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Georg Klein (and the Bundeswehr) on the Carpet
Rajiv Chandrasekaran has been allowed access into ISAF's investigation of what happened in Kunduz:
Instead of sending troops to the scene for an assessment of casualties -- as McChrystal's directive requires -- the Germans waited until morning to send an unmanned aircraft over the site to take photographs. The first German troops did not arrive at the scene until noon Friday. By then, all the bodies had been removed.
Mirajuddin said he and his relatives found the bodies of only three of his cousins. He buried them that morning in the same grave, he said.
On Friday night, though, his story, and those of others in the area, were unknown to the fact-finding team. The Germans were still insisting that only insurgents were targeted. Even so, members of the team came to believe that there almost certainly had been civilian casualties....
At midday Saturday, after visiting the hospital and flying over the bombing site in a helicopter, the team met with two local officials. The NATO officers were expecting anger and calls for compensation. What they received was a totally unanticipated sort of criticism.
"I don't agree with the rumor that there were a lot of civilian casualties," said one key local official, who said he did not want to be named because he fears Taliban retribution. "Who goes out at 2 in the morning for fuel? These were bad people, and this was a good operation."
A few hours later, McChrystal arrived at the reconstruction team's base in Kunduz. A group of leaders from the area, including the chairman of the provincial council and the police chief, were there to meet him. So, too, were members of an investigative team dispatched by President Hamid Karzai.
McChrystal began expressing sympathy "for anyone who has been hurt or killed."
The council chairman, Ahmadullah Wardak, cut him off. He wanted to talk about the deteriorating security situation in Kunduz, where Taliban activity has increased significantly in recent months. NATO forces in the area, he told the fact-finding team before McChrystal arrived, need to be acting "more strongly" in the area.
His concern is shared by some officials at the NATO mission headquarters, who contend that German troops in Kunduz have not been confronting the rise in Taliban activity with enough ground patrols and comprehensive counterinsurgency tactics.
"If we do three more operations like was done the other night, stability will come to Kunduz," Wardak told McChrystal. "If people do not want to live in peace and harmony, that's not our fault."
McChrystal seemed to be caught off guard.
"We've been too nice to the thugs," Wardak continued.
As McChrystal drove to the bombing site -- defying German suggestions that the area was too dangerous -- one senior NATO official noted that the lack of opposition from local officials, despite relatively clear evidence that some civilians were killed, could help to de-escalate tensions.
"We got real lucky here," the official said.
A former commander in Afghanistan -- and one for whom I have all the time in the world -- wrote an email to me yesterday and identified what I also believe to be the most important issue here: the reluctance of some ISAF units -- especially, perhaps, but not only the Germans -- to conduct even the most basic patrolling and/or expose themselves to combat operations. Why, one has a right to ask, did the Germans not deploy a QRF or Ground Assault Convoy to recover the fuel trucks when they were stolen? Even after the trucks became stuck the Germans decided to instead engage with an F-15. And they wonder why or how civilians are killed? If you read between the lines in Rajiv's report, you'll note the way in which he highlights the Germans' reluctance to move outside the wire. (McChrystal eventually ignores the Germans and travels to the bomb site, which the Germans thought too dangerous to visit.)
The locals, you'll note, are angry -- but not angered by the civilian casualties. They're angry, instead, at ISAF for not taking a firmer hand against the insurgents. They're angry that the grandsons of what Max Hastings described this weekend as "probably the most formidable fighting force the world has seen" can't be bothered to conduct ground combat operations in an environment begging them to do so.
I cannot even begin to imagine how frustrated General McChrystal is right now. Frustrated with Col. Georg Klein, the commander who called in the air strike, and frustrated that the Germans cannot be relied upon to regain control of Kunduz and Baghlan Provinces when he so badly needs more ISAF units in the east and west that he surely cannot spare any for the north.
This airstrike may become an
This airstrike may become an icon of failure in every dimension you can think of. German troops, now in their 8th year of deployment to Afghanistan, have not been able to built up sufficient intelligence structures, have no sustained body of knowledge throughout the now 19 contingents, waste time sitting behind the fence, are mal-equipped and - to make things worse - a political leadership that appears to not have even the basic knowledge of a professional information policy. http://bendler-blog.de/
"..when the facts change i
"..when the facts change i change my mind. what do you do sir?"
Q: How wedded are you/we to NATO?
Q: Is coalition warfare always the way to go?
Q: A few months of dealing with this, do the years prior look so inexplicable?
Q: Maybe avoiding "civilian" casualties is not the same metric of success for the Afghans that it is for us? Perhaps they value order more highly? The Afghan local officials might. Recall that the Assad regime has support in Syria because they bought order. Even if the price was Hama, and living in a Police State.
Germany is ISAF's weakest
Germany is ISAF's weakest link. In 2007, their SF units were not permitted to fire on a known Taliban commander whom they had tracked after he blew up a factory in Baghlan province, killing dozens of children there on a tour. They were only permitted to capture him, not kill him. He escaped.
Now, they're calling in 500 lb. bombs on some stolen fuel tankers? Tankers are stolen routinely in Kunduz—they've never been used for suicide attacks before, and from Chandrasekaran reported here, they had no specific reason to think that this time the tankers would be used that way either. In fact, if all they based their imminent threat talk on was a grainy aerial camera and some dude telling them they're all bad guys... what the hell is that?
It's interesting to note that the governor of Kunduz cares more about Germany's refusal to do its job than about the dead civilians out looting fuel. He finds Germany's intransigence the greater moral outrage... as should we, ultimately. The German Army bears most of the blame, IMO, for Kunduz going downhill over the past four years. They need to either man up or get the hell out and let some adults take over.
1) "identified what I also
1) "identified what I also believe to be the most important issue here: the reluctance of some ISAF units -- especially, perhaps, but not only the Germans -- to conduct even the most basic patrolling and/or expose themselves to combat operations. "
The German position in Afghanistan must be viewed in light of the fact that almost nobody in Europe agrees with what the CNAS/COIN lobby wants to do in Afghanistan. The German troops (as well as pretty much all non-US troops) are there as a sign of politicqal support for NATO. You can call it a "big problem" that the Germans won't do more tactically, but in fact the US should be thankful they are there in the first place.
Its not a question of having the Germans "adopt more effecient tactics." Due to the intense domestic German opposition to their presence the fact that they are there in the first place is a MAJOR concession. If the US starts pressing the Germans to adopt more agressive tactics militarily, watch how much harder it becomes politically for the German government to maintain that presence.
2) "The locals, you'll note, are angry -- but not angered by the civilian casualties. They're angry, instead, at ISAF for not taking a firmer hand against the insurgents."
How would you know that? Have you been talking to them? NATO kills 120 people and you assume that Afghanis are angry at ISAF for not "taking a firmer hand against the insurgents?? Do you have any evidence to back this up?
3) Are you really that much of a COIN Kool Aid drinker to not recognize a shinking ship when you see one? Wouldn't want to see you go down in history as the Pollak/ O'Hanlon of the Afghanistan war.
The German caveats have been
The German caveats have been a concern for NATO members for long but where not triggering a discussion in Germany. Now they are a political issue within Germany. The parties who tried to keep the Afghanistan mission out of their election campaign, will have to begin discussing it.
But it's not only the reaction on the ground that was highly faulty, even the political reaction by the Defense Minister can be described as catastrophe. Not only did the Defense Department not issue much information other than a few lousy statements on national TV, but Bundeswehr officials were inhibited from making statements. His reaction could perhaps cost his political career, yet as the Sueddeutsche Zeitung is suggesting, he probably will be spared from being booted b/c of the elections.
elf -- How is the situation
elf -- How is the situation in Syria supposed to explain the psyche of Afghans?
The USA/ISAF forces do not need to convince "Afghan officials", they need to persuade specific subsets of the Pashtun minority that violence is not in their best interest or incumbent on them for other reasons. The *officials* are already on your side, and most of them have been fighting dirty and preying on civilians since long before 2001, and so can be expected to recommend strongarm tactics whatever happens.
So, when deciding whether you want to employ terrorism as a tactic -- because the idea that killing civilians could be a useful method of deterrence is precisely terrorism -- you should probably look for advise from more relevant constituencies than the Afghan warlord/auxiliary echo chamber.
@ Alle, Re: Keynes quote--
@ Alle,
Re: Keynes quote-- thanks. In your case, the answer's no, you don't change your mind.
More cowbell! Cowbell! I got a fever, and the only answer is ... cowbell!
Prussian militarism is a
Prussian militarism is a Polish issue these days.
All I'm saying is that it
All I'm saying is that it would be more interesting to hear from the villages where those tens of killed lived, and see if their inhabitants got any more compliant, than to reflexively take the advice of a provincial official who owes his position to F-15 raids -- and who, speaking of cowbells, reacts to the news by automatically asking for more F-15 raids. But perhaps you've got a handy aphorism for that delusion as well.
oh, and: "They need to
oh, and: "They need to either man up or get the hell out and let some adults take over."
They'd get out in a heartbeat, if ever you asked. From a general European vantage point, Afghanistan is more akin to the kind of distant, pointless, thankless mess that Somalia 1992/93 was for a US audience. They only ever went there, rolling their eyes and sighing, to appease a US gone batshit insane after 9/11, and the home audiences aren't happy at all with it. Like it or not, you need to deal with them accordingly, if you want them to stay on.
Yelling about how their armies aren't fit for imperial duty is not going to do the trick, but if you feel you can dispense with the political (as opposed to military) cover that EU forces provide, just say the magic words. You'll find they've got their bags backed since about 2002.
Fighting a war isn't easy in
Fighting a war isn't easy in Germany nowadays: The responsible prosecutors in Potsdam are already examining wether to open an inquiry against Col. Klein because of homicide.
http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,647205,00.html (in German)
Alle, I agree, it's
Alle,
I agree, it's pointless and bordering on being totally out of touch with reality to harp on the limitations of the German mission in Afghanistan. The same thing applies to criticism of the British military's tactical performance in Iraq.
http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/09/03/ex_petraeus_aide_smacks_...
There may be elements inside the German Army that agree with the CNAS pro-escalation viewpoint in Afghanistan, and these are probably the only Germans that the CNAS pro-COIN think tankers come into contact with, but the German political establishment (not to mention the establishment in virtually every other Euro country), would be extremely happy to leave.
Let's get this straight. They are NOT in Afghanistan because they agree with the CNAS/ COIN stance on what needs to be done but out of some sense of loyalty to the NATO alliance. The bitching at Germany needs to stop. The political cover they provide for a mission that so few outside of the US beleive in, is far more valuable than anything they can bring to the fight tactically.
Andrew: Excellent post and
Andrew:
Excellent post and commentary.
While we do disagree on strategy in Afghanistan you are exactly right that once this mission was conducted the Germans should have had a patrol on the scene asap. For any of us who have done Coin operations this just makes common sense, especially with the idea that comes from the article that the locals actually believed that those killed were insurgents. A QRF on the scene immediately might have been able to capitalize on this sentiment, get ahead of the information curve, and seize it as an opportunity to have gained at least temporarily the tactical initiative.
gian
The local ANP seem eager to
The local ANP seem eager to take on the Taliban. Perhaps sending Kunduz ANP a couple hundred additional police might make a big difference. 2nd Bde, 209th ANA Corp, has 3 combat line battalions for the greater Kunduz area. Another way to deal with Kunduz would be to overstrenght these battalions. 209th ANA Corps based on CM ratings, is probably the 2nd best in Afghanistan (some would argue that 205th ANA is better.) Perhaps the problem is the orders that 209th ANA is getting?
Would German troops super embedding into the ANSF as advisors be more palatable to the German public?
CSTC-A has already indicated the first 52 combat line ANA battalion (not including the 8 planned commando bns); where should the 53rd combat line battalion (kandak) go? To Kunduz (as the 6th bn of 2-209), or to Herat to deal with
Ghulam Yahya--Afghanistan's largest nonPashtu insurgent leader?:
http://sbk.online.wsj.com/article/SB125183668667977283.html?mod=asia_home
My preference would be to focus on overstrenghtening existing ANA bns versus creating new ones. But the question still stands, where should the ANA deploy the large number of new soldiers coming online?
No QRF freedom of movement,
No QRF freedom of movement, four miles from the main provincial airbase? That's remarkable. No capability to achieve a positive ID? The F-15E feed isn't good enough to determine presence or absence of weapons, so presumably all green-blue deconfliction was done through the same single local national humint source, location unknown, as well? Wow, that would have been risky, if true.
But don't hang it all on the German Colonel and his staff, just yet. In any such case there's a real possibility of a SpIns violation by the U.S. aircrew that will have to be investigated, as well. Not saying there'd be any validity to it, just saying they were really the only coalition personnel with eyes-on on this one, so maybe there's still some room on that carpet.
@ on The Carpet...... Shut
@ on The Carpet......
Shut up, refuse to answer any further, and tell them to talk to your attorney. Oh, and inform them your feeling "stressed" and want to see the doctor. And here's my weapon as well, your Holiness. You go show us how it's done according to Humanae Triage...or summa contra CT...or whatever.....
The backstabbing C**ts who lead us, or rather direct us from the TOC (or DC, or Berlin) don't deserve even Budwisier soldaten, the grandsons of "probably the most formidable fighting force the world has seen" . Hell, I think you don't even deserve Ugandans when the first thing you do is launch investigations when someone gets killed in war.
Lions, led by jackasses.
Read and learn, trigger pullers. They will sell you out faster than Enron pimped their CFO.
@Alle - compliance by any means is acceptable. Mind you, my instincts would be to send a patrol. Think you'll find force protection and casualty avoidance were at work. Gets much more dangerous when you leave the wire. For the pols especially, of course they have so much more to risk.
Question for everyone; any
Question for everyone; any idea on how the air strike is playing with Afghans nationally? Among Pashtu in the South and East? The air strike seems to be playing well among Kunduz locals, but that matters less than how it is playing among Afghans nationally. How are Tajiks, Uzbechs, Turkmen and Hazara Shia viewing the air strikes? Perhaps some people on the ground in Afghanistan could provide their observations (Shannon, looking at you ;-) )
Isn't it strange that all
Isn't it strange that all these white people understand Afghan psychology so much better than Ahmadullah Wardak? Considering, um, that their advice is the opposite of his. Surely Exum and Wardak can't *both* be right.
I mean, every single one of them. You'd expect at least one or two Yale PhDs or Marine colonels to be as ignorant and stupid as some mountain-wog from the Hindu Kush, whose only qualification for expounding on the subject of Afghanistan is that he has lived there all his life, achieving no post higher than "chairman of the provincial council." But no. The entire international community has sagely evaded the medieval, eye-for-an-eye cycle-of-violence thinking in which poor Mr. Wardak is trapped. This, of course, is why it has been so successful in Afghanistan.
BTW, I am not Mark Moyar. However, great minds, etc. Colonialism is obviously coming back into fashion.
Every Afghan I spoken to WRT
Every Afghan I spoken to WRT the deaths of fuel pilferers has said good riddance. All think civilians who in cahoots with the insurgents or give them shelter deserve what they get. They are very critical of any NATO action that harms an "innocent person" and at the same time want the security forces to deal harshly with the insurgents and criminals. No surprises there. It's a tricky business killing only the enemy in a sea of civilians. Perhaps NATO should rethink it's use of air power at night in addition to near built up areas. And of course it should invest in some high quality infantry with a high proportion of snipers and without the current nonsensical Bundeswehr caveats.
Keep in mind, we're not
Keep in mind, we're not going to kill our way out of this. blowing those tankers was a terrible mistake, even though a number of insurgents were killed.
Actually, Im not sure that
Actually, Im not sure that this was a great deal, since the folks killed were busy *doing an act of theft*. To an average Afghan, I would suspect that removes them from the usual protection of the religious whole and puts them in the category of "haram".
yes fnord, but not to the
yes fnord, but not to the huns.
they are victims of neo colonialism
also, so grisly, can't play well.
diablo: Its a political
diablo: Its a political issue over there, you know. For understandable reasons, the agressive use of military force is by many germans seen as treason when employed in anything but self-defense. You may disagree, but from a german radical perspective the whole Afghan op is a abomination, and germany should never have gotten involved. I think its a steady 70% who wants to pull out NOW. Today. Asap. So, as has been mentioned here before, perhaps their capacity is better used elsewhere...?
Oh, for those of you who decry all euro-wimps, meet gunner Tone Gunnes, who took out 25 Talebs outside Ghowrmach. In Norwegian, but nice pics: http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/article3252398.ece
AM, why should General
AM, why should General McChrystal be frustrated with the Germans? They have specific limitations and are now being asked to operate outside of them. If we could air-lift a frigate to some hillock would you then blame the crew for not being prepared to conduct mobile armor missions? To abandon reality for maps scribbled on walls of ivory is to hang with this fellow:
I know our mythic history, King Arthur’s and Sir Caradoc’s;
I answer hard acrostics, I’ve a pretty taste for paradox,
I quote in elegiacs all the crimes of Heliogabalus,
In conics I can floor peculiarities parabolous;
I can tell undoubted Raphaels from Gerard Dows and Zoffanies,
I know the croaking chorus from the Frogs of Aristophanes!
Then I can hum a fugue of which I’ve heard the music’s din afore,
And whistle all the airs from that infernal nonsense Pinafore.
fnord: Can u translate the
fnord: Can u translate the captions, at least, sometime, for all these interesting norwegian links you link.....????
@Fnord, Tone is a girl?!
@Fnord,
Tone is a girl?! Can't tell from the caption, but it looks like it.....
So there, all you male chauvanist Amiriki types!!
Stand by for "boresighting", etc jokes :D
Yes, I understand the issue
Yes, I understand the issue there Fnord. I meant of all the ways the Germans could mess up, burning civilians in petrol has got to be the worst, PR wise.
I actually respect their position. One has to atone somehow.
"Read and learn, trigger
"Read and learn, trigger pullers. They will sell you out faster than Enron pimped their CFO"
As a CT student I am lucky to have some friends who serve/serve as SOF trigger pullers for the Australian Defense Force.In discussions over the weekend the main tonic was the investigate first SOP. Fiar enough mistakes happen and they need to be investigated, but if you fear the internal investigation more than the firefight what hope do we have.
Certainly hearts and minds need to be won, and we cannot and will not kill our way out, but lets face facts, some guys are going to have to go down on this one, and in order for that to happen some body, American, Brit, Australian, maybe be even German is going to pull the trigger.
As to the tactics of the whole debacle. If you are on the ground, get involved, patrol, I'm no grunt, but Christ even I know that you need visibility outside the fort.
Georg klein and bundeswehr
Georg klein and bundeswehr carpet.. Amazing :)
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