyway. Well, that's my outsider's perspective on the continuously spinning debate....feel free to ridicule or ignore, as need be :)
OT, but I would like to
OT, but I would like to enter a substring from the Biddlepost below. ( I still think a forum-addon would be really great for Abu M, so that old strings dont die that quick, btw.)
Mike U writes: "I have to confess to not having read through the entirety of the Posts here but have reached the saturation point with regard to dubious assertions with regard to the threat Afghan instability poses to Pakistan. I've been an admirer of Biddle's for sometime - just as I am of Kilcullen and the Kagan's- but the notion that we need to remain in Afghanistan in order to stabilize Pakistan borders on the absurd -- at least to those of us that have lived in and worked on Pakistan for awhile. "
Sir, I would contend that you forget one point that is crucial. If the civil war breaks out in full again, we can expect the families who were living in the refugee camps inside Pakistan and subsequently went back to return. Only this time, they will be radicalized to a certain extent against the west instead of the internal conflicts. A whole generation of veterans in Gaza-like refugee camps for the second time inside Pakistan? With the Pashtun mafia as strong as it is? Not a good idea. I have not been to Pakistan myself, but know and have worked with many, and was in jail with some of them, and we discuss politics now and then. Its a interesting form of inside baseball. But the Mubai and Bhutto actions, as well as several other freaking epic actions by AQ, shows that the stability of Pakistan isnt exactly very good. While I dont see them coming down from the mountains, they can do some pretty bad things if they turn their full strength south.
Absolutely glorious. Exum
Absolutely glorious. Exum has seen the writing on the wall - the Afghan adventure he has cheered for will not end well. The questionable "success" of the surge will not be repeated, no matter how events are spun.
With this post, Exum is positioning himself and the rest of his band of merry Wilsonian interventionists for the inevitable aftermath. After all, if the American people lose their appetite for ruling foreigners against their will but for their own good, where will Exum work? He might have to find a real job, or even (gasp!) return to the Army. Clearly, this will not do.
In the new COIN reverse dolchstosslegende, CNAS had a splendid, workable plan for Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the stupid, hidebound, incompetent Army and Marine Corps just weren't able to adjust fast or well enough to make it happen, mostly due to their flawed organizational culture. Future interventions will surely turn out better, but only if the COIN script is followed more assiduously.
Ignore the fact that the US government is not constituted to support these operations. Ignore the fact that Exum has never followed his own tactical advice and never will. Ignore the fact that others who have actually done what CNAS recommends almost uniformly say it will not work. Ignore the fact that casualties in Afghanistan have doubled as compared to last year as a result of following Exum's advice. Exum will not be happy until 100% of the Army and USMC are pooping in buckets with natives. Only then can he rest.
Because this can never happen, Exum and CNAS will be positioned to make an entire career of writing snarky, finger-wagging op-eds about the military's many failings.
Lifelong think-tank employment-mission accomplished, Ex!
Absolutely glorious. Exum
Absolutely glorious. Exum has seen the writing on the wall - the Afghan adventure he has cheered for will not end well. The questionable "success" of the surge will not be repeated, no matter how events are spun.
With this post, Exum is positioning himself and the rest of his band of merry Wilsonian interventionists for the inevitable aftermath. After all, if the American people lose their appetite for ruling foreigners against their will but for their own good, where will Exum work? He might have to find a real job, or even (gasp!) return to the Army. Clearly, this will not do.
In the new COIN reverse dolchstosslegende, CNAS had a splendid, workable plan for Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the stupid, hidebound, incompetent Army and Marine Corps just weren't able to adjust fast or well enough to make it happen, mostly due to their flawed organizational culture. Future interventions will surely turn out better, but only if the COIN script is followed more assiduously.
Ignore the fact that the US government is not constituted to support these operations. Ignore the fact that Exum has never followed his own tactical advice and never will. Ignore the fact that others who have actually done what CNAS recommends almost uniformly say it will not work. Ignore the fact that casualties in Afghanistan have doubled as compared to last year as a result of following Exum's advice. Exum will not be happy until 100% of the Army and USMC are pooping in buckets with natives. Only then can he rest.
Because this can never happen, Ex and CNAS will be positioned to make an entire career of writing snarky op-eds about the military's many failings.
Lifelong think-tank employment-mission accomplished, Ex!
ARB must be a troll for the
ARB must be a troll for the "other side" Why, if you are a fan of the philosophy, can't you answer the questions posed?
I would challenge Andrew to answer them. If he does I will be very interested in how he does so.
As a matter of fact if he can answer those questions with clear logic and indisputable truth. I will never post here again.
Bud, USMC /USN
I dont think my post was
I dont think my post was over the top at all. It is clear from the writings and rhetoric of the Coin Experts that the learning and adapting paradigm demands that an outfit has to be screwed up when it starts, as was the unit before it, then the learning and adapting occurs to better population centric coin and if the rules are followed then success is achieved. I am not making this up, nor am I exagerating. And it is a key pillar of the matrix.
I am also struck by Andrew's post at the end that seems to lament that the Army has not made a cultural shift away from killing the enemy to an embracing of the "population." Even with Afghanistan, is that really the kind of cultural shift that we want to make which would be away from killing the enemy to focusing on the "population"? What kind of implications does this hold for the entire Army over the next 15 to 20 years?
COL Gentile -- Again, can
COL Gentile -- Again, can you substantiate your claim that we have become a "COIN Army"?
I am also struck by Andrew's post at the end that seems to lament that the Army has not made a cultural shift away from killing the enemy to an embracing of the "population." Even with Afghanistan, is that really the kind of cultural shift that we want to make which would be away from killing the enemy to focusing on the "population"? What kind of implications does this hold for the entire Army over the next 15 to 20 years?
We probably want to make a cultural shift towards accomplishing the mission over any other subsidiary concerns like "killing the enemy" or "protecting the population". It just so happens that in this particular sort of war, and in order to accomplish the objectives set forth by the nation's political leadership, "protecting the population" represents a significant component of the operational design most suited to accomplishing the mission.
This is one impressive
This is one impressive group. I love the arguments here. I am going to pose a couple of questions to clarify a few things for myself...1. Doesn't the Army already have a specialized group trained in COIN? I thought that was Special Forces (correct me if I'm wrong). 2. Why are we then providing on the job training to conventional commanders in this area that is being paid for by the blood and sacrifice of the soldiers and marines they command? 3. Is there no way back to the Special Forces led mission in Afghanistan supported by conventional troops but subordinate to the SF command?
I still haven't seen a reasonable argument that a destablized Afghanistan leads to a Pakistan melt down. Hasn't Afghanistan been destabilized for hundreds of years? What about the tribal movements taking place in isolated areas of Aghanistan? Should we not focus on allowing these types of movements to take hold instead of propping up Karzai?
Col. Gian. Would you please
Col. Gian. Would you please adress my questions above? Your opinion I have respect for.
@MDW , I am probably not
@MDW , I am probably not adequately informed of the last 10 years of mission specific training , but I can tell you this. The COIN people are trying to remake the Army SF and Marine Corps in their image. In my 16 years of dedicated service I have never seen such a lack of understanding of the overall face of warfare.
War is one specific thing defined clearly defined.
Nation Building is a completely different thing.
We weren't trained for it, nor did we sign up for it.
Nor is the American Military responsible for it .
Afghanistan will do what it has always done unless we are there to dominate their government. Which is not in our job description.
Comment by b on September
Comment by b on September 24, 2009 - 5:28am
""The big questions are still not answered. Before those are answered there can not be a decision on strategy.
1. COIN is based on the legitimacy of the host government within a majority of its population and in international real.
Karzai does not have that legitimacy. What are you going do to to make the people accept an illegitimate government? Shot them?""
Where would you shoot them ? At the massive rallies denouncing the legitimacy of the government ? At the gathering of crowds around poll-takers recording the majority of people not supporting his government ? Sorry, neither exist.
2. COIN as "protecting the people". What are you do if those people DO NOT WANT to be protected? What are you going to do if the RESISTANCE IS THE PEOPLE?
The really stupid answer to the above two questions from the COINistas is: "Well, we will do COIN." Somehow that answer does not fit the questions.
Yes, but that's not a problem because your questions do not fit reality.
You find me a poll result that not only doesn't list security of the population as a major, overriding theme in what the population wants, but actually shows the opposite and I'll find you a poll you wrote yourself in crayon.
Kilo, well said. Does anyone
Kilo, well said. Does anyone in this discussion believe that the ANA is not popular? Does anyone believe that the Quetta Shura Taliban and Haqqani are popular? {Hekmatyur strikes me more as a run of the mill war lord that can be bribed to join the GIRoA, am I wrong?} What I think would be useful is to ask which Pashtu root for the Taliban in a battle with the ANA. There are man of these type of Pashtu in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, in some other places near the Pakistan border, and in Pakistan itself. Any estimate of how large this number is and where they live?
These are the poeple who "DO NOT WANT to be protected." What can be done to shrink this group of people might be something to discuss.
While this is a good
While this is a good discussion, someone pointed out the religious element. The populaion and enemy both are Islamic. This has been ignored and it is as if all people will react the same to strategy. What works in a non Muslim country will not work in a Muslim country. Prolonged long distance campaigns never work out so well, and it sounds to me that if the US will be in Astan another 10 years they become an imperialist country after all. Is this what you set out to do? I thought it was to destroy the Taliban an AQ or something like that.
You would think that since Anderw Exum spent years in Muslim countries he might grasp this simple concept!
It appears that none of you
It appears that none of you can answer the post of :Comment by Bud on September 24, 2009 - 2:54pm.
That is sad and tells the true story. I was hoping for intelligent and informed discourse, instead I got Exum worship.
I presented a logical
I presented a logical precise argument against the whole philosophy of COIN. Then I respectfully asked for feed back from Andrew or any other person feeling capable of refuting the argument.
Guess what I got.
Resounding silence. Which is typical of those who can't refute an argument.
I have given you every opportunity to man up............................................. Silence.
@Kilo - "You find me a poll
@Kilo - "You find me a poll result that not only doesn't list security of the population as a major, overriding theme in what the population wants, but actually shows the opposite and I'll find you a poll you wrote yourself in crayon."
It seems to me that security is not the overriding issue for Afghans, but corruption and the economy is:
But maybe the ABC/BBC/ARD poll from last February was indeed originally written in crayon - I only have the pdf version.
- The Afghans do not want more foreign troops.
- A majority still has a positive view of security - though sinking sharply
- Corruption seems to be of much bigger concern
- Electricity and development are the bigger/same concern as security.
/quote/
While Afghans likely will welcome a new strategy, they’re far cooler on new troops:
Contrary to Washington’s plans, just 18 percent say the number of U.S. and NATO/ISAF
forces in Afghanistan should be increased. Far more, 44 percent, want the opposite – a
decrease in the level of these forces.
...
Amid widespread experience of warfare – gun battles, bombings and air strikes among
them – the number of Afghans who rate their own security positively has dropped from
72 percent in 2005 to 55 percent today – and it goes far lower in high-conflict provinces.
...
more Afghans now blame the country’s strife on the United States and
its allies than on the Taliban.
...
Afghanistan’s problems range far beyond security in general and the
Taliban in particular. For one, official corruption has swelled; 85 percent of Afghans call
it a problem and 63 percent call it a big problem – the latter up from 45 percent last year.
...
Electricity supply is steadily the single biggest complaint, along with economic
opportunity and prices.
...
As noted, two chief forces are at play in deteriorating public sentiment in Afghanistan –
security and development alike. Of these, security is a stronger factor in views of the
United States and its NATO/ISAF allies. But development is about as strong as security
in views of Karzai and the Afghan government
/endquote/
Any hints for a newer poll are welcome.
@ b "But maybe the
@ b
"But maybe the ABC/BBC/ARD poll from last February was indeed originally written in crayon - I only have the pdf version"
I have it too. It's what I was referring to. Why you think it contradicts what I wrote is as yet unexplained.
The relevant data for where security sits in terms of primacy of concerns for the Afg population -- that in which security is compared to other concerns -- is in the question/answer tables (start p15) and they kick off right from question 1 with with security concerns leading the pack for:
1. The primary reason they think the country is going in the right direction
2. The primary reason they think the country is going in the wrong direction
3. The biggest problem facing the country
Note however that if it dropped from 1 to 7th, this would be the same result in terms of contradicting what you wrote until it is superseded by the libertarian option of "get security forces of any stripe out of my area".
You also mentioned (albeit very vaguely) people not wanting to be protected by security forces. This in itself is a concept too stupid to be polled, so the closest I can see is are the respective ratings for the perceptions/support of the IASF, ANA, local police and Taliban. These too are also quite clear. Not in terms of who in particular is supported, but that someone is in percentages that aren't tiny minorities.
Likewise, the polling on positive/negative ratings for the Karzai government aren't even negative.
So in summary, I don't know why you've referred to this polling. But now that you have acknowledged that you have this and are aware of it's findings, either you can pose the questions you asked with a straight face, or you can't. Which is it ?
New Usama bin Laden Audio
New Usama bin Laden Audio Message "To the People of Europe" Released Today, Listen to It
Tom Ricks: "One of the most
Tom Ricks: "One of the most interesting panels was made up of three Marine colonels who commanded battalions in successful counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Not surprisingly, they were the most vocal people all day in support of the McChrystal plan. What you need is a force that simultaneously goes after the enemy and protects the population, they all agreed. But, observed Col. J.D. Alford, "We're a completely enemy-centric force" in Afghanistan. Alford, who commanded the 3rd Battalion of the 6th Marines in northwest Iraq in 2005, said we need to be much closer to the Afghan security forces, living and working alongside them."
Ricks, a CNAS fellow, notes that Alford and the others commanded successful COIN operations. Then he reports that Alford says "we're a completely enemy-centric force..." Note that "successful" is a descriptor of operations conducted by an "enemy-centric force." Was that "successful" only grist for OERs? Or did these colonels actually achieve success? Do these colonels believe they succeeded? If they do believe they succeeded, how did they do it, if, as they are now saying, "enemy-centric" is improper? Anybody else see the difficulty some of us have in arriving at the truth here?
One must also wonder at the vaunted McChrystal report, particularly if one has any experience in the military. This report, submitted by a four-star general, lists as its contributors only one active duty officer, and that's an Air Force officer. The rest appear to be civilians with little or no military experience from think-tanks , all of whom have a stake in continued military action in Afghanistan. Where is the SF colonel? Or the infantry colonel, for that matter? Where is the military intelligence officer, active or retired? Where is the logistics guy? Where is the two-star who's been there, done that? Where are the graybeards who actually tried to do this stuff in Vietnam? Didn't see any of them. All I saw was people with agendas, ideologues with theories, but no practical experience. There don't even seem to be any folks with serious experience in Afghanistan. Some country experts would have been nice. Some people with serious ground combat experience would have been nice, too.
As one delves more deeply into this superficial and inadequate report, one is more and more surprised that a four-star general actually submitted it as his product. Not only is it mighty sketchy given what's at stake, one might also conclude that the description of the problem is such that no unbiased reader could help but believe that the recommended course of action is doomed to failure. What's remarkable is that the group that put this together was actually able to put together a fairly accurate assessment of the current situation. What's even more remarkable is that they are all able to then ignore their own assessment and recommend plowing blindly forward with unlimited faith in the American people to see the righteousness of their cause and to sacrifice their youth and their treasure for many more years.
Serious cognitive dissonance in the COIN community, IMO. If I were a COINdinista, I wouldn't be doing handsprings. The nation is falling apart and this group, which apparently does not know the difference between the Taliban and Al Qaeda, wants us to chase a chimera forever.
As a -non military- US
As a -non military- US citizen I have some concerns and questions as to what is happening in Afghanistan or will happen there in the near future. Help me understand.
1. The leaking of the McChrystal report was messy and dirty. It has denied our government the opportunity to receive the report, rationalize it, debate it, revise it and to come to a consensus to formulate a strategy in private that then could be issued to the military and explained to the American public. The media reported chest thumping of some military officers, though denied, if true it will not be tolerated by the public and will lead to shortened careers at best.
2. COIN seems to be the new tactic in Afghanistan. From everything I have read COIN is a 7-10 year process. We have spent close to 7 years there already so is this going to be a 14-17 year event. That is a generation. I know we have made mistakes in the past but is COIN the cure all to end all.
3. Increasing resources seems to be a doubling of our military, in country, in an 18 month period. Now logistically that is no small event especially in an area such as Afghanistan. I did not see much in the McChrystal leaked report on logistics. I recently read that gasoline/diesel is costing close to $100 per gallon to get it to our troops. Even if it is half that amount what will be the cost once you double our forces or is it logistically feasable to double the hard goods with our presently stretched supply lines.
4. In our new phase of Pop-Centric who is the enemy? The Taliban, Al Qaida or the Pashtun people. What percentage of our actions will be CT? Will we have to install a dummy government before a real one stands up? How soon will the agitators (Iran, Russia, China etc) provide more sophisticated weaponry to the Taliban to limit our aviation assets?
5. Money moves the world and I'm not sure we have enough to sustain a full blown COIN op in Afghanistan. Have we looked at buying off the Taliban or other players. Bribery is cheap versus the present contemplated plan.
Help me understand!
Keep trying Bud maybe the
Keep trying Bud maybe the self important overeducated morons on here will take notice.
silence......................
silence................................................man up or shut up.
Visitor 229, War Is a
Visitor 229, War Is a singular thing .
Do the job
Get out when it's done''
Instill fear.
Go home.!!!!!
Hope you are still able to relate to those you loved before you left.
Never forget the oath you took.
Learn to live with it.
Isn't a PC COIN Army a
Isn't a PC COIN Army a police force and does anyone actually want the US military to focus on policing? Does the US want ground forces modeled on the Brit Army in Northern Ireland circa 1985? How has all that COIN focus and experience worked out for the Brits in Basra and Helmand?
Is growing support for PC COIN a result of officers seeing the light or simply a function of realizing who will be sitting on promotion boards for the next decade?
BUD. you asked: " So tell me
BUD. you asked: " So tell me gentlemen, How many years will it take to change a
civilization based on Islam and a deep personal belief of the precepts of
that belief? How many lives will it cost? How much money? and finally how
much will it cost us as a country and a people to become ...............
"Just Like Them" and force change that is not of their own choice?"
I think this question is framed wrong. But before I get into that, let me give you an example of how a question could be framed differently: What is the US objective (forget about what the "civilization of Islam" wants or does not want, what does the US want?)? Whether it is the best objective or not, what is the best way to achieve that objective (if any)? what are the alternatives? I think you have to answer the first question, then we can discuss if its an achievable objective and does Islam make it harder or easier to achieve it.
Now, to your question: As someone from an "Islamic" country, I can tell you that they are not that different from unislamic countries at the same level of development. I am not saying there is NO difference. There are some. But a surprising number of the same carrots and sticks work there as well. Why should the US even need to "change the civilization"? Civilization will change by itself; its changing in every country of the world. The ambitions of the US are much more limited. You want to replace a taliban govt with a new govt that does not host terrorists anymore. its a difficult objective because the state is very underdeveloped AND because 7 years worth of mistakes have put the US effort back. But its not an impossible task and it does not involve "changing the civilization". That is a straw man, not needed and not a primary objective. Focus on simpler things. Who gets to rule? who gets to kill people? How to stop X from taking power? You are confusing yourself by focusing on a job that you dont have to do..
Omar, nicely put. I didn't
Omar, nicely put. I didn't Bud's insinuations.
M Shannon, the Brits are bad at COIN. They did an "AWFUL" job training the 10th Iraqi Army division and the Basrah and Maysan provincial Iraqi Police. In Afghanistan they have done a poor job training the Helmand ANP. How is that COIN focus? That is incompetence focus.
I sure hope the Brits have learnt some lessons and are doing a better job now.
Shannon, what do you think about the provincial ANP in Nangarhar province? Why are you so pessimistic about the ANSF in Kabul, the North and the West, and Pakhtia/Khost in the East? Are you incorrectly extrapolating from your unpleasant observations in Jalalabad to the whole of Afghanistan? Even in Jalalabad, have you heard anything negative about the ANCOPs and NDS?
@anan What do you make of
@anan
What do you make of Ann Jones's article on the ANA training near Kabul?
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2009/09/meet-afghan-army
I think McChrystal's ANA and ANP training timelines may be too short.
Antoinette, you can read
Antoinette, you can read this discussion of the Jones article:
http://www.registan.net/index.php/2009/09/20/the-importance-of-local-rel...
McChrystal's timeframe is too short in my view. The ANA and ANP training is being rushed. The training cycles are far too short. Today, a 2nd Lieutenant without any military experience only gets 20 weeks of training. Now, some ANP are trained 3 weeks and thrown into service (with the long term plan to eventually give them the final seven weeks.) This is before McChystal tightens training cycles still further.
The real problem is that the ANA and ANP throughput (number being trained at any given point of time) is far too low. This was done to "save money." Talk about penny wise and pound foolish.
Read the McChrystal report on the ANSF. He calls for growing the ANA to 134,000 by October, 2010. That is in one year! And Obama hasn't yet approved the plan yet (since it depends on additional financing and US trainers.)
I would prioritize quality versus quantity, but I am not in charge.
Anan, many thanks for the
Anan, many thanks for the link and your response.
I have seen a few of the National Military Academy of Afghanistan cadets - they are impressive.
Antoinette, can I ask about
Antoinette, can I ask about your experiences in Afghanistan and some more about your observations of the cadets?
Anan, I saw them at West
Anan, I saw them at West Point during the Sandhurst competition last spring. I was a spectator. My observations are superficial, but I was impressed by their strength, agility, and unit cohesion.
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